Al-Qaeda Battles Kurds in Syria

by Jonathan Spyer

The Kurdish flag.

Jerusalem Post, Aug. 16, 2013

Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq, threatened this week to send forces into northern Syria, to defend beleaguered Kurds there. In the statement, issued on August 10, the Kurdish leader said that he had instructed his representatives to enter Syria in order to investigate media claims that the ‘terrorists of al-Qaeda are attacking the civilian population and slaughtering innocent Kurdish women and children.”

If the reports are true, the statement continued, then ‘Iraq’s Kurdistan region will make use of all of its capabilities to defend women and children and innocent citizens.”

No details were offered as to the form the intervention would take. But Barzani’s statement indicates the growing gravity of the situation in north east Syria.

Since July 17th, the al-Qaida linked jihadis of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra organizations have been engaged in a series of attacks on outlying areas of Kurdish population and control. Their intention, ultimately, appears to be to secure a contiguous corridor under their rule stretching from the oil-rich Deir ez-Zor area in eastern Syria through Raqqa province to the border with Turkey. Demographic and geographical realities mean that such a corridor would inevitably run through an area of Kurdish population.

The existence of small Kurdish enclaves within their desired area is an obvious irritant from the jihadis’ point of view. They are thus seeking to isolate and over-run all such points of Kurdish control. This is not yet a generalized challenge to the Kurdish controlled area in the north east. Rather, it is an attempt at localized ethnic cleansing of a type familiar from other conflicts.

Kurdish and humanitarian concerns currently center on the towns of Tel Aran and Tel Hassel, 30 km west of the city of Aleppo. These Kurdish towns, with a joint population of around 40,000, were attacked and occupied by ISIS and al-Nusra forces on July 29th. Kurdish sources report that between 30-40 civilians have been killed by the jihadis, and hundreds more wounded. Around 250 civilians from Tel Aran, meanwhile, have been captured by the jihadis and are currently in captivity.

The Kurdish fighters of the YPG (People’s Protection Units) militia, are committed to the defense of these pockets of Kurdish population, which are situated to the west of the main autonomous zone in the north east of the country. The YPG is controlled by the PYD, the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish movement which dominates the Kurdish controlled areas.

But the battle is not solely between al-Qaeda and the Kurds. Non-jihadi rebels have joined forces with the former, giving the situation the increasing appearance of an ethnic clash between Arabs and Kurds. Elements of both the Tawhid and Farouk Brigades, associated with the ‘mainstream’ rebels of the western-supported Supreme Military Council, have also joined forces against the YPG.

The Arab rebels want to preserve the territorial unity of Syria, and suspect the Kurds of separatist ambitions. The jihadis within rebel ranks want an Islamic emirate in northern Syria. The Kurds, for their part, deny separatist ambitions. But they have sought since the start of the civil war in Syria to maintain control of their own areas, supporting neither regime nor rebels. It appears that this approach is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

The Arab rebels also suspect the YPG of collaboration with the forces of the Assad regime. Following the recent capture by the rebels of the strategic Minigh air base outside Aleppo city, 200 members of the fleeing regime garrison sought and were granted sanctuary in an area controlled by the YPG. From the point of view of the Arab rebels, this confirmed Kurdish links to the regime. Kurdish officials, meanwhile, say that they will offer safe passage to forces of either side (while privately admitting that the events following the Miigh capture would have been better avoided.)

So far, the military results have been mixed. The YPG fighters are better trained and organized than those of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. But the Kurdish areas are cut off from one another. The Kurds succeeded in driving the jihadis out of the contested Ras-al Ain (Sere Kaniyeh) area on the Turkish border. Tel Abyad, further west, remains contested. The fighting continues.

There are also, inevitably, a jumble of outside powers engaged in this situation. The PYD accuses Turkey of aiding the jihadis. They maintain that al-Qaeda fighters were permitted to enter from Turkey. There have also been claims of Turkish artillery support for the jihadis in the Tel Abyad battles.

Russian and Iranian senior officials and media, meanwhile, have issued statements in recent days expressing support for the Kurds. In a strange coda to the events on the ground, both the Iranian Press TV and the Russia Today government channel have noted an Iranian TV report alleging that al-Qaeda forces massacred 450 Kurdish civilians in Tel Abyad. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov expressed his ‘shock’ at the revelations.

But senior Kurdish officials say that no such massacre took place.

PYD leader Salah Muslim visited Iran in recent days. He later told reporters that the Iranian regime has agreed to the Kurdish self government project in northern Syria.

Amid all the various competing forces, there is one that is conspicuously absent.

US State Department Deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf in a statement to reporters this week urged KRG President Massoud Barzani to reconsider his plans to intervene in Syria if it transpires that al-Qaeda is indeed carrying out massacres against the Kurdish population there.

So at a time when it has become clear to all regional players that the borders separating Syria from Iraq and Lebanon are today mainly a fiction, the United States apparently considers that maintaining this fiction is more important than the fight against al-Qaeda. No-one would expect that the U.S. itself would take up this fight in Syria. But Washington seems to want to prevent anyone else from doing so either. The inhabitants of Tel Hassel and Tel Aran, meanwhile, remain under siege.

Jonathan Spyer

Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/08/al-qaeda-battles-kurds-in-syria/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

America and Europe: a Case of Impaired Judgment?

by Anat Berko


The Arab-Muslim world is currently a cauldron of violence, murder and carnage. Similar to a volcanic eruption but not in any way a force of nature, it is a man-made disaster that threatens world peace. Some people mistakenly think that the post-Arab Spring terrorism and murder plaguing the Middle East are somehow confined to the Arab world. That is a commonly held belief in Europe, which closes its eyes to the catastrophe lurking at its door and repeats to itself the mantra that the threat of radical Islam's taking over the Middle East is a matter for Israel and America only.
 
Europe needs a painful jolt of reality to see the very things it denies. Its leaders have to be made aware of what is happening right in their own back yards. Europe is coming under the influence of Muslim immigrants who live in seething, explosive enclaves of crime, regressive religious incitement and isolation. Any social-sectarian explosion may be delayed as long as they are thrown the occasional sop in the form of yet another painful concession leading to the gradual erosion of the European identity of their host countries. Under the banner of tolerance, pluralism, restraint and democracy, the Europeans are preparing lives of Islamic religious coercion for themselves.

