Obama’s Anti-Israel Jihad.

 

by Robert Spencer

Greg Sheridan, Foreign Editor of The Australian, recently wrote that "Barack Obama's anti-Israel jihad is one of the most irresponsible policy lurches by any modern American president." This is true not solely because Israel has been a reliable and loyal American ally, and is the only free society in the Middle East. Obama's animus toward Israel and bullying of our longtime ally is irresponsible because the President is simultaneously ignoring the steep rise in jihad activity by Muslims in the U.S. and U.S-born Muslims since he took office.

"Jihad is becoming as American as apple pie and as British as afternoon tea" – so said the American-born Islamic cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi recently. Al-Awlaqi, who was in contact with Nidal Hasan, the jihadist who murdered thirteen Americans at Fort Hood in November 2009, and with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the jihadist who tried to bring down an airplane as it landed in Detroit on Christmas day, had plenty of reason to claim that "jihad is becoming as American as apple pie": evidence of U.S. Muslims engaging in terrorism grows every day.

Last week a Chicago-based Muslim, David Headley, a.k.a. Daood Gilani, pled guilty to going on a reconnaissance mission to find targets for the devastating 2008 jihad attacks in Mumbai, in which over 150 people were murdered. Gilani also participated in a plot to bomb a newspaper in Denmark that published cartoons of the Muslim prophet Muhammad. Also last week, Sharif Mobley, a Muslim from New Jersey, was arrested in Yemen over his ties to Al-Qaeda and his murder of a guard in an escape attempt.

The week before that, two American Muslim women, both of whom are converts to Islam, were arrested for their involvement in a plot to murder the Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks for his cartoon of the Muslim prophet Muhammad as a dog. One has since been released, although her mother and stepfather have voiced concerns about how she is teaching her six-year-old son to hate Christians and believe that Muslims must wage war against them.

And last month, a Muslim from Queens, New York, Najibullah Zazi, pled guilty to leading a jihad plot to set off a bomb in the New York subway system. An Islamic cleric, Ahmad Afzali, pled guilty to tipping off Zazi that law enforcement officials had been asking about him, and then lying to them about having done so.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani government has charged five Muslims from Virginia with terrorism after they entered Pakistan and tried to join up with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban there in order to fight against American troops in Afghanistan. Initially the five tried to avoid being charged by explaining that they had come to Pakistan to engage in Islamic jihad, and that Islamic jihad was not illegal in Pakistan.

An undetermined number of Somali Muslims have gone from their new homes in Minneapolis back to Somalia in order to wage jihad in an al-Qaeda-linked group. Bryant Neal "Ibrahim" Vinas, a convert to Islam from Long Island, has been charged with participating in an attack on an American military base in Afghanistan and, in 2009, giving information about the New York City subway system to Al-Qaeda operatives. Another American Muslim convert, Abdulhakim Muhammad (formerly Carlos Bledsoe), murdered Private William Long and gravely wounded Private Quinton Ezeagwula outside the Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas, in June 2009. Muhammad explained that the shooting was "a jihadi attack."

And in August 2009, Daniel "Seifullah" Boyd, yet another convert to Islam, and six other Muslims in North Carolina were arrested and charged with "conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, maim and injure persons abroad." On a surveillance audiotape Boyd proclaims: "I love jihad."

What is Barack Obama doing about all this? Not much besides pressure Israel. The World Tribune reported Thursday that "the administration of President Barack Obama has refused to approve any of Israel's military requests since it entered office in January 2009. The Pentagon did not announce any weapons contracts to Israel over the last 14 months."

Does he think that bullying Israel will end the jihad against the United States?

Or does he just not care?

 

Robert Spencer is a scholar of Islamic history, theology, and law and the director of Jihad Watch.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Splitting Alliances: Why the West will Fail with Syria as it once did with Italy.

by Barry Rubin

Reading history I realized a marvelous analogy for current Western attempts to pry Syria from its alliance with Iran. While few remember it today, there was a strenuous British and French campaign during the 1930s to lure Benito Mussolini's Italy from aligning with Germany. They flattered the dictator and ignored his repression at home and aggression abroad--including his unprovoked assault on Ethiopia--in this effort.

Of course, they failed. One could say that failure was inevitable because of the similarity between the regimes in Berlin and Rome. Consider three additional factors.

First, there was no way the British and French were able to offer Mussolini more than Hitler did. They had neither the power nor the stomach to sell out more countries to Mussolini. Germany could always offer more because it was ruthless and wanted to destroy the status quo.

Second, Mussolini understandably concluded in 1940 that Germany was winning. For years he'd watched Western appeasement and diplomatic retreat. He saw Germany getting powerful weapons without the Anglo-French bloc stopping it. And he witnessed German military victories. He hopped on the German bandwagon.

