The secret of Iran's success - Dr. Ofer Israeli

by Dr. Ofer Israeli

Despite the sophistication, guile and resolve exhibited by the Persians, the Islamic republic can be defeated.

Persian civilians and government representatives have been giving and taking with foreigners for thousands of years, employing a different type of business or political discourse than the West is familiar with. Due to its basic principles these negotiations will, more often than not, primarily serve the Persian interest.

Therefore, we should not be surprised this was the case throughout the negotiations between Iran and the United States and other world powers. The Iranian delegation won significant results through its dogged adherence to the four negotiating principles of the Persian bazaar.

Firstly, the Persian bazaar approach to negotiating aims to secure the maximum result, which is predetermined and from which there is no intention of backing down. From the Persian point of view, the negotiating process is not designed for facilitating a compromise between the opposing sides. It is also not designed for reaching a middle ground between the sides' original proposals. Its goal is singular in purpose, which is to allow the Persian side to meet its objectives. If not -- the negotiating process is delayed until an unknown future date, when the conditions are deemed more favorable to achieving the objectives. In the meantime, the Persians will buy time and learn to live with the situation, as difficult as it may be. 

Secondly, the only measuring stick for success in negotiations is achieving the goal, which as stated has been predetermined. Any other outcome will be perceived as a stinging defeat, which will eventually be rejected by the highest echelons of power. No attention, therefore, is paid to the high price of the negotiating process. Iran avoided compromising its goals despite the draconian sanctions imposed on it for years, which were some of the harshest sanctions ever imposed on one country by the international community. 

While Western negotiators may give in on certain issues in order to shorten the process, which also means paying a larger price and losing more, the Persians will hold steadfast to their positions until their goal is achieved and until they completely exhaust the opposing negotiators. 

Thirdly, while the Western economic approach sanctifies the "win-win" principle, the Persian approach sanctifies the imposition of its objectives on the adversary. Any compromise on the basic principles, even a compromise that seemingly serves the Persian interest, is considered weakness that sullies the good name of the chief Persian representative, who has bent for the foreign representative. Success, on the other hand, will enhance the representative's prestige and personal status, while also illustrating the supremacy of the Persian nation.

Fourthly -- honesty and truth telling is the norm for Persians in the closer circles of family and business associations. In contrast, these rules almost completely do not apply to the world of international politics. And if they do apply -- it is only because it is temporarily fitting. Therefore, any problem raised by the other side will be met with a future solution, which will be backed up by impressive promises that will supposedly bridge the gaps. After all, there is no honest and truthful intention to stick to the deal, which will be violated at a time deemed suitable -- most likely when the other side no longer has the leverage with which to enforce the main points of the deal.

Throughout the negotiations between Iran, the U.S. and other world powers, the Iranian representatives operated in accordance with these four principles of negotiation. Of course, we can identify certain points in time where the Iranian negotiators gave in and supposedly acted in contradiction to these fundamental principles, but this was only to create the appearance of a positive dynamic while absolutely adhering to their national interests, outlined by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Despite the bitter defeat of signing the deal, which is bad for Israel, Jerusalem must examine the possible avenues of action at its disposal and act with determination to make them happen. Despite the sophistication, guile and resolve exhibited by the Persians, the Islamic republic can be defeated. One way to do so is to adopt some of the Persian strategies described here, and is a subject worth expanding on separately.

Dr. Ofer Israeli is a senior adviser on international strategy and teaches foreign policy decision-making at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=13365

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The president vs Kerry - Richard Baehr

by Richard Baehr

In the course of testimony this week, Kerry ‎admitted he did not know what was in the side agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency and ‎Iran relating to the process for inspections of the Parchin site and other locations ‎where prior military activity related to Iran's nuclear program may have occurred. Kerry had not provided any information on these side agreements when the ‎overall agreement was submitted to Congress.

John Kerry giveth and Barack Obama taketh away. After a few days of hearings ‎in U.S. House of Representatives and Senate committees and subcommittees, opponents of the Iran nuclear ‎deal were hoping for an extension of hearings, if for no other reason, than to keep ‎the secretary of state on the hot seat. The more Kerry spoke, the greater were the ‎doubts among wavering Democrats about the agreement. Kerry's performance ‎combined some of his worst tendencies -- a disdain for anyone challenging what he ‎regards as his received wisdom, and an inability to make a case, in this instance for ‎a bad deal that he himself negotiated. In the course of testimony this week, Kerry ‎admitted he did not know what was in the side agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency and ‎Iran relating to the process for inspections of the Parchin site and other locations ‎where prior military activity related to Iran's nuclear program may have occurred. Kerry had not provided any information on these side agreements when the ‎overall agreement was submitted to Congress. Similarly, Kerry responded to a ‎question from a Democratic member of Congress by stating that if the Congress ‎voted down the bill, he did not know whether the president would accept that vote ‎and obey the law (apparently, governing by the law of the land has become a ‎hypothetical that the secretary did not feel he could address at this point). Many in Congress, including ‎Democrats, were already unhappy that the agreement had been submitted for a ‎vote (which passed) in the U.N. Security Council before Congress even began ‎hearings on the agreement.‎

However, the president for the first time really since the House vote on the ‎Affordable Care Act (e.g., Obamacare) in 2010, has taken to personally lobbying ‎Democratic members of the House of Representatives to vote for the Iran deal. ‎And the president seems very invested in using all the powers of the White House ‎to make his persuasion job easier. Kerry may have ‎assisted opponents by his weak answers and unconvincing argument that however ‎good or bad the deal was, the alternative was war, which had to be worse. In ‎essence, he seemed to be conceding that it almost did not matter what was in the ‎final deal. That defeatist posture explains a lot -- in particular the deluge of late ‎concessions by the Americans in the final negotiations -- everything was fair game so ‎long as there was a deal to be brought home. As for the alternative -- who exactly ‎was going to war, if the negotiations had broken down, or if the Congress voted ‎down the deal? Obama? Israel? The EU? Iran?‎

The president seemed very conversant with the details of the deal, and made some ‎of the same straw man arguments about the lack of alternatives, but also pushed ‎the importance of this to him and the administration, and that argument carries a ‎good deal of weight with Democrats. ‎

There are parallels between the approach the administration took in passing the ‎health care reform legislation, and the approach it seems to be taking now. In the ‎case of the health care reform bill, the Senate had already passed a version of the ‎bill that differed from the House version. The president and his aides adopted a ‎strategy of having the House approve the Senate bill, and then use a technique ‎known as budget reconciliation to pass ‎changes to the Senate bill in both branches of Congress by simple majority vote. ‎So the key vote was in the House to accept the Senate version of the bill. Even ‎though there was a large Democratic majority in the House at the time (near 60% ‎of the seats), many Democratic members knew they were likely signing their ‎walking papers by voting for the bill. Obamacare was unpopular in the year it was ‎debated, and in the years since has never received majority support in any opinion ‎polls. Close to 40 Democrats did not support the health care bill, but enough did ‎vote for it to have it narrowly pass in the House. In the congressional elections ‎later that year, Democrats lost over 60 seats and their majority in the House, ‎largely due to voter anger over the Obamacare legislation, including the fact that it ‎passed on a straight party line vote without any Republican support. Unlike all ‎other major changes to domestic policy -- the adoption of Social Security, Medicare, ‎and Medicaid, which all gained bipartisan support, the Obamcare bill was viewed as ‎having been jammed through Congress without the same broad support. ‎

