Syria's record intact

 

by James H. Anderson

Sponsorship of terror reaches 30 years

Syria has an unmatched streak as a state sponsor of international terrorism, as documented by the State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism, expected to be released soon. The United States has designated Syria a sponsor of state terrorism for 30 straight years, ever since Congress first required that such offenders be listed, beginning in 1979.

No other state shares this serial distinction. To put this odious streak in perspective, President Carter was in the Oval Office and eight-track tapes were still in vogue when Syria debuted as a charter member of the terrorist list.

The State Department list is not chiseled in stone. Other states have fallen off the list after changing their behavior. For example, Libya had its sponsorship-of-terrorism designation rescinded in 2006. But Syria has never shown a willingness to relinquish terrorism as a core element of its statecraft, whether it is used to suppress political dissidents at home or further its regional ambitions.

In addition to supplying Hezbollah with sophisticated weapons in Lebanon, Syria continues to permit Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups to maintain offices in Damascus. The regime has a lengthy track record of allowing jihadists to transit Syrian territory en route to unleashing suicide attacks against American soldiers in Iraq. In recent years, Syria also increasingly has aligned itself with Iran, itself another longtime sponsor of state terrorism.

In response, the Obama administration has sought to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran. On paper, this policy approach appears tempting, especially because the theocratic regime in Tehran and the secular Ba'athist regime in Damascus appear to make strange bedfellows. But Tehran and Damascus share similar regional aims that underlie their ideological marriage of convenience, especially with respect to menacing Israel and interfering in Lebanon. With Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad beside him at a February news conference, President Bashar Assad openly mocked U.S. efforts to split the two allies.

Despite Syria's history of sponsoring international terrorism, diplomats of late have been practically tripping over themselves en route to Damascus International Airport in the hopes of promoting better relations. The initial rush began nearly two years ago, with President Nicolas Sarkozy's 2008 invitation for Mr. Assad to attend his Pan Euro-Mediterranean initiative and France's annual Bastille Day ceremony during the same trip. Since taking office, the Obama administration has sent its own emissaries to Damascus, including the State Department's third-ranking official, Undersecretary of State William J. Burns in February.

U.S. diplomatic outreach efforts to Damascus are not new. President George W. Bush also sent high-level officials to Damascus, including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in February 2001 and May 2003. But those missions ended after it became clear that Mr. Assad had no intention of moderating Syria's behavior, despite repeated assurances to the contrary.

Senior Obama administration officials are quick to point out that "engaging" Syria is not the same as "embracing" the regime. Fair enough. As a practical matter, though, this distinction is often lost because Syria is adept at playing the optics of engagement. Every visit by a senior U.S. government official is considered a political victory by Mr. Assad because it helps reaffirm the legitimacy of his regime.

Nonetheless confident that his engagement policy eventually will gain traction, Mr. Obama nominated career diplomat Robert Ford as ambassador-designate to Syria in February. His Senate confirmation, however, has stalled recently in light of disturbing reports about Syria supplying increasingly advanced weaponry to Hezbollah.

Herein lies the rub. The problem with the Obama administration's Syria policy is not lack of communication, per se. Syria has an embassy in Washington, and the State Department can haul in Syrian diplomats anytime it wants, as it already has done on several occasions. The problem, rather, is Syria's bad behavior, most of it related to terrorism, and the fact that the administration has yet to outline a compelling strategy to change such behavior.

On this point, the State Department's annual report serves as a useful reminder about the nature of the Syrian regime. A state does not make the list for three consecutive decades because its sponsorship of terrorism is incidental to its policies. On the contrary, terrorism lies at the very core of the Assad regime. It is this harsh reality that makes well-intentioned efforts to engage Syria problematic in the absence of any compelling strategy to induce constructive behavioral changes.

James H. Anderson is a professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. He was director of Middle East policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the George W. Bush administration.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The myth of the Arab triangle

 

by Tony Badran

The last couple of weeks have shed the spotlight again on the tensions between Egypt and the regional Iranian axis, which includes Syria. The tensions surged with the conviction of Hezbollah cell members by the Egyptian judiciary, as well as with Cairo’s friction with Hamas and the persistence of its strained relations with Syria. Despite talk of reconciliation between Cairo and Damascus, the gap dividing the two states remains wide, as they have conflicting objectives and opposing strategic alignments.
 
The possibility of Egyptian-Syrian reconciliation had received ample airtime ahead of the Arab Summit in late March, but it amounted to very little. During the summit, the political differences dividing the two states were on display, pitting Egypt and Syria in opposing camps on key issues such as Palestinian politics, the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, their respective positions on “resistance,” and, in general, Syria’s strategic position within the Iranian camp.

In the end, the Egyptians and Syrians only agreed to stop media campaigns against each other, which had reached a fevered pitch. It was speculated that the freeze in media wars was to pave the way for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to visit his Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak, who had undergone surgery.

A host of Arab papers kept talking up the prospect of such a visit throughout last month. The Kuwaiti paper Ad-Dar claimed that the visit was due in mid-April. It was soon followed by similar reports in a number of Kuwaiti outlets, as well as in the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi and the Lebanese Al-Liwaa, which announced everything from a visit within a “few hours,” to a readjusted “in the next two days,” all the way to a more vague “very soon.”

