Interview with the Friends of Israel Gospel Ministry

 

by Elwood McQuaid

 

EDITOR'S NOTE: Our executive editor, Elwood McQuaid, spoke recently with Daniel Pipes, founder and director of the Middle East Forum and one of the world's leading experts on Islam and related issues. We are privileged to print edited excerpts from that interview.

Elwood McQuaid: Dr. Pipes, we see a great change in Europe. I'm referring to the invasion of Islam and the Muslim claim that it is creating an Islamic Europe. Is that concern justified?

Daniel Pipes: I think it is. There are three components to it.

The first is demographic. Indigenous Europeans are not having enough children by about one-third. You need 2.1 children per woman [to sustain a population], and they are having about 1.4. So they need immigrants; and those immigrants are coming from Muslim countries like Algeria and Turkey. Also, the Muslim countries have very large, young populations.

The second component is religious. One sees a near collapse of Christianity in Europe and a lack of sense of purpose in terms of faith and spirituality - which the Muslims have, of course, in abundance.

And third is a cultural dimension. Europeans have become politically correct, multicultural, call it what you will. Muslims come with a clear sense of cultural superiority.

Put these three together and you see the possible transformation of a continent. It's not happened yet. It could be averted. But if trends continue, it's likely to happen.

EMQ: It seems the United States and Europe are resigned to Iran developing nuclear weapons. Should we be concerned about this? And what should be done about it?

DP: If Iran gets a nuclear bomb, it changes the dynamics - not just in the Middle East, but worldwide. If the Obama administration has in mind to do something, it's not about to broadcast it. So we don't know. But I'm not optimistic. But I also would not conclude at this date that the Iranians will get the bomb. There is still pressure that can be brought.

EMQ: Can sanctions really accomplish anything?

DP: I don't think so. I don't think sanctions have any value beyond window dressing. I don't think agreements have any value. I don't think threats have any value. It boils down to whether we accept the Iranian nuclear program or we destroy it.

EMQ: How should Israelis feel about this?

DP: I think it's realistic for the Israelis to attack and do real damage. Now, what constitutes success, I'm not exactly sure. There are many, many questions. If I were [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin]Netanyahu, I would say to [U.S. President Barack] Obama, "Why don't you take out the Iranian nukes? Or else we will And we will not do it by trying to fly planes across Turkey and Syria or Jordan or Saudi Arabia. We will do it from submarine-based, tactical nuclear weapons. You don't want that; we don't want that; but that's the way we can do this job for sure. You do it your way so we don't have to escalate to that." That would be a way of applying pressure. There are so many details which I'm not privy to. But that would be my kind of approach if I were the Israelis.

EMQ: Do you believe leaders in the West are actually listening to [Iranian leader Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad and believing it?

DP: There seems to be a growing willingness to accept Iranian nuclear weapons and work the Iranian government into the international system. But whether or not there is also an effort to undermine and even to destroy this, I can't tell you.

EMQ: On the issue of Israeli and Palestinian peace, apparently nothing is happening. Why is this true, and has Palestinian determination to destroy Israel diminished?

DP: No, it hasn't diminished. It's there, virulent as ever. In about 90 years' worth of Palestinian response to Palestine, which the British created right after World War I, roughly four-fifths of Palestinians have refused anything to do with the Yishuv [Jewish community in Israel prior to statehood] or Israel, and one-fifth have said, "Okay, we can live with it." That number has remained remarkably static over close to a century.

Why is nothing happening? That's a very interesting question. The Obama administration came in and had two factions within it. One said, "We can get concessions from the Israelis if we work with them." The other said, "We can get what we want from Israel by picking a fight with it." The latter faction is the one that prevailed initially. And they picked a fight by focusing on the so-called settlements. (I don't like this term, but I'll use it for shorthand.) [U.S. Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton said, "No growth whatsoever, at all, period." [Not even in Jerusalem.]

This had two inadvertent consequences that the geniuses in the .White House did not think through. First, it got the Israelis to back Netanyahu because this policy was flatly unacceptable in Israeli politics. Netanyahu got stronger, not weaker. Second, the Palestinians who had been negotiating with the Israelis said, "No more! If the Americans said you can't grow the settlements, then we say you can't grow them." So the Obama administration hardened the position on both sides and finds itself with no negotiations taking place - which, for me, is just fine. But from their point of view, it's a disaster.

EMQ: Islam is touted to be a religion of peace, love, and coexistence with other religions. If this is true, why are Muslims the primary persecutors of Christians worldwide?

DP: Islam is a religion that is 1,400 years old, and there have been many different forms of it. There have been times and places when Islam was tolerant, at least in comparison to other civilizations at that time. Today, clearly, that's not the case. Indeed, speaking as a historian of Islam, I would say there has never been a worse moment in Muslim history. There are many points of view, and one of them is that it's intolerant not just against Christians. Christians are a prominent example.

Muslims who are liberal and open-minded are, themselves, persecuted. The first victims of radical Islam are Muslims. One example is the case of Darfur. This event is arguably the worst humanitarian situation in the world today. And that's Islamists versus Muslims. The Christian plight is part of a larger picture of Muslim intolerance and radicalism that is prevailing today. When I entered this field 40 years ago, it was not like this. It is a terrible moment, and Christians in particular are paying a heavy price.

EMQ: What is the future of Islam in America? And should we be concerned when Muslims talk about a global Islamic caliphate?

DP: The global Islamic caliphate is indeed a powerful concept and something one should be concerned about. The future of Islam in America is difficult to predict. There are two great possibilities. One is that it continues down the path of being radical and adversarial with the existing order, or (I don't see this possibility in Europe) that Islam will become part of the American religious scene and not try to dominate. There is that possibility.