Third, the West wouldn't ever act in such a way that Mussolini was more afraid of it than of Hitler.

Analogies can be misleading, of course, and analogies to Germany are overworked. Still, this one might have some use in explaining why the West isn't going to flatter, concede, or pay enough to split an alliance which, after all, has persisted for thirty years and now believes itself the wave of the future.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Is Israel Facing War with Hizbullah and Syria?

 

by David Schenker 
 

• Concerns about Israeli hostilities with Hizbullah are nothing new, but based on recent pronouncements from Syria, if the situation degenerates, fighting could take on a regional dimension not seen since 1973.

 

• On February 26, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Damascus. Afterward, Hizbullah's online magazine Al Intiqad suggested that war with Israel was on the horizon.

 

• Raising tensions further are reports that Syria has provided Hizbullah with the advanced, Russian-made, shoulder-fired, Igla-S anti-aircraft missile, which could inhibit Israeli air operations over Lebanon in a future conflict. The transfer of this equipment had previously been defined by Israeli officials as a "red line."

 

• In the summer of 2006, Syria sat on the sidelines as Hizbullah fought Israel to a standstill. After the war, Assad, who during the fighting received public assurances from then-Prime Minister Olmert that Syria would not be targeted, took credit for the "divine victory."

 

• Damascus' support for "resistance" was on full display at the Arab Summit in Libya in late March 2010, where Assad urged Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to abandon U.S.-supported negotiations and "take up arms against Israel."

 

• After years of diplomatic isolation, Damascus has finally broken the code to Europe, and appears to be on the verge of doing so with the Obama administration as well. Currently, Syria appears to be in a position where it can cultivate its ties with the West without sacrificing its support for terrorism.

 

In February 2010, tensions spiked between Israel and its northern neighbors. First, Syrian and Israeli officials engaged in a war of words, complete with dueling threats of regime change and targeting civilian populations. Weeks later, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah pledged to go toe-to-toe with Israel in the next war.¹ Then, toward the end of the month, Israel began military maneuvers in the north. Finally, on February 26, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah for an unprecedented dinner meeting in Damascus.  

Concerns about Israeli hostilities with Hizbullah are nothing new, but based on recent pronouncements from Damascus, if the situation degenerates, fighting could take on a regional dimension not seen since 1973. In January and February, Syrian officials indicated that, unlike during the 2006 fighting in Lebanon, Damascus would not "sit idly by" in the next war.² While these statements may be bravado, it's not difficult to imagine Syria being drawn into the conflict.  

The Israeli government has taken steps to alleviate tensions, including, most prominently, Prime Minister Netanyahu issuing a gag order forbidding his ministers to discuss Syria.³ Still, the situation in the north remains volatile. Within a three-day span in mid-March: the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fired at Israeli jets violating Lebanese airspace;⁴ four Lebanese nationals were charged with spying for Israel against Hizbullah;⁵ and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Shiite militia was "building up its forces north of the Litani (river)." Currently, according to Ashkenazi, the border was calm, "but this can change."⁶ 

It's easy to see how the situation could deteriorate. Hizbullah retaliation against Israel for the 2008 assassination of its military leader Imad Mugniyyeh could spark a war. So could Hizbullah firing missiles in retribution for an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The transfer of sensitive Syrian technology to the Shiite militia could also prompt an Israeli strike. Regrettably, even if Israel continues to try and diffuse tensions in the north, given the central role Tehran has in determining Hizbullah policy, a third Lebanon war may be inevitable.  
 

 

Martyrs Month Pronouncements 

In mid-February, Hizbullah held the annual commemoration for its pantheon of heroes, a week of celebrations marking the organization's top three martyrs - founding father Ragheb Harb, Secretary General Abbas Mussawi, and military leader Imad Mugniyyeh. On February 16 - Martyred Leaders Day - Nasrallah gave a speech where he defined a new, more aggressive posture toward Israel, upping the ante in the militia's longstanding "balance of terror" strategy. Promising parity with Israeli strikes on Lebanon, Nasrallah threatened: 

If you [Israel] bomb Rafik Hariri international airport in Beirut, we will bomb Ben-Gurion airport in Tel Aviv. If you bomb our docks, we will bomb your docks. If you bomb our oil refineries, we will bomb your oil refineries. If you bomb our factories, we will bomb your factories. And if you bomb our power plants, we will bomb your power plants.⁷

With current estimates suggesting that Hizbullah now possesses in excess of 40,000 missiles and rockets, Nasrallah's threats have some resonance. Raising tensions further are reports that Syria has provided Hizbullah with the advanced, Russian-made, shoulder-fired, Igla-S anti-aircraft missile, which could inhibit Israeli air operations over Lebanon in a future conflict.⁸ The transfer of this equipment had previously been defined by Israeli officials as a "red line."⁹ It is unclear whether such a transgression remains a casus belli.  

