The vessel of Turkey's Muslim Brothers has surfaced in calm waters.

by Soner Cagaptay

I am often asked these days why Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is so upset with Israel. "It's so dramatic" people say, adding: "Why did the AKP uninvite Israel to Anatolian Eagle" (a NATO air force exercise held in Turkey)? "Is this the beginning of the end of Turkish-Israeli ties that go back to 1949 just as Israel is most worried about Iran?"

The AKP's snub follows harsh anti-Israeli rhetoric by party leadership, and an incendiary television series on Turkey's publicly funded TV network that depicts Israelis as cold-blooded and evil. So people ask: "Why is the AKP doing all this now?" My answer is simple: The AKP is doing and saying what it believes: the party, rooted in Turkey's own Muslim Brotherhood movement, has always hated Israel, and now that the AKP is comfortably in charge in Turkey, it will oppose Israel with any means available as well as promote other aspects of the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood's agenda.

The AKP was born out of the Welfare Party (RP), the motherboard of Turkish Islamists since the 1980s. Islamism in Turkey, though traditionally nonviolent, possesses six virulent characteristics; it is anti-Western, anti-Semitic, anti-Israeli, anti-European, anti-democratic and holds anti-secular sentiments, all of which are adopted from the Muslim Brotherhood.
When RP came to power in a coalition government in 1996 it attempted to implement this Turkish Muslim Brotherhood agenda, but was opposed by a secular, pro-western bloc, which included various media outlets, opposition parties, NGOs, businesses and the military. When massive demonstrations and a well-coordinated public relations campaign brought the party down in 1997, the EU and the US stood aside.

The Islamists drew a valuable lesson from this experience as they rebranded themselves, turning away from the six-pronged Muslim Brotherhood agenda to become more likeable and gain popular support. The AKP emerged out of this rebranding in 2001 as it declared that it had jettisoned the six elements of the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

In 2002, when the AKP came to power, the world and Turks alike celebrated the victory as a first instance of the Islamists' moderation. But far from harboring a genuine desire to moderate, the Turkish Islamists simply caved to external pressures, including the courts, media outlets, businesses and the military, as well as the US and EU, which forced the AKP to abandon the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

Yet the AKP did not forget its roots: once in power, it followed a two-pronged strategy to eliminate the domestic and external pressures that drove the RP from power in 1997. The party promoted EU accession while simultaneously cracking down on internal checks and balances, and maintained good ties with the West while nurturing anti-Western sentiments at home.

In due course the party successfully neutered the domestic forces that had forced its predecessor to step down from power. It used legal loopholes to pass the media into the hands of its supporters, resulting in half of the Turkish media falling into the hands of pro-AKP businesses and the rest facing massive putative tax fines. Large, secular Turkish businesses fear the AKP's financial police and tax audits, while judges and generals have been targeted in the Ergenekon case for allegedly planning a coup against the AKP government. Illegal and legal wiretaps are now common, justified as necessary for collecting evidence for the Ergenekon case. Whether there was actually a coup plot, Turkey's judges, opinion makers, generals, businessmen, political leaders and plain citizens are fearful of opposing the government because they worry that their private conversations will be wiretapped or they will be arrested for association with the alleged coup.

Just as it has nearly eliminated domestic checks, the AKP has also paralyzed external checks to its power. Although the party maintained amiable ties with Israel and the United States and even pushed for EU accession after coming to power, in reality the AKP's rhetoric has demonized the EU, US and Israel. The party has labeled US and Israeli policies as "genocidal" and bashed the West for "being immoral." Even though those who promoted the idea of the Islamists' moderation dismissed such rhetoric as harmless domestic politicking, the rhetoric has had devastating consequences: today, few in Turkey care for the West, most people oppose EU accession, many Turks hate America and almost no one likes Israel.

Fast forward to the Anatolian Eagle incident. After paralyzing domestic opposition and planting the seeds of anti-western sentiments in Turkish society, the AKP now feels free from the checks and balances that have traditionally forced Turkey's Islamists to behave. If the AKP is a political submarine that has cruised underwater, spotted by its rhetorical periscope, now this submarine is surfacing: the party is re-embracing the ideology of the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood.

We are witnessing the Muslim Brotherhood's take on foreign policy, highlighted by its approach to Turkish-Israeli ties. After seven years of vehement anti-Israeli rhetoric, the Turkish public has now embraced the AKP's position against Israel and the party is comfortably chipping away at the foundations of Turkish-Israeli ties, something it has always wanted to do. Today, it is Israel; tomorrow it is EU accession and cooperation with the United States, for instance on Iran. At this stage, the US, the EU and Israel have little leverage and few allies left in Turkey, and AKP policies, promoting the agenda of the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood and countering the US, EU and Israel, will find little resistance and much support inside Turkey. Turkey's Muslim Brothers have played a smart game indeed, changing the color of their vessel, then sailing deep and surfacing only when the waters were calm and clear.

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of "Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?"

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Iran: Enriching Uranium or its Regime?

by Tariq Alhomayed

The prevailing roundabout has returned i.e. [that of] saying yes and no, between the Iranian regime and the G5 + 1 countries in the Vienna negotiations that are discussing the Iranian nuclear file after Tehran surprised the West by asking for a new deadline next week in order to give its response to whether it will accept the proposal put forward with regards to uranium being enriched by a third party outside of Iran.