The president and his top White House aides, such as Ben Rhodes, have made it ‎very clear to members of the party in the House and Senate, but also to activists ‎around the country, that the Iran deal represents a foreign policy legacy for ‎Obama similar to the significance of the passage of the health reform bill in his first ‎term, his key domestic policy "achievement." And increasingly it appears that if the ‎president's deal is to be sustained, he will again rely solely on the votes of ‎Democrats. Among the 247 Republican House members, and 54 Republican ‎senators, there may be a total of two or three who are uncommitted on the Iran deal, and ‎pretty much everyone else is expected to vote no. Assuming Republicans can ‎persuade their undecided members to join the rest of the GOP caucus in opposing ‎the deal, the president's hopes will again, as with the health care reform bill, ‎depend on his ability to keep members of his own party in line. ‎

So far, the president's effort, as well as other members of the administration, has ‎been almost singly focused on House members. This suggests that the ‎administration expects that on an initial vote, both the House and Senate will vote ‎down the Iran deal. That rejection will then be vetoed by Obama, and then there ‎will be a vote to override the veto, requiring a 2/3 vote in both the House and ‎Senate for the opponents to be successful. The lobbying of House members ‎suggests that the administration is more confident that it can persuade House ‎members than senators to stick with him and defeat the override vote. Senators ‎run for their seats every six years, and have to win statewide. Many Senate races ‎are competitive, and they are always expensive. Most House members, on the ‎other hand, run in districts where the outcome is pre-ordained -- with comfortable ‎margins assured for Democrats in some districts, and for Republicans in others. ‎Perhaps 15% of the House seats -- 60 to 70 of the 435, are truly competitive in a wave ‎year, where there is a big shift for one party, as occurred towards the Democrats ‎in 2006 and 2008, and towards Republicans in 2010 and 2014. As a result of the ‎fact that senators need a broader appeal to win statewide than most House ‎members do in their districts where they tend to win comfortably, senators tend to ‎be a bit more independent and less straight party line than House members. A plea ‎for party loyalty to back the president will resound more with House Democrats ‎than Senate Democrats. This is also the case due to the racial makeup of the ‎Democratic caucus in each branch of Congress. There is only one Hispanic and one ‎African-American Democratic senator, but close to 70 House members from the ‎two groups. African-American House members, in particular, have circled the ‎wagons to protect the first black president on every key vote so far since he was ‎elected. They have been very outspoken -- accusing Republican opponents of ‎challenging him mainly because of his race. This is a preposterous accusation, ‎since there are sharp policy differences between the Obama administration and ‎Republicans in Congress which would come out whatever the race of a Democratic ‎president with Obama's agenda. ‎

This week, a Democratic congressional committee identified 14 House Democrats ‎as vulnerable members in the 2016 elections.‎ Since opponents of the Iran deal need to get at least 43 Democrats to join them, the ‎pool of swing district Democrats to pick from is much smaller than during the ‎Obamacare vote. Potential no votes among Democratic House members may ‎include some of the 18 Jewish members or other Democrats in districts in states ‎with a sizable Jewish population. Roughly 90% of the Jewish population in the U.S. ‎is in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland, California, Florida, ‎Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona and Illinois, and lobbying by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ‎and other groups is likely to focus on these members. In this regard, it was ‎disappointing that Sander Levin, a Jewish Democrat from Michigan, endorsed the ‎deal this week, even before congressional testimony was completed, as did Chris ‎Van Hollen, a Maryland Democratic congressman who is running for that state's ‎open Senate seat. Van Hollen is running against an African-American ‎congresswoman for the Democratic nomination, and may have felt he could not ‎stray too far from the president in a state where half the Democratic primary ‎voters are African-American. Courage and independent judgment are regularly ‎trumped by hard political calculation at this point.‎

Most political analysts continue to believe that both the House and Senate will vote ‎the deal down on its initial vote, but that there are not enough Democrats to ‎translate that simple majority against the deal into a 2/3 majority against the deal ‎on a vote to override an Obama veto, particularly in the House. A majority of ‎Americans are opposed to the deal, but so far pubic opinion does not seem to have ‎influenced the congressional alignment on the deal. ‎

From the time he became president, Obama has been committed to ‎breaking the historic bipartisan support in Congress for Israel, by pushing ‎Democrats to the left on this issue as on all others. Obama was cozy with and ‎helped build J Street, a left-wing George Soros-funded anti-Israel group that has ‎backed him every time he criticized or pressured Israel. AIPAC, which defended ‎the president against attacks when he first ran in 2008, has been effectively ‎neutered as Obama worked to make Israel a partisan issue. ‎

Today, Democrats who stand with the president on this deal are, for all practical ‎purposes, standing with Iran, since it is the prime beneficiary of the ‎agreement. That is the main ‎problem with the deal.‎

They will also be standing with a president and administration who are using ‎blatantly anti-Semitic and anti-Israel messaging in their attacks on opponents of ‎the deal. Democrats who vote for the deal will make obligatory ‎statements about how they are nonetheless strong supporters of Israel and the U.S.-‎Israel relationship. But their vote will be a vote for pushing the two counties ‎further apart, and endangering Israel. Such is the price of party loyalty these days.

Richard Baehr

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=13361

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Steven Vincent, insightful war reporter, murdered in Iraq ten years ago - David Paulin

by David Paulin

Above all, Vincent criticized the mainstream media for failing to recognize signs of progress in Iraq and for utilizing morally confusing language -- including terms like "insurgency," "guerrillas" or even "resistance fighters."

It has been ten years since freelance journalist Steven Vincent, an idealistic war reporter and former art critic, was kidnapped and murdered in Basra, Iraq, as an upsurge in violence bedeviled the U.S.-led occupation. His translator Nour al-Khal -- an aspiring young poet whom Vincent saw as the representative of a more modern Middle East -- was shot and left for dead.

The crime remains unsolved, though rogue Iraqi policeman associated with Iranian-backed Shiite militias were suspected of targeting Vincent -- possibly over a provocative op-ed, “Switched off in Basra,” that the freelance journalist had published in The New York Times two days earlier. It warned that British occupation forces were ignoring militias that were infiltrating Basra's police department and terrorizing the local populace with their religious zealotry. The previous January, conservative Shiite parties had come to power in local elections.

 Photo credit: Mark McQueen for Spence Publications

Vincent, then 49, was the only American journalist murdered during the occupation. Ten years after his death on August 2, 2005, his life and journalistic legacy are worth remembering as the Middle East is engulfed in the chaos that he saw coming.