In addition to laying out Hizbullah's new targeting strategy, Nasrallah also discussed his yet unfulfilled pledge to retaliate against Israel for the 2008 killing of Mugniyyeh. Two years ago, immediately after the assassination, Nasrallah declared an "open war" against Israel, swearing vengeance for the group's martyred leader. However, to date, the militia's attempts to strike Israeli targets - in Azerbaijan and Turkey - have failed.¹⁰ During his speech, Nasrallah reiterated Hizbullah's commitment to retaliate. "Our options are open and we have all the time in the world," he said, adding, "What we want is a revenge that rises to the level of Imad Mugniyyeh."¹¹ 
 

The Damascus "Resistance" Summit 

In recent years, meetings between Assad and Ahmadinejad have been routine occurrences. It has also been customary for senior Syrian and Iranian officials to visit their respective capitals - and to sign defense or economic agreements - immediately following meetings between the Assad regime and U.S. officials. So it came as little surprise that Ahmadinejad arrived in Damascus just days after Undersecretary of State William Burns departed the Syrian capital. The surprising part about his visit was that Hassan Nasrallah joined the presidents for dinner. 

On the day before Nasrallah's visit, Assad and Ahmadinejad made great efforts to demonstrate that Washington's transparent efforts to drive a wedge between the thirty-year strategic allies had failed. In a press conference on February 25, Assad famously mocked U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and the administration's gambit to split Syria from Iran, announced the end of visa requirements for travel between the two states, and described "support for the resistance [a]s a moral and national duty in every nation, and also a [religious] legal duty."¹² He also said that he discussed with his Iranian counterpart "how to confront Israeli terrorism."  

While the Syria-Iran bilateral meeting and subsequent press conference was described in some detail by Assad regime insider Ibrahim Humaydi in the pan-Arab daily Al Hayat, far less is known about what Assad, Ahmadinejad, and Nasrallah discussed during their dinner meeting the next day. According to the account in Hizbullah's online magazine Al Intiqad, the meeting was about "the escalating strategic response of the axis of the confrontationist, rejectionist, and resistance states" to the U.S.-Israeli threat.¹³ Significantly, this article also suggested that war with Israel was on the horizon. 

Resorting to the most extreme decision - that is, launching and setting a war on its path - will decide the final results. In any case, if reasonable calculations prevail, they will lead to producing comprehensive and specific [Israeli] compromises or it will lead to postponing the war which still waits for its most appropriate time for everyone.¹⁴ 

Based on its analysis of the trilateral summit in Damascus, this Hizbullah organ seems to be suggesting that a war, while not imminent, is inevitable.

  

The Weak Link

In the summer of 2006, Syria sat on the sidelines as Hizbullah fought Israel to a standstill. After the war, Assad, who during the fighting received public assurances from then-Prime Minister Olmert that Syria would not be targeted, took credit for the "divine victory."¹⁵ Since then, Syria has upgraded its rhetorical and materiel support for the Shiite militia.¹⁶ Damascus has helped Hizbullah to fully rearm, reportedly providing the militia with cutting-edge Russian weaponry from its own stocks. In this context, Syrian officials have been increasingly trumpeting their support for, and loyalty to, the resistance, so much so that the official government-controlled Syrian press now proclaims that "Syrian foreign policy depends on supporting the resistance."¹⁷ 

Damascus' support for "resistance" was on full display at the Arab Summit in Libya in late March 2010. According to reports, at the meeting Assad urged Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to abandon U.S.-supported negotiations and "take up arms against Israel," imparting his own experience that "the price of resistance is not higher than the price of peace."¹⁸ During his speech before his fellow Arab leaders, Assad was equally hard-line in his prescriptions. At a minimum, he said, Arab states should cut off their relations with Israel. The "maximum" - and presumably preferable - policy option, he said, would be to support the resistance.¹⁹ 

Despite the rhetoric, however, it's not clear that Syria is presently itching for a fight with Israel. After years of diplomatic isolation, Damascus has finally broken the code to Europe, and appears to be on the verge of doing so with the Obama administration, which recently announced the posting of a new ambassador and indicated a willingness to revise sanctions and modify U.S. economic pressures on Damascus.²⁰ Currently, Syria appears to be in a position where it can cultivate its ties with the West without sacrificing its support for terrorism. 

