by Shimon Sherman
From judicial reform to Oct. 7 inquiry, the “change bloc” eyes legislative opening.
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| Members of the Yashar party meet with President Isaac Herzog at the President’s Residence in Jerusalem during consultations with political parties on whom to recommend to form Israel’s next government, Nov. 5, 2026. Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90. |
Israel’s Oct. 27 election has produced an unusual political situation in which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could retain control of the government while his opponents secure a parliamentary majority capable of advancing legislation against his administration.
Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious alliance won 53 Knesset seats, compared with 48 for the four Jewish-led opposition parties headed by Gadi Eisenkot. The Arab parties’ combined 19 seats could give his opponents 67 of the Knesset’s 120 seats.
That numerical advantage has already influenced the government-formation process. On Nov. 7, President Isaac Herzog announced that he would grant Eisenkot the mandate to form a government after parties representing 67 lawmakers recommended him, compared with 46 who backed Netanyahu. Nevertheless, those recommendations do not constitute a governing coalition or guarantee support for individual legislative initiatives.
As Herzog acknowledged following consultations, “The results of the consultations may appear clear, but the authority vested in me by law is to determine who has the ability to form a government, and that is not entirely clear, given the mutual vetoes between the blocs and within the blocs themselves.”
The distinction between executive and legislative authority consequently creates a separate opportunity for the opposition. Netanyahu’s outgoing Cabinet will continue exercising its powers until a successor takes office. However, when the new Knesset convenes on Nov. 10, lawmakers can elect parliamentary leadership, establish committees, conduct oversight and advance legislation independently.
“Netanyahu remains politically powerful, but he no longer commands a majority in the Knesset. His opponents can replace the speaker and change parliamentary procedures,” Professor Gideon Rahat, a senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, told JNS. Rahat further observed that this legislative power creates a new source of pressure that could influence decisions about forming a government or going to another election.
The question is whether Eisenkot’s camp can turn that numerical advantage into procedural control and use it to reverse Netanyahu-era laws, or strengthen its political position.
Controlling the Knesset
The first objective is to replace Likud’s Knesset speaker, Amir Ohana. On Nov. 5, four opposition parties demanded an election for his successor at the Nov. 10 inaugural sitting.
Ohana responded that he would schedule an early vote within a week if at least 61 lawmakers formally requested one, declaring, “We will respect the members of Knesset, and if a majority of them request such a debate, I will schedule it for an earlier date.”
A 2020 Supreme Court ruling against then-Speaker Yuli Edelstein limits Ohana’s ability to obstruct a majority seeking his replacement.
Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Liberman has endorsed B’Yachad’s MK Yair Lapid for speaker, though alternative candidates have been discussed.
Replacing Ohana would be only the first stage. The opposition would also need to secure influence over the Arrangements Committee, which organizes parliamentary activity, facilitates committee appointments and can grant exemptions from the usual 45-day waiting period for private members’ bills. Establishing specialized committees and electing deputy speakers would subsequently enable legislation to advance through the required parliamentary stages.
There is precedent: Following the 2022 election, Netanyahu’s incoming coalition passed significant legislation, including expanded ministerial powers over police, before forming its government.
Nevertheless, the opposition faces a limited window. Eisenkot has 28 days to form a government, potentially extendable by 14. More important, control over parliamentary procedures would not itself guarantee agreement on legislation. Each proposed measure would require its own majority, forcing the opposition to determine which legislative objectives justify the political compromises necessary to enact them.
The legislative arsenal
That raises the next question: Which laws should the opposition pursue?
Four reforms enacted by the outgoing government are leading targets for repeal. Ynet reported plans for specialized committees to accelerate action on measures already operative or approaching implementation.
The centerpiece is the March 2025 amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary, scheduled to take effect when the new Knesset convenes on Nov. 10. The legislation restructures the nine-member Judicial Selection Committee, replacing the Israel Bar Association’s two representatives with public representatives chosen who are attorneys qualified for Supreme Court appointments, one selected by the coalition and one by the opposition. It also changes Supreme Court appointment requirements, eliminating the need for judicial support while requiring participation from both political camps.
Passed 67–1 amid an opposition boycott, the amendment is a principal achievement of Justice Minister Yariv Levin.
Other targets concern the attorney general, police investigations and broadcasting.
The attorney general legislation, passed in July by 65–51, allows the government, under specified circumstances, to disregard its chief legal adviser’s opinions and obtain independent legal representation. It also introduces Justice Ministry supervision of the attorney general. With implementation scheduled for Jan. 1, 2027, opposition lawmakers have a defined period to attempt repeal before the changes take effect.
The June legislation restructuring the Police Investigations Department, Mahash, removes it from the State Attorney’s Office and establishes it as a separate body within the Justice Ministry, with new appointment and oversight mechanisms. The broadcasting reform, promoted by Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi, reorganizes regulation of television and other broadcasting services. Although the High Court temporarily froze certain provisions in July, most of the law remains subject to delayed implementation rather than judicial invalidation.
Eisenkot’s bloc also seeks a state commission of inquiry into Oct. 7. Currently, one can be initiated by the Cabinet or through a narrower State Control Committee route linked to State Comptroller’s Office findings.
A proposed amendment would allow parliamentary initiation without Cabinet approval. The Supreme Court president would appoint the commission’s members.
Other proposals could affect Netanyahu’s political future.
Liberman has advocated legislation prohibiting criminal defendants from serving as prime minister, potentially affecting Netanyahu, whose corruption trial remains ongoing. B’Yachad chairman Naftali Bennett, meanwhile, has proposed an eight-year limit on prime ministerial tenure.
