by Giorgia Valente
This institutional design may explain why several European governments have stayed out. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have declined to participate. The Vatican has formally refused.
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On February 19, 2026, US President Donald Trump convened the first formal meeting of the Board of Peace in Washington, presenting it as the diplomatic engine for the next phase of the ceasefire and Gaza's reconstruction, even as the initiative faces open skepticism from key European capitals and the Vatican’s refusal to participate.
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The meeting’s headline deliverables were money, membership, and a claim of momentum.
Trump told representatives from 47 nations that the United States would contribute $10 billion, while participating countries had raised an additional $7 billion as an initial “down payment” for Gaza reconstruction, alongside a $2 billion UN contribution for humanitarian assistance and $75 million from FIFA for soccer-related projects.
Yet the financial numbers, while politically significant, remain far below upper-end reconstruction estimates, which have been reported to reach as high as $70 billion.
The initial tranche appears designed to stabilize basic infrastructure, humanitarian systems, and early reconstruction, not to fully rebuild Gaza. The funding, therefore, marks the opening of a multi-phase process rather than its completion.
The meeting unfolded against a parallel escalation track. Trump said he expected to know within 10 days whether a “meaningful deal” with Iran was possible, as the US continued a major regional military buildup. The issues of Gaza and Iran are now unfolding simultaneously, a reality that shapes both diplomatic bandwidth and political risk.
Institutionally, the Board’s identity remains contested, including by legal scholars who view its architecture as atypical.
Enzo Cannizzaro, professor of International Law and European Union Law at Sapienza University of Rome, described the anomaly as structural rather than political.
“On January 16 of this year, with an executive order from President Trump, an international organization was established called the ‘Board of Peace,’" he told The Media Line. "The bizarre thing is that international organizations normally are not made with an executive order that is a unilateral act of a state; they are made with a treaty based on the consent of all the member states."
“As far as I know, a formal treaty still does not exist. There are invitations to about 70 states from President Trump, and some of them accepted. Presumably, by accepting the invitation, these states acquire membership. The statute does not define the status of observer,” he added.
Cannizzaro’s critique goes beyond procedural formalities. He emphasized that the concentration of authority is embedded in the structure itself.
“Since the statute gives absolute powers to President Trump, not to the president of the United States as an institution, but to Trump as a physical person, if he were to lose the presidency, he would remain the absolute dominus of this weird organization, which seems more like a private club than an international organization," Cannizzaro explained.
The implication is significant: the Board, as currently framed, does not resemble a conventional multilateral body built on sovereign equality. Instead, it reflects a centralized executive architecture anchored in Washington.
This institutional design may explain why several European governments have stayed out. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have declined to participate. The Vatican has formally refused.
That refusal was formalized this week by the Holy See’s Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, who stated that the Holy See “will not participate in the Board of Peace because of its particular nature, which is evidently not that of other states,” adding that there were “critical points” that left the Vatican “somewhat perplexed.”
The Vatican’s decision carries symbolic weight. The Holy See has historically positioned itself as a diplomatic mediator in conflict zones. Its refusal signals not merely procedural hesitation but discomfort with the initiative's structure and mandate.
Italy’s decision to attend the Washington meeting has, therefore, sharpened scrutiny within Europe. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni framed Italy’s participation as limited, stating that Rome would attend as an observer due to “constitutional compatibility.”
The Italian constitution permits participation in international organizations only on equal terms with other states, a standard Meloni suggested the Board’s structure may not fully meet.
Cannizzaro highlighted this conceptual gap between observer status and actual authority. “The invitation to our head of government to go as an observer is not in the statute, but in the will of Trump,” he noted.
He then located Italy’s role in access rather than leverage: “Among the observers in the United Nations are the Vatican State and the State of Palestine, and they do not exercise the most important right, namely the right to vote. So, Italy, by joining this Board as observer, does not aim to exercise full membership, but only to maintain a thread of contact with the United States.”
This distinction matters. If Italy were to join an executive layer of the Board, the constitutional question would become even more complex. Can a state participate in the governing structure of an international organization whose authority is not built on treaty-based sovereign parity?
At the same time, another structural tension emerges between legal critique and political endorsement.
Joe Truzman, senior research analyst and editor at the Long War Journal published by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, characterized the Board differently, placing it within a UN-endorsed framework.
“In my view, the Board of Peace is an organization endorsed by the United Nations Security Council to implement the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip," Truzman said. "It brings together countries with the financial resources, political backing, and diplomatic influence necessary to rehabilitate Gaza and help shape its postwar future. In that sense, it functions as a high-level coordination forum.”
That characterization introduces a legal nuance. If the Board operates under a Security Council endorsement, it acquires political legitimacy, but it does not automatically resolve the institutional question raised by Cannizzaro regarding its founding instrument. A Security Council resolution can authorize action; it does not substitute for treaty-based institutional formation.
