by Farhad Rezaei
Iran’s rapid development of missile expertise has raised concerns in Washington and among its allies about Tehran’s intentions.
Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile, photo by Hossein Velayati via Wikipedia
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,110, March 12, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Iran’s
rapid development of missile expertise has raised concerns in
Washington and among its allies about Tehran’s intentions. Despite international censure, the
Revolutionary Guards have been able to develop the largest and most
diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the region. Tehran is determined to
develop and acquire ever more advanced and accurate ballistic missiles – but its efforts to achieve that goal are hampered by American and Israeli determination to subvert it.
A key component of Iran’s military doctrine is the
development of an indigenous ballistic missile program, and the
country’s rapid development of missile expertise has raised concerns in
the US and among its allies.
Iran embarked on an indigenous ballistic missile
program in 1986, when the Revolutionary Guards created a
“self-sufficiency unit” to develop military industries that would not
require assistance from other countries. Headed by Gen. Hassan
Tehrani-Moghaddam, the “founding father” of the Iranian missile program,
the unit was essentially an R&D facility for missile technology.
By reverse-engineering Soviet-era Scud technology,
Tehrani-Moghaddam enabled the Guards to develop the largest and most
diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the region. It includes the
Shahab-1 (based on the Scud-B), the Shahab-3 (based on original Scud-C
technology), the Ghadr 110 and its variants, the Emad, the Shahab-4, the
Shahab-5 (Kosar), the Shahab-6 (Toqyān), the Fajr-3, the Qiam, the
Ashoura, and the Sejjil. They are all capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.
Tehrani-Moghaddam died in November 2011 in an
explosion in his research office at the Alghadir missile base at Bid
Ganeh, near Tehran, reportedly in an operation carried out by the
Mossad. The Iranians continued advancing the missile program quietly and
produced new types of missiles, including the Dezful, the Hoveizeh, and
the nuclear-capable Zolfaghar and Khorramshahr.
Despite international concerns over Iran’s
ballistic missile program, the Obama administration decided to
compromise with Tehran on that program in exchange for concessions on
its nuclear program, which was a high priority strategic concern for his
administration. In a further compromise, Washington softened the
language of UNSC Resolution 1929 (2010), which stipulated that “Iran
shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable
of delivering nuclear weapons.” Resolution 2231, which passed on July
20, 2015 and which endorsed the nuclear deal, used more permissive
language: “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear
weapons.”
With the nuclear agreement reached and the legal
loophole created, the Iranians set about putting more effort into their
ballistic missile program. As a result, their missiles have become a
target of renewed international attention, and consequently the subject
of numerous rounds of sanctions. The Trump administration decided to
withdraw the US from the nuclear agreement in part on the grounds that
it does not address Iran’s ongoing ballistic missile program.
Sanctions notwithstanding, Iran has not faltered
in ramping up its ballistic missile and space programs. According to
Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’
aerospace program, Iran conducted seven test flights in 2018, in
addition to six Qiam missiles fired into an ISIS stronghold in Syria’s
Deir ez-Zor province in January 2018. One Khorramshahr, two Shahab-3
variants, one Qiam, and three Zolfaghar ballistic missiles were
flight-tested between February and August 2018, which, according to the
President of the UN Security Council, was “in violation of resolution
2231” because the missiles were all category I systems under the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.
In August 2018, Iran’s defense ministry unveiled
two new missiles: the Fakour and the “Fateh Mobin” (Bright Conqueror),
the latest addition to the Fateh-series of short-range tactical
ballistic missiles with a range of about 1,300 km. On December 1, 2018,
the Revolutionary Guards tested the Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic
missile at its facility near Shahrud in Iran’s northeast. On February 2,
2019, Tehran announced the successful test of the Hoveizeh cruise missile with a range of over 1,350 km during celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. On February 7, the Revolutionary Guards unveiled a new ballistic missile, the Dezful, which has a range of 1,000 km. Iran’s PressTV quoted
Gen. Hajizadeh as saying the Revolutionary Guards will “continue
missile tests…and plan to carry out more than 50 missile tests each
year.”
Tehran says its ballistic missiles are for
defensive purposes, but because ballistic missiles capable of carrying a
nuclear warhead are an integral part of a nuclear arsenal, its efforts
to develop ballistic missile capabilities may reflect its desire to
continue with its nuclear weapons program. This is a reasonable
suspicion in view of Tehran’s record of conducting covert nuclear
activities at its nuclear sites, namely the Parchin and Kolahdouz
military complexes. Proving Iran’s peaceful intentions is difficult
because ballistic missiles can be used in both a defensive and an
offensive capacity, not to mention that a cost-benefit analysis does not
justify mounting conventional payloads on long-range missiles.
Despite warnings from the US that the Iranians call “empty threats,”
Tehran has continued R&D and is testing its capabilities in
ballistic missiles. On the night of January 14-15, 2019, a Simorgh
(Phoenix) space launch vehicle lifted off from the Imam Khomeini Space
Center in Semnan province. It carried the Payam (Message) Amirkabir
satellite, which is described as carrying four cameras for scientific
earth observation from low earth orbit. The experiment failed, however,
and the satellite did not manage to enter orbit. According to
Minister of Communications and Information Technology Muhammad-Javad
Azari Jahromi, the rocket carrying the satellite “failed to reach escape
velocity in the third stage, though it succeeded in the first two
stages of the launch.”
Only a few weeks after the Simorgh failure, on
February 5, 2019, the Guards launched a second satellite, the Doosti
(Friendship), a remote-sensing satellite developed by engineers at
Tehran’s Sharif University of Technology. Deputy Defense Minister Gen.
Ghasem Taghizadeh announced the successful placement of the Doosti
Satellite in earth’s orbit and confirmed
that a new, advanced Iranian-made communications satellite, the Tolou
(Dawn), will be launched in the next three to four months. However,
satellite images released by DigitalGlobe and Planet,
two companies that specialize in space imaging, suggest that Iran’s
second attempt to launch a satellite into space has also failed.
Iran’s military and political officials attributed
the two rocket failures to a secret Washington program to sabotage
Iran’s missile and space programs. Gen. Hajizadeh accused
US and Israeli intelligence agencies of engaging in campaigns of
“infiltration and sabotage” of Iran’s missile complex. Javad Zarif,
Iran’s foreign minister, also said it was possible that the poor performance of the missiles was because of a sabotage campaign by the US.
The New York Times,
which interviewed unidentified US officials, revealed that the Trump
administration has accelerated a secret project to subvert Iran’s
missile and space program, a plan described as “a far-reaching effort to
slip faulty parts and materials into Iran’s aerospace supply chains.”
Tehran insists that its satellite launches have no military value, but
the US and its allies believe its space program is merely a cover for
its efforts to develop a ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.
The Iranians are determined to develop and acquire
more advanced ballistic missiles in the future and will probably
continue to transition from liquid to solid propelled systems, which are
more sustainable. Iran may also concentrate on improving the missiles’
accuracy, which is poor at present. But it is not clear whether they
will be able to achieve these goals given strong objections from the US
and Israel and their efforts to subvert the programs.
Dr. Farhad Rezaei is a member of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) in Washington, DC and co-authored (with Ofira Seliktar) Iran, Israel, and the United States: The Politics of Counter-Proliferation Intelligence (NY: Lexington Books). @Farhadrezaeii
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/irans-ballistic-missile-program/
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