Vincent's most interesting work was for his personal blog “In the Red Zone” and in articles for two conservative publications: National Review Online and FrontPage magazine. He had a devoted following, and on return trips to the U.S. gave a few radio and television interviews, and also participated in a seminar at San Jose State University in California. Known for his sharp analysis and moral clarity, Vincent had even “caught the attention of the White House,” recalled a former adviser to President George W. Bush and member of his National Security Council.

Bush's reading list included Vincent's 2004 book “In the Red Zone: A Journey into the Soul of Iraq,” said the former official, who asked not to be named, during a phone interview from Washington. Like many readers of “Red Zone,” Bush read it months after Vincent's death; headlines about Vincent's murder had spurred renewed interest in his book, which had enjoyed respectable sales after being published by a small conservative publisher in Texas. Bush subsequently sent Vincent's widow Lisa Ramaci a hand-written letter praising "In the Red Zone" and offering his condolences.

Vincent was working at home alone the day his life changed: September 11, 2001.

By 8:46 a.m., he was settling into his routine as a senior writer for Art + Auction, a glossy monthly magazine. Suddenly, the roar of a low-flying jet filled his East Village apartment. The sound faded. Vincent forgot about it until the phone rang minutes later, and a frantic neighbor told him to join her on the rooftop: a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center, less than three miles away.

“Steven knew immediately it was terrorism,” recalled Ramaci, speaking by phone from the same East Village apartment where she now lives alone. In her bedroom, the 58-year-old antiques appraiser has a small shrine, illuminated by a memorial candle, honoring her late husband.

She added: “It turned out that the plane he heard was American Airlines Flight 11, piloted by Mohamed Atta, who was using 3rd Avenue, less than four blocks from us, as a guide to fly south, and he was only flying about 500 feet above the ground.”

Thus began Vincent's improbable journey. He suddenly saw the art world as irrelevant -- and wanted to be a part of the biggest story of his generation. In a Q&A interview with FrontPage in 2004, he explained, "I figured our enemy was Islamic terrorism -- and I wanted to do my part in the conflict. I'm too old to enlist in the armed services, so I decided to put my writing talents to use." He sometimes called himself a “soldier with a pen.”

A longtime New Yorker who grew up in Sunnyvale, California, Vincent considered himself a moderate Democrat. He hadn't voted for George W. Bush in 2001 yet he saw the “liberation of Iraq” as a blow against “Islamofacism.” To him, the Islamic world was in a civil war pitting modernity against the backward forces that reached America on 9/11. He viewed the U.S.-led invasion as an opportunity to topple a brutal tyrant and remake the Middle East post-9/11. He regarded Saudi Arabia, to be sure, as the “spiritual and financial home of Islamism,” yet he often quoted the saying: “The road to Riyadh leads through Baghdad,” recalled Jonathan Roth, a history professor at San Jose State, who was Vincent's longtime friend.

On his first trips to post-Saddam Iraq in 2003 and 2004, Vincent relied on his wits and lived on a shoestring budget -- forgoing the bodyguards and flak jackets used by news outlets in Baghdad's “Green Zone” where coalition forces provided heavy security. They employed hastily-trained Iraqis as photographers and reporters. Conservative media critics faulted them for failing to provide a balanced picture.

Vincent, on the other hand, reported from the "Red Zone," providing a colorful mix of travelogue, gumshoe reporting, and razor-sharp analysis that presented Iraq in all its pathologies, danger, and promise. His journalism was in the tradition of some of the best reporting of the Vietnam War, a conflict in which a handful of idealistic and prescient journalists went beyond official sources and news conferences -- Saigon's so-called "Five O'Clock Follies" -- and ventured into the field to see the war up close, through the eyes of American soldiers and Vietnamese. Long before it was fashionable, they wrote of that war's self-defeating and atrocity-producing polices: free-fire zones; the use of "body counts" to measure military success; the failure to win "heart and minds" in the countryside. Like them, Vincent eschewed the mainstream media's formulaic reporting -- “If it bleeds, it leads” -- that viewed Iraq through a prism of mounting casualties, suicide bombings, and prisoner abuse scandals. He interviewed Iraqis from all walks of life: shopkeepers, policemen, government officials; those who despised the U.S. presence or were ambivalent, and those truly infected with the idea of an Iraqi democracy.

He also skewered anti-American peace activists who visited during the relatively peaceful interval before the insurgency, and he observed that Iraqis didn't care about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction -- a story that obsessed the media. Vincent would have been amused that WMDs were found all over Iraq, as The New York Times belatedly reported in October, 2014.

Moral Clarity

Above all, Vincent criticized the mainstream media for failing to recognize signs of progress in Iraq and for utilizing morally confusing language -- including terms like "insurgency," "guerrillas" or even "resistance fighters."

Vincent preferred "paramilitaries." He argued that it "evokes images of anonymous right-wing killers terrorizing a populace in the name of a repressive regime -- which is exactly what the fedayeen and jihadists are doing by terrorizing Iraqis with kidnappings, beheadings, and suicide bombings."

Writing in the National Review Online, Vincent expanded on this argument when he framed the fight in Iraq as being similar to America's civil rights struggle. "When gunmen stalk the Iraqi countryside, murdering civilians in the name of 'defending the homeland,' can we not see a modern-day Ku Klux Klan? They, too, were masked; they, too, mounted an 'insurgency'; they, too, sought to reinstate a reactionary regime based on ethnic and religious supremacy.”

And while many "culturally sensitive" reporters were reluctant to criticize Arab culture, Vincent zeroed in on what was fueling the insurgency in the Sunni Triangle, whose nihilistic nature had puzzled many journalists: it was a reflection, Vincent wrote in his book, of the all-consuming quest within Arab culture for "honor" and "self-respect." The fighters "see themselves as tribal warriors engaged in the venerable tradition of honor killings against the biggest tribe of all: America." He faulted the U.S.-led coalition for failing to quickly subdue the Sunni Triangle, which he said allowed tribal groups and the Baath Party to join forces.

Vincent's death, on his third reporting trip, came as the mainstream media was coming under increasing criticism for its war coverage, with much of the criticism revolving around its use of Iraqi reporters and photographers, not to mention its failure to report positive developments. Vincent had been researching his next book on the rise of Shiite fundamentalism. The revelations in his Times op-ed about Britain's see-no-evil occupation forces not only strained relations with Washington but eventually developed into a full-blown political scandal in Britain. Ironically, Vincent had decided to visit Basra on his third trip because there were no Western journalists based there (and he would thus have Basra to himself), and because he felt it would be relatively safe under British occupation.

