by Emil Avdaliani
US world power rests upon its ability to dominate the seas and the world’s commercial and military routes. Any power aspiring to a similar position goes against American geopolitical interests.
US CNO Adm. Jonathan Greenert departs PLAN ship Datong FFG 580 with ship's Commanding Officer Lt. Cmdr. Hao He, US Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Peter D. Lawlor via PacCom
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 961, September 28, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: US
world power rests upon its ability to dominate the seas and the world’s
commercial and military routes. Any power aspiring to a similar
position goes against American geopolitical interests. China’s naval
successes in the past decade or so therefore have far-reaching effects
as the country is gradually becoming more experienced in military
operations in far-flung regions across the globe.
A look at the map of China shows what the country’s geopolitical imperatives have been over the course of centuries.
Perhaps the first goal of all the successive
Chinese dynasties was to gain and maintain control of the heartland –
the Han core, which contains major Chinese rivers and is abundant with
people and productive lands. The next logical goal was maintenance of
influence over the buffer zones that surround the Han core. These
consist of mountainous regions to the west, desert lands to the
northwest, and impregnable forests to the south.
The third major imperative was historically to
protect China’s coastline from foreign powers. However, because this
threat was quite small in the ancient and medieval periods, the country
did not see a need to develop powerful naval capabilities. In an age
when there were no transcontinental trade routes and the only way to
connect with the Middle East and Europe was the famous Silk Road, the
geographical boundaries (mountains, jungles, deserts, and the sea) on
all sides made China essentially a closed country with self-sufficient
economic means. The Yangtze and Yellow rivers, with their surrounding
fertile lands, produced enough to feed large populations in the Han
core.
If China’s insularity was once a geopolitical advantage rather than a constraint, this has not been the case since the late 20th
century. In the age of international trade routes and supply chains,
China has to be open and in many cases must rely upon raw materials
brought from abroad via sea routes. Thence comes China’s fourth
geopolitical imperative: protection of international trade lines and
resource hubs.
This will only be viable through two options:
finding alternative land routes such as One Belt, One Road; or building a
powerful military fleet capable of securing resources and global supply
chains across the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere.
Building a powerful navy will mean collision with
the US, whose global primacy rests upon its domination of sea lanes and
relevant security alliances in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Any
diminution of US sea power will have a direct impact on the world order.
This explains the importance Washington attaches to developments in
foreign powers’ naval capabilities.
It is true that Chinese naval technology is still
substantially behind current US capabilities. The US has 11 aircraft
carriers and the Chinese only one, and that one still lacks an aircraft
wing capable of operating off a carrier deck. However, what is important
here is the trend: China has made significant progress over several
decades and is rapidly developing new destroyers, amphibs, stealth
fighters, and long-range weapons. This could expand its expeditionary
military operations around the globe.
China continues to construct an array of offensive
and defensive capabilities to enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
to gain maritime superiority within the first island chain in the
Asia-Pacific. Those are the islands that run from the Kurils, through
Taiwan, to Borneo, roughly encompassing the Yellow Sea, East China Sea,
and South China Sea.
China’s broad range of anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs) and launch platforms, as well as submarine-launched torpedoes
and naval mines, allow the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to
create an increasingly lethal, multi-access threat against an adversary
approaching Chinese waters and operating areas.
The PLAN continues to develop into a global force.
It is gradually extending its operational reach beyond East Asia and
the Indo-Pacific into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly
long ranges. The PLAN’s latest naval platforms enable combat operations
beyond the reach of China’s land-based defenses.
Furthermore, the PLAN now has a sizable force of
high-capability logistical replenishment ships to support long-distance,
long-duration deployments, including two new ships being built
specifically to support aircraft carrier operations. The expansion of
naval operations beyond China’s immediate region will also facilitate
non-war uses of military force.
The PLAN’s force structure continues to evolve,
incorporating more platforms with the versatility for both offshore and
long-distance power projection. China is engaged in series production of
the LUYANG III-class DDG, the JIANGKAI II-class FFG, and the
JIANGDAO-class FFL. China also launched its first RENHAI-class (Type
055) CG in 2017.
Even on the aircraft carrier level, despite its
numerical inferiority, China continues to learn lessons from operating
its lone carrier, the Liaoning, which is produced in the Ukraine.
China’s first domestically produced aircraft carrier, launched in 2017,
will be commissioned in 2019 (according to various sources, this will be
a multi-carrier force). China’s next generation of carriers will
probably have greater endurance and be capable of launching more varied
types of fixed-wing aircraft than the Liaoning.
PLAN Aviation is also making progress on improving
capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive offshore operations
such as strike, air, and missile defense, strategic mobility, and early
warning and reconnaissance missions.
For the moment, the PLAN’s ability to perform
missions beyond the first island chain is modest. Its ability is
constantly growing, however, as it gains more experience operating in
distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. The US
will remain a dominant force for the coming couple of decades, but
Chinese successes should not be underestimated.
Chinese naval successes, as reflected in the
recent Congressional report, add to growing American fears that China
might become a global competitor in coming decades. From the US
perspective, what the Chinese are doing in Eurasia through its pivotal
One Belt, One Road initiative as well as various moves to influence
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is geopolitically significant. The
Chinese are doing exactly what the Americans oppose – solidifying
one-country rule in Eurasia.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles focused on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/china-naval-strategy/
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