War would change this comfortable dynamic. In the event of an Israel-Hizbullah conflagration, pressures on Syria to participate would be intense. Furthermore, could Syria really watch an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities without responding? After so much crowing about its support for Hizbullah and its regional ilk, could Syria sit out yet another fight?  
 

Conclusion 

While it's too early to predict the timing or the trigger, on Israel's northern border there appears to be a growing sense that war is coming. Iran may have an interest in maintaining Hizbullah's arsenal until an Israeli strike. Likewise, for Hizbullah, which lately has been playing up its Lebanese identity in an effort to improve its image at home, waging war on Israel on behalf of Iran could be problematic. In any event, it is all but assured that a war on Israel's northern front will be determined, at least in part, by Tehran.  

In early February, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak told the IDF: "In the absence of an arrangement with Syria, we are liable to enter a belligerent clash with it that could reach the point of an all-out, regional war."²¹ Regrettably, regardless of what happens between Syria and Israel in the coming months, the decision of war or peace with Hizbullah may be out of Israel's hands. 

 

David Schenker 

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Notes 

* The author would like to thank his research assistant Cole Bunzel for his excellent assistance in the preparation of this article.

1. "Full Text of H.E. Sayyed Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders," http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=10225&cid=214.

2. "Syria Will Back Hizbullah Against IDF," Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2010. Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem echoed this threat in February 2010; see "Al-Mouallem at Press Conference with Moratinos," SANA, February 4, 2010. http://www.sana.sy/eng/21/2010/02/04/270781.htm.

3. Attila Somfalvi, "Bibi Tells Ministers to Keep Mum on Syria," Ynet, February 4, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3844619,00.html. Netanyahu also reassured Syria that Israel remained interested in peace.

4. "Lebanese Army Fires on Israeli Warplanes," AFP, March 21, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20100321-260030/Lebanese-army-fires-on-Israeli-warplanes.

5. "Lebanon Charges Four with Spying for Israel," Press TV, March 20, 2010, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=121274§ionid=351020203.

6. Amnon Meranda, "Ashkenazi: Hamas Doesn't Want a Flareup," Ynet, March 23, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3866883,00.html.

7. "Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders."

8. See, for example, Barak Ravid, "Israel Warns Hizbullah: We Won't Tolerate Arms Smuggling," Ha'aretz, October 12, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009384.html.

9. "Report: Hizbullah Trains on Missiles," UPI, January 17, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2010/01/17/Report-Hezbollah-trains-on-missiles/UPI-51221263741141/.

10. See Yossi Melman, "Hizbullah, Iran Plotted Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1089204.html. Also Avi Isaacharoff, "Turkish Forces Foil Attack on Israeli Target," Ha'aretz, December 9, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1133747.html.

11. "Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders."

12. Ibrahim Humaydi, "Al Asad: Ta'ziz al-'alaqat bayna duwal al-mintaqa tariq wahid li-l-qarar al mustaqill," Al Hayat, February 26, 2010, http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/112984.

13. "Qimmat Nejad-Al-Asad-Nasrallah: Ayy hisabat ba'daha?" http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetails.php?eid=27878&cid=4.

14. Ibid.

15. "Speech of Bashar Asad at Journalist Union 4th Conference," August 15, 2006,

http://www.golan67.net/NEWS/president%20Assad%20Speech%2015-8-6.htm.

16. In addition to the Igla-S anti-aircraft missile, some unconfirmed reports indicate that Syria may have transferred some of its Scud-D missiles - capable of delivering chemical warheads - to Hizbullah.

17. "Junblatt wa-l-Tariq ila Dimashq," Al Watan, March 10, 2010, http://alwatan.sy/dindex.php?idn=75718. That support for resistance is central to Syrian foreign policy comes as little surprise: in 2009, Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem volunteered to join Hizbullah. See "Muallem Says He's Ready to Join Hizbullah," Gulf News, May 3, 2009, http://gulfnews.com/news/region/lebanon/muallem-says-ready-to-join-hezbollah-1.248887.

18. "Arab Leaders Support Peace Plan," AP, March 28, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/middleeast/article.aspx?id=171981.

19. Ziyad Haydar, "Qimmat sirte infaddat 'ala 'ajal...wa bila za'al," As Safir, March 29, 2010, http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=3020&EditionId=1496&ChannelId=34736. In an interview following the summit, Syrian advisor Buthaina Sha'ban declared victory for the Syrian position, saying that "an agreement took place among the Arab leaders in a closed session to support the resistance and reject normalization" with Israel.

20. Ibrahim Humaydi, "Washington tarfa' mu'aradataha 'udwiyat Suriya fi munazzimat al-tijara al-'alamiya," Al Hayat, February 24, 2010,. http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/112646.