Yet chaos was mounting all over Iraq, prompting Vincent to grow increasingly uneasy about how the occupation was being managed. “America rid us of one tyrant, only to give us hundreds more in the form of terrorists,” he quoted one man as saying in Umm Qasr, a port city near Kuwait, in an article in National Review. In his book, he elaborated: "Were we wrong in Iraq? Yes, in one major sense, beyond even the shortage of troops, failure to anticipate the Baathist-led insurrection and Abu Ghraib: we did not, and still don't understand the regressive, parasitical, unreasonable presence of tribal Islam -- the black hole in Iraqi and Arab cultures that consumes their best and most positive energies. Because of our blindness, we find ourselves fighting an enemy we do not see, comprehend, or even accurately identify."

He nonetheless argued that much still depended on America's willingness to "stay the course."

Vincent and Nour

Nour, Vincent's translator, had figured prominently into “In The Red Zone." A fluent English speaker in her early 30s, she had worked in Iraq for a large Western non-government organization. On their reporting trips, Vincent and Nour sometimes attracted hard glares -- an experience Vincent described with his characteristic moral clarity as being akin to what an interracial couple would have encountered in the Jim Crow South. The next-to-the-last chapter of “In The Red Zone” was simply titled “Nour.” To Vincent, she was the face of a modern Middle East; a woman who believed in “the promise of America" -- and in this sense, he wrote, she was like many Iraqis. “Short of destroying my marriage, I thought, I would do anything to help this woman,” he related.

Believing his professional relationship with Nour had put her life in danger, Vincent had planned a sham marriage with her to get her out of Iraq -- a plan that had his wife's blessing. The "marriage" never happened. On August 2 in the early evening, Vincent and Nour were snatched off a Basra street by five men who, according to witnesses, were wearing police uniforms and driving a police vehicle. Vincent's op-ed had mentioned that rogue police officers -- whose allegiance was to the mosque, not the state -- had been driving such a "death car." He and Nour fought back. The abductors only wanted Vincent. They kept pushing Nour, shouting at her to get away. But she would not abandon him. So the men took her too.

Bound and gagged, they were taken to an abandoned building. Vincent was badly beaten and even bitten in the leg during the struggle, a medical examiner later reported. They were interrogated about their activities and personal relationship. The abductors later drove them to a Basra street, threw them out, and told them to run. They were shot in the backs. Vincent died instantly. Nour suffered three gunshot wounds.

Interestingly, Vincent had told friends in the weeks before his murder that he'd dug up information that could get him killed. He's been getting hang-up calls on his cell phone. So why would he publish his Times' op-ed while still in Basra? "He didn't want to get scooped," said Vincent's father Charles, a retired manager with the General Services Administration and former lecturer at San Jose State, in a phone interview from Sunnyvale. The reason for his third trip, Mr. Vincent added, was because Steven “felt he had another book in him.” Vincent spent a total of eight months in Iraq.

Though Basra was not as safe as Vincent had anticipated, the big story proved irresistible for him. Vincent was “always a risk taker, recalled Roth. “ He liked excitement, and was drawn to it. In retrospect he was of course overconfident, but in such a situation one tends to be in a bubble, and not see clearly.”

Vincent's funeral was held a little more than two weeks later at Middle Collegiate Church on Second Avenue -- the same church where he and Ramaci had gotten married 13 years earlier after being together for 10 years. It was standing room only. Vincent was a well-known figure in the East Village, having edited a neighborhood newspaper early in his journalism career.  Many from the art world, who'd known Vincent him from Art + Auction, and for a stint covering art for The Wall Street Journal, flew in from all over the country to bid him farewell.

'I hate America'

Ramaci, meanwhile, had not forgotten her husband's pledge. She spent a frustrating 18 months lobbying to bring Nour to America -- a process of bureaucratic red tape, phone calls, meetings, and even an appearance before a Senate committee investigating the plight of Iraqi refugees, whose lives were in danger for supporting coalition forces in the hope of creating a more democratic Iraq. Finally, in June 2007, Nour was allowed into the U.S. as a refugee. After a tearful embrace at the airport, the pair went to visit Vincent's grave in Brooklyn's Green-Wood Cemetery. Nour also presented Ramaci with a bloodstained scarf she had worn during the kidnapping. She had pressed it against a wound on Steven's head.
Nour shared Ramaci's apartment for some 15 months as Ramaci helped her adjust to American life. Ironically, the relationship between the pair attracted far more media attention than Vincent's book and journalism ever had. Major newspapers ran big spreads about the two women, who had each loved Vincent in their own ways. Marie Claire, the woman's magazine, ran a long article: “A Different Kind of Love Story.” A movie deal was even discussed.

By all accounts, Nour initially loved her adopted country; and to Ramaci's relief, she eventually stopped wearing her headscarf. But the friendship the pair had enjoyed for 4 1/2 years ended when Nour -- frustrated over the bleak job market after the 2008 financial meltdown -- made a shocking announcement at Manhattan restaurant where she, Ramaci, and journalist Abigail Esman (who had hoped to write a book about the pair) were having dinner.

Ramaci recalled, “While we were having dessert, Nour announced that she hated America, and it was like somebody had stuck a knife in my heart.”

"Lisa's reaction was largely silence," Esman recalled in an email message. "She was obviously profoundly shocked and deeply hurt. Nothing between them was quite the same after that, and soon after, Nour moved out." An email sent to an address provided for Nour was not answered.  Before that evening, the trio has been fast friends. They called themselves “sisters.” Starngely, Nour subsequently told friends that she had never requested Lisa's help.

Friends of Ramaci's who'd met Nour were shocked and baffled. The incident perhaps underscored that America can sometimes only be respected, not loved; or as Roth observed: “Lisa literally brought (Nour) to American single-handedly, and although she should have been grateful, she felt humiliated by this; and this explains her resentment and hatred. Iraqis and Arabs, in general, have this attitude, one that Steven pointed out but could not see in her. I did meet Nour; she was very charming. I see in retrospect how manipulative she is, especially of men. Steve never confided any doubts about Nour to me.” It is an observation that is indeed suggested in “Red Zone” for those who read between the lines.

For her part, Ramaci said that “Nour's inability to find work was highly frustrating, and I think the combination of her outsized expectations and the economic collapse drove her into a dark place.”

Ramaci, of course, has endured a dark place of her own -- living with the knowledge that her late husband's killers remain at large. Who murdered him? The former White House official said it was presumed the killers were associated with one of the many Shiite militias in Basra. Nour had offered to look at photos of Basra's police officers, but Ramaci said that neither the British nor Iraqis were “interested in making that happen.” The case was officially closed in 2007. The FBI had monitored the case and, when asked about the final status of the investigation, an FBI spokesperson issued a statement saying, "While the tragic murder of Steven Vincent has yet to be solved, the FBI stands ready to investigate any additional leads from the public."

“Simply pathetic," Ramaci said, when told of the FBI's response. She over the years gave the FBI many potential leads, she related, including an article from a Middle Eastern publication that named the person thought to be responsible. She doubts any of those leads were checked out. The State Department also declined to undertake any further inquiry, she said.

