Thursday, December 25, 2025

Israeli Air Force unveils new rapid-response unit to stop October 7-style ground invasions - Yonah Jeremy Bob

 

by Yonah Jeremy Bob

New arm of the Air Force set up to jump into automatic action if war is declared • More helicopters ready to mow down attackers on border within an hour

 

A military helicopter flies above the Gaza Strip, as seen from the Israeli side of the border, January 8, 2024
A military helicopter flies above the Gaza Strip, as seen from the Israeli side of the border, January 8, 2024
(photo credit: TOMER NEUBERG/FLASH90)

 

The Israeli Air Force on Thursday unveiled its relatively new unit for preventing October 7-style ground invasions of Israel going forward, after it was caught completely unprepared for that role in 2023.

Conceptually, the idea is that helicopters should be deployable, some within several minutes and some within an hour, to mow down and bomb invaders, such that the ground border defenses are not left alone.

The new unit is part of a larger transformation led by Brig.-Gen. Gilad Bar Tal, shifting significant aspects of the Air Force's helicopter units from other tasks to border defense.

This shift also involves increasing the volume of helicopters, drones, and fighter jets which are constantly at ready for border defense and which are more broadly assigned to border defense efforts.

In addition, the number of Air Force platforms which can act within several minutes and the volume of bombs that the Air Force can drop within an hour is much higher than before.

An Israeli combat helicopter shoots flares above the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, December 21, 2023 (credit: CHAIM GOLDBERG/FLASH90)
An Israeli combat helicopter shoots flares above the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, December 21, 2023 (credit: CHAIM GOLDBERG/FLASH90)

Air Force helicopter pilots given more discretion to open fire

Moreover, the rules of engagement for helicopters now give much more discretion to open fire based on each individual pilot's assessment of the threat on the ground than prior to October 7.

Despite all of these proactive changes, the Air Force still is not returning anywhere near the volume of around 100 helicopters it had before the 2013-2014 era when it shut down its cobra helicopters units.

According to the IDF, if not for the October 7 invasion, the Air Force helicopter unit was due to be reduced to around 20.

Because of October 7 and the new approach that helicopters are critical to future border defense, the helicopter units will remain around 50, meaning double what it would have been, but still half of what it was a decade ago.

Some changes to Israeli Air Force protocol began shortly after October 7

Regarding the transformation led by Bar Tal, there are several aspects. Some of the change started soon after October 7, 2023.

The IDF has acknowledged that the Air Force had no plan ready to prevent a mass ground invasion, and would not even be able to fully modify the Air Force's deployments, resources, and assignments over a few months.

However, at this point, the IDF has noted that it has had multiple years working with the land forces in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria to learn how to better defend the borders and how to better work jointly with Israeli ground forces in general.

Next, the Air Force analyzed maps and the specific topography for each potential invasion area, South, North, West Bank. Israel also has borders with Jordan and Egypt.

Each border has its own specific challenges.

An Israeli soldier works on an Israeli F-16 fighter jet in an airbase in southern Israel, March 4, 2024 (credit: REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun)
An Israeli soldier works on an Israeli F-16 fighter jet in an airbase in southern Israel, March 4, 2024 (credit: REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun)
For example, if the Air Forces bombs specific potential invasion routes in the North, it can immediately slow an enemy invasion, whereas the same strategy in the South will not prevent a continued invasion as quickly since the topography is flatter and invaders can more easily continue their invasion even using off-road trajectories.

Also, the Air Force will work differently with Divisions 210 and 91 in the North, based on those divisions' firepower and maneuvering capacities, than it will with Division 143 in Gaza, or Division 877 in the West Bank.

The Air Force has complemented those involved in IDF probes of their unit as well as those non-air-force officials involved in ensuring that the lessons of the disaster will be implemented. These processes have helped the Air Force push through a variety of changes.

As part of the change, the Air Force formally added defending the borders as part of its primary mission, whereas before striking in enemy territory and especially against distant enemies was more of the focus.

In addition, the Air Force drafted directives for the new approach covering a variety of scenarios which had been ignored until October 7.

By this past February, Bar Tal, who also handles other missions related to helicopters, had selected a new commander who has the role on the day of any theoretical invasion to direct the Air Force operational response to land-based threats.

On December 9, the IDF held a  conference about the Air Force's defense of the borders, including all of the relevant ground force brigadier general and colonel ground force commanders.

Part of the process has included building a new target bank oriented around stopping land invasions as opposed to targeting top enemy leaders and new mission parameters.

During October 7, the Air Force attacked many targets in Gaza which were part of its -pre-war target bank, and these attacks did harm Hamas, but did not harm its invasion forces.

In terms of rapid reaction helicopters, there are twice as many ready at all times as pre-October 7, and even more during the day.

Likewise with drones, there are three to four as many available for rapid deployment as pre-war, and there are also a small number of additional fighter jets available for rapid land attacks.

If the helicopters and drones can be used to fire directly on individual invaders, the fighter jets would be used to drop larger bombs on invasion routes to blow up groups of invaders or to deter those invaders from proceeding forward when they see a huge bomb blow up in the exact trajectory where they have been ordered to advance.

Now the number of bombs that the Air Force can drop in the first hour has jumped from around 16 pre-war to around 60.

Next, the Air Force also has large C-130 aircraft available to transport larger numbers of infantry reinforcements to an invaded border at a much more rapid pace.

The IDF is also now training for all of these eventualities regularly in its drills.

Regarding the rules of engagement, as soon as the brigadier general in charge of a particular front announces the country is at war or that their number of attacking forces is larger than the number of defending Israeli forces, the whole entire new arm of the Air Force is set up to jump into automatic action.

In contrast, when Gaza Division commander Brig.-Gen. Avi Rosenfeld announced his front was at war at 6:47 a.m. on October 7, no one, including Rosenfeld understood that his forces were completely overwhelmed.

The IDF Southern Command only understood this around three hours later, severely slowing the response of sending reinforcements, including from the Air Force.

Regarding the Air Force, most units which came to the Gaza border did very little against Hamas because they did not believe they could fire on Hamas inside Israeli territory lest they strike Israeli civilians.

In contrast, the new rules of engagement mean that once the brigadier general front commander has said the enemy has more forces than his own, individual pilots have the authority and duty to fire on invaders within Israeli territory.

There are still dilemmas about what to do if the invaders have already taken hostages.


Yonah Jeremy Bob

Source: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-881382

Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter

No comments:

Post a Comment