There are those who are saying that the Iranians have returned to playing the game of buying time – and this is a game that they excel at – in order to prolong these negotiations and avoid any obstacles until the end of the year. There are other reports that talk about the difficulties that the Ahmadinejad regime is currently facing in convincing Iran's hard-liners to accept the proposal made by the West in its present form, and this is something that confirms the seriousness of the position that Ahmadinejad is in. And then there is International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Directory-General Mohamed elBaradei saying in an interview to the [French] "L'Express" magazine that during his visit to Iran two weeks ago, the Iranian president informed him of his country's desire to move forward with this issue. ElBaradei confirmed that Ahmadinejad "wants to normalize relations with the US and western countries, and also with the international community in general." He added that Ahmadinejad "is not interested in a partial normalization [of relations] but a comprehensive normalization [of relations]."

The well-established issue here is the difficulty of believing in the Iranian regime's intentions, and understanding whether they are procrastinating in order to buy more time, or whether there truly are internal difficulties facing Ahmadinejad with regards to convincing the hard-line trend of the benefits of this agreement with the West, and the wisdom of accepting what is being offered. This issue as a whole may perhaps be [connected to] the distribution of roles in Iran, and it is clear today that the Iranian president wishes to enrich his regime more than he wishes to enrich uranium.

Ahmadinejad's regime is suffering from a lack of internal legitimacy following the recent presidential elections, which his opponents accused him of rigging. Ahmadeinjad's regime is also suffering from an ongoing and severe internal resistance from the reformist trend. Therefore success in the Vienna negotiations is perhaps the best way out for the Ahmadinejad regime for if Ahmadinejad is able to reach a comprehensive agreement with the West, contributing to the lifting of sanctions from Iran and the normalization of relations with the US and the West, this will allow him to turn the tables on the reformists.

By doing this, Ahmadinejad will have stripped his reformist opponents of all of the issues that [they use to] influence the Iranian street with regards to economic and political openness, not to mention achieving a major breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear file which he will be able to present to the Iranian interior however he likes, whether as an Iranian victory with talk of the West backing down, or by saying that Iran has given the world a way out of the crisis which is proof of Iran's role in the region and the world. There is no doubt that the Ahmadinejad regime will not fail to find an explanation to presents itself in a good light, for this is a game that Iran excels at.

From here we can understand the Iranian negotiators speaking about the necessity of the West taking steps to build trust with Iran by lifting sanctions and normalizing relations with Tehran. It seems that Iran is just as keen to enrich its regime as it is to enrich uranium, perhaps more so.

Tariq Alhomayed is the Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, the youngest person to be appointed that position. Mr. Alhomayed has an acclaimed and distinguished career as a Journalist and has held many key positions in the field.

 Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Why Engaging with Sudan Shows How Far Obama is Gone.

 

by Barry Rubin

The Obama Administration apparently thinks that its policy of engaging repressive radical anti-American dictators has been working so well as to extend it now to Sudan. This is the meaning of the new policy to be on this issue October 19.

That country’s government, once accused of genocide in the south, is now said to have been doing the same thing in the west. Mass murder and ferocious repression—300,000 people have been killed; 2.7 million made refugees--has been so prevalent that the country’s president Omar al-Bashir is under an international indictment for war crimes and Sudan is on the State Department list as a country sponsoring terrorism.

Far from being inconvenienced by this fact, however, Sudan has been playing a leading role in the effort to do the same to Israel: that is, wipe it out while simultaneously accusing it of war crimes. Sudan is the current leader of the “non-aligned” group at the UN, the largest bloc of members, and one of the main countries pushing to indict Israel for war crimes.

So to anyone who understands how international affairs works it would appear:

A. That the United States is rewarding Sudan for its behavior.

B. That the United States has already reached an agreement with Sudan that it will act differently at home and in the UN before giving it a big concession.

C. The United States is afraid of Sudan.

None of the above points are true. Therefore, this raises a case study regarding the most important issue of all whose absence from the Obama Administration list of priorities is most noticeable on every issue:

What will the Sudanese government do for the United States? Imagine, in the same week that Khartoum has flouted U.S. interests by pushing the Goldstone report through the UN Human Rights Council, Washington is going to reward it with a renewed relationship.

This sounds familiar:

The U.S. government announced the withdrawal of a plan to put anti-missile missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland on the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland at a time when Russia’s leader rejects sanctions on Iran and reaffirms the rationale for annexing much of Poland in 1939.

The U.S. government agreed to engage Iran immediately following the stealing of an election there and the repression of peaceful dissidents.

So we see the same pattern:

--A major concession while receiving nothing in exchange.

--The timing of a concession at a moment when the other side is acting in a particularly aggressive manner.

This is justified, however, by what might well be called the administration’s “cookie” philosophy. This was expressed by retired Major General J. Scott Gration, who has been handling U.S. policy toward Sudan. The former general, who has no previous diplomatic experience—something he has in common with the president—explained, "We've got to think about giving out cookies,’ said Gration. `Kids, countries--they react to gold stars, smiley faces, handshakes, agreements, talk, engagement."

No, that’s not how things work. Reality is better expressed by a Sudanese dissident who said that U.S. rapprochement with the regime will give it confidence to crack down all the harder and, I might add, be more aggressive abroad. That’s precisely, by the way, the effect of the policy on Iran and elsewhere.

So how does the administration guard against such an outcome? It warns that the violence and humanitarian abuses must stop. But a verbal warning from a government eager to renounce toughness and eager to forget all trespasses against U.S. interests is not exactly credible.

You see, the argument is that engagement will make the lives of people in Sudan better and persuade the regime from stopping its sponsorship of terrorism. In principle, this is a reasonable argument but only if three conditions are met:

--Real pressure is applied.

