Is Morocco Immune to Upheaval?

by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman

The uprisings that swept across the Middle East and North Africa during 2011 have largely bypassed Morocco. The absence of tumult and the loudly trumpeted package of constitutional reform measures endorsed in a July 2011 national referendum[1] further strengthened Morocco's favorable image in the West as a country that has mixed tradition with modernity and an openness to foreign cultures, and which is both politically stable and steadily evolving toward greater pluralism.

Many hoped that Morocco's King Mohammed VI, here with his wife Princess Lalla Salma, would move toward establishing a Spanish-style constitutional monarchy. Although the ruler has been open to reforms, those undertaken have been put into effect at a leisurely pace. Recent events in other North African states have given him a more urgent impetus to address his country's many problems.

Morocco's success in having thus far dodged upheaval warrants explanation for the country suffers from many of the same underlying ills that have driven the protests elsewhere—corruption, poverty, and unemployment; the overwhelming concentration of wealth in the hands of a small stratum of elite families intertwined with the authorities;[2] the absence of real democracy; and closed horizons for its large, youthful population, suffering from disproportionately high rates of unemployment and underemployment. But Morocco's starting point, in terms of its political institutions and political culture, is different in ways that provide some comparative advantages. Moreover, unlike other Middle East, autocratic regimes during this tumultuous year of popular intifadas,[3] the Moroccan authorities, led by King Mohammed VI, have been sufficiently proactive in their responses to the rumblings from below so as to render them manageable, at least for the time being.

Moroccan Exceptionalism

A closer look at state-society dynamics in Morocco during 2011, against the backdrop of the country's deeper currents, reveals the extent and limits of Moroccan exceptionalism. The country possesses considerable assets: a political and societal center within a distinct geographical core stretching back more than 1,200 years; a ruling dynasty more than 350 years old whose legitimacy is based on claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad; religious homogeneity of 98 percent Sunni Islam; and a particular material and popular culture, modes of religious practice, and linguistic configuration, much of which stems from Morocco's large Berber population (approximately 40 percent of the total) and heritage. Of course, these factors alone cannot be said to provide immunity to social and political upheaval. If anything, Tunisia and Egypt both possess an even greater degree of social and political cohesion, which did not prevent the latest revolutions there.

Is it the legitimacy provided by Morocco's monarchical institution that explains the lack of a massive, popular uprising thus far? To even suggest so would have been ridiculed a generation ago. Morocco in the 1960s and 1970s was wracked by political instability and attempted coups d'état. But by the 1990s, Middle East monarchies began to be viewed in a more favorable light as resilient institutions that often functioned as vital social and political anchors in times of rapid change.[4] Moreover, the last years of Morocco's late King Hassan's 38-year reign (d. 1999) were marked by what he liked to call "homeopathic democracy," namely, measured, incremental steps toward political liberalization. However numbingly slow, it eventually resulted in the ending of some of Morocco's most notorious human rights abuses, an expansion of the space for civil society organizations, and an agreement by opposition political parties to reenter the political game.

Liberal circles hoped that Hassan's son and successor, Mohammed VI, would move toward establishing a Spanish-style constitutional monarchy, à la King Juan Carlos. Although this did not occur, the new king moved quickly to make Morocco a significantly more relaxed place, politically, socially, and culturally by combining economic modernization, political liberalization, expanded social welfare, and a tolerant Islam that employed the tools of reason sanctioned by Islamic law on behalf of the general good. These measures stood in sharp contrast to the political stagnation and retrogression that marked the Tunisian and Egyptian political landscapes and, thus, set the stage for their 2011 revolutions.

Part of Mohammed VI's ruling formula was to allow a certain degree of Islamist political activity. The Party for Justice and Development, an Islamist party that was first brought onto the scene by his father in 1997, was allowed to grow into one of the leading political parties in Morocco's fragmented political system (no party holds more than 14 percent of the seats in parliament, rendering them malleable for co-option into coalition governments dominated by the palace). Another part of the new king's strategy was to balance Islamist and conservative forces by strengthening the country's liberal current. The centerpiece of his approach was the scrapping of the country's long-standing, Islamic-based Personal Status Code in favor of a new family law in 2003-04, which brought women significantly closer to legal equality with men.[5] Liberalizing public life also included the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, an unprecedented act in the region, which enabled public acknowledgment of the abuses committed by his father's minions.[6] In addition, the palace embraced and legitimized the increasingly visible Amazigh (Berber) culture movement as an integral part of the Moroccan fabric.

Real power in the kingdom, however, stayed in the hands of the palace and its affiliate circles while parliament remained emasculated and political parties mainly competed for the patronage the king was willing to bestow. Moreover, the security forces' response to the 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings and subsequent smaller incidents of homegrown terror called the regime's professed commitment to human rights into question as did the incarceration of Sahrawi (Saharan) activists challenging Morocco's control of the Western Sahara.[7] In addition, the country regressed in terms of press freedom and human rights. Finally, by the end of the decade, a new political party, Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), headed by one of the king's close associates, Fouad Ali Himma, appeared on the scene, apparently being groomed for power and thus rendering empty the promise of genuine political liberalization. Alongside this, economic growth failed to reduce the high rate of unemployment while the illiteracy rate remained over 40 percent.[8]

The Challenge…

The events in Tunisia and Egypt at the beginning of 2011 were keenly watched in Morocco. Like-minded Facebook protest groups quickly sprang up among Morocco's Internet-savvy, mostly politically unaffiliated twenty-something generation. Unlike their counterparts to the east, their target was not the "regime," i.e., the monarch, but the corrupt elites who benefited from the existing state of affairs. A more poignant type of emulation came in the form of a number of self-immolations, following the lead of 26-year old Mohamed Bouazizi, whose ultimately fatal act triggered the overthrow of Tunisia's president. At least two of these Moroccans died from their burns. Fadwa Laroui, a poverty-stricken, single mother of two who lost her shantytown home to builders, was unable to acquire government allocated land because as a single mother she was not "the head" of a household. She set herself on fire after repeated complaints to local officials proved useless and recorded her last words on a cell phone camera, which were later uploaded to YouTube. Would her sacrifice, she wondered, inspire people to "take a stand against injustice, corruption, and tyranny?"[9]

By mid-February, the atmosphere became increasingly charged, and the Moroccan protest movement gained a bit more form with the establishment of the "February 20th Movement," a cross-section of young activists running the gamut from previously unaffiliated Facebook users, members of Amazigh associations and various leftist groups, to members of the officially banned but reluctantly tolerated Islamist movement, al-Adl wa'l-Ihsan (Justice and Benevolence). Its inaugural February 20 protests sent tens of thousands of demonstrators into the streets across the country[10] and were followed by smaller, ongoing, weekly protests. The atmosphere on that day was mostly festive as participants called for bringing the country's political and moneyed elite to account: Prime Minister Abba al-Fassi, PAM's Himma, and Mounir Majidi, the king's private secretary, who oversees royal business interests, were particularly targeted with corruption allegations.[11] Amazigh activists, for their part, prominently displayed their movement's flag and advocated full linguistic and cultural recognition within a genuinely democratic state. The most delicate subject, of course, was the king's status; slogans calling for a "parliamentary monarchy" indicated that the protesters sought a clearer, more limited definition of the king's sweeping powers in favor of their elected representatives.

…and Response

While mild compared to upheavals in the rest of the region, the February protests raised the specter of Morocco going down the same road as so many other Arab states and unnerved the authorities. From the beginning, and right through the first half of 2011, the government adopted a multi-pronged strategy: proactive measures designed to appease popular frustration with economic conditions (e.g., increasing state subsidies on basic goods, raising salaries for civil servants, promising government jobs for recent university graduates); proclaiming the right of peaceful protests to go forward while simultaneously working to discredit the protesters; and using occasional police violence to intimidate demonstrators.[12]

Most importantly, though, was Mohammed VI's very public promise of sweeping reforms in an effort to quell the protests. Speaking to the nation on March 9, the king outlined what he called "a package of comprehensive constitutional amendments," centering on the strengthening of the powers of the government and the parliament.[13] Details were to be worked out over the following three months by a blue-ribbon commission headed by 67-year old Abdellatif Mennouni, a constitutional law expert and veteran of Moroccan public affairs, with the changes to be submitted to the public for approval by referendum. In so doing, the palace gained control of the public discourse of reform, enabling it to manage it better and to contain the currents of unrest. Ironically, but not surprisingly, even as the proposed reform package trumpeted the strengthening of political institutions and the implied devolution of some powers by the monarchy, the political parties themselves were, as usual, relegated to secondary status: Their assigned role was essentially to endorse the final text after a brief consultation with the king's advisers and then to offer revisions to the commission's recommendations.