EMQ: Do Western leaders, including Americans, really understand the root of Islamic militancy? They keep attempting to separate it from religion. Do they "get it"?

DP: Basically, no. I would say there are three interpretations of the current state of affairs. One is what I call the establishment view, which is what you just described. People say, "Islam has been hijacked; the problem is terrorism; Islam is a religion of peace." A denial of the problem.

The second is what I call the insurgent view: "Islam itself is the problem. Islam has always been a problem, with jihad, honor killings, and the like. Islam is itself evil and problematic. Muslims are inherently a problem." I think that is too broad-based and wrong.

And then there is the middle position, which I subscribe to. It would be summed up by saying, "Radical Islam is the problem, and moderate Islam is the solution." I believe there is a possibility for Islam to evolve in a way that is moderate, modern, and willing to live in harmony with others. I think it is possible for non-Muslims and moderate Muslims to work together to achieve that.

Even if you believe the insurgent approach, that Islam itself is evil, there's no policy you can pursue. What can you do if you're president [of the United States] and you believe that? Are you going to throw out freedom of religion? Are you going to exclude Muslims? Are you going to fight wars abroad to promote Christianity? It's not who we are. It requires such fundamental changes that I'd say it's just not possible. So I think it's a dead-end approach.

Even if you believe that, and I'm sure some of your listeners do, I'd say you have to join me in seeing Islamism as a political ideology comparable to fascism and Communism because we have tools to defeat that. We have won wars against them: the Second World War and the Cold War. We can do it again. But if we see the problem as religion, we don't have tools; we can't win.

EMQ: Is there a fear that speaking against Islamic radicalism will provoke attacks on reporters, officials, or whoever speaks his mind? We know that converts to Christianity from Islam are under fatwas. Is there a fear that people will be attacked if they express themselves?

DP: I would differentiate between physical attacks and social-political attacks, such as ostracism, condemnation, loss of job, and the like. And I would differentiate those two from prosecution by the government. There have been extraordinary cases of anonymous cartoonists in the UK and Netherlands being arrested, the police tracking them down and arresting them, putting them in jail overnight for cartoons. So there are actually three different dimensions: the violent, the social-political, and the governmental.

Yes, these are all significant problems. I, in fact, started something called the Legal Project at my organization, which is exclusively focused on protecting the right of scholars and activists to speak freely about this range of issues. We have developed an expertise. We have a network of pro bono and reduced-cost lawyers. We have a pot of money. And we're not just defending but, in some cases, going on the offense to make sure there is freedom of speech about this all-important issue of Islam.

EMQ: And where do you fall in those three? I know you are vehemently criticized by some of the pro-Islamic organizations and some of the so-called progressives. Where do they put you?

DP: Well, I don't have physical threats, and I don't have governmental prosecution. So for me it's just the social-political.

EMQ: If Muslims are concerned about their religion being hijacked by radicals, why the silence from Islam generally about this issue?

DP: It's not a complete silence. There have been important exceptions. Perhaps the most dramatic was in mid-2007 when literally millions of people on the streets of Turkish cities said no to Islamic law. And there have been other major demonstrations in Pakistan and elsewhere. But I accept your basic point that, in general, Muslims who don't want the Islamic law imposed on them and don't want the caliphate have been all too quiet. I think that has to do in part with intimidation, in part with lack of organization, with ideology, and with funding.

I think there is also a respect that these people [radical Islamists] are really living and applying Islam in its fullness. Just because there isn't enough of a moderate-Muslim push-back today doesn't mean there won't be in the future. I believe that is a goal we should work toward to help moderate Muslims. The U.S. government and other public institutions have been very deficient in this. If you look at television or go to a university, you'll find over and over again it is the Islamists who are in place.

We should consciously exclude them and push them to the side, exclude them as we would the KKK or Nation of Islam. Exclude them from the public square and invite the moderates instead.

EMQ: In the case of some of these extremist organizations you mentioned, it was largely Christians who rebelled against them and pushed them to the side. I hope we can see that with moderate Muslims in the future.

DP: I am very much hoping so too.

 

 

Elwood McQuaid

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Why Arab regimes don't do more

 

by Barry Rubin 

If the Arab world feels so threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran, shouldn’t it cooperate more closely with the West to seek a solution?

 

Readers often ask why it is that threatened by Iran, Syria, terrorist violence and revolutionary Islamists, Arab regimes don’t cooperate more with the West or actively seek to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Sure, they do some things – Jordan and Egypt made peace with Israel, there is some real work with the West, as in the rescue of Kuwait from Iraqi aggression in 1991. But why not much more, on the level that could achieve more stability in the region?

One reader wrote: These despots don’t seem cunning to me at all.

But that’s flat wrong. They are very cunning and if you understand how, you can begin to comprehend the Middle East.

These rulers’ most important priority is regime survival. The people’s well-being and country’s interest is secondary at best. To stay in power, a dictatorship needs to generate foreign enemies, reduce freedom and monopolize economic wealth. This is, in many ways, the opposite of the Western democratic view that a government which provides freedom and material benefits for its citizens is the one most likely to stay in power.

To ensure regime survival, the dictatorship must protect its Muslim and Arab credentials. Using these two pillars in various combinations, rulers mobilize the people. A key way to do this is anti- Western and anti-Israel demagoguery: The government portrays itself as a champion of Islam and Arabism against demonic foes.

What the West does in response is unimportant to a populace that already views it as an enemy and whose information about the outside world is filtered through regime and ideological propaganda.