--Concrete, material proof is presented by that country’s behavior before the benefits are provided.

--There is real evidence the regime wants to change its behavior.

All these conditions are lacking regarding Sudan, Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, and every other country the administration is coddling. One can add the Palestinian Authority to the list.

But here’s the problem: If the United States demands that these countries do something, they won’t. This has certain implications:

--U.S. policy toward them will appear to have failed, thus making the administration look bad.

--They will be angry and denounce Obama, thus undercutting his vaunted international popularity.

--The resulting friction might force the United States to engage in tough measures, which could be seen as imperialist bullying.

--Friction could lead to military measures, thus pressing the United States toward having to use force or the threat of force, which would damage the administration’s argument that “soft power” works.

I am not being cynical or joking in providing this list. Such things are the ideas and goals which paralyze the Obama Administration from the kind of policy needed in today’s world.

Equally, there is nothing either conservative or liberal in this analysis. It is the framework by which almost all previous American presidents have conducted foreign polic. If anything, liberals have historically been far more forthright in wanting to pressure repressive dictatorships. Yet here is a presidency supposedly built on compassion whose policy means that Sudan’s people will suffer even more.





Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Goldstone Report - Using Terminology in Service of Deception.

 

by Eli E. Hertz

Justice Richard Goldstone and the United Nations Human Rights Council, sought to rewrite history by labeling Judea and Samaria (Known as the West Bank) "Occupied Palestinian Territories" [Paragraph 11], calling Israeli Arabs "Palestinian citizens of Israel" [Paragraph 111], referring to Israeli Arab villages as "Palestinian Israeli communities" [Paragraph 110] and calling Arab inhabitants of Gaza "Palestinian People in the Gaza strip" [Paragraph 1859]. Essentially Goldstone is endowing Arabs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza with an aura of bogus peoplehood and statehood, as well as a false history as if title or ownership could be assigned out of thin air.

No legal binding authority has empowered Goldstone or any UN organ, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Human Rights Council to decide that the territories of the West Bank, known as Judea and Samaria, and Gaza could be transformed into "Occupied Palestinian Territories" or "Palestine." Goldstone's use of these dishonest, loaded terms empowers terrorism and the Palestinians with the right to use all measures to expel Israel.

 

Palestine is a Geographical Area, Not a Nationality

Arabs, the UN and its organs, and lately the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well, have repeatedly claimed that the Palestinians are a native people - so much so that almost everyone takes it for granted. The problem is that a stateless Palestinian People is a fabrication. The word Palestine is not even Arabic.

Palestine was never an independent state belonging to any people, nor did a Palestinian People distinct from other Arabs appear during 1,300 years of Muslim hegemony in Palestine under Arab and Ottoman rule. During that rule, local Arabs were actually considered part of, and subject to, the authority of Greater Syria (Suriyya al-Kubra).

Historically, before the Arabs fabricated the concept of Palestinian peoplehood as an exclusively Arab phenomenon, no such group existed. This is substantiated in countless official British Mandate-vintage documents that speak of the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine - not Jews and Palestinians.

In fact, before local Jews began calling themselves Israelis in 1948 (when the name "Israel" was chosen for the newly-established Jewish State), the term "Palestine" applied almost exclusively to Jews and the institutions founded by new Jewish immigrants in the first half of the 20th century, before the state's independence.

 

Some examples include:

• The Jerusalem Post, founded in 1932, was called The Palestine Post until 1948.
• Bank Leumi L'Israel, incorporated in 1902, was called the "Anglo-Palestine Company" until 1948.
• The Jewish Agency - an arm of the Zionist movement engaged in Jewish settlement since 1929 - was initially called the Jewish Agency for Palestine.
• Today's Israel Philharmonic Orchestra, founded in 1936 by German Jewish refugees who fled Nazi Germany, was originally called the "Palestine Symphony Orchestra," composed of some 70 Palestinian Jews.
• The United Jewish Appeal (UJA) was established in 1939 as a merger of the United Palestine Appeal and the fundraising arm of the Joint Distribution Committee.

 

There Has Never Been a Sovereign Arab State in Palestine

The artificiality of a Palestinian identity is reflected in the attitudes and actions of neighboring Arabs who never established a Palestinian state or advocated one prior to the Six-Day War in 1967.

Only twice in Jerusalem's history has it served as a national capital. The first time was as the capital of the two Jewish Commonwealths during the First and Second Temple periods, as described in the Bible, reinforced by archaeological evidence and numerous ancient documents. The second time is in modern times as the capital of the State of Israel. It has never served as an Arab capital for the simple reason that there has never been a Palestinian Arab state.

The rhetoric by Arab leaders on behalf of the Palestinians rings hollow. Arabs never established a Palestinian state when the UN in 1947 recommended to partition Palestine, and to establish "an Arab and a Jewish state" (not a Palestinian state, it should be noted). Nor did the Arabs recognize or establish a Palestinian state during the two decades prior to the Six-Day War when the West Bank was under Jordanian control and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian control; nor did the Palestinian Arabs clamor for autonomy or independence during those years under Jordanian and Egyptian rule.

So much for facts and accuracy.

 

Eli E. Hertz

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Middle East: Listen to What They're Saying, in their own language, not English.

by Barry Rubin

Here's a tip for understanding the Middle East. For Arabic-speaking countries and groups, there are two parallel lines of discourse going on: one in English, one in Arabic. The English-language one is directed outward at the West; the Arabic-speaking is for the direction of policymakers, opinionmakers, and the masses. Not surprisingly, the first is more moderate; the latter, more radical.

