U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Moderates Cry; Radicals Laugh

by Barry Rubin

In the United States, the sending of a U.S. ambassador to Syria is presented as a normal act, not a concession. That's not the way it is being seen in Syria. In the United States, the issuing of statements favoring Lebanese sovereignty is seen as an effective policy. That's not the way it is seen in Syria and Lebanon.

Or as an unidentified, but presumably Syrian, official put it:

"Obama went out of his way to send [a new ambassador]. He will be expecting something in return. Lebanon is an obvious area but the Syrians realize that the United States does not have much more to pressure them with," another diplomat said.

"Syrian political commentator [i.e., lackey of the dictatorship] Ayman Abdel Nour said Damascus was not averse to compromise if it felt the United States was lessening support for an international tribunal on the Hariri killing, which Syria views as a tool in the hands of its foes.

"`The United States is keeping the tribunal card close to its chest. But Syria is stronger on the ground in Lebanon,'" Abdel Nour said. He dismissed the possibility of Washington resuming a policy of internationally isolating Syria because Damascus has built ties with countries such as its northern neighbor Turkey."

In other words, Syria is strong; America is weak; Syria can do as it pleases with no additional cost. If the United States drops support for the international tribunal finding Syrian and Hizballah terrorism in Lebanon, Syria will then...not give anything back.

This is the gap between Washington--and America in general--which believes Obama is doing a terrific job in the Middle East, and the actual Middle East where the moderates are crying and the radicals are laughing.

And don't forget:

Hizballah seizes power in Lebanon, U.S. policy has no effective response.

U.S. policy helps Hamas entrench itself in the Gaza Strip (by providing indirect aid and pressing Israel to reduce sanctions).

In Egypt, the emphasis of U.S. policy is to press the regime into potentially fatal concessions.

Plus more. The radicals know what they are talking about.

Original URL: http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2011/01/us-policy-in-middle-east-moderates-cry.html

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Man Arrested with Explosives at Michigan Mosque

by Leon Wieseltier

A 63-year-old Southern California man who had explosives in his vehicle was arrested outside one of the nation's largest mosques in the Detroit suburb of Dearborn, authorities in Michigan said.

Dearborn police said Roger Stockham was arraigned Wednesday on one count of making a false report or threat of terrorism and one count of possessing explosives with an unlawful intent. Stockham had a large but undisclosed quantity of class-C fireworks including M-80s, which are outlawed in Michigan, Chief Ronald Haddad said.

"I was comfortable with the fact that we had taken him off the street — he isn't going anywhere," Haddad told The Associated Press Sunday afternoon. "I think the society he wanted to impact is safe."

Haddad said Stockham was arrested Monday evening without incident in the parking lot of Islamic Center of America, while a large group was gathered inside. He said police received a 911 call from a resident.

Haddad said authorities believe Stockham was acting alone but still take him "very seriously." He said Stockham has "a long history of anti-government activities," though he declined to elaborate.

Stockham remained jailed Sunday on a $500,000 bond. A preliminary examination is scheduled for Friday.

Police didn't know whether Stockham had an attorney. A public records search did not turn up a listed number for Stockham, though Haddad said he lives in Imperial Beach, near San Diego.

Dearborn, located about 10 miles west of Detroit, is the capital of the Detroit area's Arab-American community, which is one of the largest in the U.S.

Original URL: http://www.aolnews.com/story/man-arrested-with-explosives-at-michigan-mosque/1549182/?cid=10

Leon Wieseltier

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

American Liberals and the Streets of Cairo

by Leon Wieseltier

The contours and consequences of the uprising in Egypt—which, after decades in which Hosni Mubarak destroyed the civil society of his country and stifled the most elementary aspirations of his people, was perfectly inevitable—are still unclear. About the justice of the protestors’ anger there can be no doubt. But the politics of the revolt are murky. Its early stages have not been the work of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it is hard to believe that the Islamist organization will not be tempted to play the Bolshevik role in this revolution: it has the ideology and the organization with which to seize control of the situation, and it is the regime’s most formidable political adversary. The army may decide, with the government seriously wounded and robbed of any semblance of legitimacy, to do more than bring order to the streets. Mubarak, in a characteristic act of a failing dictator, has fired his cabinet, as if the ire of the Egyptian people was directed at his ministers: a pathetic move that brings to mind the memory of the Shah of Iran’s eleventh-hour reshuffle of his doomed government. We know this script. The political popularity, and political authority, of Muhammed ElBaradei is also hard to measure.

What is not unclear, however, is that the Obama administration, and American liberals more generally, have been caught intellectually unprepared for this crisis. The administration’s predicament, it must be said, is strategically complicated: since Mubarak may fall, it cannot afford to alienate the protestors, but since the protestors may fail, it cannot afford to alienate Mubarak. Our officials have been improvising, not altogether brilliantly. Joe Biden fatuously declared that “I would not refer to [Mubarak] as a dictator.” Robert Gibbs said that “this is not about taking sides.” Hillary Clinton, who used to speak warmly of Mubarak as “family,” has called for “restraint” and “reform” and “dialogue,” and warned that a crackdown could affect American aid to Egypt—as if anything but a crackdown is to be expected from Mubarak. And Barack Obama is also trying to finesse things, urging Mubarak to transform “a moment of volatility” into “a moment of promise”—the eloquence is irritating: there are times when the power of language is not the power that is needed—and proclaiming that “the United States will continue to stand up for the rights of the Egyptian people.”

Continue? There is nothing wrong with crisis management in a crisis, but the problem that the Obama administration now confronts is precisely that it has not been a cornerstone of American policy toward Egypt to stand up for the rights of the Egyptian people. It has preferred cronyism with the regime occasionally punctuated by some stirring remarks. What we are witnessing, in the confusion and the dread of the administration, are the consequences of its demotion of democratization as one of the central purposes of American foreign policy, particularly toward the Muslim world. There were two reasons for the new liberal diffidence about human rights. The first was the Bush doctrine, the second was the Obama doctrine. The wholesale repudiation of Bush’s foreign policy included the rejection of anything resembling his “freedom agenda,” which looked mainly like an excuse for war. But whatever one’s views of the Iraq war, it really does not seem too much to ask of American liberals that they think a little less crudely about democratization—not only about its moral significance but also about its strategic significance. One of the early lessons of the rebellion against Mubarak is that American support for democratic dissidents is indeed a strategic matter, and that the absence of such American support can lead to a strategic disaster. Such are the wages of realism. It is a common error that prudence is thought about the short-term; the proper temporal horizon for prudential thinking is distant and long. Realism does not equip one for an adequate appreciation of the historical force of the democratic longing. In this sense, realism is singularly unrealistic. It seems smart only as long as the dictators remain undisturbed by their people, and then suddenly it seems incredibly stupid.