The long-overdue designation of Hizballah as a terrorist organization offers a good example. Thirty years of lethal international terrorism, including last year's attack on Israelis in Burgas, Bulgaria, was not sufficient to convince the Europeans. Europe had to witness the slaughter of Syrian civilians before it could make its historic decision, and even as it did, in its fear of reprisal from both the organization itself and its own rioting Muslims, it allowed the "political" wing of the organization and some of its commanders to remain within the law. Hizballah's leaders could barely contain their smiles, and were quick to remind the Europeans, yet again, that Hizballah made no distinction whatsoever between its "political" and "military" [i.e., terrorist] wings.

Europe's fear to openly oppose the threat of Islamic terrorism is spawned by its fear of reprisal within its own cities, where there are large Muslim communities serving as fertile soil for the growth of global Islamic terrorism, and some of whose members fall prey to terrorist incitement. Europe dared to designate Hizballah as a terrorist organization only after Bahrain, a Muslim country, did so. The Europeans did not feel confident enough to simply designate Hizballah as a terrorist organization and first had to impose a boycott on products made in the Jewish settlements, a way of placating the Islamic predators stalking them in their own back yards.

As opposed to the slow, awkward and complex difficulties involved in making decisions regarding Syria and Hizballah, the West acted with surprising speed and efficiency when it came to imposing sanctions on the liberal provisional government of Adly Mansour and Abdel Sisi in Egypt. Mansour and Sisi performed a heroic act for the benefit of both the Arab-Muslim and Western worlds when, at least for the foreseeable future, they neutralized the threat of the establishment of yet another reactionary Islamic state in the Middle East.

Why do the leaders of the West seem to have such difficulty in dealing with reality? Maybe instead of being statesmen in the classic sense, elected officials with vision, they are merely politicians who have convinced themselves that what they want to see is what they see. The message sent by the Obama administration to the provisional Egyptian government indicates that the West may have a problem in seeing the picture for what it is. As far as the Americans are concerned, broadcasting a picture of the president of the United States holding a golf club and condemning Egypt is both perfectly normal and acceptable. After all, even a president has the right to go on vacation. However, for the relatives of the people being slaughtered, burned to death and raped, the message is that America is indifferent, distanced and without empathy for the suffering of others at the most basic human level. For the Islamists, the message is a green light. Egypt is in fact in the throes of terrible violence. What does the American administration expect from people fighting for the character of their country and to free themselves from the claws of Islamist terrorism? Soapbox oratory? A televised late-night academic panel? A letter to the Times?

The distance, lack of understanding of Middle East mentality, denial of the facts and political hypocrisy distort the West's picture of the world. Its leaders have a mistaken idea of the reality of the Middle East and judge it through the prism of their own ideologies. They have no real knowledge of the struggles waged in other parts of the world in which religion and national disputes play a part and which have different ideas regarding freedom, the rights of the individual and the value of human life. Those who lead the free world while nonchalantly swinging golf clubs seem to be telling the rest of the world that nothing can stop the game of denial and hypocrisy. The golf balls will fly, the president will make a statement and the fate of the masses will be decided, for better or for worse, during his game.

The West is out of its depth when it comes to how the Arab-Muslim world regards society, behavioral norms and the mood of the people, especially now, in Egypt, which is fighting for its freedom and national character. Despite Egypt's situation, the West owes a debt to General Sisi for putting the brakes on radical Islam in the Middle East, an action that will have consequences for the entire Western world. He and his army, nurtured in the bosom of the West, stopped the tidal wave of ignorance, the oppression of, and traffic in, women, the barbarity and return to the Middle Ages the Muslim Brotherhood brought with them when they rose to power. Sisi and many like him understood the Muslim Brotherhood were no one's "brothers," but rather murderers who thought only of themselves and their agenda to turn Egypt into an Islamic emirate. They are not even cousins of the family of the enlightened.

Sisi and the provisional government stopped the radical Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida from kidnapping the Egyptian revolution born in Tahrir Square. According to the statements made by Obama, he is still not aware that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaida and his organization, are the rotten fruit of the Muslim Brotherhood tree, responsible for the slaughter of American and European civilians and soldiers. That is the only possible explanation for his equivocation after Morsi's ouster. The result is a diminishing American influence that is angering both Morsi supporters and his opponents.

All that is left is to hope that the West opens its eyes and believes what it sees. The West has to listen to the cries of the suffering, the murdered and the starving, and to prevent Egypt from becoming Iran's Sunni twin. Obama has to learn the lesson of President Carter's historic mistake which, because of a similar policy failure, allowed the Ayatollahs to take over Iran.

In view of the American administration's skewed perception of reality driven by high-level appointees with plenty of academic knowledge, but little on the ground experience, one of the stumbling blocks to understanding the Middle East is apparently the theoretical knowledge gained at a high-ranking university. Over-intellectualizing can seriously harm the instinct for self preservation and distort the ability to judge a situation not covered by theoretical academic models. So when Morsi usurped judicial power last fall, and rammed through a Constitution that failed to protect the rights of women and religious minorities, the Obama administration's response was muted and empty.

The officials of the provisional government know that if they fail there is no way out for them or for the Egyptian people. Should that happen, they and the heads of the Egyptian army will be hanged in Tahrir Square and their bodies will be dragged through the streets as a warning. If they fail, the next step will be a Muslim Brotherhood Islamic dictatorship on the backs of the masses which will cast Egypt back to the Dark Ages.

If that happens, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has already sabotaged the legacy of the Pharaohs, will destroy Egypt's archaeological treasures, the marvels of its culture, the pyramids and the Sphinx, like the Taliban, which blew up the ancient statues of Buddha. That is how radical Islam imposes the Islamic narrative on the world and destroys all evidence of the existence of any other culture or religion.

That is not what the Egyptian people want. They want to live in freedom and dignity, and not under an Islamic dictatorship that will make their lives hell on earth. The Western world also does not want the Arab-Muslim world to suffer such a fate. Every school child in the Western world knows that democracy is not just a word; it expresses the desire for freedom and a life completely different from what the Muslim Brotherhood advocates. Democratic elections are not the end; they are the means to an end, the beginning of a process, not the process itself. Hitler also rose to power through democratic elections, something the West should remember when dealing with the fate of Egypt.


Dr. Anat Berko, PhD, is a Lt Col (Res) in the Israel Defense Forces, conducts research for the National Security Council and is a research fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center in Israel. A criminologist, she was a visiting professor at George Washington University and has written two books about suicide bombers, "The Path to Paradise," and the recently released "The Smarter Bomb: Women and Children as Suicide Bombers" (Rowman & Littlefield).