Suppose the US distances itself from Israel. How do Arab populaces know or interpret this step? They are told nothing has happened, that it is a trick or far from sufficient. Rather than prove the West is “nice,” these developments are interpreted as merely proving it is weak and frightened, or at best being won over to the Arab regimes’ position. This leads to more demands, not more gratitude.

In these dictatorships, the army’s main purpose is to support the regime rather than win wars. The main purpose of the educational system and media is to glorify the regime, not tell the truth and help fix its problems. The economy’s main purpose is to provide the regime with assets for rewarding friends and punishing enemies, not to create prosperity or raise living standards.

This approach provides neither rapid progress nor better lives for the people. But if you start with the original premise – keeping the regime in power comes first – everything makes sense.

NOW LET’S move to a more advanced stage. Here’s a paraphrase of a letter from another reader which parallels the first one: “Given that Israel is not the only country in the Middle East that feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and that Israel is likely to be the only country that has the political will to do anything about the situation, doesn’t this give Israel a considerable strategic advantage? It strikes me that a number of demands could be made upon Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in exchange for Israeli action against Iran.”

This is a very good question. But the answer is no. Why? Because there is little or no give and take. If Arab regimes get something from Israel, they will not give anything in return (I’ll qualify that point in a second). If they don’t get anything from Israel, they will not give to get an advantage. They will let events go as they may.

The same point, by the way, applies to US-Arab state relations. Of course, the US saved Kuwait in 1991 and Kuwait likes having US military forces around. But there has been no effort to promote pro-US feeling or to help out much on such issues as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the efforts to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Two years later when Washington begged for assistance in the Oslo process, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did nothing.

Why? Are the regimes stupid or irrational? No, they are following their interests as they perceive them. True, one day they may pay a high cost for their policies, but so far they’ve survived pretty well. The exception is Saddam Hussein in Iraq, who miscalculated and just kept going too far.

Of course, they can hope that Israel or the US will attack Iran for their own reasons, or at least US policy will contain Teheran without their having to do much. They watch a West apparently desperate to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. If the West fails, the regimes win by complaining how much they are suffering and demand compensation; if the West succeeds, their passivity worked.

And they have still another reason for acting this way: The West lets them get away with it. When they choose between fearing the US or defusing radical threats at home and abroad, the decision is easy. It is usually more risky to be moderate or work with the West than to defy it.

If you tell them they would be better off if they went to a more Western-style system, they would reply that this is not their culture; their masses might not like it; and their rivals at home and abroad would portray them as traitors. Arab elites watched what happened in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The West cheered a peaceful change for freedom; Arab regimes shivered at the thought of anarchy and their own downfall.

 

So, is this system pragmatic? Yes and no. It is not pragmatic in terms of keeping people happy through freedom and high living standards. It is pragmatic in judging that demagoguery and control are alternative means of securing passivity or even outright support for the regime. It is pragmatic in achieving the main goal: stability and regime maintenance.

Homework: Apply this model to Palestinian politics. In this framework, why isn’t the Palestinian Authority as eager for a complete peace settlement and an independent state through compromise as one would expect using a Western model of politics?

 

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center and editor of Middle East Review of International Affairs and Turkish Studies.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Rewriting the Rules of International Diplomacy

 

by Evelyn Gordon

 

Palestinian preconditions for negotiations with Israel have been changing so rapidly that it's hard to keep up. Yet they all have one thing in common: all seek to rewrite the accepted rules of international diplomacy.

The latest, unveiled this week, is that the Palestinians refuse to begin direct talks unless the U.S. guarantees that the final-status border will be based on the 1949 armistice lines, including in Jerusalem, and that an international force will replace Israel's army completely, leaving Israel with no security presence on the West Bank.

In other words, the Palestinians won't "negotiate" unless there's nothing left to negotiate about, because the U.S. has already guaranteed that all their demands will be met. That would completely gut the usual principle of negotiations, which is that both sides make concessions to forge a mutually acceptable compromise.

It would also leave Israel with no reason even to begin the talks. Not only are these demands unacceptable to Jerusalem in themselves (as I've explained here, here, and here, for instance), but with the entirety of the territory and its military presence having already been conceded in advance, Israel would have no bargaining chips left with which to secure Palestinian concessions on other issues of importance to it, such as the refugees or recognition as a Jewish state.

Indeed, if this were to become the accepted model for diplomatic negotiations — one in which everything is decided in one party's favor in advance — it would spell the death of international diplomacy, because the other party would always have the strongest possible incentive to avoid talks.

The same was true of the Palestinians' last attempt to pose preconditions: their insistence that the starting point for talks be the proposals made by former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert, which they themselves rejected. If leaders knew that any proposal they made would be binding on them and their successors — but not their interlocutors — even if the other side rejected it, they would be reluctant to offer any proposals at all. That would effectively kill off any possibility of negotiations.

Washington, to its credit, rejected that precondition and is so far standing publicly firm on the demand for guarantees as well. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas complained to Fatah's Revolutionary Council on Tuesday that President Barack Obama had been "vague" on the issues of borders and security, while State Department spokesman Philip Crowley told reporters yesterday that "fundamental issues in the process, including borders … can only be resolved within the context of direct negotiations."

Nevertheless, there has apparently been some waffling in private: an Israeli source told Haaretz this week that "Washington is giving serious consideration to issuing these guarantees in order to encourage the Palestinians to agree to direct talks."

If the U.S. actually wants talks to occur, it must continue standing firm — not only for the sake of a time-honored principle of international diplomacy, but also because there is no chance of any deal emerging until the Palestinians are made to understand that they, too, will have to make concessions to achieve it.