Al-Quds al-Arabi’s widely-recycled April 21 report claimed that Assad’s visit would be to participate in a tripartite summit along with Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah. Perhaps reflecting a Saudi push in that direction, one unnamed Saudi source, quoted in a separate report, went as far as to declare that the summit would signal the return of the so-called “Arab triangle” of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The men were also reportedly set to discuss the growing tensions with Israel as a result of the crisis of the Scud missiles, which Syria is said to have smuggled to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Cold water was quickly poured over this story, as both the Egyptians and the Syrians denied it. A couple of days later, during a trip to Lebanon, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Gheit diplomatically told reporters that Assad’s visit, while welcome, “has not yet been scheduled.” Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with President Mubarak yesterday.

Moreover, the Saudi monarch has also yet to pay a visit to Egypt. Instead, King Abdullah dispatched a letter to Mubarak with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal, who traveled to Cairo to participate in the meetings of the Arab League’s Peace Initiative Follow-up Committee.

Evidently, there was no change in the political status quo to warrant even a pro-forma photo op. There were several sources for the continued strain, not least being the Scud story, and they quickly bubbled to the surface.

For instance, one of Bashar al-Assad’s closest Lebanese associates, former Minister Michel Samaha, unleashed a scathing diatribe on Al-Manar TV against Egypt immediately following Abu al-Gheit’s visit to Beirut. Samaha rehashed all the issues dividing Syria and Egypt (specifically Cairo’s position on Hezbollah and Hamas), strongly criticizing the Egyptians and accusing them of seeking to sow dissent among the Lebanese and the Palestinians, to sabotage the Syrian-Saudi rapprochement and to lend Arab cover for an Israeli attack on Lebanon. He added, “Egypt is still holding on to its position, and we [sic] to ours.”

Indeed, Hamas officials have also come out criticizing Egypt’s rigidity over its proposed solution for the inter-Palestinian conflict. Hamas, backed by Syria and Iran, wants to introduce amendments (for example, on the issue of “resistance”) to the Egyptian document, while Egypt refuses any change. Hamas and its sponsors in Tehran and Damascus have also railed against Egypt’s increasingly tight border measures with Gaza. Most recently, Hamas accused Egypt of gassing smuggling tunnels from Gaza.

Then came the Egyptian judiciary’s conviction of members of the Hezbollah cell caught operating in Egypt, which revived tensions with the Party of God, including public condemnation by the party’s secretary general and a vow to work to set free the incarcerated cell members. And finally, at the Follow-up Committee’s meeting last week, Syria repeated its objection to granting Arab cover for renewed talks between the Palestinians and Israel, and its ambassador to the Arab League strongly attacked the committee’s resolution. 

Therefore, the issues dividing Egypt and Syria remain unresolved, regardless of whether Assad ends up visiting Cairo or not. These are strategic differences highlighting how, in the regional cold war between Iran and pro-American Arab states, Egypt and Syria are entrenched in opposing camps. This reality exposes the fallacy of the theory of the “Arab triangle” – a variant of the “returning Syria to the Arab fold” argument.

The Jordanian analyst Saleh al-Qallab made this keen observation in his As-Sharq al-Awsat column last Thursday. The calls for reviving the “Arab triangle” are badly misplaced, he wrote. In fact, this “triangle” never really existed, he added. Contrary to the common wisdom about Syria’s supposed “marriage of convenience” with Iran, in reality, it was the so-called “Arab triangle” that was the transient, ad hoc arrangement that faded, whereas Syria’s alliance with Iran endured for three decades. Egypt sees Syrian policies as subverting Cairo’s regional clout, which Damascus holds as its own entitlement. That is partly why, as Qallab noted, the idea of an "Arab triangle" was always unsustainable.
 
It is Egypt’s ongoing conflict with Iran’s regional axis that lies at the heart of the divide, all visits of protocol and wishful thinking about a Syrian “strategic realignment” notwithstanding.

 

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Time to plan for war

 

by Caroline Glick

The repeated abdication of responsibility by the Obama administration from preventing nuclear non-proliferation leaves it on Israel's shoulders.

So much for US President Barack Obama’s famed powers of persuasion. At the UN’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference that opened this week, the Obama administration managed to lose control over the agenda before the conference even started.

Obama administration officials said they intended to use the conference as a platform to mount international pressure on Iran to stop its illicit nuclear proliferation activities. But even before the conference began, with a little prodding from Egypt, the administration agreed that instead of focusing on Iran, the conference would adopt Iran’s chosen agenda: attacking Israel for its alleged nuclear arsenal.

Last week, The Wall Street Journal reported that US officials were conducting negotiations with Egypt about Egypt’s demand that the NPT review conference call for sanctions against Israel for refusing to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state. The Journal quoted a senior administration official involved in the discussions saying, “We’ve made a proposal to them [Egypt] that goes beyond what the US has been willing to do before.”

Among other possibilities, that proposal may have included a US agreement to appoint a UN envoy responsible for organizing a UN conference calling for the greater Middle East to become a nuclear-free zone. In diplomatese, “Middle East nuclear-free zone” is a well-accepted euphemism for stripping Israel of its purported nuclear capability while turning a blind eye to Iranian, Syrian and other Islamic nuclear weapons programs. Egypt’s demand, which it convinced more than 100 members of the Non-Aligned Bloc to sign onto, is for Israel to open its nuclear installations to international inspectors as a first step towards unilateral nuclear disarmament.