Source: http://www.investigativeproject.org/4133/guest-column-america-and-europe-a-case

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Egyptians Bewildered Over Support for Muslim Brotherhood

by Michael Armanious

What many Egyptians cannot understand is: Why is the U.S. administration siding with the forces of oppression in their country and assisting with its transformation into a failed state under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood? Egypt simply cannot be allowed to become another Somalia or Afghanistan, controlled by its own version of the Taliban.

The Egyptian people are astounded. They simply do not understand the Obama Administration's efforts to bring the Muslim Brotherhood back to power.

In an effort to make some sense of the Obama Administration's policies, Amr Adeeb, a prominent Egyptian commentator, argues that the U.S. is helping the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve power, in order to turn Egypt into a magnet for jihadist fighters. The goal, Adeeb states, is to turn Egypt into another Syria or Afghanistan and discredit Islamism as a viable political movement.

To Westerners, this may seem like a bizarre conspiracy theory, but for Egyptians it helps explain why the U.S. government is supporting an organization that has openly declared jihad against the West, engaged in threats of war with Israel and Ethiopia, demolished dozens of ancient historic churches, set hospitals on fire, and murdered Christians in the streets. The Muslim Brotherhood has no respect for the rule of law, but the Obama Administration treats the Egyptian military that removed the group from power as a threat to democracy itself.

An artist's rendition of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile river, currently under construction. The Muslim Brotherhood government under former President Morsi threatened to wage war with Ethiopia over this project.

The fact is, the Ikhwan (as the Muslim Brotherhood is called in Arabic) engaged in some pretty undemocratic behavior in the election that brought it to power in June 2012. Morsi lied about his background, telling voters he worked for NASA when he did no such thing. He falsely promised to spend $200 billion on an Egyptian renaissance only to say, once he was elected, that it was just an idea. He bribed voters with cooking oil, sugar, and medicine. On the day of the election, with threats of violence, the Muslim Brotherhood stopped thousands of Coptic Christians from voting. Further, in a little known aspect of the election, many voters complained of receiving ballots that had already been marked in Morsi's favor.

Egyptians were willing to overlook these irregularities in hopes that Morsi would bring order and stability to their country. They hoped he would follow through on his promise to build a modern Egypt; create jobs, and put together and inclusive government and constitution. They hoped he would honor his promise to spend $200 billion on repairing Egypt's infrastructure as part of an Islamic "Renaissance Project."

Instead, Morsi worked systematically to dismantle the institutions of a 7,000 year-old country. He gathered his cronies to speak openly, on national television, of destabilizing Ethiopia in a fight over the use of water from the Upper Nile River.

Morsi also straightforwardly stated that he was recreating an Islamic "Caliphate." He pardoned and freed hard-line Islamists -- including Anwar Sadat's killers -- and allowed them to have an Islamic political party, contrary to the constitution, which bans religious parties. When Morsi spoke to audiences, hard-line Islamists sat in the front row, demonstrating that these people were his political base.

To buttress the support of this base, Morsi released members of Gamaa al-Islamiyya, founded by the "Blind Sheikh," Omar Abdel-Rahman, who attempted the first World Trade Center attack. This group, considered a terrorist organization by the United States, killed over 60 tourists in Luxor in 1997. That history did not stop Morsi from appointing one of its members governor of Luxor, over the objection of local residents who are dependent on tourism for their livelihood. Nor did it stop him from assigning another member of this group as Minister of Culture. With these decisions, Morsi delivered a final blow to Egypt's tourism industry.

And if people are not even willing to visit Egypt, how will they invest in the country?

The Muslim Brotherhood, however, apparently does not want tourists from the West, even though they have been an important source of hard currency for decades. It seems Sheik Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, an ultraconservative Islamist and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, had asked Morsi to not allow Western tourists into Egypt, and to replace them with tourists from Muslim countries.

Life under the rule of Morsi became impossible. For Egyptians, shortages of food, water, electricity, and medicine became the norm. In response, Morsi appeared on TV to ask for more time, another 10 or 15 years.

As Morsi started driving his country into a civilizational ditch, some of the passengers rebelled. A grassroots movement called "Tamarud" ("Rebellion") mobilized over 30 million people, who took over the streets of Egypt, and called for the removal of Morsi and his radical government. Their legitimate goal was to take the steering wheel from a group of madmen who wanted to bring about famine and take Egypt back to the dark ages. To prevent a civil war, the Egyptian army removed Morsi and installed an interim government with the support of Al-Azhar University, the most respected Islamic authority in Sunni Islam; the El Nour Party (an ultraconservative group); the Coptic Church, and a number of secular parties.

Predictably, the Muslim Brotherhood responded with threats and violence, especially targeting the Christians of Egypt. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood shot a 10-year-old Christian girl in the streets as she returned home from church. They beheaded a Christian merchant, shot a priest in Sinai and marched Franciscan Nuns in the streets like war prisoners. They burned Christian business, homes, and churches, especially the ancient churches in Upper Egypt. Their goal was to terrorize Christians and erase all of evidence of Egypt's Christian past. Apparently, destroying the country's hope for the future was not enough.

Islamists also massacred officers and soldiers from the armed forces and the police. Mohamed Beltagy, an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood politician, stated in a televised interview that violence would stop when Mohammed Morsi was reinstated as the president of Egypt.

Many Egyptian are asking: Why are the West and United States insisting on supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in the name of democracy? It was the same type of "democracy" -- merely an election, which is only a small part of a democracy -- that brought Hitler to power in Germany and Hamas to power in the Gaza Strip. If Hamas is outlawed in the West, why isn't the Muslim Brotherhood?

What many Egyptians cannot understand is: Why is the U.S. Administration siding with the forces of oppression in their country and assisting with its transformation into a failed state under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood? These conditions all run contrary to American interests.

In the Middle East, a strong economy, military, and police are the cornerstones of stability. Egypt was the first Arab nation to choose the path of peace with Israel. Egypt is the nerve system of the Arab and the Islamic world. The U.S. has a strong interest in a stable, modern, and prosperous Egypt. It simply cannot be allowed to become another Somalia or Afghanistan, controlled by its own version of the Taliban.


Michael Armanious is a Coptic-American who has written extensively about his homeland, Egypt.