Obama replaced the freedom agenda with an acceptance agenda. His foreign policy has been conducted in a vigorously multicultural spirit. He rightly sensed that an emphasis upon democratization was a critical emphasis—a castigation of the existing dispensations in countries ruled by autocracies and authoritarianisms, and he did not come to castigate. He came in friendship, to “restore America’s standing.” He sought to do so with an embrace of differences, an affirmation of religions, a celebration of civilizations. As a matter of principle, such assertions of respect are right and good. But what if the positive tone misses the point—not about the dignity of other peoples, but about their actual circumstances? Of what use is happy talk to unhappy people? Do societies desperately in need of secularization and its blandishments really need the American president to cite their Scripture to them? In accordance with his warm new priorities, democracy was the fourth of Obama’s five themes is his speech in Cairo in 2009, the one called “A New Beginning.” When he finally got around to it, he introduced it this way: “I know there has been controversy about the promotion of democracy in recent years, and much of this controversy is connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by any other.” Or: the United States will no longer bother you about how you are living. He then proceeded to a fine little sermon about the virtues of government “through consent, not coercion,” but said nothing about the political conditions in Egypt. The Cairo speech did not discomfit the Mubarak regime. I imagine that many of Obama’s listeners in Cairo that day are on the streets of Cairo today, and some of them attacked the American Embassy.

It was a terrible mistake for Obama to make democratization seem like an “imposition,” with its imperialist implications, and to conflate it with military invasion. The promotion of democracy is a policy of support for indigenous Egyptian, or Arab, or Muslim democrats who are just as authentic as indigenous Egyptian, or Arab, or Muslim autocrats and theocrats, and certainly more deserving of American respect. It is a policy—to borrow Gibbs’s words—of taking sides—specifically, of taking sides with peoples against regimes. It does not create dissidents, in some sort of ugly-American conspiracy; it finds them, and then it assists them, because they are in need of assistance, and because assisting them expresses our values and our interests. To be sure, there are instances in which our interests and our values may collide, because anti-democratic and anti-American forces may come to power by means of a democratic process; but there is no surer way to bring them to power than to ignore the illegitimacy of a tyrannical government and the ordinary grievances of a repressed population. The bizarre irony of Obama’s global multiculturalism is that it has had the effect of aligning America with regimes and against peoples. This was the case with our response to the Iranian rebellion in 2009, and it was the case with our response to the Egyptian opposition until a few hours ago. The striking thing about Barack Obama’s “extended hand” is how utterly irrelevant it is to the epochal events in Egypt, and Tunisia, and Iran, and elsewhere.

Original URL: http://www.tnr.com/article/world/82435/egypt-riots-american-liberals-cairo

Leon Wieseltier is the literary editor of The New Republic.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Video of the Year: 'Egyptian Revolution: January 25, 2011'

by Rick Moran




Original URL: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/01/video_of_the_year_egyptian_rev.html

Rick Moran

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Tunisia: The End of a 23-Year Regime

by Hammouda Salhi


[ED: Not every commentator shares this author's sanguine prognosis for the ultimate outcome of the Tunisian revolution. Let us hope that future events prove him right.]

On 13 January 2011, my close friends invited me to their house in les berges du lac, a quarter located in the northeast of Tunis. This is a symbolic place, as it houses the embassies and consulates of many countries, not to mention the Arab Interior Ministers' Council.

There we drank the famous, extraordinary mint tea, which contains caffeine that increases energy and mental alertness. The warm drink is served especially as a sign of hospitality and friendship -- in fact, it is believed to contain all of the elements necessary to ensure life and hope. I daresay that mint tea is the secret ingredient behind Tunisia's peaceful uprising.

Before nightfall, as I headed to where I live in Tunis not very far from downtown, I began to hear the loud and repetitive chants of protests coming from somewhere near Habib Bourguiba Street, the main street in Tunis. When I arrived there, I found that a crowd of thousands had assembled outside the Ministry of Interior, chanting, "Ben Ali, that's enough!" and "Game over!" These people were young, old, rich, poor, and both casually and smartly dressed. Some were armed with Tunisian flags and bread loaves -- a pitiful defense against the tear gas, tanks, and bullets.

January 14, 2011 marked the 28^th day of the Tunisian protests. Shaking off their fear of the security services, Tunisians were able to force their way to the Ministry of the Interior and lead a revolution that finally toppled the most repressive police state in the MENA region after 23 years of iron-fisted rule.

Before departing, Ben Ali signed a decree handing interim presidential powers to Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi. Mr. Ghannouchi announced that he was taking charge of the situation on the basis of Article 56 of the Tunisian Constitution. But the Constitutional Court decided that it was Article 57 that should be followed, whereupon Speaker of the Parliament Fouad Mebazaa was given authority over the government instead.

I woke up the next morning to hear that President Obama had saluted the "brave and determined struggle for the universal rights," applauded "the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people," and called on the Tunisian government "to respect human rights and to hold free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people." Though Western officials have a double standard for Middle Eastern countries when it comes to democracy, I think that in the case of Tunisia, human rights and freedom of expression should be extended to Islamists as well.

Should we have concerns about Islamism in Tunisia?

The revolution was an astonishing development in the modern history of Tunisia. "[I]f any country in the Arab world is going to do it, it will be Tunisia," said Stephen Day, former British Ambassador to Tunisia to BBC News. The revolution "was carried out by the middle class, those thousands and thousands of Tunisians, and I felt incredibly proud of them," he added. While stakeholders and reporters have focused on the extraordinarily peaceful nature of the protests, it is equally important to consider what has been missing -- namely, Islamists.

Most Arab regimes present themselves as bulwarks against terrorism, making Muslim fundamentalists the target of their draconian laws. This is the case in Tunisia par excellence. Ben Ali's regime has excelled in excluding Ennahda ("Renaissance" or "Awakening"), an Islamist movement, from the political scene in Tunisia. Ali played on this fear of religious extremism to rally support from Western governments. He cracked down hard on Islamists, many of whom were jailed and tortured.

Still, Islamists are unlikely to take advantage of the revolution­ary situation. Tunisian society seems more unified around the principles of democracy and freedom of religion, and most Tunisians do not want to see Islamism take hold. This can be explained by the fact that Tunisians are "the most sophisticated and well educated people in the Arab world," according to Mr. Day.

