by Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen
The changing strategic circumstances in Syria have given rise to concerns that not only does the continuation of the campaign in its present form not forestall the danger of war, but it actually increases its likelihood
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| Two Israeli Air Force F-15I Ra'am aircraft, photo via Wikipedia |
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,074, January 27, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Moscow’s public demand
that Israel stop its attacks in Syria places Israel’s longstanding air
campaign at a critical juncture despite PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s avowed
determination to sustain it for as long as necessary.
Three primary goals underlie Israel’s longstanding
air campaign in Syria, dubbed the “Campaign Between Wars”: 1)
preventing the buildup of a terrorist front on the Golan Heights; 2)
preventing Tehran’s military entrenchment in Syria; and 3) preventing
the acquisition of long-range precision missiles/rockets by Hezbollah
and other Iranian-propped militias. In a 2015 doctrinal pamphlet
entitled “The IDF’s Strategy,” then-Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot defined
the Campaign Between Wars as designed to “weaken negative factors and
achieve deterrence in order to keep the next war away.”
At present, there is broad consensus in Israel
regarding the essential vitality of the above three goals. Yet the
changing strategic circumstances in Syria have given rise to concerns
that not only does the continuation of the campaign in its present form
not forestall the danger of war, but it actually increases its
likelihood due to the possibility of an uncontrolled escalation.
The clashes along the Syrian-Israeli border in the
three years preceding the June 1967 war may help place the current
confrontation in a broader historical context. Since 1964, the IDF had
been conducting a “Campaign Between Wars” similarly aimed at achieving
three main goals: 1) foiling the diversion of the Jordan River
estuaries; 2) asserting Israel’s sovereignty in the demilitarized zone
along the border; and 3) fighting Syria-originated attacks by the
nascent Fatah terror group. The IDF General Staff, headed at the time by
Lt. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, sought to maximize the operational and
strategic potential of these clashes while being keenly aware of the
possibility of their possible escalation to the point of war. Rabin in
particular believed that Syria’s defeat in a general war would also
solve the problem of Fatah terrorism.
On April 7, 1967, Syrian fire on Israeli farmers
tilling lands in the demilitarized zone expanded into a wider
confrontation, with Israeli PM and Minister of Defense Levi Eshkol
approving the use of air strikes to neutralize the Syrian artillery. In
the ensuing air battle the IAF shot down six Syrian fighter aircraft.
This incident was without doubt a critical
milestone on the road to the 1967 war. Had the “Campaign Between Wars”
been designed expressly to foreclose the danger of war, then the April 7
clashes – for all their tactical achievements – constituted a systemic
failure (though the deterioration to war was by no means a foregone
conclusion). From a different vantage point, however, the “Campaign
Between Wars” might have served the opposite goal: of improving
conditions in case of an outbreak of war.
The same logic may be applied to the current
Israeli campaign in Syria. While it is necessary to have it defined in
precise and clearly articulated terms, manifested in the public domain
by the above-stated three strategic goals, it is equally crucial for the
Israeli leadership to realize that in the changing circumstances, even
if the continuation of the campaign might lead to war, that war must be
prepared for with a view to fundamentally changing the security
situation on Israel’s northern border in its favor.
An earlier version of this article was published in Hebrew in Israel Hayom on January 25, 2019.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/rethinking-israels-syria-campaign/
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