The exact proportions vary with each country or movement. But even in Egypt, a large-scale recipient of U.S. aid, the state-controlled newspapers publish an almost unending stream of anti-American hate propaganda. A key problem, however, is that most Western policymakers, opinionmakers, and journalists either don't take non-English talk seriously or aren't even aware of it.

In contrast, democratic states like Israel or America says basically the same thing in both languages, with at most very small variations. Perhaps that's one reason why many or most Westerners aren't aware of the wide gap that exists in other societies.

The variation between true and false discourse—though sometimes in the same language—is, of course, quite ancient. In the "Communist Manifesto" of 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote:

"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution."

But this was before the Age of Public Relations. Even the Communists quickly became masters of saying two contradictory things simultaneously. If they were still around today the Communists would have defined themselves as a race and called anyone who opposed them a racist or, more likely, would have coined the term Communophobia. But I digress.

Here's a fun example of how doublespeak is done:

The Soviet leadership addressing the Polish people in 1920:

"Our enemies and yours deceive you when they say that the Soviet government wishes to plant communism in Polish soil with the bayonets of the Red Army."

And now here's the Soviet leadership addressing the Red Army in 1920:

"Over the corpse of Poland lies the road to world revolution. On bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to laboring humanity."

I think you get the point. Back to the Middle East of today. The more radical the group—as with Hamas or al-Qaida, for example--the higher the proportion of radical statements made in English. They just don't care. Hizballah is a little more devious.

As for Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a member of the Communist Manifesto school on that one, but Tehran gets a lot of mileage with a relatively few lies.

But why do should we believe the Arabic more than the English? Let me limit the answer to three of the most important points:

First, the Arabic dialogue establishes the main principles and the limits of what is acceptable. An example is the Palestinian debate. How is the Palestinian Authority going to accept a two-state solution based on ending the conflict, security guarantees, and settling all Palestinians in their own state if nobody even dares say that in Arabic? Exceeding the boundaries can get you killed, cost you your position, have you branded a traitor, and give your enemies ammunition against you.

For a Palestinian politician to say that Israel has ever done anything good and honestly seeks compromise peace is something like a Republican male politician putting on a dress and marching down the street with a poster proclaiming the virtues of Joseph Stalin. In Mississippi. On the Fourth of July. In the middle of an American Legion picnic.

That's why it is almost impossible to find a moderate statement by any Palestinian leader in Arabic—and I've read many thousands of them. Two examples come to mind: when Arafat was making a televised speech from Gaza which he knew was being closely watched and an angry Palestinian general when they entered Hebron complaining that people who committed terrorist acts caused damage to the economy.

During the peace process era, by the way, when Arafat was to give a speech in front of an American Jewish audience, leaders of a dovish Jewish group edited the lecture to make it more palatable. That's what I mean by lying for peace. Thinking that if you misrepresent the facts on the basis of wishful thinking somehow everything will work out ok in the end.

Second, discussion in Arabic encompasses a huge volume of statements made in all sorts of situations. In contrast, each English-language remark is crafted with a specific purpose in mind—to communicate to Western public opinion or governments.

Third, experience shows overwhelmingly that what is said in Arabic corresponds to what countries and groups actually do.

I fondly recall my biggest success ever with the New York Times. Meeting with an open-minded journalist, I pulled out a huge pile of translations from the Arabic—U.S. government ones from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service which in the pre-computer era used to take up large spaces on my bookshelves—and showed him what was actually being said by Palestinian groups, far more hardline than the American media was reporting. He wrote up a front-page piece on it. Ah, those were the days!

Today, MEMRI plays a very important role in bringing the Arabic discourse to Western attention. In fact, it has been so successful precisely because these facts are so distant from what is expected and reported in the media. Not only does it translate the many extremist statements but also the far fewer moderate writers who say divergent things.

Now, here's why you have to study carefully the primary sources (original, Arabic-language material and not just what the Western media say). Someone always spills the beans. After all, you have to keep the troops' morale high and prove you haven't sold out.

So here's a MEMRI translation of an interview given by Walid Sukariyya, a Hizballah member in Lebanon's parliament. He tells it like it is.

Syria's stance on peace with Israel? It's just for "tactical bargaining chips."

How does Syria fight America? "Since, for obvious reasons, Syria cannot [conduct] a confrontation through direct resistance it has opened [its] border with Iraq to all the resistance fighters of Al-Qaida, even though it does not share their ideology."

Notice, he said al-Qaida. And of course that's, as I've previously reported but which is pretty obvious, one of the main affiliations of the Iraqi insurgents. So, in other words,

--Syria is working with al-Qaida (this should not be a controversial statement but in the Western debate it's considered as such).

--Al-Qaida is dedicated to the destruction of America and the West.

--Therefore, Syria is an enemy and even under the narrow definition of what used to be called the "war on terrorism"—which is now only against al-Qaida—Syria is on the other side.

Finally, "This is why Damascus supports the resistance – because it does not want to confront the enemy itself." Right, Syria (and Iran) use Hamas and Hizballah to fight Israel without risk to themselves. And they won't stop doing it.

Thanks, Walid. And let that be a lesson to all of you out there: Listen to what people in the Middle East actually say, especially when they are speaking their own language.

MEMRI translation, from Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London) October 19, 2009. Special Dispatch No. 2612 October 22, 2009

Barry Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Another Tack: Condemnations are commendable.

