by Dr. James M. Dorsey
With Russia and Iran lacking the financial muscle and the US and Europe refusing to engage with the Assad regime, China is, from Syria’s perspective, a shining knight on a white horse.
Tartus, Syria, image via Wikipedia
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,648, July 17, 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: China looms large as a
potentially key player alongside Russia and Iran in President Bashar
Assad’s post-war Syria. With Russia and Iran lacking the financial
muscle and the US and Europe refusing to engage with the Assad regime,
China is, from Syria’s perspective, a shining knight on a white horse.
Syria could become a key node in China’s infrastructure,
telecommunications, and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—but
it could also drag China closer to the Middle East’s multiple
conflicts.
China’s economic interests in Syria
On the eve of the Syrian Civil War, Muhammad
Jarah’s and Ahmad Bustati’s warehouse in Damascus symbolized China’s
emergence as Syria’s largest supplier of industrial and consumer goods.
The dilapidated warehouse was stocked with everything from Chinese laser
cutting machines to plastic toys for children.
A decade of fighting dashed the two Syrian
entrepreneurs’ hopes. However, things seemed to be looking up for
businessmen like Jarah and Bustati once Syrian president Bashar Assad
gained the upper hand in the war through the assistance of Russia and
Iran. China sees longer-term economic potential in Syria as a regional
node of what the BRI will eventually look like, irrespective of the
coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic consequences.
Syrian officials have sought to drive home China’s
competitive advantages and perceived interest in taking a lead in the
reconstruction of their country. “The Silk Road is not a silk road if it
does not pass through Syria, Iraq, and Iran,” said Buthina Shaaban, Bashar Assad’s media advisor, referring to the BRI.
Chinese access to the Syrian Mediterranean Sea
ports of Tartus and Latakia is an attractive prospect for China’s
multi-billion-dollar infrastructure, telecommunications, and
energy-driven initiative, which seeks to link Eurasia to the People’s
Republic. It would complement Beijing’s footholds in Greece’s Piraeus
and the Israeli harbors of Haifa and Ashdod, and would anchor Syria as a
key point on the ancient Silk Road.
Closely connected to Chinese interest in Syrian
ports is the exploration by China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd (CHEC)
of a possible upgrading of the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon, to
allow it to accommodate larger vessels. Unlike the Syrian ports, Tripoli
would grant China greater freedom of action because it would not have
to share control with Russia. Together with the Syrian ports, Tripoli
would serve as an alternative to passage through the Suez Canal.
Last year, Russia appeared to be anticipating
potential Chinese moves when it negotiated with the Assad government an
extension of its access to military bases including what it describes as
a “logistics support facility of the Russian Navy” in Tartus.
As the agreement has not been made public, it
remains unclear what Russia’s intentions are. However, a modernization
of Tartus for military purposes would guarantee Russia a role in control
of the Eastern Mediterranean. Tartus would have to be upgraded to be
able to accommodate all types of vessels, including aircraft carriers.
In a further move, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered
his foreign and defense ministries in May to reach an agreement with
Syria on an additional expansion of a 2015 accord that governs Russia’s
naval presence in Tartus and allows the Russian Navy to base up to 11
ships in the port for 49 years. Putin wants the life of the agreement to
be extended by an additional 25 years.
“From the coast of Syria, there is an opportunity to control not only the eastern part, but the entire Mediterranean Sea,” said Captain 1st Rank Anatoly Ivanov,
a Moscow-based naval expert. “The United States has in the
Mediterranean Sea not only the ships of its Sixth Fleet, but also an
extensive ship repair base and training centers of the Navy. For Russia,
the Mediterranean Sea is much closer not only geographically, but also
geopolitically. Therefore, to use the opportunity to establish [itself]
more densely in Syria seems to be a reasonable measure.”
Qingdao Haixi Heavy-Duty Machinery Co. has already
sold Tripoli Port two 28-storey container cranes capable of lifting and
transporting more than 700 containers a day, while a container vessel
belonging to China’s state-owned COSCO Shipping Lines docked in Tripoli
in December 2018, inaugurating a new maritime route between China and
the Mediterranean.
Major Chinese construction companies are also
looking at building a railroad to connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon
to Homs and Aleppo in Syria. China has suggested that Tripoli could
become a special economic zone within the BRI and serve as an important
trans-shipment point between the People’s Republic and Europe.