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3946/muslim-brotherhood-support

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Arab MK's Sharia Blasphemy Demand on Israel

by Andrew E. Harrod

This past May, Muslim Arab Member of the Knesset (MK) Ibrahim Sarsour introduced a bill in Israel's parliament that would prohibit blasphemous speech. Sarsour's demand on Israel, a model of liberal democracy, to subject herself to sharia blasphemy laws is dubious. Further, Sarsour's own provocative, even hateful, statements against fellow Israelis is further evidence that Islamist sensitivities entail no reciprocity for other groups. 

Sarsour described his bill, first introduced in an earlier version in 2008, as prohibiting "any offense in any form" against "religious sentiments." This would include cursing, defaming, and depicting religious books and figures such as Muhammad, Moses, and Jesus. Sarsour cited as motive a future possibility in Israel of derogatory Muhammad caricatures and soccer game chants offensive to Muslims. Concerning free speech concerns, Sarsour discerned a "clear difference between... opinions and harming religious sentiment" as a "red line" having "no justification to cross." 

Sarsour stated that current Israeli law in this area is not strong enough. Section 173 of Israel's Penal Law, according to one English translation, imposes up to a year's imprisonment for spoken or written words "liable crudely to offend the religious faith or sentiment of others." Sarsour's bill would eliminate "crudely" from the law and add the aforementioned specific applications.

Section 173 originates from violent Arab rioting against Jerusalem's and Hebron's Jews in 1929. In order to suppress the riots, the British High Commission enacted "The Abuse and Vilification (religious invective) Order No. 43" imposing a one year jail sentence upon any "word or sound in public or within earshot of any other person that may be or is intended to offend his religious sensitivities or faith." Israeli Supreme Court decisions have limited Order No. 43's initial reach in present-day Section 173, yet Israeli citizens such as the Jewish Tatiana Soskin in 1998 still face conviction. Her crime was to disseminate posters of Muhammad depicted as a pig in Hebron. 

The Israeli legal community has long debated free speech restrictions. In 2003, the Israeli Democracy Institute (IDI) issued a report calling for Section 173's abolition. The IDI argued that "sensitivities" are "characterized by subjectivity" such that clashes are a "daily occurrence." IDI even argued that "harming sensitivities actually contributes to a person's advancement and to developing his faith." 

Sarsour does not have any qualms being insensitive to his fellow citizens and institutions he represents in the Knesset. Sarsour is a representative of the United Arab List (UAL) party. Formed in 1996 with the participation of Israel's Islamic Movement, in which Sarsour was active, UAL is now in coalition with one MK from the Arab Movement for Renewal (Ta'al in its Hebrew acronym). The Israeli Central Elections Committee (CEC) banned UAL-Ta'al from participating in the 2009 elections due to charges such as supporting terrorism, but the Israeli Supreme Court overturned the ban. In response to the ban, UAL-Ta'al members called the CEC "fascist" and "racist." 

Sarsour's past actions as MK are dubious. In 2011 he praised the Lebanese terrorist group Hizb'allah for its 2006 conflict with Israel and called for a caliphate based in Jerusalem. In 2012 he visited two imprisoned Palestinian terrorists, including Abbas Al-Sayyid, responsible for organizing a 2002 suicide bombing killing 35 people at a hotel Passover Seder. Mansour has even compared Israelis to Nazis, calling the April 28, 2008, Israeli collateral damage deaths of five Gaza family members "reminiscent of some very dark times, including that of the Nazis." 

Sarsour's efforts would only restrict freedom in the Middle East's only truly free society, as Freedom House has shown. Even amidst continual Arab conflict with Israel, latest polls show that 55% of Israeli Arabs would prefer to live in Israel rather than any other country. This outpost of freedom in the Middle East is worth preserving against initiatives like Sarsour's.

This article was sponsored by The Legal Project, an activity of the Middle East Forum.

Andrew E. Harrod

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2013/08/arab_mks_sharia_blasphemy_demand_on_israel.html

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Mordechai Kedar: The Current Scenario in Egypt - Radicalization and Escalation

by Mordechai Kedar

Read the article in Italiano (translated by Yehudit Weisz, edited by Angelo Pezzana)

The crisis in Egypt is deepening, and both sides of the conflict are becoming increasingly entrenched in their positions. The fatalities that have occurred among Mursi supporters as well as among the military people causes both sides to act on the basis of their hearts and emotions, and not from logic. Both sides think "We'll show them" and "we will break them", the Egyptian public scene is crashing, representatives of foreign companies are leaving in droves, and everyone blames everyone else for the miserable situation.

The vice president, Mohamed al-Baradei, resigned and fled the country, because he saw that Egypt is sliding into a swamp of blood, fire and tears, where dozens of people are killed in the streets every day, the economy is collapsing, and the solution to Egypt's problems seems farther away than ever. Al-Baradei may be put on trial for treason because he fled from Egypt and evaded his responsibilities.

The army detained Mohammed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, for two weeks, suspected of inciting the masses to violence and bloodshed. If he actually is put on trial, the Brotherhood and their supporters will most likely not stand by passively and watch, but will envelop the country in another wave of violence.

Another very disturbing phenomenon has been happening recently - the destruction of museums and the theft of antiquities. Some thieves steal exhibits in order to sell them for a small fortune on the black market to collectors; mainly gold coins, statuary and sarcophagi, which were recovered from ancient tombs from the days of the pharaohs. But along with the theft is another phenomenon: the destruction of exhibits, vandalism for its own sake, stemming from the deep hatred that radical Muslims feel toward the cultures that preceded Islam, and especially the Pharaonic culture which Islam considers to be heretical. We saw something similar in March of 2001 in Afghanistan, when the Taliban destroyed the two enormous statues of Buddha in Bamiyan Valley.

The international sphere is also undergoing a major shake-up: the United States' plan to put the Brotherhood in power has failed, but the White House and the State Department continue to issue pronouncements of support for the Muslim Brotherhood and objects to the army's actions, including the arrest of Badie. It may be that Mubarak will be freed from the defendant's box and the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Mursi and Mohammed Badie, will take his place. It seems like Washington fell asleep on the 30th of June and still has not awakened to the new situation.

General al-Sisi and his comrades are not giving in to American pressure, and despite the good relations between the Egyptian military and the United States, al-Sisi refuses to accept Obama's calls, and when the Americans issue declarations opposing the army's acts, al-Sisi becomes angry. He places his definition of Egyptian interests over Obama's definition of Egyptian interests. Al-Sisi sees the dismal failures of the United States Middle East policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Iran, and he understands that he should not allow the Americans to influence events in Egypt, otherwise it may become another link in the chain of failures.