 

by Sarah Honig  

In my very early childhood I used to let out a whoop of joy whenever the radio reported yet another UN condemnation for another Israeli anti-terrorist retaliation. As it turned out, I had lots of opportunity for elation. When my bemused parents admonished me with increased exasperation, I explained that I was happy because the UN had again rewarded our battlefield triumph.

Plainly, I didn't understand what the word condemnation meant, nor had any notion about Orwellian doublespeak, international hypocrisy or diplomatic duplicity. I simply noticed that when things go well for Jews, they get condemned.

That made condemnation sound like a good thing. Each condemnation became akin to a trophy or a victory medal for letting our tormentors have it.

More years than I care to admit later - after I had learned the definition of long strange words and became aware of the real dangers inherent in a tarnished national image - I still can't entirely fault my juvenile interpretation of grown-up events.

EVEN THE Goldstone report fits so well into my kindergarten-age perceptions. When rockets were rained on Sderot and environs for nearly a decade, Israelis were obviously faring badly. Yet so long as Israelis were victimized by Arabs, the rest of the world said nothing. Our weakness and our pain seemed to excite no reaction, indeed draw no notice, as if they occurred in a sealed vacuum.

However, as soon as the victims defended themselves, albeit belatedly, a tempest was stirred. The entire world's attention was suddenly riveted on little old us and the condemnations - familiar, strident and ever-hectoring - came, fast and furious as they had during all the decades of Israel's existence and even prior to Jewish independence. Only a show of Israeli deterrence brought Goldstone here. His very interest in us must indicate that we had done something worthy in our self-interest.

No surprise here, only the expected turn of events, as if an unstoppable natural phenomenon. However, just as unsurprising and a whole lot sadder is the fact that so many among us - including in the ostensible political mainstream, like Kadima MK Nachman Shai - feel obliged to play along with Goldstone and the misnamed UN Human Rights Council which dispatched him at the behest of such intrinsically progressive states as Syria, Somalia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

They feel a need to explain ourselves to them and atone for our self-defense. If Goldstone demands a tribunal to try our soldiers for the offense of combating the deliberate targeting of our noncombatants, then they'll subscribe to his premise and agitate for an inquiry. This notion - the latest de rigueur rallying cry - is underwritten vigorously by former minister Amnon Rubinstein, minister-wannabe Prof. Uriel Reichman and a slew of trendsetters (including Ha'aretz).

Perhaps their intentions are laudable. They're out to prove, via an inquiry chaired by a "neutral" American jurist or such Israeli champions of every left-wing cause as former Supreme Court president Aharon Barak, that we're a just society which earnestly probes itself and that at most our transgressions are minor and unpremeditated. Thereby we shall cleanse our hands before the entire accusing critical world.

The fundamental flaw in their reasoning is that the accusing critical world isn't fair and balanced in its accusations and criticism. It indulgently dismisses intentional Arab belligerence against Israeli civilians yet censures the counteraction, in which inadvertently civilians on the other side may get hurt. If anything, their injury is hardly avoidable because they function as human shields for some of the darkest forces operating in today's world.

WILL SUCH hostile hardly objective observers be wowed by our famed judicial liberality? They weren't in the past. In fact Goldstone patently wasn't. He accused Israel's postmodern ultra-morally relativist courts of discrimination against Arabs and their supporters.

This is a fight that make-nice maneuvers just can't win. But they can lose us an awful lot. Any inquiry commission, constituted under whatever official aegis, will hold lengthy daily sessions delving into the minutest minutiae of Israeli military campaigns in the best traditions of our foot-dragging, pedantic, compulsively hair-splitting judiciary. Its procedure-laden hearings will be plodding and interminable and the general public won't bother to decipher their intricate legalistic esotericisms.

What will, nevertheless, be imparted to news-consumers worldwide is that Israel is in the dock, that even it somehow admits wrongdoing, which it had been shamed and coerced into examining.

This won't be a whole lot different from the vague impressions implanted into inattentive news-consumers who may have caught the tail end of an item on attempts to have Israel's defense minister arrested for war crimes in Britain. Never mind that the charges were pressed by the lawyer who represented the terrorists who shot ambassador Shlomo Argov in 1982 and who now represents Sudan's genocidal regime. What will be dimly remembered is that Israel's higher-ups are tainted and were let off because of diplomatic immunity like South Africa's erstwhile apartheid leaders. That was the aim of the complaint in the first place. The defamers coveted commotion rather than concrete victory.

An Israeli inquiry into Cast Lead will serve identical purposes. The very likely leaks from the testimony and the sarcastic hard-hitting interrogation of the most altruistic soldiers will accentuate impressions of Israeli sinfulness. These will provide occasional damning headlines.

If, when this PR disaster eventually concludes, the commission will wag a finger at some negligible aspect of something, that will become the international bottom line. In the (unlikely) event that the commission would exonerate Israel unequivocally, its findings will be ignored by foreign news purveyors and pooh-poohed as a whitewash.

Meanwhile, IDF morale will be dealt another blow. Combat troops risk their lives only to be later summoned to what has become a routine ritual - quibbling questioning from judgmental second-guessers and dour Monday-morning quarterbacks. In time this, more than all else we do to unhinge the defense forces on which our continued existence depends, will emasculate our military.

We're already frighteningly close to the self-stymieing situation in which almost every officer needs a battery of lawyers. IDF upper echelons already expend too much energy on accounting for past actions rather than preparing for the confrontations-to-come. This isn't just an irritating inconvenience; it can lead to a distorted focus and exact dreadful cost in tomorrow's war.

This of course is precisely what our enemies and their emissaries (like Goldstone) crave. It's certainly not what Shai, Rubinstein and Reichman want. This, though, is what can come of the short-sighted desire to abide by rules our antagonists decree.