“The FBI was never interested in pursuing the case," Roth observed, "and the U.S. Government didn't want to make waves." He noted that radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his militia -- who had fought U.S.-led occupation forces -- are now “our ally in fighting Islamic State. Steve's kidnapping was certainly authorized by a high authority, perhaps even Al-Sadr himself; in any case, someone who is now in the Iraqi government. The murderers are hiding in plain sight."

David Paulin

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/08/steven_vincent_insightful_war_reporter_murdered_in_iraq_ten_years_ago.html

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Jihad on Non-Muslim Places of Worship in Turkey - Uzay Bulut

by Uzay Bulut

• "Peaceful coexistence," it seems, is a concept truly foreign to Islamic supremacists. Many pious Muslims seem to think that if Islam is the only true religion, why should one need the immoral, untrue religions or philosophies that lead people astray?
• Turkey also has an Alevi community, estimated in the tens of millions, but the number is only approximate. Alevis in Turkey (and Catholics, Protestants and others) are legally "non-existent." And as you cannot conduct a census on a group of people who are legally "non-existent," you just count them as "Sunni Muslims."
• "As far as the legislation is concerned, worshipping in a building that does not have legal status or calling a building a cem house, church or similar may lead to prosecution." -- Mine Yildirim.
• One hears that "Islam is a religion of peace." But what many Westerners fail to understand is that this "peace" takes place only after everyone has converted to Islam. No other ideology has enjoyed the luxury of being praised as the "religion of peace" while providing exactly the opposite.

Once upon a time, Asia Minor, now called Turkey, as well as the rest of the Middle East, was for centuries a real cradle of civilization, where many different religions and cultures flourished. But today these tiny, dwindling communities are not able to enjoy any freedom of religion or conscience.

"Peaceful coexistence," it seems, is a concept truly foreign to Islamic supremacists. It is this missing concept that keeps them in dark ages. They might still go to shopping malls, or use mobile phones, computers and other technological devices, but their minds and souls are trapped in dark ages. Ironically, most of the high technology and science they utilize was invented by the people whose places of worship they like to destroy.

Why is there not a single Islamic country that operates in harmonious co-existence with everyone instead of domination of everyone? And why is it that in most majority-Muslim countries, non-Muslims suffer from persecution or discrimination? Why are they not recognized as equal citizens with equal rights?

"The Latin Catholic community is not able to prove its ownership of churches it has possessed for hundreds of years due to lack of legal recognition of its existence," according to the scholar Mine Yildirim. "This results in a continuing loss of property. ... Since it has no legal personality at all in addition to not being able to own property, the community cannot go to court when it loses ownership of property on account of this very lack of a legal personality."

Yildirim, after including Protestants and Jehovah's Witnesses in the same problem, notes that, "The Syrian Orthodox community, which has grown in recent years due to migration from South-East Turkey, has been waiting for over three years for a decision on its application to open a second church in Istanbul. ... The importance of having a legally-recognised place of worship cannot be underestimated given the widespread intolerance in Turkish society towards other religions. ... As far as the legislation is concerned, worshipping in a building that does not have legal status or calling a building a cem house, church or similar may lead to prosecution."[1]

Social intolerance and even physical attacks can also cause a non-Muslim place of worship to be closed down. In the own of Inegol, for instance, a church and synagogue in a shopping mall which opened on May 10 were closed down about two weeks later due to "pressure."

The founding president of the shopping mall, Haluk Ozbek, stated: "As we feel the well-deserved pride of introducing such a big project with international identity to our Inegol, we have been exposed to ugly and meaningless attacks that we do not deserve at all by some groups, because there were also foreign places of worship in our shopping mall project as well as a mosque," according to the Cihan News Agency.

Ozbek said that since the mall has been exposed to physical attacks, as well as to attacks in the media, "they have decided to halt their decision regarding the foreign places of worship for now."

On June 10, Muhammed S. aged 25, shouting "We have finished with Christianity and Judaism... Allahu Akbar!," set fire to the entrance of the largest Greek Orthodox Church on the Asian shore of Istanbul, the Hagia Triada Church.

"The suspect said that he had seen 'Prophet Jesus' in his dream," Kostandin Kiracopulos, a representative of the Association of Greek Foundations, with which the church is affiliated, told reporters. The government-run Anatolian Agency reported that the man had been undergoing a treatment at a hospital for mental disorders.

This church was "lucky" -- it was not razed to the ground. Many historic churches in Turkey were. One, in Bodrum, the Hagia Nicholas Church, had been named in honor of Saint Nicholas, a historic 4th-century Christian saint who was born in Myra, a town situated in present day Turkey. In 1923, after many Greeks of Asia Minor were forcibly driven out of their homes during the forcible population exchange between Turkey and Greece, the Hagia Nicholas Church no longer had a congregation. So, it began to be used as a cinema, and then as a sponge storehouse. Then, in 1969, the authorities decided to tear down the church. First, they tried to destroy it with digging tools, but the building was so solid it would not fall. So they blew it up it with dynamite.

The Hagia Triada Church in Istanbul, pictured here in 2009, was recently set aflame by an arsonist. (Image source: Darwinek/Wikimedia Commons)

Other churches in Asia Minor, after the 1915 slaughter of the Armenians, were also dynamited or bombarded with cannons, according to the Human Rights Association of Turkey.

In September 1955, the Turkish government orchestrated a systematic attack that included the destruction of the majority of the churches, monasteries and cemeteries of Istanbul's Greek community.

Such attacks have led to the destruction of the Christian culture in the region. Unfortunately, this seemingly old tradition in Turkey is still in full swing. In April 2015, in the province of Mardin, which until the 1914-1925 slaughter of Assyrians had been an important center for Assyrian Christians, the Association of Assyrian Unity was abolished because the concept "co-presidency" in its charter -- a term also used by Kurdish organizations -- as well as the word "unity" in its name "are against the law." The head of the Assyrian Association, Yuhanna Aktas, said that its members will object to the decision, but if nothing changes, they will take the case to the European Court of Human Rights.

Now that there is only a tiny Christian community left in Turkey, its Islamic authorities do not often resort to their usual aggressive methods. Instead, many of the surviving churches have been used for various insulting purposes other than as places of worship, but this practice only makes the persecution of churches more invisible.

A historic church, for instance, which before 1915 had been in a majority-Armenian village of Germus, is now used as a stable. The church had been restored by Armenians just 11 years ago.
A detailed report in 2014, by the Association of Protestant Churches in Turkey, revealed hate crimes and violations of the Christians' right to build and maintain places of worship, to share their faith, and other forms of discrimination to which they were exposed. The report is filled with stories of violence or threats of violence that churches or church members experienced in Turkey in 2014 alone. In many cities across Turkey, churches, Christian community leaders or church members have been continually subjected to threats, harassment or psychical attacks.