However, even al-Sisi will not be able to forestall the waves of terror, which might bring Egypt to a state similar to that in Syria or Iraq. The neighboring countries - Libya and Sudan - as well as the Sinai Peninsula, are full of weapons of all sizes and types, and the border with these states is long and porous. Egypt could become a magnet for jihadists from the entire Muslim world, who will want to enforce Islam on the country exactly as they did in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Syria and in Libya. Egypt may also become a victim of "international terrorism", with car bombs, suicide attacks, assassinations of senior figures, attacks on military bases, trains, bridges (and there are many in Egypt), electrical lines and dams. Egypt could become a hell for its residents, especially for the Christian Copts, who are already trying to figure out how they can continue living in a country where about sixty churches were burned down in the space of one week .

The world had better get used to the scenario of radicalization and escalation of the internal situation in Egypt, so that they will not be surprised when it happens, and I hope that I may be proven wrong.

The International Arena

It is interesting to see how the world lines up - with al-Sisi or against him: his main opposition is the United States, or more accurately, President Obama and the State Department.  But on the other hand, there are many others in the United States who support the military and the steps that it is taking against the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel supports the military, but Europe thinks that the military acted in an anti-democratic manner when it removed the Brotherhood from power. Obama, the State Department and Europe want democracy at any price, even at the price of transfer of power - by democratic elections, of course - to an Islamist body that does not relate at all to any of the democratic values: the rule of law, separation of powers, rights of minorities, women's rights, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble, freedom of religion and freedom from religion. Al-Sisi knows better than they do what is right for Egypt and what is not.

Erdoğan - Mursi's ally and an anti-Semite for many years - tells the world that Israel is actually behind the revolution against his Brothers. As a result, he gets a cold shoulder both from the United States and from Egypt as well. It is conspiracy theory interspersed with allusions from the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and Erdoğan issues these declarations loudly and clearly. In light of  these words, the prime minister of Israel should rethink his apology to Turkey for the Mavi Marmara incident.

But most interesting is Saudi Arabia's position: it supports the military and al-Sisi and objects to the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia is even willing to donate money to substitute for the loss of American financial aid, if the United States stops its support for Egypt and its military as a result of Mursi's removal. The Saudis take this position in clear and audacious opposition to the president of the United States, and there are two reasons that Saudi Arabia does not hesitate to take these steps: the Saudis feel that President Obama does not understand anything about the principles that rule the Middle East so he prefers the Muslim Brotherhood over other groups for no good reason, and the second is that the Saudis are angry at Obama for not taking any effective steps against the Iranian nuclear program, which frightens the Saudis perhaps more than it frightens Israel.

But the deeper reason for the great hatred between Saudi Arabia and the Brotherhood is cultural: Saudi Arabia is Wahhabi Salafi, while the Brotherhood represents modern political Islam. The difference is simple: the Brotherhood wants to take the religion that was founded in the desert of the seventh century and adapt it to modern society of the twenty first century, while the Salafis want to take society and the state from the twenty first century and adapt it to the religion and culture of the desert of the seventh century. There is no way to bridge between these two antithetical cultural approaches, therefore the Salafis prefer secular military rule rather than modern style Islamic rule, which is contrary to its Salafi style.

From the Water, Not from the Diving Board

 Here, the question arises of what is good for Israel, and how Israel can - if at all - influence the events in Egypt.

The Middle East has some traits that we have still not become accustomed to: Israel is considered an illegitimate entity, so anyone that Israel supports loses legitimacy. Therefore in any conflict in the Middle East between side A and side B, if Israel wants to bolster side A, it must declare that it supports side B. Thus side B will lose legitimacy and side A will be strengthened. Did you get it? The same is true for the United States.

Another feature that is difficult to become accustomed to is the political dynamic of the Middle East, especially since the beginning of the "Arab Winter". Yesterday's friend becomes today's opponent, and today's enemy can become tomorrow's friend. Israel has an interest in the Egyptian military succeeding in the battle for Egypt, therefore it is logical to support it in the world capitals. But it could very well be that tomorrow this army might bring in large forces to Sinai, which is against the peace agreement, claiming that they are engaged in a "war on terror". It may also declare a suspension of the peace agreement, in order to calm the Egyptian street. Will we say that the military is friendly then too?

The public declarations about "the Israeli interest in maintaining the peace agreement" causes untolled damage, because this gives our enemies to understand that there is a vulnerable point where they can apply pressure on us since there are among us those who are willing to give everything in exchange for a piece of paper that has the word "peace" written on it, and they are even willing that "sacrificial victims for peace" will die. We ourselves raise the price for peace to a level that we cannot afford.

The conclusion from all of the aforesaid is that Israel must support its friends behind the scenes, not under the spotlight and with microphones. No one really loves us in this region, even if we support them. Discrete acts will not damage our friends for cooperating with us, and we will not be vulnerable to the fallout of a "flop" if it turns out that the party that we supported, like the Christians in Lebanon, indifferently stick a knife in our back.

 

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Dr. Kedar is available for lectures

Dr. Mordechai Kedar (Mordechai.Kedar@biu.ac.il) is an Israeli scholar of Arabic and Islam, a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and the director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan University, Israel. He specializes in Islamic ideology and movements, the political discourse of Arab countries, the Arabic mass media, and the Syrian domestic arena.

Translated from Hebrew by Sally Zahav with permission from the author.

Additional articles by Dr. Kedar

Source: The article is published in the framework of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan University, Israel. Also published in Makor Rishon, a Hebrew weekly newspaper.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the author.

Dore Gold: Have the Fundamentals of Israel’s Strategic Environment Inextricably Changed?

by Dore Gold


There is a view that developments since the advent of the Arab Spring have completely altered the way Israel should look at its national security needs for many decades to come. The old strategic assumptions that guided Israeli thinking, according to this thesis, are not going to become relevant again. In order to evaluate this idea, it is necessary to keep in mind that there are certain constants in  Israel’s security predicament that are not going to be altered even with the developments the Middle East is witnessing.   

    For Israel remains a small state surrounded by states that have a combined population of 300 million, in territories that are hundreds of times the size of Israel. As a result, Israel’s military assets may be seen as geographically concentrated in a limited area, while neighboring Arab states have been able to disperse launch sites, weapons depots, and military bases across a vast expanse of territory.

