by Jonathan Spyer
From an Israeli Point of View, the Plan Appears to Offer Much That Israel Has Sought in Its Prosecution of the War, Though Not Without Cost
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The 20-point plan presented by President Donald Trump this week offers the most realistic chance yet of concluding the war that commenced two years ago with the Hamas attack and massacres of October 7, 2023. North Gaza, March 20, 2024. Shutterstock |
The 20-point plan presented by President Donald Trump this week offers the most realistic chance yet of concluding the war that commenced two years ago with the Hamas attack and massacres of October 7, 2023. From an Israeli point of view, the plan appears to offer much that Israel has sought in its prosecution of the war, though not without cost. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has accepted the proposal, though he is seeking to tighten up aspects of it that relate to the timetable and conditions for Israel’s withdrawal from areas in which the IDF is deployed in Gaza. But will Hamas accept the deal? The Islamist group has been locked in talks for days and considering its red lines, under immense pressure from Qatari and Turkish officials to accept the deal.
The key question is the response of Hamas. Yet in this regard, close perusal of the plan indicates that it is not subject to a Hamas veto.
The key question is the response of Hamas. Yet in this regard, close perusal of the plan indicates that it is not subject to a Hamas veto. Rather, without openly stating it, the plan builds on Israel’s military conquest of 75 percent of Gaza, which it currently holds. This is the most innovative and interesting part of the proposal – it heralds, belatedly, a plan for the establishment of a post-Hamas political authority in all or part of Gaza, which can commence even if Hamas refuses to sign up to the plan.
On the face of it, the plan seems to offer little incentive for Hamas to approve it. If it does, the Palestinian Islamist movement will effectively have committed to the replacement of its rule of Gaza by a coalition of non-Palestinian forces headed by the US President. It would be hard to present such an arrangement as representing victory, or indeed an achievement of any kind. The sum total of the October 7 attacks and the subsequent war would be the loss of Palestinian control of Gaza.
Of course, Hamas could later renege on any commitments, but if the transitional force envisaged by the 20 point plan comes into being and is deployed, it will almost certainly include soldiers from the Arab and Islamic world. Attacking troops of these origins would be no small matter for the Palestinian Islamist group, which is backed by Turkey and Qatar. Failure to do so, though, would lead to the possibility that it would become irrelevant, outflanked by other jihadi organisations that would no doubt be willing to undertake such attacks.
The large-scale release of
Palestinian prisoners, including 250 individuals serving life sentences,
in return for the release of Israeli hostages could credibly be
presented by Hamas as a win, (and is one of the reasons Netanyahu’s
hard-right coalition partners oppose the plan). But in the larger
context of the loss of control of Gaza, it would be difficult to see how
this could be spun as making worthwhile the huge losses of the last two
years.
Adherence to the proposal would mean Hamas ceding its
military infrastructure in Gaza, in accordance with point 13 of the
proposal, according to which “All military, terror, and offensive
infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will
be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of
demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors,
which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an
agreed process of decomissioning.” The wording of this paragraph
suggests the influence of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
reminiscent as it is of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.
No timeline is included with reference to this program, and when the PA might be expected to undertake an executive role in Gaza.
The plan envisages the establishment of control over Gaza by an international body formally headed by President Trump. The plan pays lip service to the notion of eventual “Palestinian self-determination and statehood”, but conditions this on the implementation by the Palestinian Authority of a program of far-reaching “reform”. No timeline is included with reference to this program, and when the PA might be expected to undertake an executive role in Gaza.
So the incentives for Hamas to accede to the Trump proposal might appear somewhat slim. The disincentives, meanwhile, are notable. At the present time, the Gaza Islamists, while beleaguered from a military point of view, can table very considerable diplomatic achievements deriving from their Gaza war effort.
They have, indeed, turned the tiny Gaza area into a kind of non-stop generator of international opprobrium and increasing international isolation for Israel. This furrow appears far from mined out. As a direct result of Hamas’s efforts and the crisis the group generated, in recent weeks four countries – France, the UK, Canada and Australia – have recognised Palestinian statehood. The momentum for Israel’s normalisation with the key countries of the Arab world, which appeared unstoppable in the pre-October 2023 period, has for now been halted. Saudi Arabia, once thought of as the next in line for recruitment to the Abraham Accords, became along with France the main driving force in recent weeks behind the push for recognition of a Palestinian state. Riyadh recently confirmed a defence pact with Pakistan, suggesting the extent to which regional diplomacy has been transformed over the last two years.