 

Evelyn Gordon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Witnesses for the defense of Israel

 

by Ruth King

 

It is a major understatement to say that Israel is condemned without trial in the court of international public opinion. I speak of Western nations whose media, academies and even legal institutions have been suffused by anti-Semitism fueled by an unholy alliance of leftists, Moslem immigrants and petrodollars contributed to their sagging economies by the Arabs.

 

Those who have defended Israel, who have abjured a weak-kneed "neutrality", who appreciate Israel's extraordinary history and legacy, who understand Israel's dilemma in the face of the determined Islamic onslaught on her existence, who support Israel's right to take up arms in its own defense are honorable people deserving celebration.

In this issue we include the refreshing mission statement of the "Friends of Israel" initiative undertaken by Jose Maria Aznar, former Prime Minister of Spain.

 

Here we would like to feature an eclectic group which has independently taken up the cudgels for Israel.

 

Among journalists we single out Britain's Melanie Phillips. In May 2010 in an interview with National Review editor Katherine Lopez, Phillips said: "The treatment of Israel by the left-wing Western intelligentsia is unique in its irrationality and moral and historical inversion. It takes a nation that is the historic victim of aggression and blames it for jeopardizing peace in the region and causing Islamic extremism worldwide—despite demonstrable evidence that this is simply untrue….It takes a nation that has been under exterminatory attack for six decades (nine, if you include the Palestine Mandate) and insists that it make compromises with its attackers, even as they continue to attack it. And if any Jews dare protest at the manifest injustice, lies, and bigotry in this unique delegitimization, they find themselves accused of 'dual loyalty' or being part of a covert global conspiracy to put the world at risk."

 

In England there is also Professor Bernard Harrison whose The Resurgence of Anti-Semitism: Jews, Israel and Liberal Opinion (2005) is a powerful indictment of the anti-Semitism (disguised as anti-Zionism) within the self-proclaimed "progressive, anti-racist" left in European universities, journalism and political life.

 

Pilar Rahola is a Spanish politician, journalist and activist who departs from the left-wing chorus to be an articulate and passionate defender of Israel and the Jewish people. In her words: "The truth about Israel is not told. As a person from the left who loves progress, I am obligated to defend liberty, culture, civic education for children, coexistence and the laws that the Tablets of the Covenant made into universal principles. Principles that Islamic fundamentalism systematically destroys. That is to say that as a non-Jew, journalist and lefty I have a triple moral duty with Israel, because if Israel is destroyed, liberty, modernity and culture will be destroyed too."

 

Rahola adds that Israel is "a pariah nation among nations for a pariah people among peoples. That is why the anti-Semitism of the 21st Century has dressed itself with the efficient disguise of anti-Israelism, or its synonym, anti-Zionism. All criticism against Israel is anti-Semitism? No. But all present-day anti-Semitism has turned into prejudice and the demonization of the Jewish State. New clothes for an old hatred."

 

Geert Wilders, who leads the Party for Freedom (PVV) in Holland, is on trial for telling the truth about Islam. In June he demonstrated his commitment and understanding by stating categorically that Jordan should be renamed "Palestine" and become the homeland that the world thinks the Palestinian Arabs deserve at the cost of Israel's existence.

 

Wilders added that Israel deserved a special status in the Dutch government because it was fighting for Jerusalem in its name. "If Jerusalem falls into the hands of the Muslims, Athens and Rome will be next. Thus, Jerusalem is the main front protecting the West. It is not a conflict over territory but rather an ideological battle, between the mentality of the liberated West and the ideology of Islamic barbarism."

 

Fortunately every generation brings its own stalwart friends. I cannot end without paying tribute to John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia from 1996 until 2007. As opposition leader he regularly expressed deep friendship and admiration for Israel and the Jewish people. While Prime Minister In 2000, he declared: "The personal affection I have for the state of Israel, the personal regard I have for the Jewish people of the world, will never be diminished. It is something I hold dearly, something I value as part of my being and as part of what I have tried to do with my life."

 

In 2006 during Israel's war with Hezbollah, Mr, Howard said: "Once you are attacked…and if that attack is in the context of a 50-year rejection of your right to exist, which is the situation in relation to Iran—and bear in mind the link between Iran and Hezballah; bear in mind the exhortations from the Iranian President that Israel should be destroyed and wiped off the map—-you can understand the tenacity with which the Israelis have responded."

 

Next month I will pay tribute to other notable figures who stand solidly with Israel.

Zeev Jabotinksky said that recognizing allies is as important in the Jewish struggle as recognizing enemies. It is

 

 

Ruth King

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Lebanon: Ayatollah Fadlallah's Death and the Expansion of Iranian Hegemony

 

by Shimon Shapira

 

• Shiite religious leader Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah played a leading role in the increasing Islamic radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and laid the foundations for Hizbullah's ideology of violent struggle against the West and Israel. He endowed the need to employ violence with religious sanction.
• When Islamic radicalism blew in from Khomeini's Tehran in the 1980s and swept up the Shiites in Lebanon into jihad against Israel and the West, Fadlallah provided them with a guide. He served as a leading ideologue and supplied an organized doctrine for the mujahid who is ready to sacrifice his life for the Imam.
• According to Fadlallah, "Death for those (Muslim fighters) is not a tragedy....Death has been transformed into a carefully calculated step that is not predicated on emotion. Death does not exist together with despair. The objectives and goals remain alive." It came as no surprise that Fadlallah praised the murder of eight innocent Jewish students at the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem in 2008.
• Yet it is also true that Fadlallah displayed a measure of political courage in opposing the aspirations of Iran to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Fadlallah was not prepared to recognize the status of Iran's Khamenei as vilayat-i faqih (rule of jurisprudent) because he did not view him as sufficiently learned, and also because he opposed this principle that had been invented by Ayatollah Khomeini.
• Fadlallah's death removes one of the major obstacles to Iran's quest to establish an Islamic republic in its own image in Lebanon. Indeed, Iran and Hizbullah are already acting to incorporate Fadlallah's memory under their auspices, as though they were always a part of his flesh and blood.