    While some neighboring armies have been badly degraded by internal conflicts, it would be a cardinal error to base national planning on a temporary snapshot of reality. For example, Iraq is planning to modernize its ground forces and convert its army from a counterinsurgency force to a force with maneuver warfare capabilities based on new armored and mechanized formations. There are estimates that it will have over 2,000 main battle tanks by the middle of the next decade.

    The Gaza Strip has been flooded with Iranian and Libyan weapons. In the West Bank, where Israel holds on to the outer perimeter of the territory in the Jordan Valley, the same weaponry has not reached terrorist organizations. Global jihadists have been unable to reach the West Bank in order to reinforce their Islamist compatriots, as they did in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Thus, territorial considerations remain applicable to the new threats.

    The present wave of anti-regime rebellions is loosening central government control over large parts of several Arab states. This has created a vacuum that is being filled by regional terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This process has become accentuated in Egypt, especially in the Sinai Peninsula. Countering terrorist organizations by simply deterring the governments of the countries in which they are situated is likely to prove an inadequate strategy.

    The pressures Israel faces at this time to agree to a full withdrawal from the West Bank and to acquiesce to the loss of defensible borders pose unacceptable risks for the Jewish state. They also stand in contradiction to the international commitments given to Israel in the past.

Constants in Israeli Defense Policy Planning

There is a view that developments since the advent of the Arab Spring have completely altered the way Israel should look at its national security needs for many decades to come. The old strategic assumptions that guided Israeli thinking, according to this thesis, are not going to become relevant again. In order to evaluate this idea, it is necessary to keep in mind that there are certain  constants of Israel’s security predicament that do not change with the kinds of political shifts that the Middle East is witnessing.   

For decades Israeli defense policy planning has been predicated upon certain constants that have not changed. Israel is a small state with roughly 8 million citizens. It is surrounded by states that have a combined population of 300 million, in territories hundreds of times the size of Israel. As a result, Israel’s military assets may be seen as geographically concentrated in a limited area, while neighboring Arab states have been able to disperse launch sites, weapons depots, and military bases across a vast expanse of territory.

In past Arab-Israeli wars, these asymmetries were exploited by Arab military forces, which enjoyed quantitative superiority of active service military formations. Israel’s strategy was based on the need to withstand an attack by numerically greater forces while its reserve formations were being mobilized in roughly 48 hours. At times of increased tensions, Israel’s adversaries were always tempted to exploit these asymmetries and launch a surprise attack. Terrain, topography, and strategic depth were essential considerations influencing Israel’s ability to defend itself in these scenarios, and to stabilize the core of the Middle East.
Is the Era of Land Warfare Over?

There are new strategic uncertainties in the Middle East that make it difficult to know exactly what kinds of threats Israel will face in the future. There are voices now asserting that the era of classical threats to Israel posed by land armies has completely ended. Some neighboring armies, they note, have been badly degraded by internal conflicts. With no superpower competition, there is no equivalent to the Soviet Union, which poured arms into the Middle East during the Cold War in order to buy influence.

That description of Israel’s strategic reality is only true for the short and medium term, however. It would be a cardinal error to base national planning on a temporary snapshot of reality, for Middle Eastern states can be expected to rearm and again build up their conventional forces, initially, in order to bolster their ability to protect their regimes internally and to suppress restive minorities.

At a later stage, these armies could be used to threaten vulnerable neighbors, as in the past. For example, Iraq is planning to modernize its ground forces and convert its army from a counterinsurgency force to a force with maneuver warfare capabilities based on new armored and mechanized formations. There are estimates that it will have over 2,000 main battle tanks by the middle of the next decade. Thus, military asymmetries are likely to remain one cause of regional instability in the future. Anyone assuming that the era of land warfare is over would be making a cardinal mistake.
The Rise of the New Terrorist Threat

Before Middle Eastern states recover their full military potential, terrorist organizations are likely to pose the most immediate threat behind the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East. Yet it is important to note that terrorist organizations today can pose a serious threat to a conventional army. Using asymmetric tactics, they operate from populated areas, and are prepared to use civilians as human shields. This strategy limits the ability of conventional forces to use their full firepower without causing unacceptable civilian casualties.

In its wars in territories from which the IDF withdrew, particularly in South Lebanon and Gaza, Israel found itself unfairly accused of using disproportional force, although its operations were not much different from those of Western forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. When the UN Human Rights Council appointed the Goldstone Commission, it accused Israel of deliberately targeting civilians, a charge Justice Richard Goldstone subsequently rejected. While the commission’s initial findings were discredited, Israeli strategy had to adapt to a new reality in which its military operations would be increasingly under an international magnifying glass, further challenging its freedom of action to deal with terrorist threats.

What this meant in practical terms was that future Israeli governments could not simply withdraw from territories under the assumption that if terrorist organizations subsequently took control over them, the IDF could easily re-enter them and eliminate the threat they posed. In other words, it remains necessary to have a defensible border so that Israel can physically prevent an unacceptable threat against its interior from developing, rather than assume that the IDF can conduct raids into those territories in order to uproot any hostile forces there. 
Political Constraints in Fighting Terrorism

Another factor that will influence Israel’s future strategy against terrorism is the political-military impact of peace agreements themselves, which Israel should continue to seek with its neighbors. In the 1950s when the Syrian Army attacked Israeli villages from the Golan Heights, the IDF often responded by using its forces to eliminate Syrian military positions from which Israel had come under fire. But more recently, when southern Israel was attacked by al-Qaeda affiliates from the Sinai Peninsula, the IDF did not want to take military action that violated Egyptian sovereignty and threatened the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace.

As long as the Arab states effectively controlled their territories along Israel’s borders, the IDF faced no dilemmas of this sort, with the notable exception of Lebanon, where the authority of the central government collapsed decades ago, resulting in repeated conflicts over time. But with the advent of the Arab Spring, whatever limited stability the rest of the Middle East was able to gain has been badly undermined, posing new types of challenges for Israeli security.

For example, Israel could find itself in a situation in which jihadist organizations repeatedly attack Israel from territories belonging to states that have a formal peace treaty with Israel but are powerless to stop the attacks. What if a future Palestinian state was taken over by Hamas or quickly evolved into a failed state unable to maintain order and prevent attacks. Would Israel re-invade the territory of a state with which it had signed a peace agreement? Would the international community recognize its right of self-defense? If Israel was protected by a defensible border, it would be more difficult for such a threatening scenario to develop in the future in a critical area like the West Bank.