The protesters, though they represent a threat to the RCD ruling party officials, have not directly challenged the long history of state secularism. No slogan has called for the application of sharia during the various demonstrations. All of them called for free and fair elections and freedom of expression. The current interim government is criticized because key members have served in the previous Ben Ali administration -- but its lack of Islamist representation has not come up at all.

Rached Ghannouchi, who leads Ennahda, said that his movement is already preparing a plan of action for its political work in cooperation with the rest of the secular opposition parties. Such cooperation could lead to a unique experience of democracy and coexistence in the Arab world because opposition mainly comprises secular intellectuals, lawyers, and trade unionists. Even Islamists of Tunisia are very moderate, unlike those in Egypt, Jordan, and Algeria. Said Mr. Ghannouchi:

I prefer to be realistic, because what we would be asking for, then, is a front ready to hold power and govern. At the present time and facing the actual circumstances, the opposition is only ready for the minimum. This should be based on a programme able to co-ordinate its actions on issues such as the question of liberties, defense of civil society, the press, the lower social classes; the formation of a strong national economy; the openness of Tunisia towards its own environment: the Maghreb, and Europe.

I think that many Tunisians now -- including Islamists, of course -- will restrict their claims and struggle to enjoy the right to pray freely, which still hangs in the balance, as praying has often been linked to Islamism and even to terrorism in some cases. "I am a Muslim, not an Islamist or a terrorist," said Isam, a primary school teacher when I met him outside one of the local mosques in the town of Regueb. "I was born with this religion, and I will keep it forever. I pray five times a day." Isam added that it was the first time that he prayed at his local mosque freely, without fear of the authoritarian regime's omnipresent plainclothes policemen.

According to Professor Hicham Djaït, a Tunisian historian and philosopher, the main challenge for democracy is not Islamism, but rather an imperial president. The presidency has grown in power ever since Habib Bourguiba declared himself president for life. "Preventing an imperial president from taking hold in Tunisia is the challenge now in this transitional period," Djaït told the local Nessma TV. "We have now a long history of secular traditions, reforms, and arts of various kinds."

Driven by the youth and the trade unions, the New Carthage revolution is entering a new phase which abounds with new challenges. The protesters' efforts should be directed towards professional politicians who are trying to hijack the revolt.

The revolution is also in danger of isolation. Without the security and the mutual inspiration of international solidarity, it will suffer greatly. Most people I met expressed their doubts about the goodwill of some ministers in the interim government, though many others have said, "Thank god for Tunisia."

The time now is ripe to find safe ways to rebuild our society, economy, and political structures, so we need to be prepared and keep vigilant. If the New Carthage revolution succeeds, it will show the world that people are able to fight the most repressive regimes with their love and prayers.

Long live the revolution, and long live the heroic youth of the New Carthage!

Original URL: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/tunisia_the_end_of_a_23year_re.html

Hammouda Salhi

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Crisis in the Middle East: Syrian Facebook Pages Calling for Demonstrations on Saturday, February 5

by Y. Yehoshua

Introduction

In the past week, Syrian activists have been using Facebook to call for mass protests in Syria on Saturday, February 5, 2011, dubbing it the "Day of Rage." In Facebook pages created specifically for this purpose, members have called on the Syrian public to take to the streets on that date and stage peaceful demonstrations and rallies in all parts of the country, as well as in front of Syrian embassies in Arab and European capitals, in protest of the oppressive Syrian regime. These Facebook pages also feature images and videos slamming Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and supporting protest against his rule.

The organizers of the Syrian protests have expressed support for the demonstrators in Tunisia and Egypt, and have adopted their methods:[1] opening special Facebook pages on which information is posted regarding the place and time of the planned protests, and creating a special profile picture, associated with the protests, to be used by all Facebook members sympathizing with the cause. However, it seems that the scope of their activity is limited compared to that of the Tunisian and Egyptian activists. So far, the number of people who have registered as members on these Facebook pages is relatively small, and some of the members reside outside the country.

Among those promoting the "Day of Rage" protests is the Independent Islamic Bloc – part of the "Damascus Declaration" opposition movement – which has called upon Syrians to attend a "sweeping protest and mass rally" in front of the Parliament house in Damascus on February 5. In its announcement, the organization praised the protests in Tunisia and Egypt and warned the Syrian regime against continuing its oppression, corruption and political arrests.[2] Websites have also published a message by "the Popular Committees in Aleppo Province" announcing a February 5 protest rally in the center of Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria.[3]

The organizers of the planned demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo have listed their demands: an improvement in living standards, respect for human rights, freedom of speech for all Syrian citizens, and greater influence for Syrian youth. They requested that the protesters come equipped with nothing more than Syrian flags and signs expressing their demands.[4]

Syria is on the alert for the possible spread of protests to its territory. On January 29, 2011, the Syrian authorities prevented the holding of a demonstration in solidarity with the Egyptian protesters in front of the Egyptian embassy in Damascus, fearing a conflagration.[5] It was also reported that Syrian security chief 'Ali Mamlouk has met with province governors and police commanders in order to prepare for possible protests in the country.[6]

There are conflicting reports regarding the accessibility of Facebook, which has played a crucial role in mobilizing the public for the current wave of protests in the Arab world. According to a January 25, 2011 report on Alarabiya.net, the Syrian authorities have restricted access to Facebook in a bid to keep the protests from spreading to Syria, but some users are managing to access the site through proxies. [7] The Syrian news agency SANA has denied this, saying that access to the Internet is unrestricted throughout the country.[8]

Following is a review of the preparations on Facebook for the February 5 protests in Syria:

Facebook Pages Created to Advertise February 5 Protests

In advance of the anticipated events, several Facebook pages have been launched, such as the pages titled "Syrian Day of Rage," "The Syrian Revolution against Bashar Al-Assad," and "Towards Popular Action in Syria: The February 5, 2011 Day of Rage." As of this writing, these three pages have some 5,000 registered members, but more are joining every hour.

Facebook page launched in advance of the protests, with 1,500 members

http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?ref=nf

The "Popular Action" page, with 1,000 members

http://www.facebook.com/pages/nhw-hrak-shby-fy-swryt-ywm-alghdb-5-shbat-2011/175027102541306

Page titled "Syrian Revolution against Bashar Al-Assad"

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=136763013004194#!/Syrian.Revolution

Calls to join the "Day of Rage" Facebook groups and participate in the protests were also spread via Twitter:

Twitter account dedicated to Syrian Day of Rage:

http://twitter.com/AngrySyriaDay

Special Facebook pages have also been created for users to confirm their participation in the protests. For example, a page titled "Syrian Day of Rage – Popular Action in Syria," calling for demonstrations in Syria and abroad, includes 127 confirmations, and a page advertising a planned demonstration in Sa'd Allah Al-Jabiri Square in Aleppo has 194 confirmations.