An analysis of the new constitution reveals that while the powers of the prime minister and parliament were somewhat enhanced—the prime minister would henceforth be called the president of the government and chosen from the party that won the greatest number of seats in parliament—preponderant power remained in the hands of the king. While no longer defined as "sacred," he remained the amir al-mu'minin (commander of the faithful), both the religious and political head of the state, the symbol of the nation's unity, guarantor of the state's existence, supreme arbiter between institutions, and personally beyond reproach.

A comparison between the commission's draft text[14] and the final version illustrates the thinking of those who want to transform Morocco into a more genuine constitutional monarchy with liberal democratic underpinnings and the obstacles they face. To be sure, the final version contained specific language emphasizing a commitment to an independent judiciary, the protection of human rights, and the ensuring of equality between women and men. Nonetheless, the commission's draft was considerably more explicit in emphasizing liberal, universal values as underpinnings of the Moroccan state while downplaying the state's Islamic and Arab components.

These initial, more liberal formulations were altered in the final version. For example, clause two of the draft preamble declared Morocco to be a "unitary sovereign state"; the final version[15] replaced "unitary" with "Muslim," and the country's Arab-Islamic heritage was now referred to explicitly. In the same vein, the final version of clause three now included the goal of "deepening the sense of belonging to the Arab-Islamic umma [nation]." Article three of both the draft and final versions declared that Islam is the religion of the state but the draft version included stronger language guaranteeing the protection of religious freedom for all faiths. Clause two of article 25 in the draft constitution that guaranteed the "freedom of conscience" was dropped entirely.

Similarly, with regard to the king's powers and prerogatives, the draft text implied certain limitations that were removed or substantially altered in the final version. For example, the final version added an additional article at the very beginning of the section treating the king's status, which restored the traditional emphasis on his being the religious as well as the political head of the community. As "commander of the faithful," he remained in charge of ensuring respect for Islam and would preside over the Higher Council of Ulema (religious jurists), responsible for all religious rulings (fatwas). The king's explicit right to dismiss government ministers, inserted in previous constitutions but not in the draft text of the new version, was also restored. Overall, the king would continue to be the supreme authority on just about everything of significance: defense, religion, government (he is officially the chairman of the Council of Ministers, with the prime minister filling that role only in his absence), justice (chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council) and security (president of a newly created National Security Council).[16]

Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the new Moroccan constitution was its explicit recognition of Tamazight, the language of the country's Berber-speaking populations, as an official language. Moreover, it required the passage of an "organic law" to translate that status into reality in education and other spheres of public life. It further emphasized that the Amazigh people and culture constituted an integral component of Moroccan identity, which had been forged over the course of history alongside the Arab-Islamic and Saharan-Hassanian components and enriched along the way by African, Andalusian, Hebraic, and Mediterranean currents.[17]

To be sure, some Amazigh activists failed to be excited by the new constitution. The language equalizing the status of Tamazight and Arabic had been more forceful in the commission's draft text. This confirmed their deeply-ingrained cynicism regarding the authorities' true intentions. For these activists, the constitutional upgrade was just the latest in a series of the state's pseudo-embrace of the Amazigh movement in order to co-opt and neutralize it.[18] Nonetheless, from a broader perspective, the institutionalization of Tamazight, along with the explicit recognition of Amazigh identity as central to the Moroccan historical and social fabric, was nothing short of historic. The demand for official recognition has been the central tenet of their movement for decades, ever since its inception.[19] Morocco would become the only North African state, and the only core Arab League member state, in which Arabic was not the sole official language.[20]

An Uncertain Future

Having been disseminated, the adoption of the new constitution was now fast-tracked to adoption via a nationwide referendum on July 1, 2011, just three weeks after its publication. The state mobilized considerable resources in its public campaign for a "Yes" vote and allowed almost no space, physical or in the media, for opponents of the new constitution. Not surprisingly, 98.5 percent of Moroccan voters (73 percent of those eligible) voted "Yes" according to official figures.[21] While these numbers were most likely inflated, they, nonetheless, indicate that the Moroccan authorities had for the time being gained control over the pace and manner of political change.

To conclude the process, nationwide parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for fall 2012, were moved up to November 25, 2011. Voter turnout in the last general election in 2007 had been only 37 percent, indicating a general apathy with the process. Whether or not this year's election will produce more interest remains to be seen. As for the likely results, expectations are widespread that the elections will produce a coalition government led by a member of one of the parties traditionally close to the palace, such as the National Rally of Independents (RNI). Of course, under the new constitution, the RNI would first have to win the most votes in the election, but few observers expect the authorities to abjure traditional practices of influencing the vote-counting.

Despite these apparent moves toward reform, the February 20th Movement sought to reenergize itself with a new round of protests beginning in mid-September. It had, however, clearly lost steam. Internally, divisions between secular activists and the increasingly visible and assertive members of the Islamist al-Adl wa'l-Ihsan were taking their toll, affecting the capacity to mobilize. More generally, Moroccan society, with an eye on the upheavals elsewhere in the region and with the Algerian horrors of the 1990s still fresh in its mind, appeared reluctant to rock the boat too hard. The bombing of a popular café in Marrakesh in mid-April by Islamist terrorists[22] was, for many, a chilling reminder of the consequences of disorder and instability.

Overall, then, Morocco's new constitution reflects the country's dual and often contradictory nature—a hereditary, Islamic-based, absolute monarchy, ruling over a modernizing, multicultural, and politically pluralist social and political order. Mohammed VI has bought more time with his latest measures. But staying ahead of the rising curve of demands for more meaningful reform, which is likely to be based on some of the more potentially innovative language of the new constitution, will demand much skill and wisdom from the country's political elite, beginning with the king himself.

[1] National Public Radio, July 1, 2011; Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), July 7-13, 2011.
[2] Aboubakr Jamai, "Morocco: After the 'Benalization,' the 'Tunisation?'" bitterlemons-international, Jan. 27, 2011.
[3] Intifada (shaking off) is the term widely used in the Arab world for "uprising."
[4] Joseph Kostiner, "Introduction," in idem, ed., Middle Eastern Monarchies (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 1-12; Lisa Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," Political Science Quarterly, no. 1, 1991, pp. 1-25; Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 1-18; Owen H. Kirby, "Want Democracy? Get a King," Middle East Quarterly, Dec. 2000, pp. 3-12.
[5] The Guardian (London), Oct. 12, 2003.
[6] For an account and critique of the process, see Susan Slymovics, The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
[7] See, for example, "Morocco/Western Sahara," Amnesty International, London, accessed Oct. 6, 2011.
[8] See Paul Rivlin, "Morocco's Economy under Mohammed VI," in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine, eds., Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2011).
[9] Rachel Newcomb, "One Moroccan Woman's Fiery Protest," The Huffington Post, Feb. 28, 2011.
[10] BBC News, Feb. 20, 2011.
[11] The Economist (London), Feb. 24, 2011.
[12] Al-Arabiya News (Dubai), May 16, 2011; "A Brave Feb. 20 Young Woman Featuring Selma Maarouf," Moroccans for Change, May 16, 2011.
[13] The New York Times, July 20, 2011.
[14] The text has not been published; the author obtained a copy from a commission member.
[15] For the French-language text of the new constitution, see Sidi Slimane City.com, Morocco, June 19, 2011.
[16] Ali Mrabat, "La nouvelle constitution octroie de nouveaux pouvoirs au roi," Demain online, Oct. 7, 2011.
[17] Jewish Telegraphic Agency (New York), July 6, 2011; Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, D.C., July 6, 2011.
[18] Interviews with various Moroccan Amazigh activists, Rabat, al-Hoceima, Nador, Sept. 2011.
[19] Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Morocco's Berbers and Israel," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2011, pp. 79-85.
[20] Non-Arab Somalia and ethnically-divided Sudan (which has just seen a part of its territory secede), Djibouti, and the Comoros Islands are excluded from the notion of "core" Arab states but are, nevertheless, Arab League members.
[21] Al-Arabiya News, July 2, 2011.
[22] The Guardian, Apr. 28, 2011.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, the Marcia Israel Principal Research Fellow at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University, is author of The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States (University of Texas Press, 2011) and co-editor of Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI (Routledge, 2012).

Source: http://www.meforum.org/3114/morocco-upheaval

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

MK: Prepare for War If Egypt Deploys in Sinai

by Gil Ronen

MK Aryeh Eldad (National Union) warned Sunday that Israel must prepare for the possibility that Egypt will deploy its military in the Sinai peninsula – and respond to that act as a declaration of war.

Eldad, who is a member of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, said Israel "must prepare for the annulment" of the treaty, or its abrogation without a formal annulment.