The Protestant church in the province of Antep was sealed because "it was an illegal workplace." In Mardin, another church was apparently infiltrated by two police officers for years. The result was the deportation of some of the church members. In the Uskudar district of Istanbul, members of the Protestant community were made to leave their church and told they would be given a new place of worship. They are still waiting for it. In the Bahcelievler district in Istanbul, the Presbyterian Grace Church was threatened on social media with attacks. Police could not find the source of the threats. In the province of Kayseri, some people threatened and tried to kidnap a Christian university student. When he sought help, nothing was done, so he had to drop out of school.

Turkey also has an Alevi community, estimated in the tens of millions, but the number is only approximate. Alevis in Turkey are also legally "non-existent." And as you cannot conduct a census on a group of people who are legally "non-existent," you just count them as "Sunni Muslims."

Cem houses, the places of worship of the Alevis in Turkey, are also victims of Islamist supremacy. They have never been recognized as places of worship, either during Ottoman rule or under the Turkish Republic.

According to a parliamentary report in 2013, there are 82,693 mosques in Turkey, whereas there are only 937 cem houses. And more than half the provinces in Turkey do not have a single cem house.

As public policy expert John C. Sawhill is alleged to have said, "A society is defined not only by what it creates, but also by what it refuses to destroy."

Sadly, the Islamist supremacists do not seem to be capable of respecting people of other faiths or with no faith. Many pious Muslims seem to think that if Islam is the only true religion, why should one need the immoral, untrue religions or philosophies that lead people astray?

They also, as one can see, try to invalidate or destroy religions that came into the world hundreds or thousands of years before theirs -- even if these religions do not disrespect or try forcibly to convert anyone. To them, non-Muslims are kafirs -- what Islamic scriptures call the unbelievers.

"The language of Islam is dualistic," notes Bill Warner, the director of the Center for the Study of Political Islam. "Humanity is not seen as one body, but is divided into whether the person believes Mohammed is the prophet of Allah or not." And according to the Quran, a Muslim is not the friend of a kafir (3:28).

The Koran defines the kafir as: hated (40:35), mocked (83:34), punished (25:77), beheaded (47:4), confused (6:25), plotted against (86:15), terrorized ( 8:12), annihilated (6:45), killed (4:91), crucified (5:33), made war on (9:29), ignorant (6:111), evil (23:97), disgraced (37:18), unclean (9:28), and cursed (33:60).

"Only the word 'kafir,'" according to Warner, "shows the common political treatment of Christian, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, animist, atheist and humanist."

As Muslim jihadist armies, as well as many Muslim civilians, continue to destroy or attack the places of worship and other cultural or religious values of people of other faiths, they create their own legacy. With each church, synagogue, cem house, Buddhist temple or other non-Muslim place of worship they destroy, attack or ban, they destroy their own identity, value and worth.

Is this the legacy that they wish to be remembered with throughout generations? Apparently, it is.

At the same time, one hears claims that "Islam is a religion of peace." But what many Westerners fail to understand is that this peace takes place only after everyone has converted to Islam.

When future descendents of today's Muslims understand that, and look back at what their ancestors have done, they may well not see a past or heritage to be proud of.

Why is it so dangerous -- all around the world -- to criticize the Islamic ideology?

No other ideology has enjoyed the luxury of being praised as the "religion of peace" while providing exactly the opposite.

Uzay Bulut, born and raised a Muslim, is a Turkish journalist based in Ankara.

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[1] "Freedom of Religion and Belief in Turkey," by Ozgur Heval Cinar and Mine Yildirim, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014.

• Follow Uzay Bulut on Twitter

Uzay Bulut, born and raised a Muslim, is a Turkish journalist based in Ankara.

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6155/turkey-non-muslim-worship

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Al Qaeda Shows Off Captured US-Trained Rebels in New Video - Arutz Sheva Staff

by Arutz Sheva Staff

Another blow for White House's slowly-slowly strategy in Syria, as Nusra Front gloats over rout of US-trained Division 30.

 

Nusra Front fighters (file)

Reuters

 

Al Qaeda's Syria branch has posted a video purportedly showing its capture last week of members of a US-trained rebel force it accuses of aiding US-led air strikes against its fighters.  

The Pentagon denied on Thursday that any graduates of its training program for moderate rebels had been captured in Syria.

But the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that eight members of the 54-strong Division 30 unit inserted into Aleppo province in mid-July were being held by Al Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front.

The video released by Al-Nusra on its YouTube account on Saturday appears to show at least some of the captured rebel fighters.

It depicts five men walking through a field in a straight line, hands behind their heads, supervised by one hooded man and one armed man.

One of the apparently detained men tells the camera he was recruited by the US, through intermediaries, to receive training in Turkey for a month and a half.

He said the trainees were each given an M16 assault rifle and some cash to "fight Al-Nusra" in Syria.

A hooded man identifying himself as an Al-Nusra member said the jihadist group had "cut the hand of the West and the Americans in Syria" by capturing the men.

"Their collaboration with the West is clear," he said, accusing the detained men of helping US-led air strikes against Al-Nusra positions.  

While the Islamic State group (ISIS) has been the main focus of the coalition bombing campaign, Al-Nusra too has been targeted despite its fierce hostility to its jihadist rival.

In an online statement it published on Friday, Al-Nusra called Division 30 "agents of American interests and projects in the region."

The same day, it launched an offensive against Division 30's headquarters.

In a statement on Facebook, the US-trained rebel group said five of its fighters had been killed and 18 wounded in the battle for the base.

Under the cover of US-led air strikes, the remaining forces withdrew to the Afrin area of Aleppo province, which is held by Kurdish militia.

At least 25 Al-Nusra fighters were killed, the Observatory said.

AFP contributed to this report.


Arutz Sheva Staff

Source: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/198924#.Vb58C_mzchQ

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Opinion: Is the Gulf’s Relationship with Washington a Mistake? - Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

by Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

At the current stage of the relationship, there is a heated dispute between the Gulf countries and the US—on the nuclear agreement with Iran. This represents lowest point in the history of the Gulf–US relationship.

The US administration’s deal with Iran on its nuclear program, which ends sanctions and paves the way for rapprochement with Tehran, was viewed by some as a rather low move by Washington against its longtime allies in the Gulf, who were loyal for over five decades. As a result, some in the region believe the deal requires the Gulf states reconsider their relationship with the US.

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries with the US is not an ordinary one and is a prime example of what diplomacy can achieve in our region. Those who aren’t aware of what it has achieved do not value it and do not have a deep understanding of politics. Relations are usually established within the context of mutual interests and are based on respecting charters and agreements, including non-written ones; they must not be viewed on the basis of mythical conspiracy theories nor endowed with more interpretation than can be tolerated or supported in terms of prior commitments. The relationship with Washington is thus not based on nationalist, religious, or emotional ties. Its pillars are oil, commerce, and political consensus over several issues—though not all; there are some major issues on which the Gulf states and Washington differ, and those differences will continue to exist. Sure, Gulf–US ties are not as strong as those between Washington and, say, Britain, but they still much more solid than the relationship the US has with some other Arab and Islamic countries.

