The Gulf States in the Shadow of Iran. Part II

 

by Patrick Knapp

2^nd part of 2

 

Gulf Security under Barack Obama

President Barack Obama made the cornerstone of his Middle East policy the promise of "a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect" and "a new partnership" in the Middle East.[42] But Secretary Gates's June 2009 message to GCC defense ministers suggested that the Pentagon does not plan to make any significant changes to the Gulf Security Dialogue. Instead, Gates reiterated U.S. commitments to its vital founding pillars of interoperability, regional stability, energy security, counter-proliferation, and counterterrorism.[43] The U.S. continues its annual exercises in the Persian Gulf, but compared to France—which opened a military base in the UAE on May 26, 2009,[44] and will open an officer academy in Doha in 2011[45]—its commitment to expanding such programs has its limits. Under President Obama, the Department of Defense has announced arms sales to Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia totaling more than $4 billion.[46] Yet President Obama's undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, former Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher, signed a 2008 House resolution disapproving of the proposed sale of joint direct attack munitions kits to Saudi Arabia due to concerns over that state's oil policy. It is not clear whether the Obama administration can push such Gulf Security Dialogue sales through Congress even with the Democratic Party's large majority.

Nor is it clear whether Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's July 22, 2009 proposal to extend a U.S. "defense umbrella" over the Persian Gulf states[47] signifies a shift away from the Bush administration's desire to see the GCC states able to maintain a more autonomous collective military capability. In 2007, for example, Gates argued that "the most important military component in the war on terror" was "how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries."[48] Nevertheless, Secretary Clinton's proposal has taken pressure off GCC states to cooperate with a June proposal by senior U.S. military officers for a U.S.-GCC agreement on integrated air and missile defense.[49]

The 2010 quadrennial defense review (QDR) may signal further changes in the U.S. commitment to Persian Gulf security. While the 2006 QDR called for a shift "from a peacetime tempo to a wartime sense of urgency,"[50] a Department of Defense fact sheet on the 2010 review emphasizes a "balance of efforts and resources."[51] The review's point person, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, questioned GSD arms deals in 2007, saying that "it comes at a time when Sunni and Shi'a tensions in the region are higher than they've been in years. It comes at a time when the U.S. is in the midst of a war [in Iraq] where it's having trouble getting the support it needs from its regional allies."[52] In reality, these arms deals have spurred the GCC to help in Iraq. In July of 2008, William Burns, undersecretary for political affairs, praised the "new support and cooperation from [Iraq's] Arab neighbors," attributing it to "the readiness of the Iraqi government and security forces to confront Iranian-backed groups."[53] Indeed, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE have recently opened embassies in Baghdad.[54]

Flournoy also warned in April 2009 of a need for "pragmatism" in the face of what she calls "very difficult choices" when it comes to evaluating strategic risk. "In a world in which resources are limited," she said, "particularly in economic crisis, we have to be very specific about how we do this."[55] Such concerns echo the rationale behind the Obama administration's defense budget cuts. While Bush's 2008 budget allocated $188 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations specifically for wartime costs, Obama's 2009 budget allocated only $140 billion.[56] Recession-induced belt-tightening does not explain all the cuts. While the administration believes the economy will gradually recover, the projected wartime supplemental budget gradually drops to $50 billion by 2011. Meanwhile, to pay for increased domestic spending, the Obama administration plans to reduce the military budget from its current 3.8 percent share of gross domestic product to less than 3.3 percent by 2014.[57] This has already required cuts to missile defense spending and F-22 aircraft production.[58] Whatever the justifications for Obama's recent decision not to proceed with missile defense systems in Poland, it is tempting for U.S. allies to perceive it as more evidence of Washington's fading dedication to defense. These decisions send a conflicting message not only to the Persian Gulf states, which depend on a strong U.S. military for security, but also to the Islamic Republic.