The above well-meaning gentlemen need to ask themselves whether we can really lift our collective face through self-mutilation. Should we at all hanker after any image-improvement predicated on weakening our standing and intimidating our security-providers? Wouldn't we do better to just earn more condemnations instead?

Perhaps my preschool logic did dictate the obvious: Condemnations are commendable because they invariably accompany our successes.

 

Sarah Honig  

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Goldstone’s Crocodile Tears.

 

by Alan M. Dershowitz

Richard Goldstone, the primary author of the infamous Goldstone Report, is now trying to distance himself from the way in which the report is being used to single out Israel for condemnation.  Most recently he criticized the United Nations Council on Human Rights, which commissioned the report, for the contents of its referral to the Security Counsel.  This is what he said:  "The draft resolution saddens me as it includes only allegations against Israel.  There is not a single phrase condemning Hamas as we have done in the report."

Goldstone, as usual, is trying to have it both ways.  The truth is that the report itself barely criticizes Hamas.  Indeed, the summary—which was intended as a press release—is replete with condemnations against Israel but never once criticizes Hamas.  Instead it gently criticizes "Palestinian armed groups," as if to suggest that these were vigilante grass root killers who were not sponsored by and doing the work of Hamas.  The text of the report devotes infinitely more space to condemning Israel than it does to condemning Hamas or even "Palestinian armed groups."  It is not surprising, therefore, that the resolution of the UN Council, which is intended to briefly summarize the report, would focus its attention on condemning Israel.  Goldstone, who is a savvy and experienced international diplomat, had to realize this when he signed onto the report.  The crocodile tears he is now shedding, in claiming that the resolution "saddens" him, is simply another example of him talking out of two sides of his mouth.

Goldstone did the same thing when he told the Jewish Daily Forward, "that his group had not conducted "an investigation," but rather a "fact-finding mission" based largely on the limited "material we had."  Since this "material" was cherry-picked by Hamas guides and spokesmen, Goldstone acknowledged that "if this was a court of law, there would have been nothing proven."  He emphasized to the Forward that the report was no more than "a road map" for real investigators and that it contained no actual "evidence," of wrongdoing by Israel.

That is certainly not what the report itself says.  The report repeatedly accuses Israel of war crimes and other violations of international law.  It concludes that Israel "violated" the law and that these violations "constitute a grave breach."  It does not qualify its accusations the way Goldstone now seems to—at least when talking to Jewish audiences.

In his recent press offensive, Richard Goldstone complained that many of his critics have not read the report, have not responded to its conclusions, and are resorting to attacks on the credibility of those who are responsible for producing it.  In an interview, not surprisingly, with Al Jazeera, Goldstone said the following: "I have yet to hear from the Obama Administration what the flaws in the report that they have identified are, I would be happy to respond to them if and when I know what they are."  He continued "I have no doubt, many of the critics—the overwhelming majority of critics—have not read the report, and, you know what proves that, I think, is that the level of criticism does not go to the substance of the report."

This of course misses the point.  Many of the most severe critics have studied the report in detail and have focused on specific errors.  As far as I know, Goldstone has not responded to any of these substantive criticisms.  Moreover, there is a good reason why there has been so much focus on Goldstone himself and others on his commission, as well as on the source of the report, namely the UN Council on Human Rights.  First, as to Goldstone: The only reason anyone has given any credence to yet another report of the obviously biased Human Rights Council is because Goldstone was its chairman.  As the Associated Press reported recently, Israel tends to ignore reports of the Human Rights Council, "which includes many Arab and Muslim countries [and] is hopelessly biased against Israel."  It continues, "But Goldstone's credentials as a former war crimes prosecutor…, his Jewish faith and his close ties to Israel have made it hard for Israel to ignore his findings."  Goldstone obviously understood that he was putting his personal credibility behind this deeply flawed report.  His credibility has suffered a fatal blow as the result of his association with such bigotry.  It is not surprising, therefore, that critics are questioning his motives.

If Goldstone wants a debate on the merits and demerits of his report, I am ready and willing to debate him.  I await his reply.

 

Alan M. Dershowitz

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

One Man, One Vote, One Time.

by Noah Pollak

That is the oft-repeated formulation that describes the problem with the participation of Islamist and terrorist groups in elections. They pretend to be committed to democratic politics so long as democratic politics provide a vehicle for them to take power. But the moment elections no longer favor them, they no longer favor elections.

Many have been wondering where Hamas would come down on this question since the group's rise to power was given democratic legitimacy in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. It appears that we have an answer. Mahmoud Abbas, president of the PA and the leader of Fatah, has announced that he will schedule presidential and legislative elections for January 24th, 2010. Hamas's reaction?

Salah Bardawil, a senior Hamas official in Gaza, said Abbas' "declaration will blow away in the wind."

Hamas's Syrian leadership added:

"Mahmoud Abbas cannot hold elections only in the West Bank," said Moussa Abu Marzouk, Hamas' Syrian-based deputy political leader. "Everything he says on this subject is to put pressure on Hamas."

So Hamas will not participate in elections, and will in fact attempt to undermine and delegitimize them. This is unsurprising to most observers of Islamist politics. But then, there are legions of westerners who counsel Israel and the United States to "engage" Hamas. To take one of many examples, here is Daniel Levy, a leading spokesman for this view:

One can't marginalize Gaza — it's part of the two-state solution. And we're most certainly going to have to bring Hamas inside the tent to make this work. I think that's doable and the first imperative for the U.S. is to leave the Palestinians to do their own internal politics, and to reconstitute their own reformed national movement.