On Wednesday, the US joined the other four permanent members of the Security Council in signing a statement calling for a nuclear-free Middle East and urging Israel, Pakistan and India to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states. Following the US’s lead, on Thursday Yukiya Amano, the new director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, wrote a letter to IAEA member states asking for their suggestions for how to convince Israel to sign the NPT.

So as Iran – an NPT signatory – makes a mockery of the treaty by building nuclear weapons in contempt of its treaty obligations, the US has actively supported Iran’s bid to use the NPT review conference as yet another UN forum for bashing Israel.

It bears recalling that the primary goal of the NPT is to prevent nuclear proliferation. From the amount of attention Israel is receiving at the NPT review conference, you could easily get the impression that Israel’s purported nuclear arsenal is the gravest proliferation threat in the world today. But history shows that this is nonsense.

Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal, which it has reportedly fielded for four decades, has not led to a regional nuclear arms race. Notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary, Israel’s neighbors fully recognize that the purpose of Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal is to guarantee Israel’s survival, and consequently it only threatens those who would attack the Jewish state with the intention of annihilating it. This is why although it is four decades old, Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal has never caused a regional nuclear arms race. It has never harmed or called into question the relevance or usefulness of the NPT’s international non-proliferation agenda. Moreover, as a non-signatory to the NPT, Israel has the right to develop a nuclear program.

Iran on the other hand gave up that right when it joined the NPT regime. So, too, in sharp contrast to Israel’s alleged program, it is clear that Iran’s nuclear project is aggressive rather than defensive. Consequently, it is universally recognized that if Iran becomes a nuclear power, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other states will begin developing their own nuclear arsenals in short order. That is, it is absolutely clear that if the NPT is to have any relevance in the coming years, if there is to be any hope that counter-proliferation regimes can be useful, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons must be its signatories’ chief aim.

But due to the Obama administration’s diplomatic fecklessness and ideological blinders, administration officials were incapable of making these points. And so, instead, through its actions, the administration has advanced the cause of nuclear proliferation. The US has now joined the ranks of fools who claim that nuclear weapons in the hands of states like the US and Israel are as problematic as nuclear weapons in the hands of states like Iran and North Korea.

BUT THEN, in the end it makes no difference that the US has followed Iran’s lead at the NPT conference. Even if the administration had managed to make Iran’s nuclear weapons program the focus of debate, it wouldn’t have mattered because diplomacy is no longer a relevant tool for preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Appeasement has failed. Sanctions are dead in the water in the Security Council.

And even if the Security Council passes a sanctions resolution, they will have no impact on Iran’s behavior. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made that much clear in his speech on Monday and in subsequent remarks to the media. As he put it, “While we do not welcome sanctions, we do not fear them either. Sanctions cannot stop the Iranian nation.”

What all of this demonstrates is that the diplomatic track – from appeasement to sanctions – is irrelevant for contending with Iran’s nuclear program. The only way to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear bombs is to use military force to destroy or severely damage its nuclear installations.

And this of course is something Obama will not do. His begging-to-shake-hands policy towards Iran and the one hand and his iron fist policy towards Israel on the other makes it absolutely clear that Obama will do nothing to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Rather than correct his abysmal failures, Obama seeks to hide them by minimizing the seriousness of the threat.

In remarks to the media this week, a White House official downplayed the Iranian threat. He told the Financial Times that Iran’s “nuclear clock has slowed down. They are not making dramatic technical progress given the difficulties they are facing in their [uranium] enrichment program and the fact that their efforts to build secret facilities have been disclosed.”

The fact that the US’s published intelligence estimates of Iran’s nuclear program contradict this claim didn’t seem to faze the official.

THE US abdication of its responsibility as the leader of the free world to prevent the most dangerous regimes from acquiring the most dangerous weapons means that the responsibility for preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has fallen on Israel’s shoulders. Only Israel has the means and the will to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. And the message the NPT follies convey is that Israel must develop contingency plans for attacking Iran as quickly as possible.

Daily reports of weapons build-ups and military exercises in Iran and among Iran’s clients Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas expose the contours of their war plans.

Syria and Iran have armed Hizbullah with some 40,000 missiles and rockets, including hundreds of Scud missiles and guided surface-to-surface solid fuel M600 missiles with a 250 km. range. This week, Hizbullah threatened to attack Israel with non-conventional weapons. Syria itself has a formidable chemical and biological arsenal as well as a massive artillery and missile force at its disposal.

As for Hamas, since Operation Cast Lead Iran’s Palestinian proxy Hamas has expanded its own missile arsenal. Today it reportedly has projectiles capable of reaching Tel Aviv and beyond.

As for Iran, as its seemingly endless military exercises make clear, the mullocracy has the capacity to use conventional weapons to imperil global oil shipments from the Persian Gulf. So, too, this week’s report that Osama bin Laden may have decamped to Iran in 2003 merely underlined Iran’s ability to utilize jihadist terror forces throughout the world.