The Americans have found in the Gulf states a set of stable regional allies—allies who honor their agreements, unlike other countries in the Middle such as Libya and Iran, which are much more unstable, and hostile. Washington has found consensus with the Gulf states on most issues and there is a long list of examples on which we can find agreement between them. Even when the Saudis have disagreed with the US over strategic issues, such as ending the authority of American companies over Saudi oil company Aramco, the dispute was resolved in a cordial manner that suited both parties. Compare this with Iranian, Libyan, and Iraqi oil-related disputes, which have remained controversial, and sometimes unresolved, for decades.

If we put the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Washington—which was formulated in 1945 by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdulaziz Al Saud and President Franklin D. Roosevelt—within its correct context, we will fully appreciate its benefits by making note of all the crises we have faced in the region since then. Note, however, that the relationship between the Gulf and Washington actually dates back to World War I. However, at that time, the Americans refrained from getting involved in political and military endeavors outside their continent and left the arena open for European powers. Gulf countries, in cooperation with the US, overcame dangerous ordeals since the 1950s, confronting the Nasserist tide and the Ba’athists in Iraq in the 1960s, the communists in South Yemen in the 1970s, the Khomeinists in Iran during the 1980s, and the Iraqi invasion in the 1990s—and they have also addressed Iranian threats since 2000. Without major alliances, it is difficult for countries to overcome such threats, which were also linked to major international alliances during the Cold War. It is no coincidence that regional countries still standing on their feet actually have similar policies and alliances—this includes the Gulf states, Jordan, and Morocco. Aside from Algeria, all other regimes in the region have collapsed or totally morphed.

The economic situation is similar to the political one. It is no coincidence that Gulf countries produce 15 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) while Iran has been incapable of producing no more than 3 million bpd despite its best efforts and the help it has received from Russia and China during the last 30 years. Iran failed because the US refused to grant it the technology and expertise to develop its production, and it failed even though the Iranian topography is similar to that of its Gulf neighbors. Iran is home to the second-largest oil reserves in the Middle East, right after Saudi Arabia. Iraq comes third, some even say first, but due to its struggles with the West and its alliances in the region, it has failed to develop a viable domestic oil industry.

This is the result of political relations and not specific business deals.

Of course, there have always been disagreements between the Gulf and Washington, over several issues, most notably Palestine. This issue remains highly problematic but it has not been allowed to sabotage the entire relationship because the Gulf states are aware that Arabs who allied themselves with the Soviet Union did not succeed in achieving any victories, nor did they gain any rights, or retrieve land, for the Palestinians. There have, of course, been other disputes between the Gulf and the US, but most of them have been temporary blips. For example in 2001 Saudi Arabia refused to grant Washington the right to use its territory to attack Afghanistan (while Iran accepted). At the same time, however, over the past decade Saudi Arabia has provided the Americans with ample information and intelligence to aid in Washington’s war against Al-Qaeda.

At the current stage of the relationship, there is a heated dispute between the Gulf countries and the US—on the nuclear agreement with Iran. This represents lowest point in the history of the Gulf–US relationship. However, it will most likely not lead to a rupture between them, nor even a reevaluation of the relationship from either side—at least that is what I think. Those who recently wrote articles gloating about what happened or condemning the relationship altogether do not see beyond this crisis. Of course it will require serious diplomatic efforts in order to be resolved. But this is not the first time the US government has taken decisions in the region which have stood squarely against Riyadh’s own positions. After all, this should be par for the course considering that each country has its own unique interests.


Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is the general manager of Al-Arabiya television. He is also the former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, and the leading Arabic weekly magazine Al-Majalla. He is also a senior columnist in the daily newspapers Al-Madina and Al-Bilad. He has a US post-graduate degree in mass communications, and has been a guest on many TV current affairs programs. He is currently based in Dubai.

Source: http://www.aawsat.net/2015/08/article55344612/opinion-is-the-gulfs-relationship-with-washington-a-mistake

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The Ayatollah's Plan for Israel and Palestine - Amir Taheri

by Amir Taheri

• The book has received approval from Khamenei's office and is thus the most authoritative document regarding his position on the issue.
• Khamenei makes his position clear from the start: Israel has no right to exist as a state He claims his strategy for the destruction of Israel is not based on anti-Semitism, which he describes as a European phenomenon. His position is based on "well-established Islamic principles."
• According to Khamenei, Israel, which he labels an "enemy" and "foe," is a special case for three reasons. The first is that it is a loyal "ally of the American Great Satan" and a key element in its "evil scheme" to dominate "the heartland of the Ummah."
• Khamenei describes Israel as "a cancerous tumor" whose elimination would mean that "the West's hegemony and threats will be discredited" in the Middle East. In its place, he boasts," the hegemony of Iran will be promoted."
• Khamenei's tears for "the sufferings of Palestinian Muslims" are also unconvincing. To start with, not all Palestinians are Muslims. And, if it were only Muslim sufferers who deserved sympathy, why doesn't he beat his chest about the Burmese Rohingya and the Chechens massacred and enchained by Vladimir Putin, not to mention Muslims daily killed by fellow-Muslims across the globe?
• In the early days of his mission, the Prophet Muhammad toyed with the idea of making Jerusalem the focal point of prayers for Islam. He soon abandoned the idea and adopted his hometown of Mecca. For that reason, some classical Muslim writers refer to Jerusalem as "the discarded one," like a first wife who is replaced by a new favorite. In the 11^th century the Shiite Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim even ordered the destruction of Jerusalem.
• Dozens of maps circulate in the Muslim world, showing the extent of Muslim territories lost to the infidel that must be recovered. These include large parts of Russia and Europe, almost a third of China, the whole of India and parts of the Philippines and Thailand.

"The flagbearer of Jihad to liberate Jerusalem."

This is how the blurb of "Palestine," a new book, published by Islamic Revolution Editions last week in Tehran, identifies the author.

The author is "Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Husseini Khamenei," the "Supreme Guide" of the Islamic Republic in Iran, a man whose fatwa has been recognized by U.S. President Barack Obama as having the force of law.

Edited by Saeed Solh-Mirzai, the 416-page book has received approval from Khamenei's office and is thus the most authoritative document regarding his position on the issue.

Khamenei makes his position clear from the start: Israel has no right to exist as a state.

He uses three words. One is "nabudi" which means "annihilation". The other is "imha" which means "fading out," and, finally, there is "zaval" meaning "effacement."

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei (center), is shown meeting in May 2014 with Iran's military chief of staff and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. (Image source: IRNA)

Khamenei claims that his strategy for the destruction of Israel is not based on anti-Semitism, which he describes as a European phenomenon.

His position is based on "well-established Islamic principles", he claims.

One such is that a land that falls under Muslim rule, even briefly, can never again be ceded to non-Muslims. What matters in Islam is control of a land's government, even if the majority of inhabitants are non-Muslims. Khomeinists are not alone in this belief.