Israel could face a situation in which "the Sinai will no longer be just a place for storing arms and training, and military forces beyond what was agreed upon in the peace treaty will enter it," he said. "World public opinion should be prepared for the fact that this would be a casus belli," he said.

Eldad added that he does not believe Israel's government will take these steps, but also said that "we cannot afford not to do this" because "otherwise we will find Egyptian divisions hurtling in our direction through Sinai."

US forces deployed in the Sinai provide no protection, he said, because they might be evacuated "by means of a single phone call" as occurred in the case of a UN force stationed in Sinai before the Six Day War.

Gil Ronen

Source: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150147#.TtPxelZvIi5

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Controversy Down Under: Australian Jews Shocked by NIF Speaker

by Arutz Sheva Staff

New Israel Fund (NIF) and its guest speaker former Haaretz Editor David Landau have combined to create communal controversy among Australia's Jewish population over the past two weeks.

A recently formed group Australians For A Secure Israel (AFASI) first raised alam bells when its President - Danny Ginges - wrote to Australia's only dedicated on-line newspaper J-Wire to alert readers to beware of NIF's fundraising appeal which is meant to compete with and denigrate Israel's JNF:

"One of NIF Australia’s goals for 2011/12 is raising funds for The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (NCF), to which Australians are being asked to contribute $22,000. This NIF grantee is following the footsteps of other NIF grantees by taking issue with Israel and its Zionist agenda, specifically lambasting the JNF to multiple UN committees whose goals seem to be the delegitimisation and censure of Israel. One only has to look at the NCF website to see the prominent position given to ‘UN & Reports’. In those reports you will find statements that virulently attack the JNF and its activities being carried out legally in the Negev."

Landau's visit to Australia took place in the same week 650 people had attended a JNFgala fund raising function addressed by former Jerusalem Post Editor David Horowitz. The guests also watched a videotaped message from Israel's President Shimon Peres in which he praised the work of JNF stating:

"You changed the colour of our face. From pink and brown, the colour of the desert, Israel became green, the colour of the garden and became a wonder in the eyes of the whole world and changed this history of our people. You planted trees You built centres of water,. you carried out other enterprises which are unique in our history. You can be proud historically We are the smallest country which reached highest degree of hope and peace. Each of you has a share in this enterprise of overcoming the call of desert and introducing the call of hope. The nature of achievements…a gift for prosperity. Thank you for what you did. Please continue the same way. Penny to penny, person to person, day to day and let’s show both our fathers and our children that the fate of our people and the fate of our country is in their hands. God bless you"

Landau's well publicized views accusing Israel of sliding towards McCarthyism and racism, calling on America to rape Israel and on Israelis to boycott the Knesset didn't prevent the roof body of New South Wales Jewry - the Board of Deputies - hosting Landau at a luncheon. This action turned out to be an embarrassment when Landau addressed an NIF breakfast meeting just two days later to publicly declare something that happened 25 years ago that he had "not even told his wife":

"Landau said that he himself had “never raised a hand against an unarmed handcuffed man…but he had witnessed an event following the advent of the Intifada which had not given him peace to the present day and I have been silent about it until today. He did not go into detail but said he witnessed “an act of bestiality” perpetrated by family men. The situation drew out of “decent honorable people” the worst of them."

Why Landau had remained silent for so long and had not revealed the identities of those alleged to have taken part in this incident to the relevant authorities at the the time was unexplained. Why he chose to break his silence in Australia and not to his wife first remains a mystery.

Landau also praised the NIF Funded organization Breaking the Silence which has been roundly criticised in Israel for receiving funding from overseas governments to pursue its political agenda outside Israel in what many regard as being anti-Zioinist.

He said the present Israeli government was waging war on today’s NGOs and Breaking the Silence is threatened with extinction. Landau said “there is legislation afoot aimed at Breaking the Silence”. He said the group has two sources for funds…the NIF and the British and Dutch governments but the new legislation would block the international funding. This, he added, will impact on the New Israel Fund itself.

Landau said he was bewildered to find the New Israel Fund “under attack” in Sydney and that Breaking the Silence was “vilified and ostracised”. He said that Breaking the Silence are “the conscience of our people”. He said “you are either a person with moral fibre and an ethical code and a Jewish backbone or you’re not”. He said there is no better place to put your investment in a Jewish future"

Landau's defence of Breaking The Silence (BtS) and his allegations of IDF behavior brought forth a spirited reply from Dr Ron Weiser, the Honorary Life president of the State Zionist Council of new South Wales, who wrote:

BtS misrepresents itself as promoting human rights in Israel, but this small group focuses on European and North American audiences, repeating unsupported accusations of war crimes, as quoted in the discredited Goldstone report.

In March this year BtS hosted an exhibit in Sweden. BtS spokesperson Itamar Shaipra stated “We are the oppressors, we are the ones that are violating human rights on a daily basis. We are creating the terror against us, basically”

There is a general pattern with BtS claims, sensational unsupported allegations with names and documentation being extremely vague, headlines that damage Israel and the IDF, followed much later by reality.

Let’s be very clear. Any abuse of power is to be condemned, especially if it involves the deliberate mistreatment of other human beings.

Israel has a long and proud track record in dealing strongly and effectively with any such incidents that have occurred on rare occasions, in complete contravention of Israeli law and policy.

People who claim to have witnessed such incidents abrogate their duty and moral responsibility by not reporting them in a timely manner and to the proper authorities.

Coming to Australia and making unsubstantiated sensationalised claims about supposed incidents that are alleged to have taken place years previously and were never reported, should be treated with the scepticism they deserve.

Executive Council of Australian Jewry president Danny Lamm this week was prompted to enter the controversy saying he was sorry that former Ha’aretz editor-in-chief David Landau had been given an opportunity to speak to Jewish audiences.

“Some of his statements are statements that can be used to delegitimise Israel, for example a boycott of the Knesset and the statements that his 'idea of a wet dream is the rape of Israel',” Lamm said.

“These are obscene comments and this is unacceptable stuff.”

“The ECAJ would not have hosted him." - an oblique reference to Landau's luncheon date with the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies.

“I am sorry that he is here and I’m sorry that he has been given the opportunity to speak to our audiences,” Lamm said.

NSW Board of Deputies President Yair Miller attempted to justify the Board's invitation to Landau by stating:

“The board of deputies is the communal roof body, and as a mature, open-minded organisation it makes available a range of views to its membership,” he said. We expect that our members will engage with and challenge views that they find controversial.

The Landau lunch, which was a private function, conducted under Chatham House rules, had a guest list restricted to elected deputies, and gave our members this opportunity.”

Given this disaster, said an Australian activists, one can possibly anticipate the Board of Deputies inviting Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal as a future luncheon guest.

Most of the criticism posted against Landau and the NIF in the many blog posts appearing on J-Wire was directed at its funding of organizations with anti-Zionist objectives such as Breaking The Silence, the Negev Coexistence Forum and Mossawa. Those posting called on NIF to review its financial support of such organisations.

Arutz Sheva Staff

Source: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150149#.TtPwHVZvIi5

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Who Stole my Revolution?

by Mordechai Kedar

The popular revolution in Egypt that began on the 25th of January, succeeded after three weeks of demonstrations, fatalities and casualties to get rid of President Mubarak before he could pass the country on to his son, and proved to all that the country is not family property but belongs to all the Egyptians. Since Mubarak was removed from power, the citizens of Egypt are asking: "Where is the revolution heading?" And the answers usually swing between two poles: the religious pole, which is represented by the "Muslim Brotherhood" movement and the "Freedom and Justice" party, and on the other hand the secular pole, which is represented by a large number of political organizations and bodies, most of them new.

In February, with Mubarak's departure, the military took control and suspended the constitution for six months, during which time it was supposed to organize parliamentary elections and pass the control to a civilian government. The great majority of Egyptians believed then that the military, which is headed by General Tantawi, would be satisfied with six months of ruling and then would indeed pass the rule to the citizens in an orderly way. Six months were over in August, and another three months have passed, and it is still not certain that elections will be held on November 28.

As stated above, two main trends characterize the members of the next Parliament: The religious-Islamist orientation and the secular-liberal orientation. Each of the sides sees the revolution as belonging to its own side only, and is not interested in elections that in any way might bring to power the representatives of the opposite side. However, the two sides, who oppose each other as far as which trend is desirable for Egypt, both share the opinion that the military must pass power into civilian hands as soon as possible, and that it should be subject to the decisions made at the civilian level. Both sides are apprehensive that the military - despite the declarations of its leaders - intends to continue to hold the reins of power forever, and they are both determined not to allow the group of "young officers" to inherit the power of the "old officers", i.e. Mubarak and the generals who served him.

