by Eric R. Mandel
Hamas’s surprise assault forced Israel to rethink its maritime defense, offering lessons to the US Navy.
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For years, Hamas vessels had blended in with Gaza’s fishing fleet, using the sea as a conduit for weapons smuggling. Arms were dropped offshore and retrieved later or ferried in under the cover of civilian activity. The Navy often tolerated minor incursions into restricted waters, assuming Hamas would not risk escalation. That complacency mirrored Israel’s northern border, where Hezbollah provocations, including even the erection of a tent inside Israeli territory near Har Dov, were largely ignored in the hope of avoiding confrontation.
October 7 shattered those assumptions.
Critical weaknesses
In the aftermath, Israel’s Navy rapidly shifted from complacency to transformation. Containment and deterrence, once deemed sufficient, have been replaced by preemption, layered defense, and operational agility.Prior to October 7, naval strategy focused on routine patrols and protecting offshore gas platforms from Hezbollah threats in the North.
Along Gaza’s coast, radar fences, drone patrols, and surveillance towers now operate alongside missile ships – absent on October 7 – to prevent another infiltration like at Zikim.
Simultaneously, Israeli warships have redeployed to the Red Sea, where Houthi drones and missiles threaten maritime traffic, extending the defensive perimeter in coordination with the US and other nations whose vessels transit the region.
The attack revealed three critical weaknesses that resonate far beyond Israel. First, over-reliance on static defenses created a false sense of security. Second, intelligence was not fully integrated into early warning systems, and local commanders lacked the autonomy to act decisively. Third, naval assets were stretched too thin: On the morning of the assault, only five patrol boats covered Gaza, with no missile ships nearby.
Hamas exploited these gaps with what strategists call a “zero-notice raid” – i.e., a sudden strike by boat, drone, or commandos that forces defenders to react instantly.
Lessons for the US Navy
The US Navy faces similar challenges. In the Red Sea, American forces have been expending costly interceptors against inexpensive Houthi drones and cruise missiles, exposing vulnerabilities in cost efficiency and supply resilience. In the Indo-Pacific, US ports, energy hubs, and forward bases could face swarming attacks that overwhelm traditional defenses. Static systems alone will not suffice.Several lessons stand out for the United States. First, planners must prepare for swarm attacks on ports, LNG terminals, and offshore rigs, recognizing that passive defenses cannot stop them. Second, expensive interceptors should be paired with more affordable options such as electronic warfare, lasers, high-powered microwaves, and other directed-energy weapons to preserve advanced munitions for sophisticated threats.
Third, critical infrastructure and maritime choke points must be treated as strategic assets, defended with layered, mobile systems including unmanned surface vessels. Fourth, long-duration patrols require new approaches to resupply and provide rearmament for forces operating far from home ports, as well as regular crew rotation to prevent fatigue and maintain readiness. And finally, Israel’s preemptive strikes on Houthi launch sites underscore the importance of maritime-to-land strike capabilities to neutralize threats at their source, even hundreds of miles away.
Alliances amplify these efforts. US–Israeli naval exercises such as Intrinsic Defender and Noble Dina focus on counter-drone tactics, interdiction, and tactical integration across the Mediterranean. These drills increasingly involve European partners like Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and France, who share an interest in securing the Eastern Mediterranean as an energy hub. Cooperation with Egypt, though complicated by politics, remains essential for disrupting weapons smuggling into Gaza.
For the United States, these models of trilateral and multilateral coordination provide templates for building flexible, resilient security networks in both the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, enabling the country to confront its primary adversary, China.
Laboratory for innovation
Congress should take note. Israel’s Navy has become a laboratory for innovation, showing how disciplined maintenance and tactical adaptability can extend the life of ships and maximize operational tempo.For a US Navy stretched by global commitments and budget constraints, these lessons matter. Washington cannot afford to ignore how a smaller navy has adapted under fire and made itself more resilient.
The larger point is clear: October 7 proved that maritime surprises are not hypothetical. They can strike without warning, whether in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, or the South China Sea.
Adversaries are learning to exploit vulnerabilities with speed, low-cost weapons, and unconventional tactics. High-speed Iranian boats can swarm and harass US ships in the Persian Gulf, creating sudden, high-stakes threats. Complacency is fatal. Today, credible deterrence requires preemptive, flexible, and fully integrated defenses in partnership with allied nations, such as Israel.
Israel’s transformation from a reactive coastal force to a preemptive, expeditionary navy should serve as a case study for the United States. For American strategists, the message is simple: It is much less expensive and much safer to absorb these lessons now than to learn them under fire. The United States has the advantage of foresight if it chooses to use it.■
Eric R. Mandel is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy aides, and the State Department.
Source: https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-869445
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