"Popular Action" page, with 127 confirmations

http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=175308452510885#!/event.php?eid=149985825055327

Page dedicated to demonstration in Aleppo, with 194 confirmations

http://www.facebook.com/pages/dd-wqft-5-shbat-w-dd-ywm-alghdb-alswry-w-swrya-allh-hamyha/160085677377630#!/event.php?eid=175308452510885

Communiqué Circulated on Facebook: The Day of Rage – an Apolitical Protest to Transform Our Bitter Situation

A communiqué posted on various Facebook pages and websites, titled "Syrian Day of Rage on February 5, 2011," stated: "The protests staged by the other Arab peoples were not motivated by a will greater than our own or [enabled by] capabilities greater [than our own]. The regimes [in Egypt and Tunisia] are no less cruel and violent than the regime in our country, but the [Egyptian and Tunisian] people raised the banner of liberty and honor, and stuck to their course. The Syrian Day of Rage is a national call that has nothing to do with any particular political bloc or stream. It [expresses] the will of the people, which aspires to freedom and wishes to rise up against its bitter situation and transform the poor economic situation that is deteriorating from day to day." The Facebook pages called to spread the communiqué on as many sites and platforms as possible.

The communiqué

http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674

Ad calling for demonstrations: "On Saturday, February 5, [Protest] throughout Syria, in every street, against oppression and corruption"

http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?ref=nf#!/photo.php?fbid=147362948655482&set=a.147230262002084.27852.147151028676674

Day of Rage Profile Picture

As in previous protest campaigns, many Facebook users adopted the special profile picture designed for the occasion, consisting of the Syrian flag and the legend "Syrian Day of Rage – February 5, 2011."

"Day of Rage" profile picture

http://www.facebook.com/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?ref=nf#!/photo.php?fbid=147230265335417&set=a.147230262002084.27852.147151028676674

Numerous members use the special profile picture:

Anti-Assad Images on Syrian Facebook Pages

The Syrian Facebook pages also featured anti-Bashar Assad images, such as the one below, showing the Syrian president sharing the fate as Saddam Hussein.

The caption beneath the image says "very soon"

http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=175308452510885#!/photo.php?fbid=1821234888256&set=o.420796315726

A similar picture featuring Mubarak appeared on an Egyptian Facebook page.

http://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed?ref=mf

Images from "Syrian Day of Rage" page:

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=501159&o=all&op=1&view=all&subj=147151028676674&aid=-1&id=100000717707772&oid=147151028676674#!/pages/ywm-alghdb-alswry/147151028676674?v=photos

Syrian Counter-Campaign in Support of Regime

Naturally, Facebook pages were also created in support of the Syrian regime and opposing the February 5 protests.

Page titled "Against the February 5 Rage Day Rally – Allah Is the Protector of Syria"

http://www.facebook.com/pages/dd-wqft-5-shbat-w-dd-ywm-alghdb-alswry-w-swrya-allh-hamyha/160085677377630

Page devoted to organizing a march in support of Assad on February 15

[1] See also MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 3521, "Arab and Iranian Reactions to the Tunisia Uprising," http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/254/0/4926.htm; and MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 659, "Social Networks Harnessed by Protest Movement in Egypt," http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4949.htm .

[2] Syriahr.com, January 27, 2011.

[3] Elaph.com, January 28, 2011.

[4] http://www.syriakurds.com/home/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21854&Itemid=28;

http://www.facebook.com/home.php?sk=group_158766734172987&ap=1#!/home.php?sk=group_158766734172987&ap=1#!/profile.php?id=100001875828195.

[5] Syriahr.com, January 30, 2011.

[6] Sooryoon.net, January 29, 2011.

[7] Alarabiya.net, January 27, 2011.

[8] Sana.sy, January 29, 2011.

Original URL: http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4957.htm

Y. Yehoshua is Director of Research at MEMRI.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The Tunisian Disorder: Causes and Consequences

by Guy Millière

It seems the Obama administration decided to drop Ben Ali. So far, Obama and those working for him have not pursued a policy of defending human rights: they did not raise the need for change in the Arab world until the day Ben Ali left. That said, although he was a member of the International Socialist movement, Ben Ali could be considered a « moderate » and an ally of the West: not really the kind of man the Obama administration likes to appease or support.

In Tunisia, Ben Ali's main mistake was not corruption, brutality or censorship: all this is commonplace throughout the Arab world. His main mistake was to be an ally of the weaker side: the Western world.

His other mistake was to have blocked the anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic propaganda so widely used in other Arab dictatorships to create convenient scapegoats. He was also too close to capitalism to be loved by trendy intellectuals.

The period ahead is particularly perilous.

No one can know yet all the other reasons Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia collapsed; many pieces of the puzzle are still missing: Who were those who took the decisions ? What were their motives ? Were there foreign influences ? Most of the explanations currently given have the consistency of sand and wind. In dictatorships, especially in that part of the world, riots and popular discontent are not enough to topple whomever holds power firmly. It seems the army refused to obey, and some people in key positions decided that a change in the regime had to occur.

No one can know yet, either, what will happen now: one can merely see that, along with the people who return to Tunisia, there are not only women and men who love democracy, but also many leftists, communists, Arab ultra-nationalists and Islamists.

The risk of serious contagion seems limited: while dissatisfaction is brewing in other Arab countries, the conditions there are very different from what they are in Tunisia. Other Arab countries do not have a middle class; their armies are more fully integrated in the power apparatus; they do not rely essentially on tourism, except for Morocco and, partly, Egypt. If contagion really occurs, it could quickly take on the appearance of a cataclysm. Although in Tunisia, the threat represented by radical Islam exists without being intense [the teaching of Islam in Tunisia is generally secular: cf.Lafif Lakhdar, "Moving From Salafi to Rationalist Education," Meria, vol.9, March 2005], in other Arab countries, it is much bigger.

Even if the risk of serious contagion seems low, the risk of deterioration within Tunisia is high and underestimated. The chance that a democracy will be born soon are slim: over the past decade, attempts at democratization in this part of the world have not been an unqualified success, even though foreign forces, mostly American, were there to maintain some stability.

