by Dr. Kobi Michael
The latest round in the
Gaza Strip brings into stark relief the question of Israel's strategic
interest in this area, as well as the matter of relevant strategic
operations. Israel seems to have found itself in a ritual of violent
bouts separated by shorter-than-expected intervals, which seem to
indicate that the deterrence supposedly supplied by military actions
like Operations Cast Lead or Pillar of Defense is waning.
In absence of any
general understanding of or agreement on the Israeli interest in Gaza,
public frustration could spread, turning into a demand that the
government "do something." Along with political pressure, the government
could find itself backed into a corner, heading toward a large-scale
military operation whose outcome would not necessarily serve the broader
strategic interest.
Israel currently has a
strategic interest in keeping Hamas a ruling factor in Gaza with some
accountability, even if unofficial, while at the same time keeping the
group weakened militarily and under deterrence. The paradox lies in the
duality demanded of Israel's conduct: to keep Hamas functioning as a
governing element while weakened militarily. To achieve this it is
necessary to achieve a balance between taking full advantage of
economic, civilian, and infrastructure-related cooperation so that Hamas
can meet the needs of the local population and win legitimacy in its
eyes, while attacking its military and armament capabilities and
striking at its vital interests. Thus far, Israel appears to have
created this delicate, complex balance, even if the last round was
unusual in its extent and strayed out of bounds of what Israel sees as a
legitimate game.
At the same time, an
Israeli understanding of the Gaza reality, which includes players other
than Hamas, is required. The number of these other players is constantly
growing, and they aspire to destabilize the organization's status. As
far as this goes, Hamas faces a challenge that makes Israel a default
partner. Israel has a distinct interest in weakening Hamas' rival
players because they, or rather their opposition to Hamas, operate
against Israel though rocket terror.
It seems that in the
conflicted reality in which Israel is operating there is no good option.
We are talking about a reality in which Israel is forced to choose
between problematic options and put the least-bad one in place. Calls to
reoccupy the Gaza Strip, eradicate the terror elements, and only later
think about to whom to hand it over, reflect a tendency to ignore the
strategic complexity that characterizes the arena.
Escalation in Gaza and
toppling the Hamas regime there will not serve the diplomatic process
and will present Israel with much more complicated challenges. It is
difficult to imagine the Palestinian Authority or its security forces
retaking control of the Gaza Strip with the IDF calling the shots. There
is also the basic fact that the PA and the Fatah do not have enough
legitimacy or widespread support to operate in the Strip and govern it
with diplomatic reason, with a monopoly on using strength. At this time,
reconnecting the Gaza Strip to the West Bank would mean further
complicating the current reality.
The Israeli challenge
is becoming even more complicated these days, now that Hamas has been
outlawed in Egypt. This has meaning to the group's ability to function
as a ruling factor that can meet the needs of the residents.
But this difficulty
could turn out to be a sort of opportunity -- again, a kind of logical
paradox -- to increase civilian aid to the Gaza Strip, helping Hamas
firm up its hold on Gaza and exert its authority over rebel
organizations. Some might see this kind of gambit as moving away the
idea of disengagement from Gaza, fulfilling the disengagement of 2005,
but we have already said that Israel's choice is not between good and
bad. Israel has been sentenced to improve its ability to operate in a
dialectic reality, to operate in a paradoxical manner, to communicate
this complexity to the public and to increase the intervals between
violent clashes as much as possible.
Dr. Kobi Michael is a researcher and senior lecturer at Ariel University.
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=7825
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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