Dozens of maps circulate in the Muslim world, showing the extent of Muslim territories lost to the infidel that must be recovered. These include large parts of Russia and Europe, almost a third of China, the whole of India and parts of the Philippines and Thailand.

However, according to Khamenei, Israel, which he labels as "adou" and "doshman," meaning "enemy" and "foe," is a special case for three reasons. The first is that it is a loyal "ally of the American Great Satan" and a key element in its "evil scheme" to dominate "the heartland of the Ummah."

The second reason is that Israel has waged war on Muslims on a number of occasions, thus becoming a "hostile infidel" ("kaffir al-harbi").

Finally, Israel is a special case because it occupies Jerusalem, which Khamenei describes as "Islam's third Holy City." He intimates that one of his "most cherished wishes" is to one day pray in Jerusalem.

Khamenei insist that he is not recommending "classical wars" to wipe Israel off the map. Nor does he want to "massacre the Jews." What he recommends is a long period of low-intensity warfare designed to make life unpleasant if not impossible for a majority of Israeli Jews so that they leave the country.

His calculation is based on the assumption that large numbers of Israelis have dual-nationality and would prefer emigration to the United States or Europe to daily threats of death.

Khamenei makes no reference to Iran's nuclear program. But the subtext is that a nuclear-armed Iran would make Israel think twice before trying to counter Khamenei's strategy by taking military action against the Islamic Republic.

In Khamenei's analysis, once the cost of staying in Israel has become too high for many Jews, Western powers, notably the U.S., which has supported the Jewish state for decades, might decide that the cost of doing so is higher than possible benefits.

Thanks to President Obama, the U.S. has already distanced itself from Israel to a degree unimaginable a decade ago.

Khamenei counts on what he sees as "Israel fatigue." The international community would start looking for what he calls "a practical and logical mechanism" to end the old conflict.

Khamenei's "practical and logical mechanism" excludes the two-state formula in any form.

"The solution is a one-state formula," he declares. That state, to be called Palestine, would be under Muslim rule but would allow non-Muslims, including some Israeli Jews who could prove "genuine roots" in the region, to stay as "protected minorities. [ Editor: read dhimmis]"

Under Khamenei's scheme, Israel plus the West Bank and Gaza would revert to the United Nations' mandate for a brief period during which a referendum would be held to create the new state of Palestine.

All Palestinians and their descendants, wherever they are, would be able to vote, while Jews "who have come from other places" would be excluded.

Khamenei does not mention any figures for possible voters in his dream referendum. But studies by the Foreign Ministry in Tehran suggest that at least eight million Palestinians across the globe would be able to vote, against 2.2 million Jews "acceptable" as future second-class citizens of the new Palestine. Thus, the "Supreme Guide" is certain of the results of his proposed referendum.

He does not make clear whether the Kingdom of Jordan, which is located in 80 percent of historic Palestine, would be included in his one-state scheme. However, a majority of Jordanians, who are of Palestinian extraction, would be able to vote in the referendum and, logically, become citizens of the new Palestine.

Khamenei boasts about the success of his plans to make life impossible for Israelis through terror attacks from Lebanon and Gaza. His latest scheme is to recruit "fighters" in the West Bank to set-up Hezbollah-style units.

"We have intervened in anti-Israel matters, and it brought victory in the 33-day war by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006 and in the 22-day war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip," he boasts.

Khamenei describes Israel as "a cancerous tumor" whose elimination would mean that "the West's hegemony and threats will be discredited" in the Middle East. In its place, he boasts, "the hegemony of Iran will be promoted."

Khamenei's book also deals with the Holocaust, which he regards either as "a propaganda ploy" or a disputed claim. "If there was such a thing," he writes, "we don't know why it happened and how."

Khamenei has been in contact with professional Holocaust deniers since the 1990s. In 2000, he invited Swiss Holocaust-denier Jürgen Graf to Tehran and received him in private audiences. French Holocaust-denier Roger Garaudy, a Stalinist who converted to Islam, was also feted in Tehran as "Europe's' greatest living philosopher."

It was with Khamenei's support that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set up a "Holocaust-research center" led by Muhammad-Ali Ramin, an Iranian functionary with links to German neo-Nazis who also organized annual "End of Israel" seminars.

Despite efforts to disguise his hatred of Israel in Islamic terms, the book makes it clear that Khamenei is more influenced by Western-style anti-Semitism than by classical Islam's checkered relations with Jews.

His argument about territories becoming "irrevocably Islamic" does not wash, if only because of its inconsistency. He has nothing to say about vast chunks of former Islamic territory, including some that belonged to Iran for millennia, now under Russian rule.

Nor is he ready to embark on Jihad to drive the Chinese out of Xinjiang, a Muslim khanate until the late 1940s.

Israel, which in terms of territory accounts for one per cent of Saudi Arabia, is a very small fry.

Khamenei's shedding of tears for "the sufferings of Palestinian Muslims" are also unconvincing. To start with, not all Palestinians are Muslims. And, if it were only Muslim sufferers who deserved sympathy, why doesn't the "Supreme Guide" beat his chest about the Burmese Rohingya and the Chechens massacred and enchained by Vladimir Putin, not to mention Muslims daily killed by fellow-Muslims across the globe?

At no point in these 416 pages does Khamenei even mention the need to take into account the views of either Israelis or Palestinians regarding his miracle recipe. What if Palestinians and Israelis wanted a two-state solution?

What if they chose to sort out their problems through negotiation and compromise rather than the "wiping-off-the-map" scheme of he proposes?

Khamenei reveals his ignorance of Islamic traditions when he designates Jerusalem as "our holy city." As a student of Islamic theology, he should know that "holy city" and "holy land" are Christian concepts that have no place in Islam.

In Islam, the adjective "holy" is reserved only for Allah and cannot apply to anything or anyone else. The Koran itself is labeled "al-Majid" (Glorious) and is not a holy book as is the Bible for the Christians.

The "Supreme Guide" should know that Mecca is designated as "al-Mukarramah" (the Generous) and Medina as "al-Munawwarah" (the Enlightened). Even the Shi'ite shrine cities of Iraq are not labeled "muqqaddas" (holy). Najaf is designated as "al-Ashraf" (the Most Noble) and Karbala as "al-Mualla" (the Sublime).

In the early days of his mission, the Prophet Muhammad toyed with the idea of making Jerusalem the focal point of prayers for Islam. He soon abandoned the idea and adopted his hometown of Mecca, where the black cube (kaabah) had been a magnet for pilgrims for centuries before Islam. For that reason, some classical Muslim writers refer to Jerusalem as "the discarded one" (al-yarmiyah) like a first wife who is replaced by a new favorite. In the 11^th century, the Shiite Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim, even ordered the destruction of "discarded" Jerusalem.

The Israel-Palestine issue is not a religious one. It is a political conflict about territory, borders, sharing of water resources and security. Those who, like Khamenei, try to inject a dose of religious enmity into this already complex cocktail deserve little sympathy.

Amir Taheri

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6263/khamenei-israel-palestine

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.