The Obama administration's decision to engage the Islamic Republic may also undercut the Gulf Security Dialogue's containment initiatives. While it has upheld some of the tough policies of previous administrations towards Iran—such as weapons proliferation executive orders and economic sanctions—the Obama administration is unique in its eagerness for bilateral and multilateral talks. While Bush insisted that negotiations could only follow Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment, Obama has offered to reward talks to Iran "without preconditions."[59] Last May, Obama approved a Bush-brokered 123 agreement to prevent the UAE from enriching its own uranium but has not taken a clear stance against Iranian enrichment. Even after Iran's bloody suppression of post-election protests in June 2009, Obama sent a delegation to meet with officials of the republic last September for multilateral talks with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (Britain, China, France, Russia, United States) and Germany.[60] While the talks secured an Iranian promise to allow inspection of the newly-discovered uranium enrichment plant in Qom and to outsource some uranium enrichment to Russia and France,[61] these capitulations do not mark a change in Iranian behavior but rather an effort to slow international momentum against Iran's nuclear program. Engagement has not quelled the Islamic Republic's revolutionary zeal.

The Obama administration used the U.N. General Assembly and the meetings of the Group of Twenty (G-20) finance ministers and central bank governors in September to reassess engagement with Iran. It may resort to economic strategies at the end of the year, such as the "crippling sanctions" that Secretary Clinton threatened in April. Yet any diplomatic engagement that does not occur alongside military strategies will be ineffective and will lead Persian Gulf allies to question the value of further cooperation with Washington. The 2007 national intelligence estimate, for example, said that Iran had temporarily given up its nuclear program in 2003. The change in Iranian behavior occurred alongside the use of U.S. force in the Persian Gulf and was not the result of diplomacy alone.

Similarly, the United States's relative success since 2007 in stabilizing Iraq comes after commanders combined a new counterinsurgency doctrine with a troop surge. The June 30 "anti-surge," which confines U.S. troops to their bases, has so far proved unsettling to Iraq's Persian Gulf neighbors. Violence has flared amid Kurdish-Arab tensions in Iraq's north. Attacks in Baghdad killed 147 people on October 25, 2009—the city's deadliest day in more than two years.[62] Meanwhile Al-Qaeda has reemerged in Kuwait where authorities on August 11, 2009, foiled a terror plot against a U.S. base and oil infrastructure.[63]

As the Obama administration pursues engagement and lightens the U.S. footprint in the region, the Islamic Republic has maintained an anti-U.S. foreign policy and continues on a steady path of militarization; during his first term, President Ahmadinejad filled two-thirds of his cabinet ministry posts with former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel or members of the Basij auxiliary paramilitary force.[64] In an indirect endorsement of Ahmadinejad's reelection in 2009, Supreme Leader Khamenei urged Iranians "not to vote for those who by bowing their heads to foreigners do away with our honor."[65] The IRGC stretched the limits of its apolitical mandate by mobilizing pro-Ahmadinejad voters before the election and beating down protesters afterward. Ahmadinejad has interpreted his reelection as a green light to his aggressive foreign policy. His defense ministry appointee is Ahmad Vahidi, the former Qods Force chief of the Revolutionary Guards wanted by Interpol for the murder of eight-five people in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. Ahmadinejad also appointed former IRGC leader Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi to the intelligence ministry, and Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad Najjar to the interior ministry. Meanwhile in Iraq, the IRGC's Qods Force continues to supply improvised explosive devices and explosively formed penetrators—the more expensive explosives that fling special football-size copper slugs through armored vehicles at 2,000 meters per second—to Shi'i militias targeting Americans.[66] Finally, Iran's ever-progressing nuclear program appears little deterred by Undersecretary Tauscher's June 30 threat regarding arms control "to hold accountable those that violate their obligations and commitments."[67] Ahmadinejad's reelection only reinforced these trends. In his September U.N. address (made while reports were still trickling out of Iran of election protesters being tortured and raped), Ahmadinejad blamed the United States and its allies "for spreading war, bloodshed, aggression, terror, and intimidation in the whole region."[68]

U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf should recognize that outreach to Iran since the "unclench your fist" inaugural address has failed. Iran has ignored Obama's diplomatic plea for the Islamic Republic to join "the community of nations."[69] Meanwhile, Tehran has capitalized on the June 30, 2009 U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq: On July 16, an Iranian-backed militia killed three U.S. soldiers in Basra with an Iranian-made rocket.[70] Even though the Obama administration chose not to intervene on behalf of human rights protesters after the June presidential elections, on August 23, 2009, Iran's parliament voted to approve $20 million for exposing human rights abuses in the United States.[71] Iran has interpreted U.S. engagement attempts as desperation: Ahmadinejad's short-lived first vice president and current chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Masha'i, said in August that due to Ahmadinejad's "historic" world popularity, "the international community has no choice but to cooperate" with the regime.[72] Finally, as Washington cashes in a peace dividend, Iranian-made missiles and machine guns are landing in the hands of Yemen's Shi'i rebels. In a reference to Tehran, Yemeni information minister Hasan Ahmad al-Lawzi recently said, "There are religious authorities that are trying to interfere in the affairs of our country."[73]