From the open preparations for war that Iran and its clients have undertaken, it is clear that if they initiate the next round of fighting they will fight a four-front war against Israel. That war will be dominated by missile attacks against the entire country, aimed at breaking the will of the Israeli people while forcing the IDF to divert vital resources away from Israel’s primary target – Iran’s nuclear installations – to contend with Iran’s proxies’ missile stores.

As they consider Israel’s options going forward, Israel’s political and military leaders have to take two considerations into account. First, the side that initiates the conflict will be the side that controls the battle space. And second, there is a real possibility that the Obama administration will refuse to resupply Israel with vital weapons systems in the course of the war. The fact that Israel will be roundly condemned by the UN and its component parts is a certainty regardless of who initiates the conflict and therefore is irrelevant for operational planning.

Armed with these understandings, it is apparent that Israeli contingency plans for war must have limited goals and should be guided by the overarching aim of beginning and ending the war quickly. Luckily, Israel excels at limited, swift campaigns.

Responding to one of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s recent threats, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman promised last month that if Assad attacks Israel, Israel will bring down his regime. While bringing about the utter defeat of Iran’s regional proxies is a reasonable goal, it cannot be Israel’s goal in the coming war.

In the coming war, Israel will have only one goal: to destroy or seriously damage Iran’s nuclear installations. Every resource turned against Iran’s proxies must be aimed at facilitating that goal. That is, the only thing Israel should seek to accomplish in contending with Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas is to prevent them from diverting Israeli resources away from attacking Iran’s nuclear installations.

This means that Israel must launch a preemptive strike against Hizbullah’s missiles and missile launchers, Syria’s missiles, artillery and launchers, and Hamas’s missiles and launchers. As for their short-range rockets, Israel should do its best to intercept them and otherwise hunker down to weather the storm of Katyushas and Kassams. Life of the homefront won’t be easy. But it won’t be impossible either, as we saw in 2006.

Almost every assessment of a possible Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear installations has assumed that Israel will use its air force to strike. All that can be said of that analysis is that, just as there is more than one way to skin a cat, so there is more than one way to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations. An Israeli strike should utilize all of them to keep the Iranians off balance and on the defensive.

These are dangerous times. Iran, which seeks to position itself as a regional superpower, has been emboldened by the Obama administration’s abdication of US global leadership. Only Israel can prevent Iran from endangering the world. But time is of the essence.

Caroline Glick
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Ready, Willing and Able?

 

by Neville Teller

 

Can either side actually deliver on any proximity talks agreement?

 

 So the proximity talks are on again.  The event that caused the sudden chill in US-Israeli relations, that led PA President Mahmoud Abbas to declare himself unwilling to resume peace negotiations, even at arms length, that evoked criticism by the EU and the Quartet – now that event seems no obstacle at all. 

 

A housing development in Jerusalem – the casus belli – should never have been an issue in the first place.  Ever since the city was unified after the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli governments and Jerusalem mayors of whatever political persuasion have been developing and expanding all areas of Jerusalem – those largely occupied by Jewish, as well as those largely occupied by Arab, households.  When Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced a 10-month construction freeze in the West Bank last November, he explicitly excluded construction in Jerusalem.  This was well understood by all parties who negotiated the start of proximity talks early in March.

 

The diplomatic and political débacle was caused not by the fact of a future housing scheme in Jerusalem's Ramat Shlomo suburb, but in the nature and timing of its announcement.  One might term it "insensitive" if the suspicion did not exist that it was, in fact, deliberate and designed to attract maximum media attention.  Some things are understood, but best left unsaid.  This announcement, authorised by Israel's Interior Minister at the moment the US Vice President had arrived to inaugurate the proximity talks, certainly fell into that category.  It is doubtful if Prime Minister Netanyahu had been consulted.

 

Yet now, with Netanyahu maintaining, or at least not formally disavowing, Israel's long-held position on building in Jerusalem, the obstacle is apparently no obstacle at all.  What has in fact changed is the atmosphere.  A new understanding between the Obama administration and Netanyahu has been forged in the fire of the controversy – "a gentleman's agreement.".  The Israeli Prime Minister has tacitly agreed to halt construction in East Jerusalem for the moment, while the American President has tacitly acknowledged that there is a limit to the amount of pressure Netanyahu can accept and still maintain his coalition government.  Obama asked for a series of gestures from Israel to help sweeten Palestinian opinion, and Netanyahu has responded with a prisoner release offer, a lifting of West Bank roadblocks and an easing of the restrictions on imports to Gaza. 

 

These concessions, backed no doubt by some intense persuasion from Washington, have been sufficient to lead Arab League nations, in their meeting in Cairo on 1 May, to endorse a resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  In doing so, the League made it clear that their agreement was for four months, during which time they expected to see some positive results.

 

US special Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, is expected back in the region this coming week, and the proximity talks could start shortly afterwards.  The earlier demands for an explicit Israeli declaration halting all construction in Jerusalem beyond the "Green Line" have been quietly brushed under the carpet, not only by Washington, but by the PA President and the Arab League.  

 

Assuming the talks do, indeed, get under way, what chance of success do they have?  The two leading participants – Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and PA President Abbas – will by definition be ready and willing to engage in negotiations with a two-state solution the desired outcome, but would either be able to deliver?