Both sides of the social equation - secular and religious - are apprehensive concerning outside intervention: The seculars fear a Taliban-style theocracy in which the hands of thieves will be amputated, suspected adulterers will be stoned and that Iran is stirring the political pot by means of the money that it streams to Islamists; and Islamic fanatics are warning against intervention from Western countries that support the seculars, even at the price of military control of the country, in order to secure their obedience.

Many Egyptians fear that General Tantawi is secretly plotting to bring Mubarak's "National Democratic Party" back to power and perhaps even to cause his sons to be exonerated in court so that they can be returned to positions of power in the country; this will enable the control of the military to continue as it has been since the revolution of the Free Officers in 1952. These misgivings are strengthened by the fact that the trial of Mubarak and his sons continues without arriving at a final decision, and because of the constitution that was suggested by the military in which it awards to itself a status above the state. The cruelty and the violence that characterize the army's methods since it took control in February are worse than those used in Mubarak's day. And this also does not contribute to the public's trust in the military or its intentions.

In the huge demonstrations that took place in Tahrir Square at the beginning of last week, signs were waved that called for Tantawi's removal in the same spirit that they had called for the removal of Mubarak. Tantawi appealed to the throngs again and tried to calm them by saying that the military has no intentions to take control of the government, but he has lost much of his credibility in recent months, and the public does not believe the promises of the supreme military council. The economic situation, which continues to deteriorate, adds fat to the fire of public frustration, and the crowds are impatient to see results of the revolution and the realization of the hopes that they hung upon it.

Many in the Arab world are following the events in Egypt with much concern, especially since in Tunisia the Islamic party won forty percent of the Parliament, more than double the largest secular party. The religious in Egypt are encouraged by the success of Islam in Tunisia, while the seculars fear that the religious will control their lives. Both sides speak of "stealing the revolution": The religious are convinced that the revolution must progress in an Islamic direction with the aim of imposing Shari'a upon the country, and if not, then the revolution will have been "stolen" by the secularists. The secularists, on their side, object to the "stealing of the revolution" by the religious, and aspire to see a modern, open and liberal country. And neither side is willing to have the military steal the revolution from them, to continue "Mubarak's Government" under a different name.

Thus, the misgivings engulfing all the Egyptians today were the main factor in the outbreak of demonstrations in recent days, which were met with a violent and harsh response by the military and the police. The number of fatalities in this round is close to fifty, the number of wounded reaches as high as one thousand five hundred, and the government of Egypt resigned or rather was forced to resign, in order to calm the masses, to send them back to their houses and to continue in the preparations for the elections on the 28th of the month with the hope that indeed it will pass uneventfully. However there is an atmosphere of severe disquiet, and no one is ready to gamble on the elections being held on time.

Egyptian and Arab newspapers reflect the misgivings deep in the hearts of the Egyptians and members of the Arab world today, and we will bring here some reports of these misgivings.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is calling for elections to be held at their appointed time, since they are organized and ready. They have been organizing for years by means of organizations of civil society that have helped the poor residents to overcome the difficulties of everyday life, and so they succeeded within a short time to set up a system of well-oiled and organized groups, to prepare election propaganda, to set up popular candidates, and they are well prepared to bring people to the polls and supervise the conduct of elections. In the aftermath of the elections in Tunisia, the removal of the dictator in Libya and the expected departure of the Americans from Iraq, "The Brotherhood" are very much encouraged. They call for fair and transparent elections, in order to prevent manipulation by those who oppose them - the military and the secularists - as it was during Mubarak's time. They also call for all of the other bodies to honor the results of the elections, whatever they may be, and this call apparently stems from their confidence that they will win the highest number of the seats in the Peoples' Council, and perhaps even a clear majority, that will enable them to rule without the participation of other groups. Fair and transparent elections will also ensure that the secularists will not appeal the results of the elections.

In accordance with a modern approach, the "Brotherhood" call for the public to vote "according to the qualifications and not the connections"; to ignore family connections and to vote for the one who is most suitable. In their eyes, fair elections are a direct continuation of the revolution, because that's what the people want. The "Brotherhood" strongly object to the intention of the high military council to enable the people who are identified with the Mubarak regime to run in the elections. It cannot be - say the "Brothers" in their official document - that people from Mubarak's party, which the court disbanded and who are sunk deep into economic, ethical and political corruption, will try to again pounce on the parliamentary seats.

The results of the elections in Tunisia, in which the Islamic party won the lion's share of the seats in Parliament, mirrors the Islamic political approach in Egypt as formulated by the Brotherhood (in parenthesis, my clarifications. M.K.): "The Tunisian people, who suffered from attacks of Western attempts to erase the Islamic identity and intentions to impose secularism upon it by oppression and terror, remains true to its Islamic identity which is faith, civilization and culture; and signs of secularization that have been imposed upon it are nothing but fetters on its hands and his brain, which he removes at the first opportunity that is given him to express his opinion freely. The Tunisian Islamic movement, whose members were sent to prison and exiled for the 22 past years, returned to life after the revolution, and its leaders were surprised to discover that the Muslim Tunisian people still support them. And their young party, which was founded a few months before the elections, won the largest portion of the votes despite the short period of time until elections. It didn't demand to postpone elections claiming that it still wasn't organized, which is not what is happening with us in Egypt, where (secular) parties demand a postponement because they are not yet ready. The results of the elections in Tunisia prove that the Arab and Islamic people never give up Islam, which is their faith, their life, and is imprinted in their genes. Everyone - both in Egypt and outside of it - must internalize this fact, honor the desire of these peoples and let them live according to their Shari'a, according to their values and (Islamic) heritage. They can, with the help of Allah, show the world an example of a complete, balanced and humane civilization, that connects spirit and intelligence and brings man happiness in this world and the next. People of the West must stop spreading their aggressive slogans that stem from a battle between cultures, and adopt the slogan of cooperation between cultures.

We were gladdened by the declaration of our brothers in Libya about the complete liberation of their land, after the elimination of the criminal and dictatorial regime and the resignation of the heads of the regime and its "tails" While we congratulate them on this achievement, we must remind them that the future is difficult, great and important, and is expressed in patriotic unity, peacemaking between the tribes, cities and groups, with the establishment of institutions of the country, in the writing of a modern constitution, removal of the remnants of the destruction, and building the future on all levels while keeping the interest general, not individual, love between people, honoring the Islamic and democratic principles, focusing on independence (from NATO), guarding the national treasures, and using them for the good of all the members of Libyan society. Also, we call on our brothers in Libya to learn from the experience and not to allow a despotic dictator, whoever he is, to take control of their lives and to repress their will, even at a high price. They must take good care of their wounded brothers (from the war against Qadhaffi) and the families of the fallen for whom we pray that Allah will accept them in his mercy and will settle them into Paradise with the righteous and the prophets.

On the International Level: The American President, Barack Obama, announced the end of the war in Iraq and the withdrawal of American forces from this country at the end of the current year. This decision followed a long debate and tedious negotiations whose purpose was to leave an American presence in Iraq forever, in light of the profound changes occurring in the Arab countries. The "Muslim Brotherhood" believe that the decision to withdraw, even if it was too late, reflects two truths: one - wars don't solve problems between countries (hint to Iran) or between cultures, and the decision to withdraw expresses the failure of the idea of a battle of cultures and waging war as a way of settling disputes and conflicts. The second - since the disputes exist as an existential feature that Allah has implanted within man, the countries and governments must establish a just system (not the UN, which is controlled by the West) that will manage the relationships between them without bias towards one side (the West) at the expense of the other (Iran and the Arab and Islamic countries). The future must be based on mutual respect and understanding in those issues and interests that relate to peace, security and economic matters.

The material above is in the document that the "Muslim Brotherhood" published a few days ago. The absence of any reference to Israel and to the peace treaty with Israel is obvious, for several possible reasons: a. the results of the elections in Egypt are still not known and perhaps the Brotherhood will not have a majority in Parliament that will enable them to revoke recognition of Israel and the peace with her. b. the "Brotherhood" know that the revocation of the peace treaty with Israel will arouse severe misgivings in the world regarding the stability of Egypt, and these misgivings may deter investors from investing in the Egyptian economy. Following the revolution, foreign investments have almost totally disappeared in Egypt, and if the "Brotherhood" want to restore the paralyzed Egyptian economy back to action, they must prevent upsetting the stability with Israel. The unemployment in Egypt as of now stands at almost fifty (!) percent, and the "Brotherhood" know that if they will be in the driver's seat, the Egyptian people will see them very quickly as responsible for the terrible economic situation, or at least as responsible for its continuation, even if not for its creation. So they are aware that they must get the economy going right after the election, and revocation of the peace treaty doesn't contribute to the success of this objective.