 

Conclusions

U.S. commitment to Persian Gulf security is important because it gives the gulf states the confidence and ability to resist Iranian intimidation. Without this commitment, the Persian Gulf states would accommodate the Islamic Republic. Iran's nuclear program and military ambitions would benefit from such a capitulation as it would give Tehran more access to the region's energy resources and would take pressure off the regime's weapons-trafficking efforts. U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf should continue the Bush administration's successful efforts to strengthen the region's security. Winning the trust of these vulnerable Persian Gulf states requires not only a commitment to arms sales and joint military exercises but also a broader foreign policy that values long-term relationships over shortsighted attempts at "mutual respect" with declared enemies such as Iran.

Washington should use the Gulf Security Dialogue to counter Iran's regional ambitions. To this end, the dialogue has indeed made important inroads, especially in coordinating interoperable defense and augmenting the Persian Gulf's arms edge. In April 2008, Bahrain and Kuwait signed their first bilateral security accord. In July 2008, the Department of Defense notified Congress of the possibility of the first GSD-related defense sale to Qatar. But the future success of the dialogue depends on the Persian Gulf's perception of U.S. strategy in the rest of the region. If the Persian Gulf states suspect White House realism will sacrifice their defense on the altar of a deal with Tehran, they may decide they have no choice but to make accommodation with the Islamic Republic, a tendency that ultimately may undercut the U.S. ability to maintain a presence in the region.

Indeed, such accommodation is already occurring. The UAE and Qatar were quick to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his reelection victory,[74] and Oman's sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said traveled to Iran in August.[75] Qatar's emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani discussed ways to expand economic cooperation with Iran with Tehran's ambassador to Qatar on August 27, 2009, the day after Iran's envoy to Bahrain called on the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states to stop "employing foreign forces."[76] The New York Times reported in May that Oman and the UAE increasingly rely on "mutual interest" trade with Iran, which is "an important political and economic ally that is too powerful and too potentially dangerous to ignore, let alone antagonize."[77] Iran's talk of "indigenizing" regional security shows signs of appealing, especially in Qatar. [78] In Bahrain, too, an eagerness to bow to growing Iranian power has taken the shape of bilateral energy agreements.[79]

As the Obama administration's experiment with engagement has shown, the Gulf Security Dialogue is a necessary but insufficient measure for countering Iranian aggression. The dialogue is ineffective when conciliatory U.S. gestures towards Iran contradict it. President Obama got it right at his inauguration when he said America must fight its enemies "not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions." Among these convictions is that "our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint."[80]

This is the spirit of the dialogue. The United States cannot negotiate sturdy alliances through barter and concession. It must earn them by denying "mutual respect" to the enemies of America's democratic ideals and standing by those who desire a new way forward.

 

Patrick Knapp is a second lieutenant in the Minnesota Army National Guard. He is currently attending the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