 

Concessions there would undoubtedly have to be on both sides in hammering out answers to the major outstanding issues – the nature and extent of land swaps in returning to an approximation of Israel's 1967 borders, the nature and extent of compensation for forgoing the right of return on the Palestinian side, the status of Jerusalem if the capital of a future Palestinian state is to be in its environs, the future administration of Jerusalem's holy sites, means of physically linking Gaza to the West Bank.

 

Could Netanyahu carry his coalition with him if agreement were ever reached round the negotiating table on these and related matters?  Could he carry the country?  Could he in fact deliver?  Major political upheaval would be likely, a referendum might be mooted,  and even then, depending on the nature of the proposition, some violent settler resistance or even wider civil unrest is not improbable.

 

Could Abbas deliver?  He has the backing of the Arab League in entering the talks – vital, since he is risking opposition from Palestinian hardliners backed by Syria and Iran.  But would that cover be maintained in the face of a compromise agreement?  Syria is a member of the Arab League, but its protests at the approval twice given by the League to the peace talks have so far carried no weight.  Will this continue to be the case?  Then, Abbas has lost control of Gaza to Hamas, which is wholly opposed to peace negotiations with Israel.  What is the value of an agreement between Israel and a PA whose writ does not run in a major part of its territory?

 

Hanging over these forthcoming proximity talks will be the report in the Israeli newspaper "Ha'aretz" a few days ago.  This asserted that President Barack Obama has told several European leaders that if Israeli-Palestinian talks remain stalemated into September or October, he will convene an international summit on achieving peace in the Middle East.

 

This conference, it was reported, would be run by the Quartet – the United States, European Union, United Nations and Russia – in a bid to forge a united global front for creating a Palestinian state.  Israeli officials have said that if such a plan emerges, Obama could postpone it until after the mid-term Congressional elections in November.

 

Both the Israeli and the Palestinian leaderships are likely to oppose such a conference.  It would deprive them of ownership of the peace process.  In any case, it is doubtful if an outcome unacceptable to either side could simply be imposed.  Israel is, after all, a sovereign state, and the PA aspires to become one.  Though one never can tell, It does not seem a likely scenario,.  The reports may fall into a category familiar in the British media during the Blair years and dubbed "disinformation".  They may, in short,  be designed simply to inject some degree of urgency into the forthcoming discussions.

 

In any case, September is likely to be a critical month.   In endorsing the talks, the Arab League is requiring them to show progress within four months, that is by September. The UN General Assembly is due to reconvene in late September, and in addition September 26 marks the end of the 10-month period Israel allocated for a freeze on West Bank settlement construction.  Whatever else is on the table at the time, Netanyahu will have to decide by then whether to allow such building to be resumed.

 

So, as May commences, we cast our eyes towards the distant horizon of September with some trepidation but surely, also, with a little hope.

 

 

Neville Teller

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Ahmadinejad Swaggers at the UN

 

by Robert Spencer

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was back in New York Monday, continuing his effort to intimidate and shame Barack Obama into dropping his policy of retaining first-strike capability against rogue states such as Iran. For 35 minutes at the UN, Ahmadinejad did his best impression of an anti-nuke crusader, working to eradicate these weapons for humanity's sake. Behind his peacenik façade (which is sure to take in many on the Left), however, lurks a reality that couldn't be more contrasting.

"The possession of nuclear bombs isn't a source of pride," Ahmadinejad intoned piously, sounding like a spokesman for Greenpeace. "It is disgusting and rather shameful. And even more shameful is the threat to use or to use such weapons, which isn't even comparable to any crime committed throughout the history."

And of course top on the Iranian President's list of "disgusting" and "shameful" countries was Israel: "While the Zionist regime has stockpiled hundreds of nuclear warheads…it enjoys the unconditional support of the United States government and its allies and receives, as well, the necessary assistance to develop its nuclear weapons program."

Referring to Obama's reservation of first-strike capability, Ahmadinejad said that signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should consider "any threat to use nuclear weapons or attack against peaceful nuclear facilities as a breach of international peace and security," and punish the offenders accordingly.

Delegates from the U.S., Britain and France walked out of the UN General Assembly during Ahmadinejad's speech. Perhaps they didn't relish having to sit through the absurd charade of a ruthless despot, the president of a country that gives aid to the jihad terror groups Hamas and Hizballah and yearns to wipe Israel off the map, being allowed to enter the United States and accuse it of being a terrorist state — all the while defending his nuclear program.

This was the same Ahmadinejad, after all, who just weeks ago warned Israel not to attack the jihadists in Gaza who still shoot rockets into Israel and plot the destruction of the Jewish State: "An attack on Gaza would not make you mightier," he said, addressing the "Zionist entity," "and would not restore your damaged prestige. And you should know that an attack on Gaza will end your inauspicious and filthy life."

What could end Israel's "inauspicious and filthy life" except…a nuclear attack?

These are favorite themes of Ahmadinejad's public utterances. In mid-March, he declared: "Today, it is clear that Israel is the most hated regime in the world… It is not useful for its masters [the West] anymore. They are in doubt now. They wonder whether to continue spending money on this regime or not. But whether they want it or not, with Allah's grace, this regime will be annihilated and Palestinians and other regional nations will be rid of its bad omen."

