by Stephen Soukup
The voters rejected the methods and the tactics, not the outcomes of the second Trump presidency.
For much of the last 60 years or so, British and American politics have moved in rough partisan alignment with one another. Both were governed by largely ineffective and hapless “big government” conservatives in the early 1970s. Both followed that up with even more ineffective, more hapless, and bigger-government liberals for the rest of the decade. Both enjoyed economic and military revivals under true conservative leadership throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. And both suffered through the doldrums of insincere centrist “third-way” nonsense in the mid-to-late ’90s.
The two nations’ paths diverged somewhat at the start of the twenty-first century, with the Clinton-esque Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair serving alongside George W. Bush for much of his presidency and the George W. Bush-esque Conservative David Cameron serving alongside Barack Obama for much of his.
The paths converged again in 2016, when right-leaning populism captured both nations. Donald Trump was elected president in the United States, and across the pond, future Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson led his nation in Brexit, its controversial but critically important escape from the overweening and overbearing European Union. These two indispensable nations, the heart of the Anglosphere, appeared aligned once again and seemed ready to take on the challenges of the twenty-first century together.
And then a funny thing happened on the way to the Anglosphere’s revival.
Donald Trump’s first term may not have been the ideal conservative presidency, but it was anomalous, both by comparison to his American contemporaries and in contrast to the “Conservatives” who governed Britain during those four years. Or to put it more bluntly, Trump was elected largely because he promised to do three things: end the nation’s “forever wars,” end mass immigration (and illegal immigration in particular), and enable the domestic production of energy resources. And while historians may argue about how effectively he stopped immigration, he, more or less, delivered on the other two, ending the foreign policy adventurism of the previous two presidencies and turning the United States into the largest oil and natural gas producer in the world.
At the same time, the British Conservatives went squishy. Theresa May’s squishiness came as a surprise to no one, of course, but Boris Johnson’s caught many off guard. After all, he was the leader of the Brexit movement. He was the feisty, slightly alarming Mayor of London, the gutsy populist with terrible hair, their Donald Trump, in short. Only he wasn’t. He wasn’t even close. As the inimitable Mark Steyn warned about Johnson, his onetime editor at The Spectator, never had so much skill and wit been wasted on a man so concerned about himself and little else:
What does he believe in? Other than himself, not terribly much…. In the 2016 referendum, he considered the Leave and Remain choices in terms of what served his interests. To favor Remain meant supporting David Cameron, the de facto leader of the cause, and consigning himself to being a mere gentleman of the chorus. Whereas, if he chose the other side, his star power would make him the face of the campaign. He expected the Remain guys to win, and himself to have done himself a world of good with the Tory base come the next leadership election. Instead, and at least partly because of him, Leave won, and the chaos of the last three years began.
The “Conservatives” who governed Britain during the first Trump term and the Biden presidency (May, Johnson, Liz Truss, and Sunak) were far more ideologically aligned with Biden than with Trump, which is to say that they saw Trump’s promises on immigration and energy as both ludicrous and ludicrously backward. They all toed the global ruling-class line on mass third-world migration and on the inevitable doom that would befall the planet if they didn’t immediately and irreversibly halt their nation’s carbon emissions while simultaneously (and multiculturally) winking and nodding at China’s and India’s mass embrace of coal. They were, putting it bluntly, Conservatives in name only. The “funny thing” that happened after 2016’s populist rebellion is that while the U.K. legally and officially detached itself from the EU, its leaders nevertheless adopted their continental counterparts’ worldview in toto. It was Brexit in name only.