[1] Michael Knights, "Changing Military Balance in the Gulf," Realclearworld.com, Sept. 15, 2009.
[2] Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman, "GCC-Iran: Operational Analysis of AIR, SAM and TBM Forces," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Aug. 20, 2009.
[3] "Operation Praying Mantis," Global Security.org, accessed Oct. 5, 2009.
[4] Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., May 19, 2009, p. 26.
[5] Kayhan (Tehran), July 9, 2007 .
[6] BBC Persian, Feb. 16, 2009.
[7] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Broader Strategic Context," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Dec. 5, 2008, p. 38.
[8] Tehran Times, Oct. 30, 2008.
[9] Cordesman, "Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 15.
[10] Marine Corps Times, June 25, 2007.
[11] The CNN Wire, June 19, 2009.
[12] "Operation Earnest Will," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed Oct. 12, 2009.
[13] Martin Indyk, quoted in Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 261.
[14] Anthony H. Cordesman. "Conventional Armed Forces in the Gulf," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., June 23, 2008, p. 37.
[15] "Strengthen Relationships," U.S. Central Command, excerpts from testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2007.
[16] BBC News, Feb. 19, 2009.
[17] Cordesman, "Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction," p. 15.
[18] Tariq Khaitous, "Arab Reactions to a Nuclear Armed Iran," Policy Focus #94, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2009, p. 23.
[19] Jim Garamone, "Cooperative Defense Initiative Seeks to Save Lives," American Forces Press Service, Apr. 10, 2000.
[20] "Regional Overview and Contributions of Key Allies," A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Mar. 2001), accessed Oct. 14, 2009.
[21] "Assistant Secretary Hillen to Travel to Persian Gulf Region," U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 12, 2006.
[22] Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2006.
[23] Simon Henderson, "Naval Exercises off Bahrain: Preventing Proliferation between North Korea and Iran," PolicyWatch, no. 1157, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 2006.
[24] John Hillen, quoted in Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2007, p. 33.
[25] "U.S.-Kuwait Gulf Security Dialogue Joint Statement," U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 22, 2007.
[26] Katzman, "Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses," May 19, 2009, p. 41.
[27] Robert Gates, Manama dialogue speech, Manama, Bahrain, Dec. 8, 2007.
[28] Rachel Stohl, "United States Re-emerges as Leading Arms Supplier to the Developing World," Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C., Dec. 30, 2008.
[29] Christopher M. Blanchard and Richard F. Grimmett, "The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sale Proposals," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., Oct. 8, 2008, p. 1.
[30] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 31, 2007.
[31] Kenneth Katzman, "Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., May 20, 2009, p. 6.
[32] Katzman, "Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses," May 19, 2009, p. 42.
[33] Ibid.
[34] SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Aug. 17, 2009.
[35] Charles Schumer, "Statements on introduced bills and joint resolutions," introducing S. J. Res. 32, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., May 13, 2008.
[36] Robert Gates, speech to U.S. Central Command Gulf States chiefs of defense, Washington, D.C., June 24, 2009.
[37] Agence France-Presse, Apr. 27, 2009.
[38] "U.S.-U.A.E. Gulf Security Dialogue," U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Mar. 11, 2008.
[39] George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," Jan. 28, 2008.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Reuters, June 17, 2009.
[42] Barack Obama, "Inaugural Address," Jan. 20, 2009; idem, interview, Al-Arabiya (Dubai), Jan. 27, 2009.
[43] Gates, speech to U.S. Central Command, June 24, 2009.
[44] BBC News, May 26, 2009.
[45] Gulf Times (Dubai), Sept. 10, 2007.
[46] "Kuwait—Technical/Logistics Support for F/A-18 Aircraft," Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Washington, D.C., July 7, 2009; "Kuwait—Upgrade Desert Warrior Fire Control System with GITS II," Defense Security Cooperation Agency, July 10, 2009.
[47] The New York Times, July 22, 2009.
[48] Robert Gates, speech to the Association of the United States Army, www.Army.mil, Oct. 10, 2007.
[49] The National (Abu Dhabi), June 30, 2009.
[50] "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, p. xi.
[51] "2010 QDR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet," U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., Apr. 27, 2009.
[52] National Public Radio, July 31, 2007.
[53] William J. Burns, testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., July 9, 2008.
[54] Asharq al-Awsat (London), June 11, 2008.
[55] U.S. News and World Report, May 4, 2009.
[56] Thomas Donnelly, "Indefensible," The Weekly Standard, Mar. 9, 2009.
[57] Edwin J. Feulner, "Spending Spree and Cutting Defense Don't Add Up," America at Risk Memo, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., July 20, 2009.
[58] FOX News, Apr. 6, 2009.
[59] Barack Obama, speech, Cairo University, White House press office, June 4, 2009.
[60] Barack Obama and Angela Merkel, Washington, D.C., White House press office, June 26, 2009.
[61] BBC News, Oct. 2, 2009.
[62] CBS News, Oct. 25, 2009; Army Times, Oct. 25, 2009.
[63] American Forces Press Service (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 11, 2009.
[64] Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh, "Iran's Hidden Revolution," The New York Times," June 16, 2009.
[65] Fars News Agency (Tehran), May 18, 2009.
[66] Marisa Cochrane, "Iran's Hard Power Influence in Iraq," IranTracker, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., Apr. 10, 2009.
[67] Ellen Tauscher, remarks to U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence symposium, U.S. Department of State, Omaha, Neb., July 30, 2009.
[68] Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, full text of speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Salem (Ore.) News, Sept. 23, 2009; Bloomberg.com, Sept. 24, 2009.
[69] BBC World News America, Mar. 20, 2009.
[70] CBS News, July 17, 2009.
[71] The Washington Post, Aug. 24, 2009.
[72] PressTV (Tehran), Aug. 25, 2009.
[73] Chris Harnisch, "A Critical War in a Fragile Country: Yemen's Battle with the Shiite al-Houthi Rebels," IranTracker, Aug. 31, 2009.
[74] Emirates News Agency, June 14, 2009; State of Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 13, 2009; Tehran Times, June 15, 2009.
[75] Oman Daily Observer, Aug. 12, 2009.
[76] Fars News Agency, Aug. 26, 2009.
[77] The New York Times, May 16, 2009.
[78] Tariq Khaitous, "Arab Reactions to a Nuclear Armed Iran," Policy Focus #94, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., June 2009, p. 23.
[79] Kenneth Katzman, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., June 1, 2009.
[80] Obama, "Inaugural Address," Jan. 20, 2009.