How will Israel be "annihilated," except by…a nuclear strike?

Iranian Major General Hassan Firouzabadi declared in early April: "If America presents Iran with a serious threat and undertakes any measure against Iran, none of the American soldiers who are currently in the region would go back to America alive."

Not one? Not even one? How could the Iranians possibly accomplish that, except with…nuclear weapons?

Ahmadinejad mocked Obama's impotence, telling him in an April 7 address that, faced with Iran's nuclear program, American leaders who were "bigger than you, more bullying than you, couldn't do a damn thing, let alone you."

And indeed, the thuggish Iranian president is probably right about that. Barack Obama's wrongheaded and weak policy of "engagement" has put a swagger in Ahmadinejad's step. Besides funding Hamas and Hizballah and egging on their genocidal intentions toward Israel, Iran is training the Taliban in Afghanistan in the most effective use of roadside bombs, and continuing to meddle in Iraq.

For all this we have one man to thank above all: Barack Obama. After a year of Obama's dogged wooing of the Iranian mullahs, his scandalous refusal to support the anti-regime protestors in Iran, and his abject failure to do anything effective to counter the Iranian nuclear program, which even his own Secretary of State now acknowledges is working toward developing nuclear weapons, the only thing the president has to show for his policy is an increasingly confident, belligerent and assertive Iran.

It was good that the Americans left the General Assembly hall while Ahmadinejad was speaking Monday. Now they should back this up by changing course, and showing more spine in the face of Iran's bullying. But there is no sign that that is going to happen.

 

Robert Spencer is a scholar of Islamic history, theology, and law and the director of Jihad Watch.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Jerusalem Really IS a Final Status Issue?

 

by Jennifer Rubin

David Axelrod pronounces: “The president agrees that Jerusalem as an issue can’t be the first issue for negotiations.” What’s more, he wants us to know that “Jerusalem should ‘probably be the last’ issue negotiated, Axelrod said, echoing the position of Israel’s government, which is that the issue is too sensitive to discuss before other issues, including borders, are settled.”

So let’s review. The adviser who went on the Sunday talk shows to make clear how angry Obama was over a Jerusalem housing project and has personally counseled the president to go beserk with the Israelis over the issue and who presumably is aware of the threat to abstain rather than veto a UN resolution should that building proceed now says it’s the last issue we should talk about. If you’re confused, I’m sure the parties in the region are, too. There are several explanations.

Perhaps Axelrod and the rest of the Obama crew are simply telling every party what it wants to hear, raising Palestinian expectations and simultaneously giving Jews assurances on the Israeli capital. It is a recipe for disaster, of course, once negotiations begin and everyone has a different set of expectations and understanding of the U.S. position.

Another explanation: Obama has abandoned the entire Jerusalem gambit after raising it to the level of an international incident, damaging U.S.-Israel relations, and encouraging more Palestinian violence. It would be a remarkable turnaround.

Or the Obama brain trust may be practicing some bizarre word games and hoping everyone plays along. Yes, yes, Jerusalem is a final status issue, but we can’t let Israel “predetermine” the outcome by building in its capital (even though this was precisely the agreement reached with the Bush administration), so “final” doesn’t mean they won’t make demands on the Israeli government now.

It’s not clear what the Obama gurus are up to or whether there is even a strategy here. Whatever it is, it certainly is not “smart” — that is, coherent, credible, and clear — diplomacy.

 

 

Jennifer Rubin

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Ahmadinejad Unveils His Grand Strategy: A Nuclear Defensive Umbrella for Aggression

 

by Barry Rubin

Whatever you think of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad he is not a stupid man. And he's also not acting like an intimidated one. During the latest UN meeting on nuclear issues, when the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)director-general urged Iran to "clarify" its activities, the camera showed Ahmadinejad laughing contemptuously.

Diplomatic engagement isn't going to win this guy over, nor are hollow threats. He knows the current U.S. government court-martials Navy Seals for giving a bloody lip to a terrorist who murdered American civilians in Iraq and mutilated their corpses (though the two tried have been cleared). What does he have to be scared about?

The main theme of Ahmadinejad's speech at the 2010 Review Conference by countries that have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is to outflank Obama's calls for getting rid of nuclear weapons, trying to repeat Iran's success of last September in getting sanctions postponed. Back then, Iran proposed a plan for letting its nuclear materials be reprocessed abroad. But once the sanctions' momentum had been derailed, Iran made clear that it had no intention of agreeing to anything like that.

Incidentally, it was Obama who strongly supported adding the issue of getting rid of all nuclear weapons in the world to the UN conference agenda.

Afer running his own international nuclear summit under the slogan, "Nuclear Power for All, Nuclear Weapons for None," Ahmadinejad gave a UN speech sounding word for word what an idealistic pacifist would say: nuclear weapons are bad; ban them now.

Nuclear weapons, Ahmadinejad explained, don't bring real security and producing or possessing them, "under whatever pretext..is a very dangerous act which first and foremost makes the country" having them worse off. He even stated:

"The possession of nuclear bombs is not a source of pride; it is rather disgusting and shameful. And even more shameful is the threat to use or to use such weapons." The entire system of non-proliferation, said Ahmadinejad, is just an oppressive sham letting those who possess these weapons try to keep others from getting them in order to maintain their own supremacy. Those in control of the international system also, he continued, want to use nuclear arms as an excuse to get others from obtaining nuclear energy, "the cleanest and cheapest" source of power.