Regardless of how future scenarios might develop, the failure to halt the infiltration of advanced weapons to terrorist groups could have devastating consequences for Israel. In the Gaza Strip, where Israel gave up the Philadelphi Corridor along the border with Egypt, the area has been flooded with Iranian and Libyan weapons. In the West Bank, where Israel holds on to the outer perimeter of the territory in the Jordan Valley, the same weaponry has not reached terrorist organizations like Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

It must be remembered that many terrorist groups like Hizbullah, and to a lesser extent Hamas, have acquired many of the attributes of a conventional army, obtaining from their Iranian sponsors advanced weapons, the likes of which terrorist groups never had access before, including shore-to-ship missiles, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Hizbullah also has an arsenal of ballistic missiles and rockets larger than that of most states in the Middle East. Its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in the future cannot be ruled out.

Moreover, global jihadists have been unable to reach the West Bank in order to reinforce their Islamist compatriots, as they did in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. What a rejuvenated al-Qaeda needs to wage war against Israel is access to its interior, which it has been unable to obtain as long as the IDF controls the vital strategic buffers that surround it. In short, the territorial considerations that were relevant for defending Israel from a massive ground attack in the 1970s remain applicable to the new threats now becoming more prominent.
The Rising Profile of the Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood and its Allies

What makes this concern with the rise of terrorism in the Middle East even more compelling is the fact that the strongest political forces vying for power in the Arab world today, seeking to replace the current regimes there, are tied to the Muslim Brotherhood network. In the 1960s, Arab nationalism provided the glue for military coalitions against Israel. In today’s Middle East, Islamism could also provide the basis for hostile coalitions that first will threaten moderate Western allies, and later pose a new challenge to Israel itself. As in the era of Nasserism, Islamism is a hegemonial force that does not accept national boundaries.

This is already evident in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood had an extremely low profile when President Mubarak was toppled, but since that time its role in Egyptian politics has grown substantially,1 leading to the election of a Muslim Brotherhood president. While the movement suffered a serious setback in July 2013 with the fall of Mohamed Morsi, the situation remains fluid and it is difficult to predict whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to make a comeback in Egypt. Even before the current wave of uprisings, after 2006, Turkey became a new center of Muslim Brotherhood activity, hosting its global network in high-profile conferences in Istanbul.2

The Muslim Brotherhood stands out as one of the main political forces behind the wave of protests that took place in Jordan, as well.3 Indeed, Jordanian Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit charged that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was taking orders from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria.4 Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood has provided the ideological underpinnings for the leading figures in global terrorism, from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to Osama bin Laden.

In the last few years, with the rise of leaders like Muhammad Badie in Egypt and Hammam Sayid in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood has come under a more extremist leadership, which still embraces hardline doctrines against the West and a commitment to jihadism.5 Both the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood branches, as well as Hamas, attacked the U.S. for eliminating Bin Laden.6

Even if the Muslim Brotherhood does not return to power in Egypt at this point, it will undoubtedly become part of future political coalitions that will move many neighboring countries into a much more hostile stance against Israel and even one supportive of militant action against the Jewish state. The hostility of the Muslim Brotherhood to Israel should not be underestimated. It is frequently forgotten that Hamas, which regularly launches rocket attacks deliberately aimed at Israeli population centers, is, according to its own charter, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Muhammad Badie in late 2010 issued a weekly message in which he plainly stated that the way forward on the Palestinian issue is not through negotiations, but rather by returning to jihad and martyrdom (istishhad).7 Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood’s second-in-command announced in February 2011 that the movement will seek to cancel the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.8

It should always be remembered that the struggle with Israel is only a small portion of the Muslim Brotherhood’s overall strategy that makes it a hostile movement, for its ultimate goal is to create a new caliphate which will become the basis of a global Islamic state.9
Muslim Brotherhood Regimes Providing Support to Jihadists

At a minimum, Muslim Brotherhood regimes can be expected to provide support and even sanctuary to terrorist groups engaging in active conflict with Israel. The first Muslim Brotherhood regime, under Sudanese leader Hassan Turabi, hosted both Hamas and al-Qaeda in the early 1990s, and allowed them to set up training bases.

In January 2011, Mohamed Morsi escaped an Egyptian prison with a number of leading jihadists, like Ramzi Mahoud al-Mowafi, who served under Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and later became a senior commander for the jihadist insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula after his prison escape.10

Under the Morsi regime, the Muslim Brotherhood pardoned jihadists and let them out of prison, like the leader of Gama’a Islamiyya, who was behind the 1997 Luxor massacre. Also released was Muhammad al-Zawahiri, a Salafi jihadist who was the younger brother of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Morsi also sought the release of the blind cleric, Sheikh Omar Abderrahman, who planned the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. He also pressed the Egyptian military to accept jihadists into Egyptian military academies. In short, when in power, the Muslim Brotherhood proved itself to be a key ally of the jihadist organizations. 

Second, the present wave of anti-regime rebellions is loosening central government control over large parts of several Arab states. This has created a vacuum in many areas, which is being filled by regional terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and its affiliates that seek to establish new sanctuaries beyond the reach of pro-Western Arab military establishments. This process in which Middle Eastern states are showing signs of fragmentation is already evident in Yemen, Libya, and Syria. It has become accentuated in Egypt, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, where the Bedouin have drawn closer to Hamas in a number of acts of sabotage against the Egyptian gas pipeline, which supplied both Israel and Jordan.

During the Iraq War, al-Qaeda in Iraq sought to set up a forward position in the Jordanian city of Irbid. Al-Qaeda in Iraq also set up a Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, which has sought to infiltrate Jordan. Jordanian security forces have overcome these challenges, but Israel has to recognize that in the Middle East today the proliferation of such groups is on the rise and the ability of states, whether friendly or adversarial, to control the spread of terrorist groups is declining. Countering terrorist organizations by simply deterring the governments of the countries in which they are situated is likely to prove an inadequate strategy.

Third, the undermining of the internal stability of Sunni Arab states is occurring as Iran seeks to consolidate its regional hegemony in the entire Middle East. While Iranian interests may be affected by the continuing rebellions in the Arab world, especially in Syria and Hizbullah- controlled Lebanon, Tehran stands to be a major beneficiary of the current instability in critical countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.