The death of Shiite religious leader Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah gave rise to a wave of eulogies, publications, and manifestos that continued even after he was brought for burial at his mosque in the Dahiya neighborhood in Beirut where he preached, rather than in Najaf, Iraq, where he was born in 1935 and where his father and grandfather are buried.¹

The general tone of the eulogists - devotees and critics alike - emphasized the moderate, scholarly, moral, and progressive aspects of his activity since his arrival in Lebanon in 1966. At first he operated in the shadow of Imam Musa Sadr, who led the Shiite community in Lebanon until his mysterious disappearance in summer 1978 in Libya. Seven months later, immediately after the Islamic revolution in Iran, Fadlallah became the most influential cleric in Lebanon.²

A Leader in the Radicalization of Lebanese Shiites

He played a leading role in the increasing Islamic radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and laid the foundations for Hizbullah's ideology of violent struggle against the West and Israel that brought him to the television screens and front pages of newspapers throughout the world. In the 1980s, an irate Fadlallah poured fire and brimstone on the unbelievers, and endowed the need to employ violence with religious sanction.

In death he was transformed into the "sweet" Fadlallah who concerned himself with the status of women and gave women the right to stand up against wife-beating husbands. Fadlallah was a combination of the two, a man of many faces who managed to combine anger with grace. Yet Fadlallah knew full well that a smiling and moderate face would not enable him to attain the exalted status of marja al-taqlid (source of imitation) in the Lebanon of the 1980s. Islamic radicalism blew in from Khomeini's Tehran and swept up the Shiites in Lebanon into jihad against Israel and the West.

Fadlallah provided them with a guide. He spoke their language and supplied them with an organized doctrine and the perfect ideology for the mujahid who is ready to sacrifice his life for the Imam. The Israeli entry into Lebanon in 1982 (and for a brief period that of an international force in Beirut) greased the wheels of an Islamic revolution in Lebanon, one in which Fadlallah served as its leading ideologue.

In his book Islam and the Logic of Force, which Fadlallah wrote "when shells are falling in the background and by candlelight" during the Lebanese civil war in 1976, he laid out the basic infrastructure. In his preface to the 3rd edition in 1984, Fadlallah explained the concept of terror which his acolytes were accused of perpetrating:³

Civilization (hadara) does not mean that one contends against a rocket with a stick, against a combat aircraft with a kite, and against a warship with a sailboat....Against the force of oppression, one rises up with equal force or superior force; for the legitimate defense of man, the soil, the nation or fate, all means are legitimate.

Fadlallah did not content himself with referring the believers to his written philosophy that frequently contained single-minded ideas, expressed in some measure of double entendre and ambiguity. Life's travails united everyone around his charismatic image. They expected clear answers from him and he did not disappoint them. From his mosque fortress he showed the way. His sermons and lectures riveted thousands of partisans who drank in his words with an unquenchable thirst. Similar to Khomeini's technique, Fadlallah's speeches were recorded on cassettes and disseminated throughout Lebanon, in this way reaching a broader public that did not necessarily read his writings or hear him speak in Beirut. His speeches and lectures were also disseminated as proclamations and "pocket books."⁴

A Theology of Resistance

One of Fadlallah's most important lectures published in this fashion was al-Mukawama al-Islamiya ("The Islamic Resistance") against Israel. It was delivered in summer 1984 in the midst of Hizbullah's armed struggle against Israeli forces in south Lebanon, and was intended to lay the theoretical base for the Islamic struggle against Israel.⁵ With militant Shiite fervor, Fadlallah analyzed the change that had come over the Muslims in Lebanon. Fadlallah complained that they had become accustomed to acquiescence, and accepted a political reality whose slogans -  "there is no room for change" and "Lebanon's strength lies in its weakness" - were inexorable facts, spawning a generation of leaders that had no inkling of the term "resistance." The result, said Fadlallah, was that "when Israel entered south Lebanon [to eliminate PLO terrorist bases], it was regarded as a savior...and it scattered sleeping pills that instilled upon the fatigued residents a sense of tranquility. But the pills quickly dissolved in their bodies...Israel began to disclose its true face that was concealed at the beginning."

At a certain point a change occurred. "We did not have any experience in the struggle against Israel," wrote Fadlallah, "but after the initial attempts we began to sense that the Israeli could be killed, he runs away, lives in fear. This surprised people...and provided them with strength." Moreover "that woman who quaked with fear when she saw a soldier with his weapon confronting her...began to provoke and resist, because the legend of the (hitherto) unvanquished soldier collapsed. Here he was killed by a bullet and there by a roadside bomb, and all the people began to feel their power, a power that began to find new modes of expression. Since they did not have the ability to operate using classical means, they developed small-scale, guerrilla warfare. Against that, the enemy could not use tanks and planes. This is how our people in the south discovered their strength."⁶

Death and Martyrdom

Fadlallah discussed the current Islamic struggle at length, without ambiguity. "Death for those (Muslim fighters) is not a tragedy and does not represent a psychological state choked with emotion. Death has been transformed into a carefully calculated step that is not predicated on emotion. Death does not exist together with despair. The objectives and goals remain alive." Fadlallah voiced his opposition to "those who take issue with suicide attacks in Beirut, in the south, and other places (and argued) that they (the suicide bombers) lived in an atmosphere bereft of feeling and underwent brainwashing...when they contemplate sweet dreams and detach themselves from thought, sensing themselves suspended in the atmosphere of the Garden of Eden."⁷