../..

Wall St Journal: Stop the Trial of Geert Wilders.

 

by Leon De Winter

 

A Dutch court is forced to compare Hitler's 'Mein Kampf' and the Quran.

 

What started as a trial against Geert Wilders for alleged Islamophobia has nearly turned into its opposite: a historical case about the message of the Quran. The Amsterdam court trying the controversial Dutch politician is now preoccupied with the question of whether this book, sacred to more than a billion believers, can be compared to one of the most vile publications in the history of Western civilization—Hitler's "Mein Kampf." What could possibly go wrong?

In his writing and speeches, Mr. Wilders has found these two works to be similar in terms of their anti-Semitism and incitement to hatred, and has thus called for a publishing ban on the Quran similar to the one in place for "Mein Kampf." This is what triggered Mr. Wilders's prosecution for discriminatory and insulting remarks against Muslims and Islam. The Dutch politician, though, denies having insulted Muslims. He insists his focus is on radical Islam and the Quran, which he considers to be not only a religious text but also a political pamphlet encouraging Muslims to discriminate against and, if necessary, kill Jews, Christians, apostates and other unbelievers. That's why Mr. Wilders claims the right to criticize and condemn Islam.

Following complaints brought by mostly Muslim and radical leftist activists, Amsterdam's district attorney in 2008 at first found no legal basis for prosecuting Mr. Wilders. Prosecutors were forced to change course only after an activist appeals court last year ordered Mr. Wilders's prosecution—basically condemning the politician before any trial could even begin and before Mr. Wilders had a chance to defend himself. The court's unusual intervention illustrates the Dutch confusion about the conflict between two essential rights: the right to free speech and the right to protection from discrimination.

According to polls, Mr. Wilders's Freedom Party, a libertarian-conservative movement with populist tendencies, is currently the most popular political party in the Netherlands. If elections were held today, Mr. Wilders would be a serious contender for the position of prime minister. Mr. Wilders's detractors are mistaken if they think a conviction would hurt him politically. The trial is a win-win situation for him: If the court rules to restrict Mr. Wilders's right to free speech, many Dutchmen will interpret this as an effort by the politically correct establishment to limit the growing strength of the Freedom Party, which would widen its appeal to many voters. If, on the other hand, the prosecution fails to prove that Mr. Wilders has purposely insulted Muslims because of their religion, Mr. Wilders's views will be seen as vindicated. Again, he will gain politically.

More importantly, Mr. Wilders's prosecution may in the end inadvertently create a crisis between the Netherlands and the Islamic world. On trial is not so much Geert Wilders, but the Holy Book of Islam. On Jan. 20, the first day of the case, Mr. Wilders's defense team presented the court with a list of expert witnesses. It is indicative of his strategy. The expert witnesses, a group of internationally renowned academics on the one hand and, on the other, radical Islamists (among them Mohammed Bouyeri, the killer of Theo van Gogh, and the influential Iranian Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, an outspoken anti-Semite and religious mentor of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinedjad), are requested to testify about the Quran's message and Mr. Wilders's comparison of the Quran to "Mein Kampf." As Mr. Wilders stated on the first and, so far only, session in court, if his statements about the Quran and "Mein Kampf" are correct, he cannot be convicted for telling the truth. So Mr. Wilders's defense team will concentrate on the extreme and violent paragraphs in the Quran, and compare them to paragraphs in "Mein Kampf."