Hamas and its allies are committed to a doctrine according to which Israel is to be slowly eroded through constant military and political pressure until it ceases to be a viable state. This doctrine is deeply rooted in a particular interpretation of Islam and the need to return the Jews to a situation of subjugation. The achievement of Jerusalem’s growing isolation might credibly be presented as representing progress in the direction of this still obviously very distant goal. This might well represent an additional disincentive for Hamas to concede to the conditions of the Trump plan. Indeed, arguably, Israel’s growing isolation may have been one of the reasons for Jerusalem’s agreeing to some elements of the plan presumably less attractive to it. These would include the agreement that Israel will eventually withdraw to a perimeter around the edge of the Gaza Strip, and acceding to an amnesty for Hamas members “who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons.”
What this means, in plain English, is that the plan appears set for implementation whether Hamas agrees to it or not.
Hamas’s leaders have made plain that they are indifferent to the physical conditions faced by the population of Gaza. They see this situation as part of the grim necessity of sacrifice which achievement of the strategic goal entails. Given this, it might be considered that Hamas would have an interest in keeping the fight in Gaza going. Should Hamas elect to do so, its remaining militants face the prospect of death in the ruins of Gaza City.
In this regard, it is vital to note that Trump’s 20-point plan includes a provision for what will happen should Hamas decline to sign up. According to point 17 of the plan, “In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF (International Stabilisation Force).”
What this means, in plain English, is that the plan appears set for implementation whether Hamas agrees to it or not.
As a result of its military actions over the last two years, Israel is currently in control of about 75 percent of Gaza. Gaza City and its environs, and the refugee camps in the Deir al-Balah area in the central part of the strip, are the only areas it doesn’t control. If Hamas declines to sign up to the proposal, then it appears that the establishment of both the “Board of Peace” (that is, the new administrative body that will rule Gaza) and the ISF will happen anyway. They will presumably deploy in the areas that Israel has conquered, and humanitarian aid will be streamed in that direction, while Israeli forces continue to reduce the Hamas presence in the remaining parts of Gaza.
At the time of writing, there is no response from the Hamas leadership, despite the organisation having now exceeded the 72-hour deadline set by Trump for release of this hostages, about 20 of whom are still hoped to be alive. If past form serves, Hamas is likely eventually to return a “yes ... but” answer rather than a firm rejection or endorsement. Horse-trading will then continue, against a background of a continuation of the war. But in this regard, article 17 of the plan may well prove the most significant. For the first time since the war began, a plan for postwar Gaza has now been rolled out, with the agreement of the government of Israel. An attempt to implement this plan across most of Gaza appears to be imminent, and not subject to a Hamas veto.
An effort to implement it in at least 75 percent of Gaza appears imminent, regardless of the Islamist group’s response. That is, in outline, postwar Gaza is already here.
The details of this plan have been rejected by Netanyahu’s hard-right coalition partners, but it remains unclear whether their opposition will extend to endangering the governing coalition. Even if it does, the current coalition is likely to enjoy external support from part of the opposition, enabling it to limp along for a while.
Either way, the unveiling of the 20-point Trump plan clearly represents the fruit of much behind-the-scenes work, involving the US and Israeli governments. Details of the plan, and the involvement of Tony Blair, suggest also the involvement of the United Arab Emirates (Blair is closely associated with Abu Dhabi). Hamas’s response will now determine if the war ends, and if the plan will be implemented throughout Gaza. But an effort to implement it in at least 75 percent of Gaza appears imminent, regardless of the Islamist group’s response. That is, in outline, postwar Gaza is already here.
Published originally on October 3, 2025, under the title “Where Israel Rules, Post-War Gaza Is Already Here.”
Jonathan Spyer oversees the Forum’s content and is editor of the Middle East Quarterly. Mr. Spyer, a journalist, reports for Janes Intelligence Review, writes a column for the Jerusalem Post, and is a contributor to the Wall Street Journal and The Australian.
He frequently reports from Syria and Iraq. He has a B.A. from the
London School of Economics, an M.A. from the School of Oriental and
African Studies in London, and a Ph.D. from the London School of
Economics. He is the author of two books: The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (2010) and Days of the Fall: A Reporter’s Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars (2017).
Source: https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/is-the-war-in-gaza-ending
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