"The problem with psychology," argued Fadlallah, "is that this science investigates concrete phenomena in laboratory conditions, whereas there are things you cannot understand unless you experience them....Someone who does not understand oppression cannot understand freedom, and someone who does not comprehend hunger cannot understand the screams of hunger, as the Queen of France said when the famished demonstrated opposite her palace and demanded bread. She asked the minister what they wanted. When he replied that they wanted bread, she said: 'There is no bread and the bakeries are closed; why should they not eat cake?'" "Why did she say this?" asks Fadlallah, and he responded, "because she could not understand how a person could lose his bread; she never experienced something like this and therefore she could not understand why they wanted bread when they were hungry." "The same is true with the psychologists," determines Fadlallah, "those who research phenomena using what they have in their possession, such as epilepsy and nerve diseases. From their limited experience they cannot understand how a person can work on behalf of a cause that fills his heart, belief and essence."⁸

Later, Fadlallah argued, "We do not see in this (self-sacrifice) the result of brainwashing or unconscious activity, as the intelligence services attempt to hint to the world. They do not want to present to the world the example of a person who wants to die by taking action on behalf of his liberty....They do not want the world to honor such a person, because this would constitute a problem for all imperialist governments." For Fadlallah, "a person senses spiritual joy when he is going to die and is not, as the media describes him, the laughing suicide bomber. Such a person does not laugh facially and with his lips but in his heart, and not on the basis of the sweet dreams that he experiences, but on behalf of the objective that he knows that he can advance one step forward."⁹

Subsequently, Fadlallah argued that he never issued a fatwa (a religious ruling) permitting istishhad (self-sacrifice).¹⁰ However, given his concepts, his followers did not require a fatwa to understand how their guide was directing them. It came as no surprise, therefore, that Fadlallah praised the murder of eight innocent Jewish students at the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem in 2008.¹¹

Standing Against Iran in Lebanon

Yet it is also true that Fadlallah displayed a measure of political courage in opposing the bruising aspirations of Iran to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon. As long as Khomeini was alive, Fadlallah tiptoed around the issue. Both sides needed each other to build the new Shiite society in Lebanon. Iran knew how to restrain its demands on Fadlallah and understood how to utilize his influence on Shiite believers in Lebanon and channel them to broad support for Hizbullah. Iran's emissaries in Hizbullah respected the rules of the game that were set in Iran.

When Ali Khamenei replaced Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the rules were shattered. Ayatollah Fadlallah was not prepared to recognize the status of Khamenei as vilayat-i faqih (rule of jurisprudent) because he did not view him as sufficiently learned, and also because he opposed this principle that had been invented by Khomeini. Fadlallah also did not recognize the religious authority of Iran's leader. He built up his own religious authority and in 1995 he was recognized as the marja al-taqlid. His office became a workshop for issuing religious decrees in the various spheres of life of the believers. His superior scholarship now found practical expression. The masses turned to him with questions and awaited his dicta. Hizbullah could not stand aside, and imposed organizational discipline on its members. Whoever sought to join Hizbullah had to (and still has to) recognize the religious and political authority of Iran's Khamenei as the marja al-taqlid in Lebanon, as a religious obligation that the believer must fulfill.

Fadlallah rebelled. He was not willing to play Khamenei's game, even when he was subjected to false accusations, based on fraudulent documents, that he had espoused heretical opinions. Heading Fadlallah's opponents were Khamenei and his protégé in Lebanon, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah. The Hizbullah leader stayed away from Fadlallah's home for several years and cancelled Fadlallah's special security protection. Moreover, a senior Hizbullah security officer was even suspected of trying to assassinate Fadlallah. A Shiite religious figure close to Fadlallah described the bad blood between Tehran and Fadlallah: "All of the money Iran spent fighting Fadlallah was greater than the amount it spent on fighting Israel during all the years of the occupation from 1982 until the victory in 2000."¹²

The Second Lebanon War in summer 2006 led to a rapprochement between Hassan Nasrallah and Fadlallah, whose house had been struck by an Israeli bomb. Iran, too, understood Fadlallah's value in Hizbullah's difficult moments and his role in assisting the movement in regaining mass sympathy when some blamed Hizbullah for the loss of their homes and assets during the war. Fadlallah was willing to hug Hizbullah leader Nasrallah, his former student, but continued to reject the vilayat-i faqih - a fundamental principle of the Islamic Republic. He persisted in his refusal to recognize the religious authority of the Iranian leader and Iranian aspirations to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon.

Khamenei never forgave Fadlallah for this. In a letter of sympathy after his death sent by the Iranian leader, Fadlallah was called al-'alam al-kabir and al-mujahid and by Nasrallah ab hakim and murshid hakim, but both ignored his status as marja al-taqlid. Nasrallah left no doubt with regard to the marja al-taqlid's identity in his condolence letter when he mentioned in the name of the fighters, and the families of the dead, wounded, redeemed captives, and the entire resistance public that their marja was Iran's Imam Khamenei.¹³ All this did not prevent Nasrallah and senior Iranian representatives from standing before Fadlallah's coffin and reciting the fatiha prayer and for Hizbullah to take over the funeral ceremonies as if it were for one of their own. If Fadlallah were to have arisen from his grave, he would have been amazed and stunned by the manifestations of sorrow, mourning, and grief displayed by the Hizbullah leaders.