21. Amos Harel, "Barak: Without Peace We Could Be Headed for All-Out War," Ha'aretz, February 2, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1146731.html.

The Missing Link.

 

Where is Hamas in the US peace strategy for the Middle East?

 

 by Neville Teller

 

A basic inconsistency at the heart of the current US-led peace effort in the Middle East has been starkly revealed by the events of the past few days.

 

Last week two Israeli soldiers were killed while pursuing a group of Hamas fighters trying to lay mines near the border fence between Gaza and Israel.  During the shoot-out two other Israeli soldiers were wounded, and two Hamas men killed.  This incident came against a background of increasing rocket attacks into Israel from within Gaza. 

 

Following a period of comparative calm after the end of Israel's Operation Cast Lead, March saw something like 20 rocket and mortar attacks.  A rocket fired from Gaza two weeks ago killed a Thai agricultural worker in a nearby Israeli town.   On Thursday another rocket was fired into Israel.

 

That seemed to be the last straw.  On Friday Israel struck back.  According to an Israeli military spokesman, aircraft blasted two weapons-making factories and two weapons-storage facilities. Reports speak of two caravans near the town of Khan Younis being blown up, together with a cheese factory in Gaza City and, in the central refugee camp of Nusseirat, a metal foundry. There were no fatal casualties from any of these attacks, though three children were reported to have been injured by flying debris.

 

So far, one might say, situation normal.  This wearisome pattern of incitement and retaliation consistently emerges when the first rays of a possible peace negotiation flicker above the horizon – and at this moment, despite the diplomatic furore of the past few weeks, a start to the US-inspired proximity talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority is far from impossible.  So an upsurge in extremist action on one side or the other was not unexpected. 

 

What is  less explicable is the reaction of Western governments, led by the United States.

For example, US State Department spokesman, Philip J Crowley, said on Friday that although Israel has a right to defend itself, "our message remains to the Israelis and Palestinians that we need to get the proximity talks going, focus on the substance, move to direct negotiations and ultimately arrive at a settlement that ends the conflict once and for all."

 

The UK echoed the message.  A Foreign Office official told the media that Britain encouraged "Israelis and Palestinians to focus efforts on negotiation and to engage urgently in US-backed proximity talks."

 

But statements like these, matched by those from the UN, the EU and elsewhere, simply do not reflect the realities of the situation.  The proximity talks, if or when they take place, will be between Israel and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.  The military provocations and the indiscriminate firing of rockets onto the civilian population of Israel emanate from within Hamas-controlled Gaza.  Hamas – and even more so the Al-Qaeda inspired militant groups operating within Gaza – are opposed tooth and nail to the concept of negotiating with Israel, either directly or at one remove by way of the proposed proximity talks. 

 

So even if, by some heaven-sent miracle, the proposed round of indirect discussions hosted by George Mitchell, the US special envoy to the Middle East, do lead to face-to-face negotiations, and they in turn result in an agreement on substantive issues, what would have been achieved?  Hamas, which has dissociated itself from President Mahmoud Abbas's initiative, even though it has the backing of the Arab League, would not be party to the agreement.  It would continue to pursue the support of the Palestinian man-in the-street, in the hope of eventually overturning the Fatah-led government of the West Bank.

 

In this struggle for power, Hamas is actually fighting on two fronts.  For at its heels are the militant Islamist groups that refuse to abide by Hamas's virtual ceasefire, and indeed oppose the Hamas administration for failing to live up fully to extremist Muslim standards. A recent statement from the Jihadi Salafis ran: "We will not stop targeting the figures of this perverted, crooked government, breaking their bones and cleansing the pure land of the Gaza Strip of these abominations."  They and Jaljalat, Jund Ansar Allah, Army of the Nation, and the Salafi Army of Islam, to name some only, not only mount armed attacks on senior Hamas figures, but pursue their own agenda in attacking Israel.

 

This aspect of the Arab-Israeli dispute is the missing link in all the well-intentioned calls to Israel and "the Palestinians" to abandon recourse to arms and participate in the proposed proximity talks.  Hamas, and the extremist militant groups it is signally failing to control, are not, and would not wish to be, parties to the peace discussions.  But they are very much an element to be reckoned with before any final agreement can be achieved.

 

It would be best if, In their public statements, all those striving for a settlement in Israel-Palestine acknowledged this indisputable fact.

 

 

Neville Teller

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

American Jews, take a stand.

 

by Vic Rosenthal

 

It's time for Jewish Americans to stand up.

Does the state of Israel have special meaning for them, or is it just another foreign country? They should decide.

This is because the Jewish community in the US, for whatever reasons, has an influence that's much greater than numbers (about 6.5 million) would indicate. And it's become urgent to exert this influence in a positive direction and in a coordinated way.

