by Yaakov Lappin
Hamas is struggling to manage Gaza economically, it refuses to divert funds from its military wing to civilian needs, and the Strip’s infrastructure is eroding at an alarming rate.
Incendiary balloons launched from Bureij in the Gaza Strip and sent into Israel,
photo by Minozig via Wikimedia Commons
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,108, March 10, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Tensions between Israel
and Hamas are surging again following a string of attacks from Gaza and
Israeli retaliatory airstrikes. The reason is simple: Hamas is
struggling to manage Gaza economically, it refuses to divert funds from
its military wing to civilian needs, and the Strip’s infrastructure is
eroding at an alarming rate. Only brinksmanship with Israel can
extricate Hamas from the disarray it has created.
Hamas’s failure to manage Gaza economically and
determination to direct funds to its military wing rather than to
civilian needs have raised the specter of a potential implosion in Gaza,
which could mean that the Islamist regime will find itself facing an
internal revolt. To avoid this fate, Hamas is doing what it has tried to
do for an entire year: escalate the security situation and ratchet up
pressure on Israel and other regional actors while stopping short of
triggering a war.
This high-stakes brinksmanship – using violence to
try and force Israel to ease security restrictions on Gaza, increase
the import of goods, and get the international community to find donors
who can rescue Gaza from economic doom – is a calculated approach
directed by Hamas leader Yihye Sinwar. It appears as if the Qatari cash
injections have not been sufficient to push Gaza away from the brink of
instability. The economic chokehold the Palestinian Authority has tried
to place on Gaza as part of its own internal war with Hamas has
contributed to tensions over the past year as well.
“A short while ago, shots were fired at an IDF
position near the northern Gaza Strip security fence. No IDF injuries
were reported. In response, an IDF tank targeted a Hamas military post
in the northern Gaza Strip,” the IDF Spokesman’s Unit announced on
Thursday, February 28.
The night before that incident, Gazan terrorists fired a rocket at
the Eshkol region, triggering a siren, sending residents fleeing for
cover, and causing an Iron Dome missile-defense system to fire an
interceptor. Earlier that same day, Hamas-organized operatives sent
balloons carrying explosives over the border into southern Israel,
jeopardizing the safety of local residents.
In response, the Israeli Air Force launched
strikes on several targets inside a Hamas compound in southern Gaza
overnight between Wednesday and Thursday. The IDF did not specify what
those targets were, but it’s safe to assume that they were high-value
Hamas assets, and that the strikes were designed to tell its leadership
that it only stands to lose if this situation continues.
This message was reinforced by Israeli PM
Netanyahu, who said Hamas “should understand now that any display of
aggression will be answered with a double and quadruple decisive reply
by Israel. It is best that Hamas understands this now rather than
later.”
On Friday, March 1, a rocket was fired from the
Gaza Strip towards Israel after thousands of Palestinians took part in
another round of violent protests along the border. Amid the protests,
two men were arrested by the IDF after crossing into Israel from the
northern part of the Gaza Strip.
The IDF has been stepping up its responses to
attacks from Gaza. In recent weeks, airstrikes on Hamas positions have
become a new norm in retaliation against explosive devices sent over the
Israeli border attached to balloons, and to the explosives that
terrorist operatives set off along the border every night.
Taking advantage of the Israeli election season
The problem is that Hamas’s leadership is prepared
to risk continuing this escalation, even though it doesn’t seek a
full-scale war. Hamas has assessed that any further delay in getting
outside actors to step in and stabilize Gaza’s economy will threaten the
future of its regime as least as much as would a war with Israel.
Hence, it is signaling to Israel and to Egypt (which is playing a key
role as an intermediary), as well as to the international community,
that its demands must be met or the attacks will continue, come what
may.
For Netanyahu, who is in the midst of a
contentious election campaign, the timing of Hamas’s latest challenge is
difficult. If he is seen to “give in” to its demands, it will damage
his campaign, and he is already facing domestic criticism for
facilitating the flow of Qatari aid money into Gaza.
Hamas may have decided to try and gamble by
increasing the pressure during elections, based on the assumption that
Netanyahu will be reluctant to get into a major conflict in Gaza at this
time. For his part, Netanyahu is seeking to convince Hamas that this
assumption is a dangerous illusion.
The coming days and weeks will be explosive and decisive for the Gazan arena.
Assuming conflict does not break out before the
elections, whoever is in government in Israel post-elections will likely
end up with one of two difficult choices: 1) seek a long-term truce in
Gaza by stabilizing its economy, which would bring quiet but also
strengthen Hamas; or 2) decimate Hamas’s military wing in a new
conflict.
In the meantime, Israel’s defense establishment is
keeping a cautious eye on the West Bank. It has managed to stay
relatively calm so far and has not reflected Gaza’s instability, but
Hamas is doing its best to change that.
Gaza-based Al-Aqsa satellite TV,
run by Hamas, is one of the ways Gaza has tried to export terrorism to
the West Bank. Hamas even used the channel to send coded messages to
terror cells in the West Bank last year, leading the IDF to bomb its
studios in November. This week, Israel designated the channel a
terrorist organization. Even so, that won’t stop Hamas in Gaza from
systematically trying to set fire to the West Bank.
This is an edited version of an article that was published on JNS.org on March 8, 2019.
Yaakov Lappin is a Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. He specializes in Israel’s defense establishment, military affairs, and the Middle Eastern strategic environment.
Source: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/hamas-is-willing-to-risk-war-to-avoid-economic-collapse/
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