The Secular Approach

On the other hand, secular parties are concerned that Islamic radicals, even the "soft" ones among them, like "The Muslim Brotherhood" will take over Egypt and will impose upon her the rule of religious law. Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the most prominent spokesman for political Islamism is accused by Egyptian secularists of pulling the country towards application of Shari'a, in which ten million Copts will lose their rights, and women will be obligated to stay in the home because "The best hijab for a woman is her house" (a saying of the Prophet Mohammed), and in the next phase they will cut off the hands of thieves and stone adulterers. The examples of Islamic rule for the secularists are the Taliban in Afganistan and the Ayatollahs in Iran. They don't want to live in any version of political Islam, and their feeling is "now or never": If they fail at this time to put into place a democratic and secular government, "civilian", as they call it, they will be forced to emigrate from Egypt as millions of Copts have done until now, because of the Islamism that has been taking over the Egyptian street for the past few decades.

One of the prominent spokesmen for the Arab secular approach is Dr. Shaker Al-Nabulsi, past president of the Association of the Neo - liberal Arabs. He is originally a Palestinian from Jordan, but he is widely known throughout the Arab media. Relating to the recent events in Egypt, he writes under the title: "Indeed, do not vote for the secular Egyptians! This is the call by "our lord" Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi to Egypt, and before then there were words both more and less clear of the leaders of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and their new party, the Freedom and Justice Party, not to vote for secular candidates in the elections for the Peoples' Council. (In order to buy the votes of the electors) the "Muslim Brotherhood" movement acquired tens of thousands of sheep in order to distribute them for free to the voters who would not be able even to dream about meat. The Islamist newspaper Al-Shuruk" ("The Sunrise") which spreads the religious and political legacy of the "Brothers", wrote that there are posters on the walls of the mosques in the colleges of Cairo which are spreading the ideas hostile to a civil state (not religious) and describe secularism as a call to apostasy and permissiveness. The posters call for the establishment of an Islamic country, not a civil one, because a civil country would be anti-religious and heretical. Another poster describes secularism as denying the monotheistic religions, as a call to take interest in this world at the expense of the next world and elimination of religion from every sphere of life. One poster demanded to turn Egypt into an Islamic country and to reject decisively the possibility that it can be a civil country, according to one of the Salafi (fundamentalist) spokesmen in Alexandria, Sheikh Yassir Barhami.

So there is nothing new in the call of "our lord" Sheikh Qaradawi's, which is an old demand of the Salafi groups in religious, lower class Egypt. This class of Egyptians strongly resents modernity, secularism and democracy, and so it is poor, illiterate, living in cemeteries, under bridges and in many unplanned neighborhoods (without water, sewage, electricity, education and civilian infrastructure). We have heard, read and seen, how the new Salafi parties in Egypt see any secular candidate who might be elected as an apostate who will go straight to Hell, and so we have returned to the Middle Ages. Before us today stands the choice between the perpetuation of the present dictatorial system and the clouded future which is engulfing the Arab countries in revolution, crowned with Islamist promises decorated with flowers and birds (of Paradise). At this point the parties of the secular opposition are weak, ridiculous and poor, while their Islamist competitors are strong, thanks to the societal mechanisms that they have established in order to serve the poor voters. They distributed free food to the poor, sheep to sacrifice for the Holiday of the Sacrifice (about one month ago), and supplied services to the populace which the country has failed to provide, so that they would be able to tell the voters: "We will establish a good welfare state." Lately, the Islamist parties have found themselves at the front of the revolution, because of their intention to take control of the regime, since in the past they had been excluded from it and were not recognized as legal. They suffered isolation, imprisonment and torture at the hands of the dictators, and despite everything they remain faithful to a certain extent to the existing political order within which framework they acted, usually in the opposition, in order to gain popularity at the expense of that political order. Today they are seeking the votes of the poor and ignorant voters who are clamoring to enter Paradise in heaven, when the time comes, since they did not have Paradise on Earth during their lives.

The Islamists fear the sort of undreamed-of and crushing political victory that happened in Tunisia because they don't know what to do with the government and administration because of their ignorance in practical politics. If they indeed will win a majority in Egypt as well, this will be very helpful to the secularists, and then the failure of the extremist Islamist message will become clear. The leader of the Tunisian Islamic movement, Rashed al-Ghanoshi, distances himself very much from the extremist message, and assigned the leader of the secular parties, Muntsaf al-Marzooki, the job of president of the country so that he would burn in the fire of the internal mess and chaos of Tunisia. The "Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt are more aware and cautious, so they announced at the beginning of the revolution in Egypt that they will not take over the government, since they know well what it would mean to take responsibility for a country like Egypt... Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's call not to vote for secular candidates and to give the vote to Islamist candidates will surely cause the Islamists to burn. Therefore not voting for secularists is the best way to serve modernity and secularism in Egypt and in the Arab world, and we will yet see Qaradawi crowned as a prophet of innovation and modern Arab secularism".

These are the sarcastic words of Shaker al-Nabulsi.

Egypt is entering a very dangerous crossroads these days: Will she choose the road to the kind of modern, forward-looking country which is required in the twenty first century, or perhaps she will turn to face backwards, to the tradition that was established a thousand and four hundred years ago in the arid desert of the Hijaz.

Dr. Mordechai Kedar is an Israeli scholar of Arabic literature and a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University. He served for twenty-five years in IDF Military Intelligence, where he specialized in Islamic groups, the political discourse of Arab countries, the Arabic press and mass media, and the Syrian domestic arena.

Source: The article is published in the framework of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan University, Israel. It was also published in Makor Rishon, a Hebrew weekly newspaper. Translated by Sally.

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Mainstream Media Turn Blind Eye to Dark Side of Tahrir Square

by Leo Rennert

At the beginning, most mainstream media turned into cheerleaders for the Arab Spring revolutions to topple secular dictatorships like Hosni Mubarak's regime in Egypt. Once Mubarak was gone, the story line went, democracy and respect for human rights would flourish. It didn't quite happen that way. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged instead as a potent replacement force.

More recently, thousands again demonstrated in Cairo's Tahrir Square, staging a second revolution - this time to get rid of military rule. Once the military are ousted, the new story line goes, political parties of varying stripes could take over and usher in a new era of parliamentary democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood is generally portrayed as just another political party. We are assured that it isn't a homogeneous, fanatical Islamist movement. Instead, it's supposedly comprised of many political shades and needn't be feared in any potential governing coalition, even if it were to become the dominant player.

As in past years, when newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Post bent over backwards to portray Hamas and Hez'ballah in the kindest possible light and sanitized them of any semblance of terrorist fantaticism, now it's the turn of the Muslim Brother to get this kind of media whitewash.

So, it should come as no surprise that when the Muslim Brotherhood staged a rally this week in the most prominent Cairo Mosque and thousands of its followers chorused to "kill all the Jews" and volunteered for "jihad" to liberate all of Palestine - i.e. exterminate the Jewish state - most mainstream media, whether leading newspapers or the evening TV network news, generally gave this event a pass. Never mind that it revealed an ominous side of the Muslim Brotherhood's real agenda and cast a dark cloud over Egypt's adherence to its 1979 peace treaty with Israel. It just didn't fit the more favorable perception of the Muslim Brotherhood peddled by mainstream media.

The same inattentiveness by prominent media outlets left largely unreported two more sexual assaults of female journalists covering the tumult in Tahrir Square and other Egyptian hot spots. Never mind that Caroline Sinz, a journalist for the TV France 3 network, and Mona Al-Taditawy, an Egyptian-American reporter, told harrowing tales of multiple sexual assaults amid the latest revolutionary upheavals against Egypt's military rulers. Never mind that Reporters Without Borders, an international journalism group, issued an advisory to media editors and publishers not to send female journalists anywhere near Tahrir Square, making it clear that last February's rape of CBS News reporter Lara Logan was not an isolated threat. With their fixation and preference for an end to military rule, mainstream media largely ignored the not-so-happy fate that may await women under a new set of rulers for Egypt.

It's not as if there has been a total media blackout of the recurrence of sexual assaults in revolutionary Egypt or the Muslim Brotherhood's undisguised animus against Jews. UPI and AP filed some dispatches. So did CNN and Politico. But the Saturday, Nov.26 edition of the Washington Post kept these incidents from its subscribers - as did other prominent media that usually pride themselves of being ahead of the curve and serve as models for the rest of the media pack.

Leo Rennert is a former White House correspondent and Washington bureau chief of McClatchy Newspapers.