For Israel, the biggest question is the future orientation of Iraq, where the Iranians have been supporting a number of key Shiite parties.11 Those Iraqi politicians who are prepared to oppose Iranian encroachments have only done so with strong U.S. backing.12 But after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, what is to prevent Iraq from falling into Iranian hands? For the last number of years, Lebanese Hizbullah has also been active in Iraq, training Shiite militias, along with Iranian Revolutionary Guards. As Iran’s regional power grows, Iraq is likely to evolve into an Iranian satellite state and re-engage, in some form, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraq is not far away from Israel; it is roughly 210 miles from the Iraqi border to the Jordan River.

It has not gone without notice that Saudi Arabia has reinforced its northern border with Iraq, considering that it too cannot be certain what Baghdad’s future orientation will be. Israel, as well, cannot rule out Iraq, under Iranian influence, re-engaging in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1948, 1967, and 1973, Iraq took part in the war effort along Israel’s eastern front by consistently dispatching one-third of its ground forces. In 1991 Baghdad launched missiles against Israeli cities. Regardless of the form it takes, if the rejuvenation of Israel’s eastern front is even a remote possibility, how can Israel be expected to fully withdraw to the 1967 lines and abandon its right to defensible borders?
Undermining a Negotiated Peace

To conclude, the pressures Israel faces at this time to agree to a full withdrawal from the West Bank and to acquiesce to the loss of defensible borders pose unacceptable risks for the Jewish state. They also stand in contradiction to the international commitments given to Israel in the past. These recognized that Israel did not have to agree to a full withdrawal from this territory.

Additionally, the 1993 Oslo Agreements envisioned a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Borders were to be decided upon by the parties themselves and not be imposed by international coalitions or by unilateral acts. In fact, those commitments to a negotiated solution of the conflict appeared explicitly in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement. Notably, that agreement bears the signatures of President Bill Clinton and officials from the European Union and Russia, who acted as formal witnesses.

What is clear today is that the Palestinian leadership under Mahmoud Abbas has had a questionable interest in a negotiated solution to its conflict with Israel. Until the intervention of Secretary of State John Kerry, Abbas piled up preconditions for any negotiation with Israel. He preferred to see the international community impose territorial terms that are to its advantage without having to formally declare an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and without having to recognize the rights of the Jewish people to a nation-state of their own.

The idea that the EU or other international actors would dictate to Israel recognition of the pre-1967 lines and set the stage for an imposed solution may serve the Palestinian interest, but not the interest of achieving real peace. European support for such initiatives would contravene the very peace agreements they signed in the past as witnesses. It would set the stage for further Palestinian unilateralist initiatives at the UN and deal a virtually fatal blow to any negotiations.

Finally, it must be added that the people of Israel have undergone a traumatic decade and a half. For the most part, they passionately embraced the promise of the 1993 Oslo Agreements and yet, instead of peace, they saw their cities attacked repeatedly by waves of suicide bombers that left over 1,000 Israelis dead.

Israelis took further risks and supported a unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, only to find that there was a five-fold increase in rocket fire against Israeli population centers in the year that followed. Longer-range rockets poured into Hamas-controlled Gaza, as Iran exploited the vacuum created by Israel’s withdrawal.

The people of Israel have an inalienable right to security and to certainty that the mistakes of recent years will not be repeated. The full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip must not be attempted again in the West Bank, especially given what is happening today across the Middle East region. For those reasons, Israel must not be asked to concede its right to defensible borders.


Notes
1. Michael Slackman, “Islamist Group Is Rising Force in a New Egypt,” New York Times, March 24, 2011.
2. “Islam and the Arab Revolutions,” The Economist, April 2-8, 2011. See also, “Energized Muslim Brotherhood in Libya Eyes a Prize,” CNN, March 25, 2011.
3. Ranya Kadri and Isabel Kershner, “Protestors Rally into Night in Jordan,” New York Times, April 1, 2011.
4. Taylor Luck, “Gov’t, Islamists in ‘Dangerous Game,’” Jordan Times, April 1, 2011.
5. For a discussion about the more extremist trends in the Muslim Brotherhood, see Shadi Hamid, “A Radical Turn for the Muslim Brotherhood?” Brookings Institution, June 26, 2010; and Jonathan D. Halevi, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: In Their Own Words,” February 6, 2011, Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Hammam Sayid was known before his election as head of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to have made statements in support of Osama bin Laden; see al-Hawadeth, September 24, 2001.
Regarding the harder line of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood under its new leader, see Nour Malas, “Brotherhood Raises Syrian Profile,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011.
6. Jonathan D. Halevy, “Who Else Is Condemning the U.S. for Killing Bin Laden?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs blog, May 5, 2011.
7. Muhammad al-Badi’ – Weekly Message, December 23, 2010 (from the Muslim Brotherhood website in Arabic).
The entire Umma [the Islamic people], and not just the Palestinian Authority, is being asked to return to true fundamental principles, that must guide the [handling of the] Palestinian problem, so that it won’t be forgotten. Therefore, relating to negotiations, to recognition [of Israel], to reconciliation [with Israel], or establishing a Palestinian state in the ‘67 borders as an axiom, is a big mistake, for the Land of Palestine is Arab and Islamic land, on which their holy sites [of the Muslims] are located. The Jihad for the return of this land is an obligatory commandment incumbent on the entire Arab and Islamic nation….Palestine will not be liberated by hopes and prayers, but rather by Jihad and sacrifice, and we call all Brothers in Palestine to return to national unity, on the basis of resistance, for that is the only way to recover Palestine. Jihad is victory or martyrdom for Allah.
(For the complete text in Arabic, see http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article. asp?ArtID=76669&SecID=213).
8. Rashad al-Bayumi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s second-in-command, announced in an interview with Japanese TV (and cited by al-Hayat, March 2, 2011) that the group would join a transitional government in order to cancel the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, as it “offends the Arabs’ dignity and destroys the interests of Egypt and other Arab states.”
9. Eric Trager, “The Truth about Egypt,” World Affairs, August 15, 2013.
10. Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, “The Jihadist Threat in Egypt’s Sinai,” Al-Monitor, July 22, 2013.
11. Michael Gordon, “Meddling Neighbors Undercut Iraq Stability,” New York Times, December 5, 2010. Gordon refers to a WikiLeaks U.S. cable from November 13, 2009, according to which Iran was spending up to $200 million annually on political groups in Iraq.
12. Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, “Stand with Iraq,” Weekly Standard, April 18, 2011.


Dore Gold

Source: http://jcpa.org/article/have-the-fundamentals-of-israels-strategic-environment-inextricably-changed/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.