Ahmadinejad's alternative is, "Immediate termination of all types of research, development, or improvement of nuclear weapons and their related facilities" and dismantling all U.S. nuclear weapons everywhere.

Oh, yes, and he calls for reforming the UN Security Council to get rid of a veto or permanent membership for the United States and others. And--no stranger to chutzpah--Ahmadinejad called for kicking the United States off the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

At the end, Ahmadinejad invited Obama "to join this humane movement, if he is still committed to his motto of `change.'"

What is all this about? Why is the leader most determined to pay a high price for getting nuclear weapons bad-mouthing them. Is this just camouflage to buy more time for Iran to get nukes? Yes but that's not all.

First, Ahmadinejad is calling Obama's bluff. You want to eliminate nuclear weapons? Make my day, let's do it! Obviously, this isn't going to work at this stage on Obama. But Ahmadinejad is not trying to persuade the United States but rather a range of Third World countries that might well oppose sanctions, including Lebanon, Turkey, and Brazil, which all happen to be on the Security Council right now and whose votes will be vital for passing (or, more likely, not passing) sanctions.

What's most important of all, however, is the second motive, an Iranian strategy I call creating a defensive umbrella for aggression. This might become the centerpiece of Middle East politics in the future. Let me explain.

Most discussion in the West has focused on Iran using nuclear weapons or threatening to do so. Yet, instead, Iran could genuinely be developing these arms in order to defend itself. The problem is that this defense is coupled with an aggressive policy.

In this framework, Iran would continue and escalate its subversive efforts against neighbors; consolidate and increase its influence in Lebanon and Iraq; support Hamas and client forces in Afghanistan; press regional states toward appeasement; recruit millions into revolutionary Islamist groups; and try to make Iran the hegemonic power in the region.
But when anyone tries to oppose Iran, Tehran need merely give a gentle reminder that it has nuclear arms and so they better shut up. To be fully intimidated by this tactic, Arabs don't have to believe that Iran would win a nuclear exchange with the United States. After all, even if Tehran lost they know their own countries would be devastated. Better to avoid any chance of a nuclear war than to offend Iran. Syria and Turkey, under its neo-Islamist regime; Hamas and Hizballah; Yemeni rebels and Iraqi insurgents would smirk and stick out their tongues from under Iran's protective umbrella.

The other element—as so often in the Middle East—is who the local rulers most fear. How can the Obama Administration, which has criticized past U.S. use of force and decisive leadership, persuade Iran to tremble in fear and convince moderate Arabs to stand tall feeling securely protected? Of course, these Arabs will accept American security guarantees but they would then be far more likely to bow to Iranian demands than to U.S. requests.

And there's still another trick up Ahmadinejad's sleeve. Under the current administration concept of containing Iran, the United States would have to do precisely what Ahmadinejad proposes to outlaw: threaten Iran with nuclear retaliation. So how will a U.S. threat that keeps nuclear Iran from flexing its muscles be worded, how scary will it be for Tehran, and how encouraging will it be for that regime's intended victims?

Ahmadinejad's apparently pacifist-style, peacenik stance at the UN conference fits into his strategy. Nuclear weapons may well provide the umbrella for him to seek regional hegemony with weapons of mass destruction unused but highly visible in his back pocket.

For a detailed analysis of what's going on regarding current non-proliferation issues, read Josh Pollack, a serious expert on these issues who actually makes them comprehensible, go HERE.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Fundamentally Freund: The road to nowhere

 

by Michael Freund

The only tangible outcome certain to emerge from the peace talks is a boost in Mitchell’s frequent-flyer account.

On the eve of the anticipated start of so-called proximity talks between Israel and the Palestinians, there is a discernible lack of enthusiasm.

The fanfare that usually accompanies the relaunch of Middle East negotiations has been replaced by an atmosphere of apathy, as it seems clear to just about everyone – outside the White House, that is – that little will come of the impending round.

Speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Tuesday, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Baidatz, head of IDF Intelligence’s Research Division, said that even before the talks commence, the Palestinians are “already preparing the ground for the failure” of the process.

And dovish Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor was no less gloomy, telling The Jerusalem Post yesterday that the talks “won’t yield results” because the Palestinians are not willing to take “tough decisions.”

Indeed, it says a lot about the state of the peace process that the only tangible outcome certain to emerge is an inevitable boost in US envoy George Mitchell’s frequent-flyer account. This, of course, is entirely the fault of the Palestinians, who have repeatedly rejected the various gestures made by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu over the past 12 months.

Basking in the glow of unprecedented American pressure on the Jewish state, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is in no rush to make progress in difficult bargaining with Israel. He has every reason to wait, knowing full well that when the negotiations stall, the weight of international pressure will come down hard on the decision-makers in Jerusalem and not Ramallah.

But Washington too shares a great deal of the blame. By choreographing this farce of indirect talks doomed from the start, the Obama administration is playing directly into Palestinian hands, thereby further diminishing the already dismal chances of making peace. Through its naiveté, Washington is unwittingly setting the stage for an explosion of frustration and violence when the talks come screeching to a halt, which is hardly in anyone’s interest.