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/11/mainstream_media_turn_blind_eye_to_dark_side_of_tahrir_square.html

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No Road Leads to Peace between Israel and the Palestinians

by Neil Snyder

There are many reasons why a Palestinian state of any sort cannot work. Chief among them is that Palestinians lack the prerequisites for a nation: common purpose; the desire to live in peace so the nation's citizens could carry on normal lives and build for a better future; concern about the well-being of their children and posterity; and a commitment to law and order and to building an economic infrastructure capable of supporting a thriving economy. These are the basics that any nation must have, and all of them are missing.

Common purpose

Only one thing unites the people we call "Palestinians" today -- the desire to annihilate Israel. If you read the Palestinian and Hamas charters, you can't help but notice that the central tenet in both of them is the animus the Palestinian people have for Israel. The elimination of Israel is the overarching theme in both charters, and the creation of a Pan-Arab nation comes in second. Neither of these guiding principles bodes well for peace with Israel or for building a prosperous Palestinian state.

The desire to live in peace so the nation's citizens can carry on normal lives and build for a better future.

Judging by what the Palestinians say they want to achieve, peace with Israel is totally out of the question. In fact, based on what they say, war is inevitable. Both charters call upon Palestinians to dedicate their lives and their wealth to destroying Israel. The Western concept of a "normal life" isn't even hinted at, and a better future by their definition is nothing more than a Middle East with no Israel. If you take them at their word, and there is no reason not to, they have no other vision for a brighter future.

Concern about the well-being of their children and posterity

Palestinians raise their children to become martyrs -- walking bombs that they can explode among crowds of innocent Israelis. That's not what I say -- it's what they say, and it's spelled out clearly in their charters as though it's the only reason Palestinians have children. That's a version of love for children and posterity that Western minds can't fathom, and it's certainly not conducive to building a prosperous and peaceful nation.

A commitment to law and order

The Palestinian government, be it Hamas or Fatah, is notorious for corruption and the whims of despotic rulers. The rule of law isn't even part of their vocabulary. Peaceful and prosperous nations that survive over the long-term must have law and order, and there is no evidence that Palestinians want either.

Building an economic infrastructure capable of supporting a thriving economy

The economic model in place today in the Palestinian community is one of providing labor for a bustling Israeli economy and seeking donations from useful idiots around the world who support the Palestinian cause, which is to destroy Israel. These two economic characteristics are antithetical to building a flourishing national economy. By definition, Palestinians can't seek to eliminate Israel and at the same time expect to thrive as Israel grows and prospers. Similarly, Palestinians can't hope to achieve economic independence if they position themselves as global beggars. Delusory thinking and hatred are not substitutes for sound economic principles, and they don't lead toward prosperity or peace.

Absent sweeping changes in Palestinians' thinking, there is no way a Palestinian state will work, and no amount of wishing and hoping for peace and prosperity will compensate for the abiding hatred the Palestinian people have for Israel.

The "Right of Return" is a Deal-Breaker

Most people don't have any idea what the "right of return" means. In a nutshell, it means that descendants of so-called "Palestinians" who left their homes when Israel's War of Independence began in 1948 have the right to return to their homes. But this issue is murkier than you can imagine. For instance, consider these facts:

• In 1948, when Israel's War of Independence began, everyone living in the land we call Israel today was referred to as a Palestinian -- Jew and Arab alike.

• Yasser Arafat commandeered the name "Palestinian" for Arabs in 1964 when he founded the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of thePalestinian people."

• When the British Mandate ended, the land was divided into two parts: Israel and Transjordan. Transjordan was supposed to be the Arab state, and Israel was supposed to be the Jewish state. Later, the name "Transjordan" was changed to Jordan. For a more complete explanation, see "A Brief History of Israel and Palestine."

• Jews in Palestine at the time of the War of Independence invited their Arab neighbors to stay and help them build a country. Arab leaders told them to flee immediately because they intended to crush the fledgling Jewish state and, as they put it, "to drive the Jews into the sea." Most of the Arabs departed, thinking that they would return in a few days at most and reclaim their homes along with spoils left behind by the defeated Jews, but Israel defeated the combined Arab armies, and Arabs who left their homes became refugees.

• Most Arab political leaders decided not to offer citizenship to Arabs who fled Israel. Instead, they built refugee camps for them in hopes of winning global sympathy for their plight. King Hussein of Jordan, King Abdullah's father, made it clear that Arab leaders alone were responsible for the plight of the refugees, but his was a voice in the wilderness. Israel gladly accepted Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

• There were more Jewish refugees from Arab countries during Israel's War of Independence than there were Arab refugees from Israel.

• The value of assets left behind by Jewish refugees from Arab countries far exceeds the value of assets left behind by Arabs who fled Israel.

• Many, if not most, of the so-called "Palestinian refugees" today have no connection whatsoever to people who fled Israel at the time of the War of Independence. For decades, Arab leaders have routinely ousted rabble-rousers from their countries and forced them to join their Arab brothers in "Palestinian" refugee camps. It was a form of exile -- like being sent to Siberia in Stalin's Soviet Union.

Every year, Arabs remember Nakba Day. In English it means "the Day of Catastrophe." It refers to Israel's defeat of the combined Arab armies during the War of Independence. In a literal sense, they aren't just remembering the "catastrophe," as they put it. They are hoping and waiting for the day when they can reverse their fortunes and return to the land of Israel, or Eretz Yisrael.

On Nakba Day 2011, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issued a statement saying, "The right of return will remain sacred for every Palestinian who was forced by the Zionist war machine to leave his or her home and land in Palestine. The Palestinians won't succumb to extortion; either we get the home and land peacefully, or we will make sacrifices until we return." As the facts above indicate, that statement is a bald-faced lie, but it sells well in the Arab world and among the liberal, left-wing Western intelligentsia who have bought into the Palestinian cause hook, line, and sinker.

In practical terms, Abbas was saying that the "right of return" is non-negotiable. Even more, he was saying that Arabs will fight until the bitter end for the "right of return." In absolute terms, the "right of return" is the ultimate deal-breaker, because Israel will never accept it, and for good reasons. In other words, for Palestinian leaders, the "right of return" is a convenient way out of any compromise that may lead to peace with Israel.

Neil Snyder is a chaired professor emeritus at the University of Virginia.

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/11/no_road_leads_to_peace_between_israel_and_the_palestinians.html

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Wapo Quota System: A Major Israel-Bashing Spread Once a Week

by Leo Rennert

At the Washington Post, it has become an all too predictable ritual -- a major Israel-bashing article by Jerusalem correspondent Joel Greenberg once a week -- preferably at the weekend.

Greenberg's highly selective pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel coverage gets top play in the foreign news section. It is designed and executed by Greenberg to put Israel in the worst possible light, while keeping silent about all too real Palestinian obstacles to a two-state solution.

A case in point: Greenberg's latest dispatch in the November 27 edition, spread across a full half page with a six-column headline that reads, "In Israel, concerns grow about stifling dissent -- Threats against anti-settlement activist come amid legal proposals that some say are aimed at government's leftist critics."

Stifling dissent in the Jewish state? For anyone acquainted with all the raucous debate in Israeli society about political and religious issues, this sounds like a bad joke. But Greenberg nevertheless pushes the alarm button about a supposedly imminent danger to democratic dissent.

His evidence?　A couple of pieces of legislation in the Knesset that would restrict funding of leftist "human rights" groups by foreign governments and restrict access to Israel's ultra-liberal Supreme Court by such groups. That, along with death threats received by an activist of Peace Now, an anti-Israel group that advocates full Israeli retreat to the 1967 lines without reciprocal Palestinian concessions.

Put it all together, Greenberg argues, and it amounts to nothing less than an "extremist challenge to Israel's democracy."

With a closer look, however, Greenberg's case quickly begins to fall apart. The legislative crackdown against foreign-financed NGOs (non-governmental organizations)? It's going nowhere because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is keeping it safely bottled up, as Greenberg -- after his all his dire forecasts -- is finally forced to admit. But Greenberg's admission doesn't pop up until the 12^th paragraph, well into the second half of his article -- a reality check that most readers won't even notice as they scan the biased headline and the biased top of his story, and then go on to peruse other parts of the Sunday paper.

The death threats to a Peace Now researcher, it turns out, are getting serious attention from Israeli authorities and a suspect already has been arrested. But readers aren't told that until the 19^th paragraph -- again, well after Greenberg milks the death threats to the fullest and presents them as a death-knell to Israel's democracy.