It's beginning to be clear that the relatively pro-Israel policy that the US has followed since 1967 — I say this even though I know that there have been ups and downs in this period, that some influential institutions (the State Department) have always been less than friendly, etc. — is coming to an end.

This isn't surprising. Since before 1948, the proponents of a Jewish state have struggled against  opposition from the Arabs and from antisemites, and the founding of the state didn't make it go away — on the contrary. Israel's history for the  past 62 years can be seen as a series of attempts to eliminate it. Its enemies have tried various approaches, but in recent years have realized that a regional military confrontation alone won't achieve their goal.

Israel's enemies have come to understand that in order to win they must isolate Israel and remove the international support that has, over the years, allowed this small nation to prevail militarily over the much larger Arab armies. As everyone knows, the goal is to delegitimize Israel, to demonize her, and to split her supporters away from her. Their desired practical results are these:

• No nation will supply Israel with the weapons or the means to develop weapons whose qualitative superiority is needed to make up for the huge quantitative advantage of the Arabs and Iranians;
• International institutions will act to portray Israel's self-defense as aggression and her enemies'  aggression as defense, and impose sanctions and embargoes, or even intervene militarily against her;
• Great powers — the US, Russia, the EU — will impose diplomatic agreements on her which will weaken her strategically, strengthen her enemies, and make her more vulnerable to terrorism and asymmetric warfare;
• Her morale and her economy will be damaged.

At first, their attempts to do this were crude, and it was necessary to overcome the reservoir of sympathy for the Jewish refugees of WWII. But little by little they've learned which levers to pull — the ones connected to oil, the ones related to colonial guilt, the religious ones that animate the world's Muslims, even the subtle psychological ones which have given rise to the remarkable phenomenon of Jewish Israel-hatred, and the even more remarkable one of Israeli Israel-hatred.

 

The US may be the last major battleground of this psycho-war, which seems to have

been more or less successful in Europe and especially in the UK. Today there is no other country but the US which could be counted on to supply Israel in time of war or to support her in the UN Security Council.

The battle is raging. Saudi Arabia, for example, has employed the best PR firms, a veritable army of former US officials, even an ex-president, and legions of academics and journalists — all in the service of chipping away at Israel's support in the US.

Every sector of American society is targeted. Muslim and pro-Palestinian organizations on campuses maintain a continuous stream of anti-Israel propaganda, films, events, etc. Left-wing, human rights, and peace groups have almost all adopted anti-Zionism as a foundational plank of their platforms. Jimmy Carter speaks to Evangelicals who have traditionally supported Israel, explaining that Christians in the Holy Land are suffering — because of Israel. And Jews have a smorgasbord of Jewish groups that will tell them why they should oppose Israel, including of course the slick, dishonest J Street.

The Obama Administration — the President, his staff and advisors — have not been immune to this campaign. Educated at Harvard, and with associates like Rashid Khalidi, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samantha Power, Robert Malley, etc. Barack Obama sees the Middle East through a pro-Arab lens. Obama's recent actions — his unprecedented demand on Israel to stop Jewish building in Jerusalem, his failure to pressure the Palestinians for any reciprocal concessions, his brutal humiliation of PM Netanyahu — make this clear.

 

American Jews:

If you consider yourself part of a people — if it means anything to you that your ancestors were Jews — remind yourself that they were blown all over the world by the whims of non-Jewish rulers who in many cases thought they were inherently evil or subhuman. Most of you do not remember when there was no state of Israel. Most of you do not remember the insecurity of living in a world where Jews — regardless of citizenship — were regarded as beings who did not belong anywhere. A world where a Jew was nobody.

If you study recent history, you'll learn that the reason for the persistence of the Israeli-Arab conflict is not that the Palestinian Arabs want a state, but that the Arabs do not accept the existence of a Jewish state of any size in the Middle East. You'll learn that Israel is fully legitimate in international law. You'll learn that the areas illegally occupied by Jordan in 1948 are not ipso facto 'Palestinian land'. You'll learn that Israel has given up territory and security, exposed its people to terrorism, in order to try to make peace with its neighbors — and gotten war in return.

If you are concerned about the treatment of Palestinians, remember that context is everything. Remember that every single day Israelis are shot at, stoned or are the target of firebombs thrown by Palestinian Arabs. Remember that almost every day the checkpoints that are emblematic of the 'oppression' of Palestinians result in the interception of a terrorist carrying explosives or weapons. Remember what happened before the hated security barrier was built: hundreds of Israelis were killed by suicide bombers in early 2002.