Adding to China’s expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, COSCO acquired in 2015 a 65% stake in Turkey’s Kumport Terminal on
the Ambarli coast of Istanbul. To round off the circle, last year
Egypt’s navy signed an agreement with China’s Hutchinson Ports to build a
terminal in Abu Qir, a port 23 kilometers northeast of Alexandria. Chinese companies already operate Alexandria’s own port as well as that of El Dekheila, 10 kilometers west of the city.
Chinese influence in at least 10 ports in six
countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean—Israel, Greece, Lebanon,
Turkey, Egypt, and Syria—could complicate the US’s and NATO’s ability to
maneuver in the region.
This was one reason why the Trump administration
warned Israel that Chinese involvement in Haifa, where the Chinese have
built their own pier, could jeopardize continued use of the port by the
US Sixth Fleet.
Informing US thinking is China’s Military Strategy white paper,
published in 2015, which emphasizes the “strategic requirement of
offshore waters defense and open seas.” It raises the specter of
Chinese-managed or owned ports in the Eastern Mediterranean serving the
People’s Republic’s economic and commercial, as well as military,
interests.
Chinese sway over multiple ports in the Eastern
Mediterranean could also encourage Turkey to bolster its grip on the
energy-rich waters in violation of international law. Turkish military
support for the internationally recognized Libyan Government of National
Accord produced a maritime agreement between the two entities that
created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean
favoring expansive Turkish claims.
China’s interest in Mediterranean ports is part of
a larger effort to integrate the Middle East into the maritime leg of
the BRI that also includes the Gulf, the Arabian Sea with the Pakistani
port of Gwadar as its focal point, and the Red Sea with the
establishment of the People’s Republic’s first military outpost in
Djibouti.
The integration is further advanced by Chinese
investment in ports and logistics facilities in, among other locations,
Dubai and Oman, as well as industrial parks linked to maritime
infrastructure. China’s moves have been embraced by Gulf States, several
of which have incorporated them in their long-term plans to diversify
and streamline their economies.
Qi Qianjin, China’s ambassador in Damascus,
spelled out China’s interest in Syria when he stressed, in a 2018
statement to the People’s Republic’s state-run news agency Xinhua as
well as in a letter, Beijing’s intent to expand its economic, political,
and military footprint in the country.
“I think it’s about time to focus all efforts on
the development and reconstruction of Syria, and I think China will play
a bigger role in this process by providing more aid to the Syrian
people and the Syrian government,” Qi said during a visit to a hospital
in the Syrian capital.
Chinese donations in recent years of at least $44 million to Syria for humanitarian purposes back up Qi’s statements.
In a letter written in August 2019, the ambassador focused on the development of Syrian railways and seaports. The letter was published a month after Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to lend $20 billion to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Jordan for reconstruction and economic development.
Few doubt that China, even prior to the
coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic fallout, is best
positioned to be a key, if not the key player in the post-war
reconstruction of Syria. That project is estimated to require between
$250 billion and $400 billion in investment.
This is even more the case as other potential
funders, including the US, Europe, Russia, and the Gulf Cooperation
Council states, will either refuse to work with the government of Assad
or be consumed with fighting a domestic and global recession and
substantial loss of revenues in the wake of the pandemic.
Moreover, in opposition to Western states, China
has, on six occasions, backed Russian vetoes at the UN Security Council
that blocked condemnations of the Syrian government and its backers,
Russian and Iran; calls for ceasefires; and sanctioning of alleged war
criminals.
One of China’s comparative advantages in heavily
sanctioned Syria is the experience it has garnered in circumventing US
and UN sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea.
China further benefits from alternative
institutions it has built like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Beijing either controls these
institutions outright or has considerable influence over them.
That has not stopped the US Justice Department
from accusing Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei of operating in
Syria in violation of US sanctions. The department is seeking the
extradition from Canada of Meng Wanzhou, the company’s chief financial
officer and daughter of its founder. Meng was detained in Canada at the
request of the US.
Seemingly oblivious to the risk of being targeted
by the long arm of US justice, some 200 Chinese companies in 2018 and 58
in 2019, active in sectors such as telecommunications, oil and gas, and
transportation, attended the Damascus International Fair where they
discussed deals ranging from car manufacturing to development of mobile
hospitals.
The participation of China National Heavy Duty
Truck Company highlighted China’s interest in the Syrian automotive
sector. Syria could also prove to be a lucrative market for Chinese
military exports. Assad could well see Chinese interest as a way of
loosening Moscow’s and Tehran’s grip on his country despite Russian and
Iranian efforts to reap the benefits of their boots-on-the-ground
support for his government by winning lucrative reconstruction
contracts.