For good measure, Greenberg also takes aim at "militant Jewish settlers" who in recent months have attacked Palestinian mosques, cars and olive groves in the West Bank. True -- up to a point.　 Violence in the West Bank, however, is not a one-way affair of settlers attacking Palestinians, as Greenberg would have Post readers believe. It's a two-way affair, with plenty of Palestinian violence against settlers, which Greenberg fails to report.

Just to mention two incidents in recent months that Greenberg doesn't include in his article: Five members of the Fogel family of the Jewish community of Itamar near Nablus -- Udi Fogel, his wife Rath, and children Yoaf, 11, Elad, 4, and three-month-old Hadas -- were stabbed to death by a Palestinian terrorist. Also, Asher Palmer and his one-year-old son Yonathan were killed when a Palestinian hurled a rock through the windshield of their car.

Why not present a complete picture of West Bank violence? Why not take aim at extremists from both sides?

And that's exactly the problem with Greenberg's coverage. Palestinians tend to be portrayed only as victims, while only Israeli transgressions merit big play. Would the Post ever splash across a half page with a six-column headline pieces about Mahmoud Abbas glorifying suicide bombers or teaching Palestinian children that "Palestine" stretches from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, swallowing up all of Israel?

Of course, not.

Because, in the final analysis, even-handed journalism, thy name is not the Washington Post.

Leo Rennert is a former White House correspondent and Washington bureau chief of McClatchy Newspapers

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/11/wapo_quota_system_a_major_israel-bashing_spread_once_a_week.html

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Jordan is Boiling

by Eran, Oded

In the forthcoming months King Abdullah II will face his toughest test, certainly his most difficult since he succeeded his father nearly thirteen years ago. Within the Kingdom and across three of its borders, unfolding developments carry far reaching implications for the region in general and Jordan's stability in particular.

Inside Jordan, the opposition – both that of the Muslim Brotherhood and that coming from the supposedly loyal southern tribes and towns – is sizzling.

The US final withdrawal from Iraq may cause anarchy there, which in turn will increase the flow of Iraqi refugees to Jordan. More than half a million people fled to Jordan in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, exacerbating economic demands and inflationary pressures. Ongoing Sunni-Shiite tension may draw Jordan against its will into the conflict, as occurred in 2005 when a Jordanian suicide bomber killed 127 Iraqis in Hillah, mostly Shiites, approximately 100 km south of Baghdad.

The uprising in Syria has created a new challenge for the Jordanian regime. For decades, King Hussein viewed Damascus and its leaders, especially Hafez al-Asad, with much suspicion. His concerns were far from unjustified, especially given his awareness of the ploys by the Syrian regime itself and other players who found shelter in Damascus. Relations, however, remained "correct," and the current leaders have even managed to soften them .But the uprising in Syria has yet again awakened the perennial Jordanian fear of becoming a safe haven for those fleeing the cruelty of the current Syrian government and those who will likely flee, primarily from the Alawaite minority, if the regime is replaced by a government with a Sunni majority. Several thousand Syrians have already crossed the border, even though the Jordanian army has increased its deployment there.

After several months of silence regarding the events in Syria, in mid November interviews to CNN and the BBC, King Abdullah departed from his previous detachment. In what for a Jordanian monarch was an atypical statement, he said that he called Bashar al-Asad twice to advise him to introduce reforms but that the Syrian president refused to listen. "I believe if I were in his shoes, I would step down," the King said.

On the one hand, a regime change in Syria, if it prompts both an untying of the Damascus-Tehran knot and less hospitable treatment by the Syrian regime to groups that in the past tried to undermine Jordan's stability, might be viewed positively in Amman. On the other, the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has sided with the Syrian anti-government forces and on November 16 called upon the King to recognize the Syrian National Council puts King Abdullah in an awkward situation. The specter of Jordanian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood cooperation no doubt raises concerns in the Jordanian palace. A sample of problems to come was the death of a Jordanian youngster last week in the border town of Ramta .The person who was arrested, allegedly for helping Syrians to buy arms, died in jail. Although the Jordanian authorities claimed he committed suicide, the hundreds of Jordanians who took to the streets to demonstrate thought differently. Leading figures in the Jordanian government rushed to Ramta to express their condolences to the family of the youngster, indicating an increased sensitivity to the fragile situation on the border with Syria.

Unrest also returned to the streets of Amman and the remote towns of Karak, Shoubak, and Ma'an. The south is the Monarchy's base of strength, but severe problems of poverty and unemployment have driven demonstrators to violence and vandalism. In the face of public outcry against corruption and especially in the government, King Abdullah resorted to the traditional measure of changing prime ministers. This time, though, the appointment of a new prime minister aims to be more than just a routine political move. Awn Khasawneh is one of the most prominent Jordanians who until the King's call served as a judge in the International Court of Justice in the Hague. He knows the Royal Court, as he was its head in the mid-1990s during the negotiations leading to the 1994 peace treaty with Israel.

The prestige of an international jurist as prime minister was likely seen by the King as an asset in trying to convince the Jordanians that the government will fight corruption and become more transparent. The other motive in the appointment of Khasawneh was the attempt to buy Muslim Brotherhood endorsement of the King's attempts to introduce certain reforms in the Constitution and the electoral laws. Khasawneh has not hidden his views that banning Hamas in Jordan in 1999 was a mistake, and he has maintained cordial relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, Khasawneh's appointment maybe prove insufficient, especially if the Jordanian Brotherhood will – together with the rest of the world – witness political success of fellow organizations in other Arab countries.

This issue of government-Brotherhood relations must have been in the King's mind when he decided to visit Palestinian Authority President Abba in Ramallah on November 21.The rapprochement between the two major Palestinian factions and the possible cooperation between them will affect Jordan. This may occur, for example, if Hamas is allowed to renew its activities in the West Bank, which is closer to Jordan than Gaza, both geographically and demographically. In addition, a Fatah-Hamas joint platform of action, which may put an end to any prospect of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, would be viewed with great concern in Amman. The absence of any negotiations may drift into violent friction between Israel and the Palestinians with dire consequences for all concerned, Jordan included. The fear in Jordan of another wave of Palestinians fleeing a third intifada, in addition to fears from Syrian and Iraqi refugees, must surely cause sleepless nights in Amman.

Israel's Foreign Minister made an important statement (November 14) saying that those claiming that Jordan is the Palestinian state are causing harm to Israel's security interests: "Jordan is a stabilizing factor in the region in terms of what takes place in other states. Talk about Jordan as a Palestinian state runs contrary to the Israeli interests and reality." This statement, which was deliberate and more than simply off the cuff, must have been heard and read in Amman, even though no reaction came from there. Official Jordan should encourage and commend such statements.

Eran, Oded

Source: http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=5733

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The Threats in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea

by Efraim Inbar

A review of the political dynamics in the states on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean generates great concern about the ability of the West to continue enjoying unrestricted access to this area.

Evolving political events in Libya indicate that radical Islamic elements will definitely play a greater role in the future of the country. If the transition to a new regime descends into civil war, the ensuing chaos may allow greater freedom of action for Muslim extremists from the shores of this Mediterranean country.

Next to Libya is Egypt, which is in the midst of a great confrontation between the military and the Islamist parties over the future of the country. In any case, the planned elections will in all probability catapult the Islamist parties into a dominant role in the emerging Egyptian political system.

Apart from managing important ports on the Mediterranean, Egypt also controls the Suez Canal, a waterway that links Europe to the Persian Gulf and the Orient. This is a critical passageway that might fall into the hands of the Islamists.

Significantly, Egypt has already opened the Suez Canal to military vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran. This enhances the ability of radical Iran to supply its Mediterranean allies, such as the current regime in Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. Moreover, it has enhanced Iranian access to Muslim states in the Balkans, namely Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo, thereby increasing its influence in that part of the Mediterranean.

Even if the Egyptian military is able to curtail the Islamist forces in the state, its grip over the Sinai Peninsula is a different issue. The tenuous control of Egypt over Sinai has weakened since the fall of the Mubarak regime. Sinai has become a highway for weapons smuggling into Gaza and a base for the activities of several Muslim terror organizations. This situation could lead to the “Somalization” of Sinai, negatively affecting the safety of naval trade along the Mediterranean, the approaches to the Suez f:\israel\politics\blog\hard_nl OUT.txtCanal, and the Red Sea.

Next to Sinai is Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas, a radical Islamist organization allied with Iran. Israel's enforced naval blockade on Gaza has increasingly been criticized by the international community. Considering the recent political changes in Egypt and their detrimental impact on the Egyptian-Israeli relations, the containment of the Islamist threat from Gaza will become even more challenging in the near future.