In Tunisia, the population stands alone, facing the army and a small ruling clique. The old bureaucracy is everywhere and will not be dissolved and replaced within a few weeks. The emergence of a new strongman, more open to some freedoms, and ready to make a few promises, is a more likely possibility; but it is premature to exclude a deterioration of the situation and a slide into chaos.

At first, the Tunisian population protested in the context of rising prices of food and the growing despair of young jobless graduates. The protests became a global revolt in which all the accumulated frustrations against the regime came spilling out.

Food prices will increase further over the coming months. Unemployment will increase as well, and purchasing power is likely to fall. Financial difficulties will arise : the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families have diverted huge sums of money and vast amounts of gold; the price tag for one month of riots already is more than two billions dollars. This is a lot for a small country without energy resources, and whose image of stability, so essential to attract visitors, is badly damaged.

In this context, discontent and violence could last, and all political maneuvers could become possible, especially those emanating from people preaching anger, resentment and magical solutions: leaders of En-Nahda [Rebirth] claim that they are not radical anymore, but it would be foolish to take their word for it without a high dose of skepticism. One of the provisional government's first decisions was to offer a general amnesty to all the people who were convicted of political crimes, including Islamists imprisoned for acts of terrorism. Today, Al-Jazeera in Arabic is the most watched TV channel in the country.

It would be equally foolish to rely on Europe and Europeans to give any relevant advice. In recent days, the attitude of European governments was dictated by opportunism and fear of what the « Arab street » might do on European soil; it is mainly because of this fear that European politicians who described Ben Ali a few weeks ago as the reliable leader of a relatively healthy country now depict him as the hideous incarnation of the worst corruption and the most abominable brutality. Europe is seriously afflicted by a widespread spirit of pre-emptive submission to threats. The media are essentially in the hands of « useful idiots » and zealous followers of political correctness.

If the United States acts wisely and swiftly, it could play a positive role, and again be a beacon of freedom. But the decisions of the Obama administration in this regard have not been promising . To do what is necessary, the administration would have to completely change its guidelines. If Obama decides to adopt principles close to those used by President William Jefferson Clinton in 1994 (the « doctrine of enlargement », designed to extend and protect basic human and civil rights around the world), it could not be impossible. The new Congress would have to encourage Obama to go in this direction. And the encouragements would have to be strong and unambiguous.

The price of agricultural products and energy resources is bound to rise all over the planet. Europe will be even more profoundly destabilized by the crisis of the euro. The situation in the Ivory Coast will remain tense: the idea of holding elections to reunify a country deeply split between Christian and Muslim areas areas was nonsense and can only lead to a dead; as several countries, starting with Nigeria, experience the same type of division, any armed action might engulf the region. Tensions in the Sudan have not really vanished: a vote was held in Southern Sudan, and a massacre tentatively averted (it seems the Obama administration stopped General Bashir's arm by promising to forget his crimes and easing sanctions against his regime); but the most barbaric brutality can resume anytime.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah recently strengthened its grip on the government, and continues to amass weapons.

The Iranian regime meticulously weaves its networks of Hamas and Hizballah in the region and throughout South America, and advances smoothly toward nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, the vacuum left by the United States has allowed the highly symbolic return of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

Afghanistan is extremely unstable, and the Taliban are preparing an offensive for next Spring.

Many signs seems to show that Pakistan is on the verge of collapse.

In Saudi Arabia and Egypt, rulers are old and sick. Riots in several Egyptian cities in recent days will leave traces and have consequences.

Russia and China's interests are to exploit this general disorder, both to continue pushing their pawns and to make the world even safer for dictatorships.

If the chances to see a democracy emerge in Tunisia are thin, in the region that stretches from Pakistan to Morocco they are almost non-existent.

If democracy in Tunisia could lead to a victory of radical Islam, it would almost definitely mean a triumph of Jihadism in many other Arab countries.

How would you like to live in a world dominated by China, Russia, dictators and jihadists ? That is what a post-American world would look like -- it could easily become a reality.

The year 2011 seems destined to be the year of living dangerously.

Original URL: http://www.hudson-ny.org/1832/tunisian-disorder-causes

Guy Millière

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Special Report: The Revolt in Egypt and U.S. Policy

by Barry Rubin

There is no good policy for the United States regarding the uprising in Egypt but the Obama Administration may be adopting something close to the worst option. This is its first real international crisis. And it seems to be adopting a policy that, while somewhat balanced, is pushing the Egyptian regime out of power. The situation could not be more dangerous and might be the biggest disaster for the region and Western interests since the Iranian revolution three decades ago.

Experts and news media seem to be overwhelmingly optimistic, just as they generally were in Iran's case. Wishful thinking is to some extent replacing serious analysis. Indeed, the alternative outcome is barely presented: This could lead to an Islamist Egypt, if not now in several years.

What's puzzling here is that a lot of the enthusiasm is based on points like saying that the demonstrators are leaderless and spontaneous. But that's precisely the situation where someone who does have leaders, is well organized, and knows precisely what they want takes over.

Look at Tunisia. The elite stepped in with the support of the army and put in a coalition of leadership, including both old elements and oppositionists. We don't know what will happen but there is a reasonable hope of stability and democracy. This is not the situation in Egypt where the elite seems to have lost confidence and the army seems passive.

Can Omar Suleiman, long-time head of intelligence, as vice-president and former Air Force chief (the job Mubarak himself used to have) Ahmed Shafiq as prime minister stabilize the situation? Perhaps. He is an able man. But to have the man who has organized repression running the country is not exactly a step toward libertarian democracy.

There are two basic possibilities: the regime will stabilize (with or without Mubarak) or power will be up for grabs. Now, here are the precedents for the latter situation:

Remember the Iranian revolution when all sorts of people poured out into the streets to demand freedom? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now president.

Remember the Beirut spring when people poured out into the streets to demand freedom? Hizballah is now running Lebanon.

Remember the democracy among the Palestinians and free elections? Hamas is now running the Gaza Strip.

Remember democracy in Algeria? Tens of thousands of people were killed in the ensuing civil war.

It doesn't have to be that way but the precedents are pretty daunting.

What did Egyptian tell the Pew poll recently when asked whether they liked "modernizers" or "Islamists"? Islamists: 59%; Modernizers: 27%. Now maybe they will vote for a Westernized guy in a suit who promises a liberal democracy but do you want to bet the Middle East on it?

Here's the problem.