The prosecution did not object to calling the witnesses for the purpose of shedding light on the Quran and "Mein Kampf" and only objected to the high number of witnesses named (17). The court will thus most likely allow most witnesses on the list to testify. Without doubt, there are many anti-Jewish remarks in the Quran. According to some researchers, there may be more of these in the Quran than in "Mein Kampf." So it is quite conceivable that the court will judge that Geert Wilders was within his right to compare the Quran to "Mein Kampf." Anything is possible in this absurd trial.

The three judges hearing the case—no doubt decent, modest, postmodern Dutchmen with a minimum knowledge of Islam and its culture and traditions—will now be forced to debate the nature of a religious text, something that should have never been heard in the court of an enlightened society. In front of the judges and television cameras, the ancient founding text of an entire civilization will be criticized and weighed against one of the most inhumane texts written in the 20th century—without any doubt a deep insult to Muslims, radical or not.

There is a way out. The district attorney's office has complied with the appeals court's order to prosecute Mr. Wilders. The trial has started. It should now ask the court for an acquittal. This preposterous trial needs to be stopped right now.

 

Mr. de Winter is a Dutch novelist and adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Obama Administration Learns its Basic Mideast Lesson.

 

by Barry Rubin

In contrast to its refusal to change course on Iran, the Obama administration has learned something about Israel-Palestinian peacemaking, conclusions clearly expressed in the government's new talking points.

First, President Barack Obama stated recently that his administration had overestimated its ability to get the two sides into meaningful peace talks. Blaming both parties equally, Obama said the problem is that neither Israel nor the Palestinians were ready to take the bold steps necessary to succeed.

This is a recognition of reality and about the best that could be expected. Of course, it maintains a determined evenhandedness, failing to hint at the easily demonstrable fact that it was the Palestinians who were not interested in making any compromises, even refusing to come to the table at all. But evenhandedness is welcome from an administration that originally seemed set to become the most anti-Israel presidency in history.

The new perspective, at least its public version, does not note the administration's own responsibility in raising Palestinian expectations that Washington would abandon Israel and give them everything they wanted. Two key points here were the administration's early bashing of Israel combined with the silly obsession about freezing construction on settlements. The Obama administration also has repeatedly told the Palestinians that they "deserve" a state with no indication that they would have to earn it.

But as I said, this is the best to be expected.

The words of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton should be studied carefully on this matter as it points out the administration's future plans. These can be summed up as: remaining active (and continually calling attention to their activity, however minor) but doing relatively little in real terms.

This new line is being framed always with the awareness of how the Obama administration blamed its predecessor for not doing enough. Ironically, the new policy is effectively an admission that the aforementioned predecessor in the White House couldn't have achieved more if he had used greater zeal on the issue, which was precisely the same conclusion reached by that other president's team.

Thus, Hillary takes a swipe at George Bush even while adopting his interpretation:

"We believe that this is a situation that deserves constant, persistent attention; that the absence of such attention perhaps created some of the difficulties that we are now encountering."

It's pretty funny to deconstruct this statement: We were too optimistic and our expectations were too high;  we tried really hard and got nothing. But the reason we didn't get anything is because the people in office before us didn't also set expectations too high, try really hard, and get nothing!

Ok, now let's focus on the future. Clinton continued:

 "But ultimately…this has to be between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The United States, the UK, the EU, the Arab League, everyone can work together to try to create the conditions for a resolution of the outstanding issues between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but at the end of the day, they must make that decision."

Isn't this what the Clinton and Bush administrations concluded? Well, it's good that the Obama administration has learned this lesson.

So what are they going to do? Clinton lays out the framework: "We are going to continue to do everything we can to create an environment in which that is possible." In other words, have lots of talks and present ideas which continually fail but at least show they are trying.

Of course, what's left out is the missing element which might allow at least for some minimal progress: put real pressure on the Palestinian Authority to make some compromises. But that isn't going to happen. And so we return to business as usual.

 

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

 

Why I murdered 13 American soldiers at Fort Hood: Nidal Hassan explains it all to you .

 

by Barry Rubin

How do we know that the attack at Fort Hood was an act of Islamist terrorism? Simple, Major Nidal Hassan told us so. You've seen reports of a long list of things he did and said along these lines. But what's most amazing of all is this:

Hassan is the first terrorist in history to give an academic lecture[1] explaining why he was about to attack. Yet that still isn't enough for too many people — including the president of the United States — to understand that the murderous assault at Fort Hood was a Jihad attack.