The obvious question is: If Hamas will neither participate in elections nor temper its ambitions, how do we bring it "inside the tent"? The engagers are being either lazy or dishonest when they take as their unspoken premise that Hamas itself desires to come into the tent. What if Hamas cares more about maintaining its ideological purity and guarding its Gaza fiefdom than it does about earning good PR from the West? Indeed, isn't it perfectly rational that Hamas should seek to protect its hard-earned sovereignty in Gaza by rejecting participation in a process whose goal is ending that sovereignty?

It is precisely the fear of becoming entangled in a system that it cannot dominate — i.e., elections or a national-unity government — that provokes Hamas's rejectionism. As David Makovsky notes,

Surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, led by Khalil Shikaki, found that current Palestinian support for Hamas stands at 28 percent, compared to 44 percent for Fatah. In fact, Hamas has not polled better than Fatah since June 2006.

The lesson here is obvious, but alas too simple for sophisticates like Levy: Hamas will not participate in elections. It will not compromise on any of its positions in order to join a national-unity government with Fatah. It will not participate in a peace process or agree to any previous Palestinian agreements. Why would it do any of these things — why would it come into "the tent" — when doing so would require the group to surrender its one great accomplishment: its control over Gaza?

 

 

Noah Pollak
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Iranian Ploy of the Week?

 

by Barry Rubin

There are widespread reports about an imminent deal with Iran regarding its nuclear program. Here's how the New York Times optimistically presents the proposal:

"Iranian negotiators have agreed to a draft deal that would delay the country's ability to build a nuclear weapon for about a year, buying more time for President Obama to search for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear standoff."

(To be fair, even this somewhat cautious note may be much less ecstatic than what we'll be hearing if the deal goes through.)

What is the proposed bargain? It is based on an offer the Iranian government made in 2007 and reintroduced last June. In practice, the result would be that Iran enriches unlimited amounts of uranium to a level near that needed for weapons, a large amount of this would be shipped off to France and/or Russia where it would be converted into something useful for medical purposes alone. Thus, it could be said that Iran having nuclear weapons has been either stopped or delayed considerably, though in fact it would only be delayed (if at all) not very long.

If the deal is made—and don't take for granted it will be as the Iranian regime can think of plenty of delaying tactics, demands for modifications, real or imaginary internal conflicts blocking acceptance, etc.—there will be general rejoicing and the idea of further sanctions will be put on a back shelf to gather dust.

Indeed, it could effectively be argued, that existing sanctions could be removed. This does not seem likely at present--it would require a UN resolution undoing existing sanctions--but such a thing could arise in the future. And of course various countries in Europe could interpret the restrictions more loosely to allow deals that would not have gone through otherwise.

In other words, Iran could go on sponsoring terrorism (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, against Israel, and in other places) and calling for Israel's destruction while being treated as a regular member of the international community. It would only be a matter of a week or two before media outlets start writing that this proves President Barack Obama did deserve the Nobel Peace Prize.

Iran is trumpeting the proposed deal as a victory. But that seems rather strange doesn't it? If this deal is as it appears (and again assuming it happens), then Iran won't get nuclear weapons, has wasted billions of dollars and years of effort for nothing. In fact, it will be running a huge nuclear program to produce a product which in strategic terms is totally useless.

Or to put it another way, it's like setting up a massive and expensive sword-making industry, then shipping off the completed swords to be turned into ploughshares and pruning hooks when you didn't have any agriculture.

And by the way, since Iran--and its apologists--have been insisting that its real goal was nuclear power plants (as if one of the world's largest oil producers which exports almost all of its production needs that) then why doesn't Iran just agree to some deal in which all the uranium went to fuel such reactors with foreign-enriched fuel and close supervision? Even that would make more sense than this deal.

Does this make sense? There will be many silly reasons for this put forward: Iran was scared by sanctions and a united front against it, or Obama is so popular that they like him or trust him and it proves his strategy works. These ideas are nonsense but one a lot of average people in the West will believe them).

One logical argument that will be advanced is that internal disorder is forcing the regime to take a step back and be more cautious. This is a partial argument but, again, doesn't explain why there would be such a huge apparent concession from a regime unaccustomed to making them.

So what's really going on?

First, the whole thing may turn out to be a maneuver for buying time and no agreement is actually made.

Second, the Franco-Russian reworked uranium could be turned back into something suitable for further enrichment into weapons'-grade material in several months.

Third, Iran may well have other secret facilities which are going to be pumping out military useful enriched uranium. We have just seen how well they can conceal these things by the public exposure of such a secret facility. These could easily replace the uranium shipped abroad in a brief period of time.

Fourth, Iranian leaders, knowing that they have some way to go before being technologically ready to build weapons, are happy to accept a seeming delay in providing the uranium which will allow them to catch up with the technological and engineering requirements of making a bomb that works and missiles that will carry it to the target. Indeed, with sanctions loosened, it might get the very techniques and tools it needs to complete this process under the guise of other uses.

Note that the Bushehr nuclear reactor, which was supposed to have begun operation some months ago, has not been started up yet. Is this due to some technical difficulties? The reason certainly doesn't seem to be Iran sending a signal of willingness to compromise since the regime has not used this factor as proof of its flexibility.

If this last argument is true--and it seems to be a reasonable one--then the idea that such a deal would even "slow" Iran's obtaining nuclear weapons wouldn't necessarily be true.