On one hand, everyone knows that President Husni Mubarak's government, based on the regime that has been running Egypt since the morning of July 23, 1952, is a dictatorship with a great deal of corruption and repression.

This Egyptian government has generally been a good ally of the United States yet has let Washington down at times. For example, the Mubarak government has continued to purvey anti-American propaganda to its people; held back on solving the Israel-Palestinian conflict (it did not endorse the 2000 Clinton plan, though I have good sources saying Mubarak said later he regretted that decision); has not taken a strong public stance on pressuring Iran; and so on.

For a long time it was said that Egypt was the most important U.S. ally in the Arabic-speaking world. There is truth in this but it has been less true lately, though due more to passivity in foreign policy than to hostility.

Clearly, though, Egypt is an American ally generally and its loss to an anti-American government would be a tremendous defeat for the United States. Moreover, a populist and radical nationalist-much less an Islamist-government could reignite the Arab-Israel conflict and cost tens of thousands of lives.

So the United States has a stake in the survival of the regime, if not so much that of Mubarak personally or the succession of his son, Gamal. This means that U.S. policy should put an emphasis on the regime's survival. The regime might be better off without the Mubaraks since it can argue it is making a fresh start and will gain political capital from getting rid of the hated dictator. Given the weakness of designated successor, Gamal Mubarak, who is probably too weak to deal with the situation the regime might well be a lot better off.

On the other hand, the United States wants to show that it supports reform and democracy, believing that this will make it more popular among the masses in the Arab world as well as being the "right" and "American" thing to do. Also, if the revolution does win, the thought is, it is more likely to be friendly to America if the United States shows in advance its support for change.

Finally, the "pro-democracy" approach is based on the belief that Egypt might well produce a moderate, democratic, pro-Western state that will then be more able to resist an Islamist challenge. Perhaps the Islamists can be incorporated into this system. Perhaps, some say (and it is a very loud voice in the American mass media) that the Muslim Brotherhood isn't really a threat at all.

So in this point of view, U.S. policy should favor the forces of change.

Of course, it is possible to mix these two positions and that is what President Obama is trying to do.

Thus, Obama said:

"I've always said to [Mubarak] that making sure that they are moving forward on reform -- political reform, economic reform -- is absolutely critical to the long-term well-being of Egypt, and you can see these pent-up frustrations that are being displayed on the streets....Violence is not the answer in solving these problems in Egypt, so the government has to be careful about not resorting to violence and the people on the streets have to be careful about not resorting to violence. I think that it is very important that people have mechanisms in order to express legitimate grievances. As I said in my State of the Union speech, there's certain core values that we believe in as Americans that we believe are universal: freedom of speech, freedom of expression -- people being able to use social networking or any other mechanisms to communicate with each other and express their concerns."

On paper, this is an ideal policy: Mubarak should reform; the opposition should not use violence; and everything will turn out all right. Again, this is the perfect policy in theory, and I'm not being sarcastic at all here.

Unfortunately, it has little to do with reality. For if the regime does what Obama wants it to do, it will fall. And what is going to replace it? And by his lack of support--his language goes further than it might have done--the president is demoralizing an ally.

And it is all very well to believe idealistically that even if Egyptians are longing to be free, one has to define what "free" means to them. Also, the ruler who emerges is likely to be from the best organized, disciplined group. People in Russia in 1917 were yearning to be free also and they got the Bolsheviks. In Iran where people are yearning to be free, the Obama Administration did nothing.

No matter what the United States says or does at this point, it is not going to reap the gratitude of millions of Egyptians as a liberator. For the new anti-regime leaders will blame America for its past support of Mubarak, opposition to Islamism, backing of Israel, cultural influence, incidents of alleged imperialism, and for not being Muslim. If anyone thinks the only problem is Israel they understand nothing.

This is not the first time this kind of problem has come up and it is revealing and amazing that the precedents are not being fully explained. The most obvious is Iran in 1978-1979. At that time, as I wrote in my book Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, the U.S. strategy was to do precisely what Obama is doing now: announce support for the government but press it to make reforms. The shah did not go to repression partly because he didn't have U.S. support. The revolution built up and the regime fell. The result wasn't too good.

There is a second part of this story also. Experts on television and consulting with the government assured everyone that the revolution would be moderate, the Islamists couldn't win, and even if they did this new leadership could be dealt with. So either Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini couldn't triumph-Islamists running a country, what a laugh!-or he couldn't really mean what he said. That didn't turn out too well either.

Even more forgotten is that, regarding Egypt, that's how the whole thing started! Back in 1952, as I wrote in my book, The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, U.S. policymakers supported-don't exaggerate this, it was not a U.S. engineered coup but they were favorable-to an army takeover. The idea was that the officers would be friendly to the United States, hostile to the USSR and Communism, and more likely to enjoy mass support.

In other words, policymakers and experts are endorsing a strategy today that has led to two of the biggest disasters in the history of U.S. Middle East policy. And now it is even worse, since we have these precedents and particularly the point about what happens when Islamists take power.

There is no organized moderate group in Egypt. Even the most important past such organization, the Kifaya movement, has already been taken over by the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2007 its leader has been Abdel Wahhab al-Messiri, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a virulent antisemite.

Muhammad el-Baradei, leader of the reformist movement, makes the following argument against my analysis:

"Mubarak has convinced the United States and Europe that they only have a choice between two options -- either they accept this authoritarian regime, or Egypt will fall into the hands of the likes of bin Laden's al-Qaida. Of course that is not exactly true. Mubarak uses the specter of Islamist terror to prevent a third way: the country's democratization. But Washington needs to know that the support of a repressive leadership only creates the appearance of stability. In truth, it promotes the radicalization of the people."

This is a reasonable formulation. But one might also say that nothing would promote the radicalization of the people more than having a radical regime. Even el-Baradei says that if he were to be president he would recognize Hamas as ruler of the Gaza Strip and end all sanctions against it.

That is not to say that there aren't good, moderate, pro-democratic people in Egypt but they have little power, money, or organization. Indeed, Egypt is the only Arab country where many of the reformers went over to the Islamists believing-I think quite wrongly-that they could control the Islamists and dominate them once the alliance got into power.

Nothing would make me happier than to say that the United States should give full support for reform, to cheer on the insurgents without reservation. But unfortunately that is neither the most honest analysis nor the one required by U.S. interests. In my book, The Long War for Freedom, I expressed my strong sympathy for the liberal reformers but also the many reasons why they are unlikely to win and cannot compete very well with the Islamists.