About a month ago, London’s Telegraph published a story ostensibly about the upcoming Spanish elections and the trouble facing the country’s leftist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, whom the paper called “the undisputed leader of the European Left.” Hidden deep in the bowels of the story, the paper noted that the struggles endured by the leader of the Left are emblematic of the ideology altogether. With the rise of the AfD in Germany and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, the European Left, ascendant for much of the last quarter-century, is in serious trouble:
[I]f Mr Sanchez’s gamble backfires this time, the already small number of centre-Left leaders in Europe will be reduced to Mr Burnham, Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen and Malta’s Robert Abela….A victory for the PP and Vox [in Spain] will build momentum behind Europe’s insurgent populist parties, which are already buoyed by two electoral victories for the AfD in East Germany last month…
Victory for Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni and her Polish allies in the European Parliament, the Law and Justice Party, will see the EU swing further to the Right, and the Left further diminished.
New(ish) British Prime Minister Andy Burnham does not have to face an election for another three years, but already the opposition—Reform UK and the now slightly less hapless Conservatives under Kemi Badenoch—are signaling serious resistance based in part on pushback to net zero and the current immigration regime.
In other words, everywhere in the developed world, the Left is facing a reckoning—except in the United States, where it now, ironically, appears finally to be having its moment. The conventional wisdom has it that this is all Donald Trump’s fault, that his personality and policies have shattered the Right and enabled the American Left to rise to higher heights than it has ever risen before. Trump broke the GOP, and now, the nation will suffer the consequences. As the conservative writer and commentator Ryan Girdusky put it, “The midterm election wasn’t a wave. It wasn’t a cyclone. It was the collapse of the Republican and the Trump coalition; a total collapse.”
There is some truth in this, I suppose, and as I noted in these pages last week, voters generally just want their political leaders to be normal, which is not exactly Trump’s forte. That said, the Trump-emboldened-the-Left-in-America narrative misses the proverbial forest for the trees. The voters rejected the methods and the tactics, not the outcomes of the second Trump presidency.
In reality, the American people were comfortable voting for leftist candidates two weeks ago because Donald Trump made them that comfortable. The problems pushing the developed world toward conservative populist rebellion for more than a decade have been addressed in only one country: Donald Trump’s America. The United States today produces more oil and gas than Saudi Arabia and Russia combined, while in the first year of his second term, net migration actually turned negative (at least according to the Brookings Institution). We can argue all day (and all night and all day again) about the effectiveness or political suitability of Trump’s solutions, but the simple fact of the matter is that he offered them, when no one else would.
Here, the example provided above of the British Conservatives is telling. In 2016, it was clear that unfettered immigration and net-zero climate and energy policies were both destructive to the standing of the West on the global stage and thoroughly unquestioned (and unquestionable) by all Western leaders of the Left, Right, and Center—save one. In 2016, when the Brits saw their future being shattered by the EU’s technocratic soft leftism, they were able to leave the EU but were unable to elect a leader who would offer policies that would differ in any significant way from it. We Americans, by contrast, had a choice. And we took it. We had the same choice in 2024, and we took it again. Today, the United States is one of only a handful of Western nations with a semi-secure border and maybe the only one with a sensible energy policy. Trump offered an alternative, in other words, and it worked. Whereas the rest of the West is now facing economic, cultural, and technological irrelevance because of its ruling-class consensus, the United States, at the very least, has a glimmer of hope.
Again, one could debate Trump’s good and bad points forever and a day. Still, the conventional wisdom gets him entirely backward. He didn’t destroy the conservative coalition. He held it together far longer than anyone else could have, largely because he always wanted to put “America First.” He didn’t create the American far Left. He delayed its rise by offering a genuine alternative.
The United States today is, inarguably, in a precarious political position. It is, however, in a far better position than any other country in the West, including the U.K. If Boris Johnson had really been the U.K.’s Donald Trump, it too would be better off than its European neighbors. But he wasn’t, and it isn’t. Trump may be a radical outlier in global politics, but it’s far from clear that that’s a bad thing.
Stephen R. Soukup is the Director of The Political Forum Institute and the author of The Dictatorship of Woke Capital (Encounter, 2021, 2023)
Source: https://amgreatness.com/2026/11/16/trump-is-and-always-has-been-an-outlier/
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