North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits Lebanon, a state dominated by radical Shiite Hizballah whose ports are inhospitable from a Western perspective. Hizballah has already laid claim to some of the huge Israeli-found gas fields in the sea that could diminish Europe’s energy dependence on Russia and Turkey. Moreover, Syria, an enemy of Israel and a current ally of Iran, exerts considerable influence in Lebanon. Its Mediterranean shores, north of Lebanon, are also hostile to the West and its ports even supply services to the Russian navy. The Assad regime in Syria faces great domestic opposition and may fall. Considering the current trends in the Arab world, a Syrian successor regime could also be Islamist and anti-Western.

The next state on the eastern Mediterranean coastline is the AKP-ruled Turkey. The country has over the past few years shifted away from a pro-Western foreign policy, instead adopting a radical stance on many issues. Its current government supports Hamas and Hizballah, opposes sanctions on Iran and holds strident anti- Israel positions. This reflects the AKP's clear Islamic coloration. Moreover, Turkey has displayed huge ambitions for leadership in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. A combination of Turkish nationalism, neo-Ottoman nostalgia and Islamic-Jihadist impulses has pushed Turkey into an aggressive stance on several regional issues.

Turkey has flexed its naval muscles, threatening Israel that it will escort flotillas trying to break the blockade on Gaza. It has also threatened Cf:\israel\politics\blog\hard_nl OUT.txtyprus in order to secure its share of the potential energy riches south of the island. Turkey is interested in gaining control over the maritime gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean as this would help fulfill its ambitions to serve as an energy bridge to the West, thereby creating a dependence on it. This may lead Turkish troops, stationed in the northern part of divided Cyprus, to complete the conquest of the island started in 1974. Such a Turkish takeover would not only hurt Western geoeconomic interests, but would constitute a significant Western loss of the strategically situated island. The Cypriot island served as a bone of contention in the past between Persia and the ancient Greeks, and between the Ottomans and Venetians. In short, it represents the struggle between East and West.

West of Turkey is Greece, a democratic Western state with a clear interest to protect the Cypriots from Muslim domination. Its current economic crisis, however, might erode its limited military ability to parry the Turkish challenge alone. With the exception of Israel, all other eastern Mediterranean states would likely favor the return of Cyprus to Muslim rule and the ascendancy of Islam in the eastern Mediterranean.

Western influence in the eastern Mediterranean is being challenged by the growing radical Islamic influence in the region. The access of Iran to Mediterranean waters, the disruptive potential of failed states, and the competition across countries for energy resources is destabilizing the region. But it is not clear that Western powers, particularly the US, are aware of the possibility of losing the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea to radical Islam or are preparing in any way to forestall such a scenario. Foolishly, they seem to believe that the so-called “Arab Spring” heralds an improved political environment and that Turkey represents “moderate Islam.” American naivete? and European gullibility could become extremely costly in strategic terms.

Prof. Efraim Inbar is a professor of political studies at Bar-If:\israel\politics\blog\hard_nl OUT.txtlan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.

Source: http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/perspectives156.pdf

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The Coming Oil-Shale Revolution?

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

To preface, when it comes to global petroleum supplies, a distinction is drawn between "conventional" and "unconventional" oil reserves. The former are still in abundance in oil fields throughout the Middle East, and petroleum is produced from them simply by drilling at oil wells. Unconventional reserves include tar sands and oil shale: the latter is a form of sedimentary rock that must first be decomposed at high temperatures before crude oil can be obtained for refinement.

In terms of reserves, it is estimated that conventional sources across the world can yield around 1.2 trillion barrels, while in the United States alone, anywhere between 500 billion and 1.1 trillion barrels are thought to be recoverable from oil shale. An immediately astonishing observation to draw is the low-end of the estimates for U.S. oil shale, which is still around twice as large as Saudi Arabia's total reserves.

What makes this issue particularly relevant now is the emergence of reports on a potential breakthrough in oil shale extraction technology. Traditionally, extraction of oil shale has required the use of a method known as "fracking," or "hydraulic fracturing" (to use the more technical term).

Hydraulic fracturing, however, has raised concerns because of issues such as contamination of groundwater and air pollution, besides the large amounts of water required for the process. The high water usage is particularly problematic in the Southwestern states that contain most of the United States' oil shale reserves and are under water stress owing to drought in recent years.

Nonetheless, companies such as Chevron are now looking into the use of propane gel rather than water. Not only does this method require no water, but it also makes more sense from a technical point of view. As one former Halliburton Co engineer pointed out, "It's an ideal liquid to crack the rock open with because it does not damage the rock like water would." Accordingly, this pioneering process, despite some worries over propane gel's flammability, is increasingly being given the green light by regulators in Canada and the United States.

In light of these developments, the chief executive of Saudi Arabia's state-owned oil company- Aramco- has come to acknowledge that the development of large oil shale reserves in North America looks set to shift the monopoly over global energy supplies increasingly away from the Middle East. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has now halted a $100 billion expansion program that aims to expand Saudi output to 15 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2020.

Meanwhile, China is expected to be producing 1.1 million bpd of unconventional oil by 2035 (as opposed to 6.6 million bpd from the United States and Canada), a petroleum firm has announced the discovery of significant oil shale reserves in Argentina, and various companies have reported success in drilling wells for extracting natural gas from shale rocks in Poland.

Naturally, the following question arises: Are we finally moving into an era of complete energy independence from the Middle East and OPEC? If so, what are the implications?

As regards the former question, there is still one sign that appears to point to uncertainty. Despite anticipated increases in oil shale production, the fact remains that conventional oil will always be much cheaper to extract and use. Linked to this point is the International Energy Agency's recent report that predicts Iraq will be the largest contributor to the growth in global oil production over the next 25 years. Iraqi crude, like that in Saudi Arabia, is perhaps the least expensive oil to extract in the world at only a few dollars per barrel.

Since state-control (which still exists) over the Iraqi oil industry and international sanctions have meant that for many years Iraq has produced oil largely for domestic consumption, there is still potential for exploration and discovery of new reserves in the country, hence, for instance, the recent exploration deal signed between ExxonMobil and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

Since the 2003 invasion, Iraq has been able to secure numerous contracts with foreign firms in an effort to undergo a massive expansion in production for the international market, and output can only be expected to increase over the coming years. Peak oil for Iraq is not expected to occur until at least 2036.

Nonetheless, questions have been raised over export capacity hindered by outdated infrastructure. Perhaps paradoxically, the increased oil revenues for the Iraqi government mean that Baghdad is unlikely to shift towards liberalizing economic reforms, which in turn will continue the problem of excessive bureaucracy that impedes reconstruction and updating of infrastructure.

In any case, regardless of whether the West achieves energy independence from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia's profits (as well as those of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) from the oil industry will probably diminish in light of competition from Iraq and oil shale across the world. In this context, commentators will no doubt be wondering if these developments will mark a decline in Islamism around the world.

In fact, what Daniel Pipes terms the "Islamic revival" coincided with the surge in oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s, and so many analysts have drawn a major link between the two events. End the oil dependence, so the reasoning goes, and Saudi Arabia will be exhausted of petrodollars to fund and spread its Wahhabi ideology.

However, I remain skeptical of such claims, which appear to reduce simplistically the growth in Islamist ideology to a single cause. Of course, funds from Saudi Arabia have led to an upsurge in the Wahhabism in countries like Bosnia, where an individual influenced by the Wahhabi movement growing in Bosnia- Mevlid Jasarevic- opened fire on the American embassy in Sarajevo.

Nonetheless, Islamism is ultimately a problem rooted in questions of "identity and circumstance" (as Pipes puts it), and in the age of mass communication, it is much easier for those who draw on broad elements of traditional Islamic theology to justify doctrines of jihad as offensive warfare and imposing Islamic law to attain success in winning over peaceful Muslims to their causes.

Moreover, we see that in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan with its numerous Islamist movements, Tunisia with its an-Nahda movement, Yemen with al-Qa'ida, Somalia with ash-Shabaab, and Sudan with its regime under Omar al-Bashir (to name just a few), Islamism enjoys success without dependence on financial boosts from petroleum profits.

As Pipes noted back in 2002: "Oil revenues helped give militant Islam a start; but once up and running… it [militant Islam] no longer depends on this financial boost as shown by oil revenues having several times in the intervening years gone down without a noticeable reduction in militant Islam's steady gains."

In short, therefore, growing energy independence for the West via oil shale (a pleasing development in its own right) seems unlikely to hamper significantly the problem of Islamist ideology.

The only real solution- necessary, but difficult and almost certainly long-term- is honest reform within mainstream Islam to counter appeal to traditional notions of waging jihad against non-Muslims and imposing Shari'a in the public realm.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an intern at the Middle East Forum.

Source: http://www.meforum.org/3113/oil-shale-revolution

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.