If you think the Israeli operation in Gaza was 'disproportionate', think about what it would be like to have hundreds of rockets falling on your town each week, even if they did kill 'only' 14 people. And also remember that almost everything in the US and international media about Palestinian casualties and Israeli actions in Gaza is a lie.

If you are concerned about justice, think about the way Israel has been slandered and falsely accused in the UN, with the incredible Goldstone Report as exhibit A.

If you consider yourself even a bit connected to Judaism, look at the Torah. More than anything else, it is about a three-sided relationship: one between God, the Jewish people, and the Land of Israel.

 

American Jews:

It's time to ask if you feel a connection to the Jewish state which has been in existence for just a few years, but which is the culmination of the yearnings of the Jewish people — your people — for two thousand years.

If you do, then it's time to stand up and tell J Street to take its Arab and Iranian funding and go to Hell. It's time to make it clear to Obama that he will not get Jewish votes, contributions and support if he tilts toward the Arabs and treats the leaders of the Jewish state — in a sense, the representatives of the Jewish people — like nobodies.

The Jews of America — the largest Jewish community in the world — need to do this not only because they are influential, but because if they don't support Israel, why should anybody else.

Here is the least that we, American Jews, Democrats and Republicans, should demand from any party in return for our support:

1. The US must take the position that negotiations for a Palestinian state cannot take place until the Palestinians agree that Israel belongs to the Jewish people and that a final agreement will end all Arab claims on Israel. In addition, Palestinians must stop anti-Israel incitement.
2. The US must reaffirm the commitments made by President Bush in 2004 that the pre-1967 lines are not sacrosanct and that refugees and their descendants should not expect to be settled in Israel.
3. The US must reaffirm the prior understanding that Israel can build in Jerusalem.
4. The US must refrain from trying to interfere in Israel's political system and must show appropriate respect for its representatives.

Vic Rosenthal

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Iran And The Utter Futility Of Sanctions.

 

by Professor Louis Rene Beres

In the matter of Iranian nuclearization, U.S. President Barack Obama still doesn't get it. Economic sanctions will never work. In Tehran's national decision-making circles, absolutely nothing can compare to the immense power and status that would presumably come with membership in the Nuclear Club. Indeed, if President Ahmadinejad and his clerical masters truly believe in the Shiite apocalypse, an inevitable final battle against "unbelievers," they would likely be willing to accept even corollary military sanctions.

From the standpoint of the United States, a nuclear Iran would pose an unprecedented risk of mass-destruction terrorism. For much smaller Israel, of course, the security risk would be existential.

Legal issues are linked here to various strategic considerations. Supported by international law, specifically by the incontestable right of anticipatory self-defense, Prime Minister Netanyahu understands that any preemptive destruction of Iran's nuclear infrastructures would involve enormous operational and political difficulties. True, Israel has deployed elements of the "Arrow" system of ballistic missile defense, but even the Arrow could not achieve a sufficiently high probability of intercept to protect civilian populations. Further, now that Mr. Obama has backed away from America's previously-planned missile shield deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, Israel has no good reason to place its security hopes in any combined systems of active defense.

Even a single incoming nuclear missile that would manage to penetrate Arrow defenses could kill very large numbers of Israelis. Iran, moreover, could decide to share its developing nuclear assets with assorted terror groups, sworn enemies of Israel that would launch using automobiles and ships rather than missiles. These very same groups might seek "soft" targets in selected American or European cities - schools; universities; hospitals; hotels; sports stadiums; subways; etc.

While Obama and the "international community" still fiddles, Iran is plainly augmenting its incendiary intent toward Israel with a corresponding military capacity. Left to violate non-proliferation treaty (NPT) rules with impunity, Iran's leaders might ultimately be undeterred by any threats of an Israeli and/or American retaliation. Such a possible failure of nuclear deterrence could be the result of a presumed lack of threat credibility, or even of a genuine Iranian disregard for expected harms. In the worst-case scenario, Iran, animated by certain Shiite visions of inevitable conflict, could become the individual suicide bomber writ large. Such a dire prospect is improbable, but it is not unimaginable.

Iran's illegal nuclearization has already started a perilous domino effect, especially among certain Sunni Arab states in the region. Not long ago, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt revealed possible plans to develop their own respective nuclear capabilities. But strategic stability in a proliferating Middle East could never resemble US-USSR deterrence during the Cold War. Here, the critical assumption of rationality, which always makes national survival the very highest decisional preference, simply might not hold.

If, somehow, Iran does become fully nuclear, Israel will have to promptly reassess its core policy of nuclear ambiguity, and also certain related questions of targeting. These urgent issues were discussed candidly in my own "Project Daniel" final report, first delivered by hand to then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on January 16, 2003.