It was reported that the audience was shocked and frightened by his lecture. He was supposed to speak on some medical topic yet instead talked on the topic: "The Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military." All you have to do is look at the 50 Power Point slides[1] and they tell you everything you need to know.

It is quite a good talk. He's logical and presents his evidence. This is clearly not the work of a mad man or a fool, though there's still a note of ambiguity in it. He's still working out what to do in his own mind and is trying to figure out if he has a way out other than in effect deserting the U.S. army and becoming a Jihad warrior. Ultimately, he concluded that he could not be a proper Muslim without killing American soldiers. Obviously, other Muslims could reach different conclusions but Hassan strongly grounds himself in Islamic texts.

In a sense, Hassan's lecture was a cry for help: Can anyone show me another way out? Can anyone refute my interpretation of Islam? One Muslim in the audience reportedly tried to do so. But unless these issues are openly discussed and debated — rather than swept under the rug — more people will die.

In fact, I'd recommend that teachers use this lecture in teaching classes on both Islam and Islamist politics. .

Follow along with me and you'll understand everything.

Hassan deals with three topics: What Islam teaches Muslims, how Muslims view the wars in Afghanistan and Iran, how this might affect Muslims in the U.S. military. [Slide 2] Hassan defines Jihad, showing how silly are the claims that it only means a personal struggle to behave better. It also signifies holy war, of course. [Slide 5].

Now here's Hassan's central theme. Muslims cannot fight in an infidel army against other Muslims. And Hassan himself says that it's getting hard for Muslims in the U.S. military to justify doing so. [Slide 11] Obviously, Hassan was deciding that he couldn't do so.

He then quotes the Koran extensively to prove the point. Allah will punish anyone who kills a Muslim [Slide 12]. Hassan then gives four examples of Muslim soldiers who broke under the strain. One who killed fellow American soldiers (which Hassan would himself do), one accused of espionage (but was acquitted), one who deserted, and one who refused deployment to Iraq. [Slide 13]

Quoting the Koran, Hassan next provides a number of quotations to show that the believer must obey Allah. If they do, they will enjoy great delights (though he left out the 72 virgins, there's one quote hinting at pederasty), and if they don't they will suffer torments of Hell.

Finally, he gets into the heavy stuff. Hassan introduces the concept of "defensive Jihad" which is a core element in radical Islamist thinking and has especially been promoted by Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida. [Slides 37-39]. If others attack and oppress Muslims, then it is the duty of all Muslims to fight them. September 11 was justified by its perpetrators by saying that the United States had attacked Muslims and therefore it was mandatory to kill Americans in return.

And here is the crux of the matter: Verse 60:08, "Allah forbids you...from dealing kindly and justly" with those who fight Muslims." [Slide 40]

If Nidal Hassan believed this and would follow it, he must — to be a proper Muslim in his eyes — pick up a gun and join the Jihad, Muslim side. He was not shooting Americans because he caught battle fatigue from American soldiers he treated. Think about it. To have done so, Hassan would have had to sympathize with them, thinking about what it would be like for him if he'd been fighting...Muslims in Iraq or Afghanistan. But that was precisely his problem. He sympathized with the other side.

Being ordered to ship out to one of these countries, Hassan now had to decide: which side are you on? Would he choose the side of Allah and the Muslims, to be rewarded in Heaven? Or would he join with the infidels, to be punished with Hell and to betray his religion? He made his decision.

It is interesting that no Muslim debate has developed over a very simple issue: What if two groups of Muslims are fighting, cannot one side with one group, even if it has non-Muslim allies? After all, Americans are not going to Iraq or Afghanistan simply to "kill Muslims" but to defend Muslims from being killed. The Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Egyptians had no problem with using Western troops to save them from Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991, for example. The Iraqi and Afghan governments, made up of pious Muslims, do the same thing.

Arab nationalists who are Muslims can take this position more easily. But for Islamists the problem is not some abstraction but knowledge that they are fighting a battle to seize control of all Muslim-majority states and indeed perhaps of the entire world.

The true problem, then, is not that some Muslims help infidels kill Muslims, but that some Muslims help infidels kill Islamists. But Hassan never considered this point, which could be quite persuasive to other Muslims in Western militaries.