There could also be Iranian deals with other countries—perhaps North Korea or Venezuela, for example—to cooperate in supplying what's needed. Such a possible arrangement with Syria was destroyed by an Israeli attack on a facility in that country last year.

And speaking of an Israeli attack, this agreement would buy Iran assurance that this couldn't happen no matter what Tehran did since the regime's program would be now under Western protection.

As an Arabic-language expression has it: How do you know it was a lie? Because it was so big.
For example, if Iran was truly going to change course in any real way, there would have been a heated debate within the government of which we would have heard something about.

Or there would have to be a factional dispute or domination by a less extremist group in the ruling circle that argued President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's adventurism was too dangerous to pursue. But all these people have been expelled.

Or it would seem apparent that Iran really was afraid of Western military action or tremendous pressure that would be so great as to force it into a big defeat.

Such cautions seem quite logical. Yet no matter how ridiculous the situation seems if Iran pulls off this ploy it could be a devastatingly successful one.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), with Walter Laqueur (Viking-Penguin); the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan); A Chronological History of Terrorism, with Judy Colp Rubin, (Sharpe); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Goldstone report constitutes nothing less than a prize for terrorism.

 

by Danny Ayalon

 

For eight years, while Hamas indiscriminately shelled Israeli civilians with rockets provided by its patrons in Iran, the UN stood silent. Only when Israel, after years of restraint, moved to put an end to the terror, did the Human Rights Council act -- by condemning Israel. This one-sided body passed a one-sided resolution calling for a one-sided investigation. Last month, the results of this "investigation" were presented by Justice Richard Goldstone to the HRC. Yet instead of dealing responsibly with the report, HRC members engaged in yet another anti-Israel travesty, which even Goldstone acknowledged as one-sided.

 

There have been dozens of international inquiries into events in the Gaza operation, and Israel has cooperated fully with almost all of them, including one undertaken by the UN Secretary General. Only in those instances where it was clear beyond any doubt that an inquiry was motivated by a political agenda -- and not concern for human rights -- did Israel decide not to cooperate. Unfortunately the HRC's Fact-Finding Mission was one of these.

 

 

Even Goldstone is now trying to distance himself from the results of his own handiwork.

 

Sadly, what was clear to Israel from the outset, has only now become clear to Goldstone. He is now trying to distance himself from the results of his own handiwork.

Last Friday he discussed his disappointment with the action taken by the HRC, telling the Swiss daily Le Temp: "This draft resolution saddens me as it includes only allegations against Israel, there is not a single phrase condemning Hamas."

 

We must now deal with the consequences. The council's adoption of the Goldstone report constitutes nothing less than a prize for terrorism in more ways than one. First, the resolution adopted Friday perverts the reality of Hamas criminality, blaming the victim, rather than the true perpetrator of war crimes in Gaza. For the HRC, it was totally irrelevant that Hamas committed grave war crimes by openly calling for Israel's destruction, purposely firing thousands of missiles at Israeli civilians, endangering Gaza civilians by firing from populated areas and abducting Gilad Schalit.

 

It was likewise irrelevant to the HRC that Israel had a responsibility to protect its citizens, made every effort to avoid confrontation and did all that it could to minimize civilian casualties. The only relevant consideration for the HRC was the fact that an opportunity had presented itself to demonize Israel in the international arena.

 

Second, the resolution undermines moderate Palestinians who are interested in peace with Israel. There is a power struggle going on within Palestinian society. It is a zero-sum game, in which any gain for extremism comes at the expense of support for moderation. When the Hamas "tail" is allowed to wag the Middle East "dog," the Palestinian street takes heart and the entire region takes heed. In our neighborhood, everybody loves a winner. So when an international body upholds Hamas's atrocious behavior and exploits it once more to bash Israel, Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority loses face, moderate Arab states lose ground and the Hizbullah-Syria-Iran axis gains strength.

 

 

This resolution grants immunity to the terrorists and prevents law-abiding states from defending their citizens.

 

Thirdly, the resolution creates a new obstacle in the global battle against terrorism. A new form of warfare has emerged, in which terror groups launch attacks against "enemy" civilians from behind a shield of "friendly" civilians. This resolution grants immunity to the terrorists and prevents law-abiding states from defending their citizens. With the blessing of the HRC, this tactic will be repeated by terrorists throughout the world, to the detriment of all other democracies struggling against terrorism, putting millions of innocent civilians in danger.

 

Finally, and most tragic, this whole episode has led Israelis to doubt the underlying assumptions that have guided them until now in their internal debate on how best to achieve peace. Most Israelis supported the willingness of their leadership to take calculated risks to advance the peace process, with the understanding that the "world" would support such efforts and "hedge their bets." Israelis assumed that if, after making compromises, things didn't work out, they would at least retain the right to defend themselves and the world would support them in their struggle.

 

Yet now, a nightmare has come true. After taking the tangible risk of leaving contested territory for the sake of advancing peace, Gaza was turned into a lawless enclave of Hamas-led, Iranian-backed terrorism. Yet, when Israel was forced to defend itself, the world reacted not with support and understanding, but with accusations of "crimes against humanity." Damned when they do and damned when they don't, Israelis are now asking themselves "Was the sacrifice worth it?"

 

While Israelis consider their options, the Goldstone snowball is threatening to gain momentum. From Geneva, the issue has now been passed to the UN General Assembly in New York for further action. But, it is still not too late. An international rejection of the HRC's treatment of the Goldstone report would signal to the Israeli public that the world indeed supports its compromises toward peace.

 

 

Danny Ayalon is Israel's deputy foreign minister.