Neither measure would automatically disqualify Netanyahu. Their impact would depend on their final wording, particularly whether previous service or existing indictments were covered. Both could also face constitutional challenges, while opposition leaders have reportedly expressed reservations about legislation perceived as targeting Netanyahu personally.
Haredi conscription is another fault line: Moves to end broad exemptions could undermine talks with United Torah Judaism and its seven MKs.
The risks of the blitz
The legislative offensive is inseparable from government formation: Each party must weigh parliamentary victories against coalition prospects and another election.
Four outcomes remain in play: national unity, an Arab-supported government, a haredi-supported coalition, or another election.
Eisenkot has the strongest immediate interest in preserving coalition flexibility. His mandate gives him an opportunity to form a government, but sweeping legislation targeting Netanyahu or alienating the haredim could close negotiating routes. Liberman faces a different constraint: Although he supports restricting Netanyahu’s political future, dependence on Arab parties contradicts his declared position, while his newfound willingness to compromise with the ultra-Orthodox risks damaging his secular credentials.
For The Democrats party head Yair Golan, an aggressive legislative campaign offers tangible achievements and could complicate a Likud-centered unity arrangement that excludes The Democrats. Bennett, meanwhile, has maintained a comparatively restrained public posture. Although his intentions remain unconfirmed, another election could offer an opportunity to challenge Eisenkot’s leadership, making an irreversible legislative confrontation potentially less attractive.
A limited offensive, centered on replacing Ohana, establishing committees and advancing an Oct. 7 inquiry, would offer the broadest scope for cooperation. It could give Lapid the speakership, provide Eisenkot with negotiating leverage, and demonstrate opposition effectiveness without requiring agreement on a governing coalition. However, even this approach carries risks: Netanyahu’s associates have reportedly warned that replacing Ohana could jeopardize unity negotiations.
A selective legislative offensive, targeting judicial appointments, the attorney general’s powers, and other institutional reforms, would deliver more substantial political achievements. It could appeal particularly to Golan and Lapid, while allowing Eisenkot to demonstrate results if government formation fails. But repealing signature Netanyahu-era reforms could make cooperation with Likud more difficult, narrowing Eisenkot’s coalition options. It would also require separate parliamentary majorities for each measure, and could exacerbate disagreements within the opposition.
The most consequential option would be a maximalist offensive, extending to legislation restricting Netanyahu’s eligibility, prime ministerial term limits and haredi conscription. Such measures could fundamentally reshape the political environment preceding another election. If successfully enacted and legally sustained, eligibility restrictions might limit Netanyahu’s ability to return to office, while conscription legislation could increase pressure on the religious parties.
Yet this strategy also presents the greatest political dangers. Anti-Netanyahu legislation could strengthen his argument that his opponents are using authoritarian methods to block him from the ballot box. Aggressive conscription measures could eliminate the possibility of haredi cooperation, while reliance on Arab votes could expose Bennett and Liberman to criticism from their electorates.
Time is limited: Eisenkot’s mandate can last at most 42 days, and substantive legislation must follow parliamentary procedure.
The opposition must weigh legislative gains against coalition and electoral costs. Restraint preserves options but achieves less; maximalism could weaken Netanyahu while fracturing the majority needed to do so.
Netanyahu’s counterplay
Netanyahu can counter the offensive through parliamentary delays, judicial challenges and political pressure exploiting opposition divisions.
Likud and its allies could submit amendments, reservations and procedural objections. Opposition MKs used tens of thousands of reservations against the 2025 judicial appointments reform.
A determined majority, however, can expedite proceedings and limit debate within parliamentary rules. Netanyahu need not approve its legislation.
Retroactive eligibility restrictions could face constitutional challenges, as could laws passed without adequate deliberation.
Likud has already attacked the opposition over its prospective reliance on Arab parties, questioning its ability to manage national security while depending on lawmakers whose positions on Hamas differ sharply from those of the Jewish-led factions. Simultaneously, Netanyahu has accused his opponents of hypocrisy for considering agreements with the same haredi parties whose conscription policies they campaigned against.
Netanyahu could further exploit these tensions by keeping the possibility of national unity alive. His renewed unity appeal, reportedly prompted partly by concerns about haredi defections, offers an alternative that could deepen disagreements between opposition leaders willing to negotiate with Likud and those categorically opposed.
Individual bills provide additional opportunities for political pressure. Conscription legislation could divide those courting haredi support from those defending secular electoral commitments. Measures targeting Netanyahu personally could force opposition leaders to choose between maximal confrontation and preserving a path to unity. Judicial reform legislation could expose divisions between maximalist and moderate partners in the bloc.
An expansive campaign could let Netanyahu depict the opposition as seeking to exclude him legislatively rather than defeat him electorally, mobilizing his base.
His defense may be to make every legislative victory carry a cost in coalition talks or the next election.
Eisenkot has weeks to form a government before alternative attempts could eventually lead to another election.
The question is whether the opposition can convert its majority into lasting advantage without destroying the alliances needed to replace Netanyahu.
Shimon Sherman is a columnist covering global security, Middle Eastern affairs, and geopolitical developments. His reporting provides in-depth analysis on topics such as the resurgence of ISIS, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, judicial reforms in Israel, and the evolving landscape of militant groups in Syria and Iraq. With a focus on investigative journalism and expert interviews, his work offers critical insights into the most pressing issues shaping international relations and security.
Source: https://www.jns.org/analysis/how-israels-opposition-could-win-the-knesset-and-lose-the-political-battle
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