Death Removes an Obstacle to Iran

Fadlallah's death removes one of the major obstacles to Iran's quest to establish an Islamic republic in its own image in Lebanon. As long as the erosion of the Lebanese state continues and the central government fails to impose its authority in the regions under Hizbullah control (southwest Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Beqaa Valley), Iran's efforts to realize its strategic objectives in Lebanon will intensify. This process may be expected to accelerate now that there is no longer any figure of political or religious stature among the Shiite community in Lebanon that can challenge or obstruct Iran and its emissaries in Lebanon. This also applies to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who formally holds the most important Shiite position in the Lebanese state.

During his life, Fadlallah prepared no disciple or heir who could fill his shoes. This is not the Shiite custom. Iran as well will not seek to groom any Lebanese heir to Fadlallah who might later compete with Khamenei. Interest in Sheikh Afif Nabulsi,¹⁴ a minor cleric from south Lebanon, as a possible successor to Fadlallah does not appear serious. It would appear that Shiite believers will have to turn to Ali al-Sistani of Iraq or Ali Khamenei in Iran.

Nevertheless, Fadlallah's office continues to operate under the direction of his son, Ali, to offer advice and guidance to the believers. Fadlallah's website announced immediately following his death: "To the emulators of the late religious authority, His Eminence Sayyed Muhammed Hussein [Fadlallah]: it is permissible to continue to emulate a deceased (marja) based on a fatwa of a living religious authority who fulfills all the conditions of such a post and who deems it permissible to continue to emulate a deceased (marja). Furthermore the office of His Eminence is considering issuing a detailed explanation of the issue. Meanwhile, we will continue to answer your inquiries in accordance with the opinions of His Eminence."¹⁵

While Fadlallah's many institutions will continue to operate in the coming months, as time passes, it can be expected that his son, Ali, will find it difficult to raise money and to continue to operate his father's network at its current capacity. The main concern of Fadlallah's successors will be the unbridled efforts of Iran and Hizbullah to take control of the widespread Fadlallah network, which he built up over many years. Iran and Hizbullah are already acting to incorporate Fadlallah's memory under their auspices, as though they were always a part of his flesh and blood.

 

Notes

1. Two unusual events were the tasteless words of Brtish Ambassador to Beirut Frances Guy regarding Fadlallah's personality, followed by her apology, and the surprise firing of CNN correspondent Octavia Nasr after her words in reaction to his death were publicized. Kim Ghattas, "Ayatollah Fadlallah Tributes Divide Opinion," BBC News, Washington, July 10, 2010.
2. On Fadlallah's initial path, see Shimon Shapira, Hizbullah, Between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 2000), pp. 102-105, 120-123, 130-131 (hereafter, Shapira); Jamal Sankari, Fadlallah, The Making of a Radical Shiite Leader (London: Saqi, 2005).
3. Shapira, p. 152.
4. Shapira, p. 156.
5. Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, al-Mukawama al-Islamiya, June 18, 1984.
6. Ibid., pp. 4-6.
7. Ibid., p. 16.
8. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
9. Ibid., pp. 18-19
10. Interview with Fadlallah, al-Mustaqbal, Paris, July 6, 1985.
11. Shimon Shapira, "Lebanon's Ayatollah Fadlallah and the Mercaz Ha-Rav Yeshiva Attack in Jerusalem," Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 7, no. 35, March 10, 2008.
12. "Facts About the Relationship between Fadlallah and Hizbullah," www.alshiraa.com, July 7, 2010.
13. Al-Manar television, July 5, 2010.
14. David Schenker, "Passing of Shiite Cleric Fadlallah Spells Trouble for Lebanon," Christian Science Monitor, July 9, 2010.
15. The web site of the religious authority Sayyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah - english.www.bayynat.org.lb.

 

Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Briefing in a Minute: The Middle East Right Now

 

by Barry Rubin

Snippets on the latest developments and themes in the region:

--Israel will deploy Iron Dome defense against rockets, mainly from the Gaza Strip, in November.

--EU "foreign minister" Ashton and--separately--Turkey and Syria--call for complete end of any blockade on the Gaza Strip. Ha! Great minds think alike. Why shouldn't Hamas have all the weapons it wants?

--Syria bans face veils in universities. Promoting revolutionary Islamism is fine as a foreign policy campaign but we wouldn't want them to take over our country and shoot the rulers, right?

--U.S.-Israel relations are quite good, the best at any time during the current presidency, and this could be expected to continue into early 2011 at least.

--The U.S. government has upgraded the Palestinian Authority representatives in the United States to the level of a general delegation, allowing them to fly the Palestinian flag in Washington DC. If this had come after the PA accepted direct negotiations with Israel that might have been understood. But once again we see the fatal pattern: first give a unilateral concession in hope that the other side will reciprocate. Shall I list the occasions on which that approach has failed during the last 18 months? You can develop your own list. That's not the way to do foreign policy.

--The new sanctions against Iran are definitely causing some pressure on and within the country though short of stopping the nuclear campaign it should weaken Tehran's ability to carry out its policies to build up militarily and advance further in regional influence.

 

--Have Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizballah signed a secret mutual assistance and alliance

--President Husni Mubarak's illness and the potential change of power in Egypt bears close watching. It is not official but does seem likely that Gamal Mubarak will be the next president. He has some good characteristics--pragmatism and moderation--but his age, lack of military experience, and limited charisma are against him. What Gamal would have to do, then, is to form a close partnership with key members of the elite and get the top people behind him.