So, in his thinking, how might Hassan have escaped from that stark choice? Hassan answers that question. Quoting the Koran, he indicated that if the Americans ended the wars, then that would be okay and no killing would be necessary. [Slide 42]

Another alternative is if the Americans accepted Islam or agreed to become subservient to Muslim rulers (dhimmis) and paid a special tax [Slide 43-44].

The third alternative would be if the Muslim Messiah came, destroyed Christianity as a false religion and set off the post-history utopia. [Slide 45]. He didn't mention another part of this description, which was the murder of all Jews.

A digression is appropriate here. Hassan, although a Palestinian, has never been quoted as attacking Israel or the Jews. This is one more reminder that this struggle isn't all just about Israel. But it also tells something important about Hassan which also applies to many Muslim radicals in Europe. Hassan is an American. As such he has no other nationality, neither Palestinian nor Arab. He doesn't support Hamas or Fatah. But he has a religion that directs his thinking. That's why he is an Islamist and why he supports a generalized Islamist revolutionary movement, al-Qaida.

As one moderate Muslim from Canada pointed out, the clothes he wore the day before committing his Jihad attack was not (as some sources put it in a silly manner) some martyr or even Arab garb but the clothing of Pakistan and Afghanistan. He is an al-Qaida Jihadi, having changed sides in the War on Terror.

Hassan was no fool or blind fanatic. Indeed, he presents a sophisticated view. For example, he quotes contradictory Quranic verses, one suggesting that all religions can enter Heaven; another that all non-Muslims will go to Hell [Slide 47].

His conclusion takes on tremendous significance in light of what would happen at Fort Hood. He writes:

"If Muslim groups can convince Muslims that they are fighting for God against injustices of the 'infidels'; i.e., the enemies of Islam, then Muslims can become a potent adversary ie: suicide bombing, etc."

And of course, these groups did so convince Hassan. [Slide 48]

Why? Hassan tells us:

"God expects full loyalty. Promises heaven and threatens with Hell. Muslims may seem moderate (compromising) but God is not." [Slide 49]

And at the very end, he proposes what might have been his own escape route:

"Recommendation: Department of Defense should allow Muslim soldiers the option of being released as 'Conscientious objectors' to increase troop morale and decrease adverse events." [Slide 50]

If that had existed for Hassan, I think, he would not have killed people. This proposal is worth debating, though it has negative implications too, of course. But then he had other options. He could have resigned his commission, deserted, or refused deployment as a conscientious objector and gone to prison. In fact, Hassan himself cited individuals who had done the last two.

Consequently, Hassan's lecture also tells us why Muslims can choose not to be Jihadists, though this requires ignoring or rationalizing clear, religiously binding commandments in their religion or by being basically secular people of Muslim background. This is the kind of solution found in Christianity and Judaism, of course.

Hassan was too pious and consistent to take this way out. The answer to his personal behavior must be found in a mix of psychological factors and political-religious beliefs. The fact is, however, that he clearly did see himself as a Jihad warrior in the end. The existence of psycological factors in no way negates the importance of religious considerations.

All terrorists have some psychological forces working to make them follow such a path. Yet if not for ideological — and in the case of Islamists, religious — beliefs they never would have become terrorists. In contrast, criminals have psychological factors plus material goals, while mentally ill people who commit crimes are compelled by purely psychogical factors. Hassan does not fit either of those two categories.

Equally, his action cannot be attributed to a "misreading" or "heretical" interpretation of Islam. To read this lecture is to understand how carefully and self-critically he approached the issues. Anything so obviously false or deviant from mainstream Islam would simply not appeal to so many Muslims. Hassan was looking for a way out in the texts and listed the "loopholes" he did find: either the United States must not fight anyone who was a Muslim or it must let him out of the military.

What Hassan neglected was an explanation that lay outside what his strict reading of the Muslim texts would allow him to say: the United States must fight, in general, because the Islamists have been the aggressors. And the United States is actually fighting as allies with one group of (more moderate) Muslims against another (of radical Islamists). Yet the texts always deal with the Muslim community as a united whole (the umma), an interpretation that just doesn't correspond with reality. Indeed and ironically, this view enables Islamists to themselves kill thousands of Muslims all over the world!

The fact that Hassan's lecture has not been the centerpiece of the whole post-massacre debate is a true example of how impoverished are the "experts," journalists, and politicians at dealing with these issues. Of course, without exploring the Islamic factor, they're wasting everyone's time. They're also going to be wasting quite a few lives.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.