by Fred Fleitz
The Trump nuclear deals with Saudi Arabia and South Korea represent a modernized and pragmatic path with both nations.
The recent U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal, which will allow Riyadh to build nuclear power reactors and enrich uranium for reactor fuel, represents President Trump’s leadership in strengthening and developing America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and promoting stability in the Middle East. It is also a long-overdue modernization of how the United States should share peaceful nuclear technology with trusted partners and will deliver major wins for U.S. industry. Like the nuclear deal with South Korea, the Saudi deal keeps sensitive nuclear technology under American influence rather than ceding it to rivals.
Both nuclear deals are a matter of trust. South Korea is a model member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and an ironclad U.S. ally. Saudi Arabia is a critical partner in a volatile region. By moving forward with these agreements, the United States is demonstrating confidence in close partners that have repeatedly proven their reliability.
Saudi Arabia is seeking peaceful nuclear power to diversify its energy mix, free up oil for export, and support its broader economic transformation. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have signed agreements that position American firms—led by companies such as Westinghouse with its AP1000 reactors—to design, build, and help operate those plants. This is a multi-decade, multi-billion-dollar opportunity. U.S. companies will construct the reactors and related infrastructure on Saudi soil. American technology, engineers, and supply chains will be at the center. High-paying jobs and industrial capacity will be created in the United States.
This deal also locks out Russia and China from spreading their less reliable nuclear technology with weaker safeguards.
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal includes provisions for a joint study on the economics of fuel production, with the possibility that U.S. firms would build and operate a Saudi uranium enrichment facility under strict controls. This would require Saudi Arabia to honor its NPT obligations and permit IAEA monitoring of all of its nuclear facilities.
This new nuclear partnership is also a major gesture of strategic goodwill by President Trump to encourage Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel.
By offering Riyadh a high-value, long-term economic and technological partnership with the United States, Trump is creating a powerful incentive for Riyadh to take the final diplomatic steps toward full diplomatic relations with Israel. Such a historic agreement would promote stability in the Middle East and prosperity between the two nations. Its benefits are especially clear in the aftermath of Iran’s escalating threats to the region, including its massive drone and missile attacks against both countries since January.
Trump is taking a similar approach to increased sharing of peaceful nuclear technology with South Korea. Seoul is a model NPT member, a steadfast U.S. ally facing nuclear-armed North Korea and a rapidly expanding Chinese navy, and a global leader in shipbuilding and civilian nuclear technology. South Korea already operates advanced conventional submarines and a sophisticated nuclear power sector that supplies roughly 30 percent of its electricity. It needs nuclear-powered attack submarines for credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific—vessels that can remain submerged for months and patrol at sustained high speeds.
South Korea also needs access to the full nuclear fuel cycle (uranium enrichment and reprocessing) so it can produce its own reactor fuel, manage spent fuel stockpiles more effectively, produce high-assay low-enriched uranium for advanced reactors, including small modular reactors (SMRs), and become an exporter of complete nuclear solutions.
Producing its own fuel rods would also save South Korea money and reduce its reliance on Russian-supplied uranium, which currently accounts for roughly a third of the enriched uranium it imports. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has cited that dependence as a key reason for pursuing domestic enrichment.
The new U.S. nuclear agreements with both countries require modernized “123 agreements”—treaties the U.S. has signed with many nations to share nuclear technology—that prohibit uranium enrichment, reactor fuel reprocessing, or access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. These prohibitions no longer make sense when dealing with close partners facing acute threats. Moreover, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil, and others already possess fuel-cycle capabilities under IAEA safeguards. South Korea and Saudi Arabia should also have access to this technology.
Moreover, rigid U.S. denial of these technologies does not prevent nuclear proliferation; it merely drives our allies toward less reliable suppliers and leaves the United States with less visibility and less leverage. Structured sharing, American industrial leadership, robust safeguards, and mutual trust can counter this. The Trump approach will expand peaceful nuclear energy, create economic value at home, advance regional diplomacy—including Saudi-Israeli normalization—and keep sensitive technology under the highest standards of safety and nonproliferation.
Critics are naturally raising concerns that these agreements will undo U.S. agreements and policies that have successfully restricted the spread of nuclear technology with weapons applications. Such critics include many Democrats as well as some Republicans. This criticism is ironic given that the Biden administration unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a similar arrangement with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, criticism that the Trump nuclear deals pose unacceptable proliferation threats ignores the fact that there are other, less scrupulous players standing ready to sell nuclear technology with little or no proliferation protections. The alternative to U.S.-led cooperation is not nuclear-free regions; it is regions in which others set the terms.
The Trump nuclear deals with Saudi Arabia and South Korea represent a modernized and pragmatic path forward with both nations. They deserve strong congressional support.
Fred Fleitz previously served as chief of staff of the Trump National Security
Council. He is the author of North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the
Oval Office, which was just released by Texas A&M Press.
Source: https://amgreatness.com/2026/08/14/why-sharing-peaceful-nuclear-technology-with-saudi-arabia-and-south-korea-strengthens-america-and-nonproliferation/
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