The conceptual error underlying the policy of the Obama administration is stark and simple: It still seems to think that the Oslo process has a chance in hell of succeeding.

In this respect, it is well worth recalling an important if largely dubious anniversary in Middle East diplomacy that slipped by this week.

IT WAS 16 years ago on Tuesday, on May 4, 1994, that prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat ascended a stage in Cairo and signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, paving the way for the first transfer of Israeli territory to Palestinian control.

At the ceremony, then-foreign minister Shimon Peres assured those present that a new day was at hand. “Today,” he said, beaming, “we declare that the conflict is over. Today we have agreed to promise mothers and children, Arab and Jewish, that no finger will pull a trigger to endanger the lives or to affect the dignity or happiness of their children.”

Within a few weeks of the signing, Arafat returned triumphantly to Gaza, as the IDF retreated and the experiment begun in the September 1993 Oslo Accords was put into place on the ground.

We all know how well that turned out. Despite Peres’ optimism, the conflict remains far from over. Instead, the Oslo process bequeathed us years of suicide bombings, hundreds of civilian deaths, diminished deterrence and the loss of territory, as well as the rise of Hamas.

Logic, then, would dictate that rather than trying to keep this failed process going, Washington would do better to reexamine its approach and acknowledge its mistakes. A good place to start would be to recognize once and for all that there is no serious partner on the Palestinian side with the courage, authority or conviction to negotiate terms with Israel. Like it or not, the chances of forging an agreement with the current cast of characters in Gaza City and Ramallah are close to nil.

Moreover, President Barack Obama’s enthusiasm for the land-for-peace paradigm and the two-state solution has proven to be entirely misplaced. Israel’s past abandonment of territory, whether unilaterally or through agreements, has only brought disaster in its wake. The fact is that “peace for peace” was and remains the only viable and acceptable basis for a just end to the conflict.

Nonetheless, Washington stubbornly refuses to accept what is obvious to all, and insists on plunging ahead down a well-worn path clearly marked “Dead End.”

The result will likely be catastrophic.

In diplomacy, Henry Kissinger once noted: “If you don’t know where you are going, every road will get you nowhere.”

And that, it seems, is precisely where Obama is about to take us.

 

 

Michael Freund
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

What Do the New Israel-Palestinian Indirect Talks Mean?

by Barry Rubin

The question of the day is whether the Israel-Palestinian Authority (PA) indirect talks will make progress in the "peace process" or result in failure. One wonders at this point how many naive people believe that peace is at hand, and how many misled people think that the lack of peace is Israel's fault.

What is needed to understand the issue is precisely what is not presented by policymakers, academics, and all-too-much of the mass media: The PA neither wants nor is capable of delivering a compromise peace agreement.

Radicalism within its ranks, in public opinion, and the ever-present challenge from Hamas ties the hands of leaders who are not so moderate themselves.

Belief that if they continue the struggle or keep saying "no" or subvert Western support for Israel they will get everything they want without giving up much is too tempting.

But can these specific talks at this specific time bring progress or failure?

Depends on what you mean by "progress"; depends on what you mean by "failure."

If one believes there will be a comprehensive peace agreement, then the result will be failure because the PA didn't want a comprehensive agreement to begin with, and both internal politics and intoxication in believing the Obama Administration will give them what they want is going to result in even more intransigence.


If the United States wants to impose a solution, the PA, sensing this will make sure the talks fail, have no incentive to make a deal. And any attempt after that by--let's be honest here--people who really don't understand the issues or how the region's politics work would bring disaster in the longer run.


If, however, one wisely uses the talks to reduce tension betwen the two sides and deal with more immediate problems that can be resolved--economic growth, security cooperation, ways to make the Palestinian Authority more stable politically, better for its people, and able to survive the Hamas challenge--the talks could be beneficial.

From an Obama Administration standpoint, if it takes a bow on its "great" work in getting indirect talks going (after its policy contributed to delaying them so long), it will be happy and find the talks beneficial for itself. It will also believe that the talks will soothe Muslims and Arabs, making its own policy task easier on other issues by getting Arab state support for, say, what the United States is doing with Iran sanctions or Iraq withdrawal or reducing terrorism against Americans. This is doubtful but it will make the administration, and perhaps its constituents, feel better.

If the talks become direct ones, then the world will rejoice, forgetting that this merely returns the situation to what existed--without great progress--in 2008. Indeed, direct Israel-Palestinian talks have been going on now for 17 years, with Israel offering a Palestinian state as an outcome of talks during that entire period, and offering the immediate opportunity for the Palestians to get a state with its capital in east Jerusalem and the equivalent of all the West Bank and Gaza Strip 10 years ago.

And, by the way, when will any Western mainstream media actually report what Israel wants in a peace settlement: security guarantees, dropping of all further Palestinian claims, a non-militarized state without foreign armies on its soil, resettlement of all Palestinian refugees in Palestine, and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state in response to recognition of Palestine as an Arab state? Might these things be just as relevant as Palestinian demands for a state, the dismantlement of Jewish settlements, and territorial demands?

Until Western leaders understand why there hasn't been progress and set their policies accordingly how could there be any real success in resolving this issue?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.