There would then follow a period of several years in which either the elite would stand together behind Gamal or split, thus endangering the regime's future. If Gamal did not rule well and consolidate his support, there could be some kind of coup against him. In addition, the Brotherhood could gradually grow in power to fill the vacuum and exploit the discontent. The Brotherhood cannot take over for some years to come. The danger is a longer-term one.

Events could go either way and we will have to watch them closely. It is clear, though that Egypt's regional power is at about the lowest point in 60 years, though its determination to oppose Iran, Syria, and Hamas--if it feels American support is firm--is strong.

 

 

Barry Rubin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Inside Iran's Revolutionary Guard: A Defector Speaks

 

Featuring David B. Crist and Reza Kahlili

On July 9, 2010, Reza Kahlili addressed a special Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute. Mr. Kahlili is the author of A TIME TO BETRAY: THE ASTONISHING DOUBLE LIFE OF A CIA AGENT INSIDE THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS OF IRAN, a memoir that describes his career as a spy for the CIA. He was introduced by David B. Crist, a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute on leave from the Defense Department, where he serves as a senior historian for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks.

David B. Crist

Although Iran was a country of great strategic importance at the time of the Islamic Revolution, the United States had few sources of information about what was occurring there, especially after the U.S. embassy was seized and official relations ended. Accordingly, Iran became an early priority for former CIA director William Casey in the 1980s. Information provided by Iranian insiders such as Reza Kahlili became critically important in this regard.

One anecdote aptly illustrates Kahlili's key role. Former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger's personal papers include an account of a National Security Council debate concerning Iran's plan to seize Basra, Iraq. In his book, Kahlili described how he told his CIA handler to inform the U.S. government about the planned offensive. Weinberger's papers make clear that Kahlili's report was a key factor in U.S. discussions about whether to tilt toward Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. Whether that was a smart policy or not is another issue; the point here is that thanks to Kahlili, Washington was well informed in advance about Iran's plans.

 

Reza Kahlili

After attending college and graduate school in the United States, Kahlili returned to Iran in 1979, hoping that the Islamic Revolution would bring real democracy and freedom to his nation. What he found, however, fell far short of his expectations. Compared to his successors, the shah had provided a high standard of living to the Iranian people and created a peaceful regional environment -- albeit at the price of severe restraints on freedom of speech and political participation. Kahlili had a childhood friend in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who recruited him to join the force, where his expertise was in high demand. The process was not complicated and did not involve much vetting other than his friend vouching for him. He did not receive much training; in its early years, the IRGC was not a very systematic organization.

To his surprise, once Kahlili was established in the Guard, he found that the revolution had been taken over by extreme elements. As a result of his position, he become aware of the regime's horrific, systemic human rights violations, such as the rape and execution of teenagers. The Islamic Republic soon evolved into a fascist state, with a radical minority ruling a moderate majority.

Seeing this new direction firsthand and lacking a political option to work for change, Kahlili decided to help his country by spying for the CIA. He returned to the United States under the pretext of caring for a sick aunt and contacted the FBI, which handed him over to the CIA. The CIA personnel he dealt with were very professional and well informed. They asked him to return to Iran as a spy, though they said he was free to remain in the United States if he wished. Kahlili volunteered to help the agency, hoping that the information he provided would help the United States bring about change in his country.

When Kahlili returned to Iran, his IRGC friend asked him if he had joined the CIA, and Kahlili joked about dining at the White House. Had anyone from the IRGC followed up by investigating whether he actually had a sick aunt in America, he might easily have been exposed.

During his CIA recruitment and training, Kahlili became acutely aware that U.S authorities tended to lack understanding of Iran. From then on, he became committed to helping Washington assemble a more accurate picture of Iran's internal politics. He provided many reports, waking early to prepare them before going to his IRGC job. He was surprised -- and a bit concerned for his safety -- to learn from news accounts of U.S. government statements that his reports were taken very seriously.

According to Kahlili, the IRGC was -- and, he assumes, still is -- composed of three types of people: average individuals, many with little education and moderate religious beliefs; self-serving opportunists; and hardcore radicals who subscribe to a extreme messianic Islamist ideology. Despite these diverse motivations and beliefs, however, most IRGC members shared certain attitudes, including a deep belief in fundamentalist Islam and a conviction that Israel is the enemy of their religion. And the IRGC intelligence unit recruited from the ideological hardcore of loyal regime insiders, whose families were considered among the regime's staunchest supporters.

In assessing the religious views of IRGC members, Kahlili noted that the majority of the guards he had contact with believed that Islam would eventually rule the world. Only a minority were motivated by or felt a deep loyalty to IRGC leaders. And despite their enmity toward Israel, many expressed interest in living in the United States -- that is, they viewed Israel and America in entirely different lights.

As for the benefits of IRGC service, Kahlili noted that in his day, members received low salaries and lived modestly, though he believes that has changed as the Guard has moved into economic activities. During his tenure, he saw the IRGC make use of all institutions under the regime's control -- for instance, Guardsmen were posted abroad as officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and many other government- or government-affiliated institutions.

Despite leaving Iran more than twenty years ago, Kahlili still has strong opinions about the country and its relations with the United States. He would like to see the regime overthrown, and argues that the key to doing so is incapacitating the IRGC. Toward that end, he would support an external military attack against the Guard if necessary. He also is convinced that the IRGC continues to pursue nefarious activities around the world, working in one way or another with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

Although Kahlili is skeptical about whether his years as a spy helped advance his goal of a free Iran, he continues to give the CIA potentially valuable information from his contacts in the IRGC. He also speaks out for freedom and democracy in Iran, being acutely aware that many who live there are unable to speak out.

 

This rapporteur's summary was prepared by Hale Arifagaoglu.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.