Ihave pointed out that the Brotherhood's new leader sounds quite like al-Qaida and has called for war on both Israel and America.

And here is Rajab Hilal Hamida, a member of the Brotherhood in Egypt's parliament, who proves that you don't have to be moderate to run in elections:

"From my point of view, bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities, since they are a thorn in the side of the Americans and the Zionists....[On the other hand,] he who kills Muslim citizens is neither a jihad fighter nor a terrorist, but a criminal murderer. We must call things by their proper names!"

A study of the Brotherhood members of Egypt's parliament shows how radical they have been in their speeches and proposals. They want an Islamist radical state, ruled by Sharia and at war with Israel and the United States.

Then it is also being said that the Brotherhood is not so popular in Egypt. Then why did they get 20 percent of the vote in an election when they were repressed and cheated? This was not just some protest vote because voters had the option of voting for secular reformers and very few of them did.

The mass media is full of "experts" who also argue that the Brotherhood is not involved in terrorism. Well, partly true. It supports terrorism against Americans in Iraq and against Israelis, especially backing Hamas. In major cases of terrorism in Egypt-for example the assassination of Farag Fouda and the attempting killing of Naguib Mahfouz-Brotherhood clerics were involved in inciting the violence beforehand and applauding it afterward.

The deeper question is: why does the Brotherhood not engage in violence in Egypt? The answer is not that it is moderate but that it has felt the time was not ripe. Knowing that it would be crushed by the government, and its leaders sent to concentration camps and tortured or even executed, as happened under Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, is a deterrent. It is no accident that Hamas and Hizballah-unrestrained by weak governments-engaged in violent terrorism while the Muslim Brotherhood facing strong and determined regimes in Egypt and Jordan did not.

Having said all of this, U.S. influence on these events, already rejected by Egypt's government, is minimal. It is morally good to speak about freedom and seem to support the protestors but also quite dangerous and will not reap the gratitude of the Egyptian masses in the future. After all, aside from the likely radicalism of their leaders, a revolutionary regime would be hostile toward the United States since America would be blamed for supporting the Egyptian dictatorship for decades. President Obama will not charm them into moderation.

The Egyptian elite wants to save itself and if they have to dump Mubarak to do so-as we saw in Tunisia-the armed forces and the rest will do so. But if the regime itself falls creating a vacuum, that is going to be a very bad outcome. If I believed that something better could emerge that would be stable and greatly benefit Egyptians, I'd be for that. Yet is that really the case?

Consider this point. Egypt's resources and capital are limited. There aren't enough jobs or land or wealth. How would a new regime deal with these problems and mobilize popular support? One route would be to embark on a decades-long development program to make the desert green, etc. Yet with so much competition where would the money come from? How could Egypt try to gain markets already held by China, for example?

More likely is that a government would win support through demagoguery: blame America, blame the West, blame Israel, and proclaim that Islam is the answer. That's how it has been in the Middle East in too many places. In two cases-Lebanon and the Gaza Strip-democracy (though other factors were also involved) has produced anti-democratic Islamist regimes that endorse terrorism and are allied to Iran and Syria.

Is America ready to bet that Egypt will be different? And on what evidentiary basis would that be done?

The emphasis for U.S. policy, then, should be put on supporting the Egyptian regime generally, whatever rhetoric is made about reforms. The rulers in Cairo should have no doubt that the United States is behind them. If it is necessary to change leadership or make concessions that is something the U.S. government can encourage behind the scenes.

But Obama's rhetoric-the exact opposite of what it was during the upheavals in Iran which he should have supported-seems dangerously reminiscent of President Jimmy Carter in 1978 regarding Iran. He has made it sound-by wording and nuance if not by intention-that Washington no longer backs the Egyptian government. And that government has even said so publicly.

Without the confidence to resist this upheaval, the Egyptian system could collapse, leaving a vacuum that is not going to be filled by friendly leaders.

That is potentially disastrous for the United States and the Middle East. There will be many who will say that an anti-American Islamist government allied with Iran and ready to restart war with Israel "cannot" emerge. That's a pretty big risk to take on the word of those who have been so often wrong in the past.

Suggested Readings

Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics, Second Revised Edition Palgrave Press (2002, 2008).

Barry Rubin, The Muslim Brotherhood: A Global Islamist Movement (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010)

For the Brotherhood's political views on supporting Hamas "by any means necessary"

MERIA Articles

Barry Rubin, COMPARING THREE MUSLIMS BROTHERHOODS: SYRIA,JORDAN,EGYPT", Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007)

Adel Guindy, "THE ISLAMIZATION OF EGYPT", Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2006)

Magdi Khalil, " EGYPT'S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND POLITICAL POWER: WOULD DEMOCRACY SURVIVE?" Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006)

Original URL: http://www.gloria-center.org/gloria/2011/01/special-report-egypt-revolt-and-us-policy

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Al-Jazeera 'Disclosures'

by Isi Leibler

If ever there was a need to provide irrefutable evidence of the extent to which all parties involved in the Arab Israeli conflict are living in Alice in Wonderland, this was demonstrated by the Al-Jazeera "disclosures" of the negotiations that allegedly took place between the PA leaders and the then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni.

It resulted in a massive global media campaign by anti-Israeli groups to distort and spin these reports in order to portray Israel as being intransigent in the face of major concessions offered by the Palestinians. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Most of the parties involved have egg on their faces.

That the major settlement blocs - Ariel, Maale Adumim and Gush Etzion - would remain under Israel sovereignty had already been mooted in the Clinton parameters and conveyed to Yasser Arafat at the Camp David summit in July 2000. It was reaffirmed by President Bush in his April 2004 letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon relating to the need to take account of demographic changes when finalizing the borders. The Israeli consensus, as ratified by all Israeli governments, including the Olmert government reflected this.

So Tzipi Livni was justifiably surprised when in the course of the private negotiations, the Palestinians demanded that Maale Adumim, Ariel and Efrat remain under Palestinian sovereignty. Even US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had told the Palestinians that if they persisted in demanding the dismantling of Maale Adumim and Ariel they would never achieve statehood. That Livni felt obliged to consult her advisers instead of outrightly rejecting the suggestion that Maale Adumim be retained with its 30,000 residents under Palestinian sovereignty will disturb many Israelis.

Livni is also quoted as having made other remarks that will not go down well with her Israeli constituents. She is alleged to even have reviewed pretexts for enabling terrorists to be released with the Palestinians. On another occasion she needlessly opined that "we're giving up the Golan".