Israel's security from mass-destruction attacks will depend in part upon its intended targets in Iran, and on the precise extent to which these targets have been expressly identified. For Israel's survival, it is not enough to merely have The Bomb. Rather, the adequacy of Israel's nuclear deterrence and preemption policies will depend largely upon (1) the presumed destructiveness of these nuclear weapons; and, (2) on where these weapons are thought to be targeted.

Mr. Obama's "Road Map" notwithstanding, a nuclear war in the Middle East is not out of the question. Soon, Israel will need to choose prudently between "assured destruction" strategies, and "nuclear war-fighting" strategies. Assured destruction strategies are sometimes called "counter-value" strategies or "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). Drawn from the Cold War, these are strategies of deterrence in which a country primarily targets its strategic weapons on the other side's civilian populations, and/or on its supporting civilian infrastructures.

Nuclear war-fighting measures, on the other hand, are called "counterforce" strategies. These are systems of deterrence wherein a country primarily targets its strategic nuclear weapons on the other side's major weapon systems, and on that state's supporting military assets.

There are distinctly serious survival consequences for choosing one strategy over the other. Israel could also opt for some sort of "mixed" strategy. Still, for Israel, any policy that might encourage nuclear war fighting should be rejected. This advice was an integral part of the once-confidential Project Daniel final report.

In choosing between the two basic strategic alternatives, Israel should always opt for nuclear deterrence based upon assured destruction. This seemingly insensitive recommendation might elicit opposition amid certain publics, but it is, in fact, more humane. A counterforce targeting doctrine would be less persuasive as a nuclear deterrent, especially to states whose leaders could willingly sacrifice entire armies as "martyrs."

If Israel were to opt for nuclear deterrence based upon counterforce capabilities, its enemies could also feel especially threatened. This condition could then enlarge the prospect of a nuclear aggression against Israel, and of a follow-on nuclear exchange.

Israel's decisions on counter-value versus counterforce doctrines will depend, in part, on prior investigations of enemy country inclinations to strike first; and on enemy country inclinations to strike all-at-once, or in stages. Should Israeli strategic planners assume that an enemy state in process of "going nuclear" is apt to strike first, and to strike with all of its nuclear weapons right away, Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads - used in retaliation - would hit only empty launchers. In such circumstances, Israel's only plausible application of counterforce doctrine would be to strike first itself, an option that Israel clearly and completely rejects. From the standpoint of intra-war deterrence, a counter-value strategy would prove vastly more appropriate to a fast peace.

Should Israeli planners assume that an enemy country "going nuclear" is apt to strike first, and to strike in a limited fashion, holding some measure of nuclear firepower in reserve, Israeli counterforce-targeted warheads could have some damage-limiting benefits. Here, counterforce operations could appear to serve both an Israeli non-nuclear preemption, or, should Israel decide not to preempt, an Israeli retaliatory strike. Nonetheless, the benefits to Israel of maintaining any counterforce targeting options are generally outweighed by the reasonably expected costs.

To protect itself against a relentlessly nuclearizing Iran, Israel's best course may still be to seize the conventional preemption option as soon as possible. (After all, a fully nuclear Iran that would actually welcome apocalyptic endings could bring incomparably higher costs to Israel.) Together with such a permissible option, Israel would have to reject any hint of a counterforce targeting doctrine. But if, as now seems clear, Iran is allowed to continue with its illegal nuclear weapons development, Mr. Netanyahu's correct response should be to quickly end Israel's historic policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Such a doctrinal termination could permit Israel to enhance its nuclear deterrence posture, but only in regard to a fully rational Iranian adversary. If, after all, Iran's leaders were to resemble the suicide bomber in macrocosm, they might not be deterred by any expected level of Israeli retaliation.

No country can be required to participate in its own annihilation. Without a prompt and major change in President Obama's persistently naive attitude toward Iran, a law-enforcing expression of anticipatory self-defense may still offer Israel its only remaining survival option. This will sound unconvincing to many, but rational decision-making - in all fields of human endeavor - is based upon informed comparisons of expected costs and expected benefits.

Does President Obama really believe that both we and the Israelis can somehow live with a nuclear Iran? If he does, he should be reminded that a nuclear balance-of-terror in the Middle East could never replicate the earlier stability of U.S.-Soviet mutual deterrence.

This would not be your father's Cold War.

 

 

PROFESSOR LOUIS RENE BERES, Professor of Political Science at Purdue, was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971). Born in Zurich, Switzerland, at the end of World War II, he is the author of many major books, monographs and articles dealing with international law, strategic theory, Israeli nuclear policy, and regional nuclear war. In Israel, where he served as Chair of Project Daniel, his work is known to selected military and intelligence communities.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.