China has so far refrained from responding in any
real way to Syrian urging to kick-start reconstruction of critical
national infrastructure even before remaining rebel strongholds in the
country has been reconquered. It has, however, exploited commercial
opportunity.
The vast majority of Syrian exports go to China,
and Chinese goods are ubiquitous in Syrian markets. Hama, Syria’s most
important industrial region after the collapse of manufacturing in
Aleppo and Damascus as a result of the war, is awash in Chinese-made car
parts as well as machine tools and equipment for the automobile,
motorcycle, and shoe industries.
Multiple delegations of Chinese investors and
businessmen have visited Syria in recent years. In 2018, China hosted
its First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects with some 1,000
Chinese companies in attendance and pledged $2 billion for the
construction of industrial parks.
China’s security concerns from Syria
Assad’s ability to regain control of most of
Syria, with the exception of the rebel-held northern region of Idlib,
not only created economic opportunity but also heightened already
existing Chinese security concerns.
As Syrian government forces rolled back rebel
fighters, China feared their battle-hardened Uyghur and Central Asian
contingent would gravitate toward Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan
from where it would be easier to target China.
The presence of Uyghur fighters in Syria was one
driver for a brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in China’s troubled
northwestern province of Xinjiang. It also persuaded China to step up
border security cooperation with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where
militants of the Uyghur jihadist Turkistan Islamic Party, an
al-Qaeda-affiliated group, allegedly fight alongside the Taliban.
The Uyghur presence in Syria prompted China to
consider sending Chinese troops to join the fight for Idlib in violation
of its foreign and defense policy principles. China ultimately dropped
the idea, which would have amounted to the People’s Republic’s first
military intervention beyond its borders in recent memory.
Repeated unconfirmed media reports have, however,
suggested that China has been sharing intelligence with Syria and has
been sending military advisors for the past four years to help in the
fight against Uyghur militants.
Discussion about an intervention followed a pledge
in 2016 by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei of the People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) to increase military cooperation with the Syrian
government.
Two years later, a Syrian state-controlled newspaper, Al Watan,
cited Mr. Qi, the Chinese ambassador, and China’s military attaché,
Wong Roy Chang, as saying that China wanted to contribute “in some way”
to the Syrian military campaign against the rebels in Idlib.
The PLAN took nine days to deny Chinese interest in getting involved in the fighting, calling the report a “misunderstanding.”
Though it is supportive of efforts to negotiate an
end to the Syrian war, China has studiously avoided taking a leading
role. Its sole initiative to shape the outcome of the conflict was a four-point plan that never gained much traction.
China’s dilemma in Idlib lies partially in
sensitivity to Turkish opposition to an all-out assault on Idlib. Ankara
fears it could spark a renewed refugee exodus and is concerned that
Chinese involvement in an assault could whip up pro-Uyghur sentiments in
Turkey despite growing anti-refugee sentiment in the country.
Turkey has long supported Uyghur rights and has frequently turned a blind eye to Uyghur militants.
An Uyghur dressed in a Turkish military uniform and sporting an automatic weapon, claiming in a video clip posted
on Twitter that he was fighting in the northern Syrian district of
Afrin alongside Turkish-backed rebels, advised Han Chinese residents of
Xinjiang to leave the area. “Listen you dog bastards, do you see this?
We will triumph! We will kill you all. Listen up Chinese civilians, get
out of our East Turkestan. I am warning you. We shall return, and we
will be victorious,” the Uyghur said.
Syria in the wider Chinese Middle East policy
Beyond its reluctance to become embroiled in the
Syrian war, China, despite its consistent backing of the Syrian
government as a secular bulwark against Islamic extremism, feared that
greater involvement in Syria could jeopardize its successful efforts to
remain aloof in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran that has
influenced multiple disputes in the Middle East.
That fear has receded with states in the GCC
ending their longstanding support for anti-Assad rebels and cozying up
to the Syrian leader in an effort to counter Iranian and Turkish
influence.
Chinese aloofness also shielded it from entering
into direct competition with Russia and Iran in the post-war
reconstruction phase. Deepening Chinese-Russian ties in the wake of the
pandemic and perceived greater Iranian dependence on China may allow for
a divvying up of the pie in ways that turn Syria into an important BRI
node.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/syria-reconstruction-china/
Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter
No comments:
Post a Comment