by Just the News
In a 6–3 opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court held that IEEPA does not grant the president authority to impose tariffs. The ruling struck down the tariffs at issue in the case.
The U.S. Supreme Court may have struck down President Donald Trump’s tariffs, but the fight is far from finished. While the Court closed one legal door, it left several others wide open – and the president has already signaled that he intends to step through them.
The Court’s Decision
On Friday, the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, a case about whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the president to impose the challenged import tariffs.
In a 6–3 opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court held that IEEPA does not grant the president authority to impose tariffs. The ruling struck down the tariffs at issue in the case.
Importantly, however, the court did not hold that the president lacks tariff authority altogether. Rather, it concluded only that IEEPA is not a valid statutory foundation for such measures. The opinion left intact the president’s ability to rely on other trade statutes enacted by Congress.
The Dissent’s Roadmap
Justice Brett Kavanaugh underscored that limitation in his principal dissent, and in doing so, he sketched a roadmap for future presidential actions.
“Although I firmly disagree with the court's holding today, the decision might not substantially constrain a president's ability to order tariffs going forward,” Kavanaugh wrote. “That is because numerous other federal statutes authorize the President to impose tariffs and might justify most (if not all) of the tariffs issued in this case.”
Kavanaugh pointed specifically to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232); the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 122, 201, and 301); and the Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 338).
In doing so, the dissent read less like a dead end than a legal roadmap.
President Trump Doubles Down
Trump wasted little time responding. In a lengthy Truth Social post, he condemned the ruling as “deeply disappointing,” thanked Justices Kavanaugh, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito for their dissents, and accused members of the majority of acting for political reasons at the expense of American economic interests.
He also announced his next move: “Today I will sign an Order to impose a 10% GLOBAL TARIFF, under Section 122, over and above our normal TARIFFS already being charged, and we are also initiating several Section 301 and other Investigations to protect our Country from unfair Trading practices.”
The message was unmistakable: the court’s ruling will not mark the end of the administration’s tariff strategy.
Alternative Statutory Authorities
Even before the high court ruled, Trump administration officials had publicly identified alternative legal authorities that could sustain new tariffs in the event of an adverse ruling. There are at least three statutory schemes that offer presidents varying degrees of tariff authority.
The Trade Act of 1974
One is the Trade Act of 1974, signed by President Gerald Ford during the Watergate era. Section 122 authorizes tariffs of up to 15% for 150 days in cases involving large trade surpluses with the United States or other balance-of-payments concerns.
Section 201 allows the U.S. president to impose temporary, safeguard tariffs or quotas on imported goods that cause or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry. It requires an investigation by the International Trade Commission to determine if increased imports are a substantial cause of injury, and any actions are meant to facilitate positive industry adjustment.
Section 301 targets unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory foreign trade practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce, enabling tariffs or other remedies.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Another option lies in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, signed into law by President John F. Kennedy.
Section 232 authorizes the president to impose tariffs or other import restrictions if the secretary of Commerce finds that certain imports threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
The statute directs the Commerce Department to consider not only traditional military needs, but also broader economic factors, including the health of domestic industries, employment, government revenues, and the capacity of U.S. producers to meet national defense requirements. Once the Commerce secretary submits a report finding a national security threat, the president has wide discretion to determine the appropriate response.
Trump relied heavily on Section 232 during his first term to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, arguing that foreign overcapacity and dependence on imports undermined U.S. national security.
Those tariffs survived multiple legal challenges, including claims that Section 232 represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In 2020, the Supreme Court declined to review a challenge to these tariffs, allowing them to stand.
The Tariff Act of 1930
A third avenue comes from the Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. This protectionist trade measure was signed into law by President Herbert Hoover in 1930.
Section 338 authorizes the president to impose discriminatory tariffs of up to 50% on imports from any country that discriminates against U.S. commerce. Unlike broader trade statutes aimed at systemic imbalances or national security, Section 338 is explicitly retaliatory. Its focus is not emergency powers or economic injury, but unequal treatment of American goods abroad.
The section is striking for both its breadth and its age. Enacted at the height of protectionist sentiment during the Great Depression, Smoot-Hawley is widely blamed for exacerbating global trade collapse. Yet Section 338 survived the postwar dismantling of high tariffs and remains embedded in the U.S. Code, a reminder of how much unilateral tariff authority Congress once contemplated – and never fully revoked.
Each of the provisions carries its own procedural requirements and political risks, but together they provide the president with a robust menu of options.
The Congressional Option
Another path always remains open: Congress itself. The president could seek explicit legislative authorization for a new tariff regime, either by expanding existing statutes or enacting new trade legislation.
That approach would be slower and politically more challenging. But it would also place tariffs on the firmest possible legal footing.
Not the End of the Tariff Wars
The Supreme Court’s ruling was a setback, but not a defeat. By narrowing one statutory tool while leaving many others untouched, the Court ensured that the battle over tariffs will now shift from the judiciary back to the political branches.
For the president, the question is no longer whether tariffs are possible – but which legal authority, and which political strategy, he will choose next.
Just the News
Source: https://justthenews.com/government/courts-law/john-roberts-leaves-room-trump-prevail
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