Truzman cautioned against premature conclusions. “Today marked its first formal meeting, and it is far too early to assess whether the Board of Peace will be able to successfully implement the remaining phases of the plan.”
“I can’t speak about Italy and the mandate," he said, declining to assess Italy’s mandate. "I am not an expert in international law, and I do not want to speak about a subject I am not an expert in.”
That boundary reflects the layered nature of the debate: legal architecture, political viability, and operational feasibility are overlapping but distinct questions.
Operationally, the Board’s promise is concrete. It is meant to translate pledges into access, logistics, and governance sequencing inside Gaza, where key elements of the postwar plan remain unresolved.
Core tests are still pending: Hamas’ full disarmament, IDF withdrawal, the size and management of the reconstruction fund, humanitarian flows, and the creation of an independent National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).
The sequencing problem is central. Reconstruction requires stability. Stability requires administrative control. Administrative control presupposes either disarmament or, at a minimum, the containment of armed factions.
An emerging credibility issue concerns the separation between the technocratic committee and figures connected to Hamas, including Husni al-Mughni, reportedly accused of being Hamas’s "tribal" mouthpiece.
Truzman framed the issue as one of proximity rather than symbolism. “Much depends on the nature and proximity of the individual’s ties. There is a clear distinction between a technocratic committee member whose immediate family includes current or former Hamas operatives and someone from Gaza who may have only had limited or indirect exposure to the organization.”
But the larger dilemma remains unresolved.
“Hamas’ conduct on the ground, coupled with statements from its leadership, suggests the group has no intention of voluntarily relinquishing power in Gaza,” Truzman said.
“It is likely that the Board of Peace has developed a strategy to address this obstacle, though its details have not been made public,” he added.
Truzman continued with a structural warning. “If the Israeli military was unable to compel Hamas to disarm and surrender authority after two years of sustained conflict, it remains unclear what mechanism, absent meaningful consequences, would persuade the group to do so now. This is a fundamental question the Board of Peace has yet to publicly answer,” he noted.
“At the same time, reconstruction presents significant security risks,” Truzman continued.
“The Board of Peace must establish robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that funds and materials designated for civilian rehabilitation are not diverted to Palestinian armed groups.”
Truzman emphasized that effective oversight will be critical to prevent reconstruction efforts from inadvertently contributing to the reconstitution of factions such as Hamas.
On feasibility, he remained cautiously pragmatic. “I believe reconstruction is feasible. Gaza has experienced multiple cycles of conflict and rebuilding. Thus, there should already be an idea of what needs to be done ... Border crossings will be central to this effort, as they are the primary channels for transferring construction equipment and materials. This is where Israel and Egypt play indispensable roles.”
Noting that Egypt has extensive experience supporting reconstruction in Gaza, Tuzman added that its participation in the Board of Peace adds valuable institutional knowledge and operational familiarity.
“What makes this moment different is the unprecedented scale of destruction. While pledged funding has helped ease the initial financial burden, it may not be sufficient to fully rehabilitate Gaza. Additional contributions will likely be required,” he said, commenting on the scale of Gaza’s reconstruction needs.
In Italy, the debate is framed in terms of credibility. Cannizzaro criticized what he sees as an inconsistency between humanitarian assistance and continued arms transfers. “Of course, there have been violations of human rights and of international law in Gaza. Therefore, the Italian state, like all other states, should have refrained from sending weapons. We helped significantly in humanitarian terms, and then we sold weapons to Israel that violate human rights.”
He also warned against politicization. “This issue has become highly politicized because of the historical moment, but we should not jump to quick statements.”
In the shadow of potential conflict with Iran
All of this is unfolding under the shadow of Iran.
Truzman assessed that escalation could slow implementation but not necessarily collapse it. “President Trump appears committed to seeing this process through. While a potential conflict with Iran could slow progress in implementing the second phase of the ceasefire, it is unlikely to derail it entirely. Only a significant escalation that evolves into a broader regional war would raise serious concerns.”
In his view, the United States and the Board of Peace will need to maintain sustained focus on Gaza, not allowing developments related to Iran to divert attention or political capital away from implementing the ceasefire and reconstruction plan.
For now, the Board’s first meeting created the public architecture of a postwar plan: money pledged, selective participation, a Washington-centered governance model, and a declared pathway for reconstruction.
What remains unresolved is institutional identity.
Is the Board a treaty-based international organization? A Security Council-backed coordination forum? A transitional governance authority? Or a politically driven mechanism whose legitimacy disputes may test its operational lifespan before reconstruction fully begins?
That question, more than the pledges announced in Washington, may ultimately determine whether the Board of Peace becomes a functional reconstruction platform or a contested diplomatic experiment in a volatile regional moment.
Giorgia Valente
Source: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-887759
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