by Yoel Guzansky
Qatar’s readiness to use its immense economic
power for political purposes, coupled with the weakness of several regional actors
in the wake of the “Arab Spring,” has put the emirate’s foreign policy in the
spotlight. Indeed, Qatar became a key country in the Middle East in recent
years, wielding significant influence far beyond its borders. All this is
likely to change. While American defense support has given Qatar a sense of
security and empowered its diplomatic activism (Qatar is host to both the US
Central Command Forward Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Center,
America’s largest air force base in the Middle East), the emirate’s power is not
unlimited. Many are unhappy with Qatar’s “adventurous” foreign policy and regional
activism, not to mention its opportunism.
Image Bank / Getty Images
Several internal and external developments are
likely to have a negative impact on Qatar’s standing. Last June, in an unusual step,
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani
handed the leadership over to his 33 year-old son, Prince Tamim, who
thereby
became the youngest head of state in the Arab world. There are
indications that
the new emir will seek to gradually focus more on internal affairs and
development projects in preparation for the 2022 football World Cup at
the expense of the extravagant foreign policy of the recent past, which
has
aroused criticism at home. Behind closed doors, some in the emirate have
urged
that the immense wealth be used to develop “roads in Doha, not Lebanon.”
In foreign policy,
some of the emirate’s gambles were unsuccessful. Before the outbreak of the
Syrian civil war, Qatar was close to the Syrian regime. Once the civil war began,
however, believing that regime’s days were numbered, the al-Thani family turned
its back on the minority Alawite regime and its allies, Hizbollah and Iran, and
began supporting the opposition. Qatar’s support for the extremists among the
rebels in Syria (as previously in Libya) sparked criticism and damaged Qatar’s
relations with the US, which fears the consequences of strengthening these
factions. Qatar has since reduced its involvement in the crisis and its support
for the rebels in general, while Saudi Arabia, its large neighbor on the west,
has become their principal supporter (for example, Ahmad Jarba, who is close to
Saudi Arabia, recently replaced Mustafa Sabbagh, who is close to Qatar, as president
of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces).
The emirate has
been subject to international criticism, following the exposure of conditions
for foreign workers (mainly Nepalese and Indians) in development work for the
World Cup – 600 foreign workers die each year in the emirate. The possibility
that the World Cup will be rescheduled for the winter because of the difficult
conditions in the summer in the Gulf could also harm Qatar’s prestige, as Doha feels
that the World Cup should take place as planned, on the original dates. On a
different international front, Qatar offered its “good offices” in negotiations
between the US and the Taliban. These negotiations have stalled, due in part to
the closure of the Taliban offices in Doha a few months ago, which has hurt
Qatar’s prestige and its potential ability to assist in such efforts in the
future.
With the rise of
political Islam, Qatar, to the dismay of its Arab Gulf neighbors, tried to ride
the Islamic wave by becoming close to its most prominent representative, the
Egypt of Mohamed Morsi, awarding it some $8 billion in loans and grants. Yet for
many years relations between Qatar and Egypt were strained – Egyptian President
Husni Mubarak once asked “Why should I pay attention to a country with the population
of a small Cairo hotel?” – and the one-year honeymoon between Qatar and Egypt
during the brief Muslim Brotherhood era ended. When Morsi fell, Qatar lost both
a principal ally and considerable influence in Cairo and the region. In an
attempt to resuscitate its relations with Egypt, at least to some extent, Qatar
has tried, so far without success, to portray itself after the military
takeover in Egypt as having always supported the “Egyptian people,” rather than
any particular regime.
The new Egyptian
regime was not impressed by this posture; it froze LNG supply talks with the
emirate, closed down the local branch of al-Jazeera and arrested journalists employed
by the network, rejected Qatar’s request to increase the frequency of flights
between Cairo and Doha, and even in protest returned a $2 billion grant from
Qatar awarded to the previous regime and deposited in Egypt’s central bank – an
indication of the depth of the tension and the strained relations. In late
September 2013 the Egyptian government even issued an arrest warrant against
Sheikh Yusuf Qardawi, an Egyptian theologian living in Qatar who is identified
with the Muslim Brotherhood, on charges of incitement that led to the killing
of Egyptian policemen. Al-Jazeera has lost some of its influence in sizable
parts of the Arab world following its coverage of the events in Egypt, which
reflected a critical attitude toward the military regime.
Qatar had some
influence in Jerusalem, with which it maintained open relations for years – a kind
of de facto normalization. Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in late
2008-early 2009, however, and Qatar’s relations with elements such as Iran and
Hamas (to which the previous emir gave a $400 million check on a
well-publicized visit that “breached” the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip),
caused a break in relations between Qatar and Israel. Qatar was proud of
these relations, which helped distinguish it in the Arab world, and Qatar does
not conceal its willingness to enjoy open relations with Israel, on condition
that “Jerusalem proves that it is serious about the peace process,” a lower
threshold for relations than those stated elsewhere in the Arab world.
As a small country, Qatar must identify
processes and trends and keep ahead of its larger neighbors in order to promote
its particular agenda, which is driven by pure survival interests. It cannot be
ruled out, however, that the small emirate has reached the limits of its power and
is now facing opposition to its regional policies. It will have to adjust its
regional policy, especially toward Egypt, if it wants to retain its influence
in the Arab world. As long as the regime in Egypt is not yet entirely stable,
it will find it difficult to completely dispense with aid from Qatar. If and
when the situation in Egypt stabilizes, however, and there is no change in
relations between Cairo and Doha, the Egyptian military regime will prefer doing
without Muslim Brotherhood-supporting Qatar, and settle for the generous aid readily
offered by Qatar’s oil-rich neighbors: Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.
Until the uprising
in Syria began, Qatar’s foreign policy was all about keeping as many doors open
as possible. Relations were maintained with all elements in the Middle East as
an insurance policy, in part as protection against radical forces in the
region. This demonstration of an independent policy, which was in inverse
proportion to Qatar’s geographic size, resulted from its drive to enhance its
regional importance and protect its vast natural resources. However, the
emirate, home to some 300,000 citizens (in addition to over one million foreign
workers), has exceeded its natural boundaries in acting as a major league
player in recent years. Given its financial power, it will be hard to ignore it
in the long term. Nonetheless, the (temporary?) weakness of political Islam in
the region may prompt Qatar to focus more on domestic affairs, exercise a more
cautious policy, and wait patiently for auspicious political opportunities. Indeed,
Tamim’s first official trip abroad was to Saudi Arabia, possible evidence of
his attempt to ease the tension with Riyadh and perhaps even adopt a more
moderate foreign policy.
Yoel Guzansky
Source: http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=5827
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
No comments:
Post a Comment