The reality is that many of the concessions offered to the Palestinians by Olmert and Livni would probably not have been endorsed by the Israeli public. These included failing to insist on maintaining defensible borders and offering to share jurisdiction of the Temple Mount with other governments, including Saudi Arabia. Yet even these offers which were included in a package handing Palestinians 93.7% of territory over the green line, were rebuffed by the Palestinians.

The Palestinians also refused to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and when Livni asked Saeb Erekat how he would provide security for Israelis living in a Palestinian state, he responded "Can you imagine that I have changed my DNA and accepted a situation in which Jews become citizens having the rights that I and my wife have?"

Israelis were not the slightest surprised by these "disclosures" which were basically in synch with previous published unconfirmed Israeli media reports of what had taken place. In fact, most of the purported "concessions" from the Palestinians represented long standing Israeli positions that had already been taken as givens by the US and other Western powers.

The one major breakthrough was the verbal admission by Mahmoud Abbas that for the Jewish state to accept "five million or even one million refugees would mean the end of Israel". But once this was disclosed to the Arab public, it led to charges of high treason being leveled against the PA leadership who subsequently adamantly denied that they would ever contemplate compromising the "sacred" right of all Palestinians to return to Israel.

Indeed the release of the Al-Jazeera documents led to hysterical rage amongst Palestinians who accused their leaders of betrayal. The documents allege that the PA had been informed in advance concerning Operation Cast Lead in Gaza and that they had colluded with Israeli security forces, as Saeb Erekat is quoted, "to kill our own people". The disclosure of these allegations enraged the Palestinians who accused their leaders of betraying them. In response, Saeb Erekat claimed that the Al-Jazeera leaks were false, had been engineered by Palestinians associated with the CIA and British intelligence, and endangered his life.

Of course the absurdity of these "concessions" is that they directly contradict every public statement expressed by the PA in relation to these issues.

It is totally legitimate for diplomats to deal with controversial issues in camera. However to pay lip service to negotiating peace in good faith whilst simultaneously assuming a contrary hostile public profile must invariably end disastrously. Instead of attempting to dampen the flames of incitement and hatred, the Palestinian leaders have been encouraging all levels of their society to sanctify and glorify suicide bombers and promote hatred in the kindergartens, mosques and media.

Such behavior confirms that the PA representatives realized that they could never convey to their constituents an arrangement that sanctioned the maintenance of Jewish sovereignty. It demonstrates that when the Palestinian leaders indulge in private negotiations, they speak with a forked tongue and have no intention of ever publicly presenting compromises to their people. They were simply negotiating to obtain more concessions from Israel as part of their strategy to dismantle the Jewish State in stages.

However, this has now resulted in the PA is now being hoisted by its own petard. The incitement against Israel has succeeded to such an extent that their own people now feel betrayed and accuse them of behaving like quislings. Their bitter rage may undermine the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas and ultimately lead to the demise of the duplicitous "moderate" Palestinian leadership. The net gainers may be the more "honest" genocidal Jihadists - Hamas.

The other fallout in this imbroglio is the pro-Palestinian left which considered itself "betrayed" by the PA for contemplating any concessions. It was mind-boggling to observe the outraged "pro-peace" media like the Guardian and the BBC accusing the Palestinians of betraying their people, demanding that they reject any meaningful compromise and calling on them to adhere to their maximalist demands.

Needless to say, the principal loser is President Obama. His irresponsible and fatuous campaigns against construction in Jerusalem and the settlements were exposed as counter-productive acts of folly. The Al-Jazeera disclosures demonstrate conclusively that the Palestinians were unconcerned about this issue and had accepted the reality that the Jerusalem Jewish suburbs of Ramot, Pisgat Zeev and Gilo remain integral parts of Israel.

They only subsequently jumped on the bandwagon after Obama's demand that Israel institutes a settlement freeze, exploiting his assessment of Israeli settlements as representing "obstacles to peace", as a pretext to halt all negotiations with the Israelis.

By leaving it to the US Administration to pressure Israel on their behalf and avoiding dialogue, the PA were also able to conceal their intransigency.

The implication is that there are no credible Palestinian peace partners and when they indulge in private negotiations, they realize that they are unable to present any meaningful concession to their people who they themselves have brainwashed with hatred and extremism. At least in future they may now hesitate before embarking on duplicitous private peace gambits, which are never intended to be submitted to their people but merely designed to mollify Western public opinion.

Original URL: http://wordfromjerusalem.com/?p=2782

Isi Leibler

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

What I Learned From Iran’s Failed Revolution

by Abolhassan Bani-Sadr

By removing a despot who was the main obstacle to democracy, the Tunisian revolt has immense importance for the Arab and Islamic world. Above all, it has opened up a future that, due to the iron grip of an authoritarian political system backed by European and Arab governments, had been considered closed.

As we see from the burgeoning demonstrations in Egypt, it is not lost on others in the region that ousting corrupt autocrats is no longer just an impossible dream. Tunisia’s message to others in the region is that despotism is not a lot in life to which they must submit. That message is spreading fast because the Tunisian democratic movement is legitimately homegrown and not tied to a Western sponsor, as was the case with the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

As I well know from personal experience, however, an open future includes not only the possibility of democracy, but the possibility of resurgent dictatorship.

In order to achieve democracy and diminish the prospect of a new strongman taking over, certain conditions have to be fulfilled.

First, the movement has to distance itself from the old regime and its elites. Revolutions only happen when the system is thoroughly dismantled and rebuilt. For now, the political and neoliberal economic structures that supported Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s dictatorship, although shaken and fragile, are to a large extent still intact. The same elites are still in charge.

From this perspective, it was a mistake for the movement to enter into negotiations to form a coalition government with the old elites. They can be trusted only when they voluntarily resign and allow themselves to be replaced by others elected by the people.

Second, the entire structure of the despotic regime — the executive, judiciary and legislative branches — should be revolutionized. It would be a mistake to limit the objectives of the movement to simply changing personalities.

The lack of experience on the part of ordinary people should not lead the movement to import elites from the former regime into the new government. My experience of the 1979 Iranian revolution taught me that in any department and ministry there are enough patriotic experts who are not tarnished by their association with the former regime and who are willing to play a constructive role in rebuilding the country. The fact that the existing elites have the lion’s share of the seats in government indicates that there is a serious shortcoming here. This gap has to be filled as soon as possible; otherwise, the elites of the ancien régime will reconstitute their power.

Original URL: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/01/28/what-i-learned-from-irans-failed-revolution/

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.