Why Islam Will Never Accept the State of Israel

 

By Steven Simpson

 

It is a common belief that the "Arab-Israeli conflict" is a conflict of two peoples fighting over the same piece of land and is therefore one of nationalism. Rarely, if ever, do we hear or read of the religious component to this conflict.

 

However, if anything, the conflict is more of a "Muslim-Jewish" one than an "Arab-Israeli" one. In other words, the conflict is based on religion -- Islam vs. Judaism -- cloaked in Arab nationalism vs. Zionism. The fact of the matter is that in every Arab-Israeli war, from 1948 to the present, cries of "jihad," "Allahu Akbar," and the bloodcurdling scream of "Idbah al- Yahud" (slaughter the Jews) have resonated amongst even the most secular of Arab leaders, be it Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s or the supposedly "secular" PLO of the 1960s to the present. Indeed, the question must be asked: If this is really a conflict of different nationalisms and not Islamic supremacism, then why is it that virtually no non-Arab Muslim states have full (if any) relations with Israel?

 

There is a common Arabic slogan that is chanted in the Middle East: "Khaybar, Khaybar! Oh Jews, remember. The armies of Muhammad are returning!" It would be most interesting to know how many people have ever heard what -- or more precisely, where -- Khaybar is, and what the Arabs mean by such a slogan. A short history of the Jews of Arabia is needed in order to explain this, and why Islam remains so inflexible in its hostile attitude towards Jews and Israel.

 

Until the founder of Islam, Muhammad ibn Abdallah, proclaimed himself "Messenger of Allah" in the 7^th century, Jews and Arabs lived together peacefully in the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, the Jews -- and Judaism -- were respected to such an extent that an Arab king converted to Judaism in the 5^th century. His name was Dhu Nuwas, and he ruled over the Himyar (present day Yemen) area of the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, it is most likely that the city of Medina (the second-holiest city in Islam) -- then called Yathrib -- was originally founded by Jews. In any event, at the time of Muhammad's "calling," three important Jewish tribes existed in Arabia: Banu Qurayza, Banu Nadir, and Banu Qaynuqa.  

 

Muhammad was very keen on having the Jews accept him as a prophet to the extent that he charged his followers not to eat pig and to pray in the direction of Jerusalem. However, the Jews apparently were not very keen on Muhammad, his proclamation of himself as a prophet, or his poor knowledge of the Torah (Hebrew Bible). Numerous verbal altercations are recorded in the Qur'an and various Hadiths about these conflicts between the Jewish tribes and Muhammad.

 

Eventually, the verbal conflicts turned into physical conflicts, and when the Jews outwardly rejected Muhammad as the "final seal of the prophets," he turned on them with a vengeance. The atrocities that were committed against these tribes are too numerous to cite in a single article, but two tribes, the Qaynuqa and Nadir, were expelled from their villages by Muhammad. It appears that the Qaynuqa left Arabia around 624 A.D. The refugees of the Nadir settled in the village of Khaybar.

 

In 628 A.D., Muhammad turned on the last Jewish tribe, the Qurayza, claiming that they were in league with Muhammad's Arab pagan enemies and had "betrayed" him. Muhammad and his army besieged the Qurayza, and after a siege of over three weeks, the Qurayza surrendered. While many Arabs pleaded with Muhammad to let the Qurayza leave unmolested, Muhammad had other plans. Unlike expelling the Qaynuqa and Nadir, Muhammad exterminated the Qurayza, with an estimated 600 to 900 Jewish men being beheaded in one day. The women and children were sold into slavery, and Muhammad took one of the widows, Rayhana, as a "concubine."

 

In 629 A.D., Muhammad led a campaign against the surviving Jews of Nadir, now living in Khaybar. The battle was again bloody and barbaric, and the survivors of the massacre were either expelled or allowed to remain as "second-class citizens." Eventually, upon the ascension of Omar as caliph, most Jews were expelled from Arabia around the year 640 A.D.

 

This brings us, then, to the question of why modern-day Muslims still boast of the slaughter of the Jewish tribes and the Battle of Khaybar. The answer lies in what the Qur'an -- and later on, the various Hadiths -- says about the Jews. The Qur'an is replete with verses that can be described only as virulently anti-Semitic. The amount of Surahs is too numerous to cite, but a few will suffice: Surah 2:75 (Jews distorted the Torah); 2:91 (Jews are prophet-killers), 4:47 (Jews have distorted the Bible and have incurred condemnation from Allah for breaking the Sabbath), 5:60 (Jews are cursed, and turned into monkeys and pigs), and 5:82 (Jews and pagans are the strongest in enmity to the Muslims and Allah). And of course, there is the genocidal Hadith from Sahih Bukhari, 4:52:177, which would make Adolph Hitler proud. "The Day of Judgment will not have come until you fight with the Jews, and the stones and the trees behind which a Jew will be hiding will say: 'O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come and kill him!"' Thus, the Arab Muslims had their own "final solution" in store for the Jews already in the 7^th century.

 

The fact that Muslims still point to these (and many other) hateful verses in the Qur'an and Hadith should give Jews -- not just Israelis -- pause to consider if there can ever be true peace between Muslims and Jews, let alone between Muslims and Israel. When the armies of Islam occupied the area of Byzantine "Palestine" in the 7^th century, the land became part of "Dar al-Islam" (House of Islam). Until that area is returned to Islam, (i.e., Israel's extermination), she remains part of "Dar al harb" (House of War). It now becomes clear that this is a conflict of religious ideology and not a conflict over a piece of "real estate."

 

Finally, one must ask the question: Aside from non-Arab Turkey, whose relations with Israel are presently teetering on the verge of collapse, why is it that no other non-Arab Muslim country in the Middle East has ever had full relations (if any at all) with Israel, such as faraway countries like Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan? Indeed, why would Persian Iran -- conquered by the Arabs -- have such a deep hatred for Jews and Israel, whereas a non-Muslim country such as India does not feel such enmity? The answer is painfully clear: The contempt in which the Qur'an and other Islamic writings hold Jews does not exist in the scriptures of the Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and other Eastern religions. Therefore, people that come from non-Muslim states do not have this inherent hatred towards Jews, and by extension, towards Israel. But when a people -- or peoples -- is raised with a scripture that regards another people and religion as immoral and less than human, then it is axiomatic why such hatred and disdain exists on the part of Muslims for Jews and Israel.

 

Islam -- as currently interpreted and practiced -- cannot accept a Jewish state of any size in its midst. Unless Muslims come to terms with their holy writings vis-à-vis Jews, Judaism, and Israel and go through some sort of "reformation," it will be unlikely that true peace will ever come to the Middle East. In the meantime, unless Islam reforms, Israel should accept the fact that the Muslims will never accept Israel as a permanent fact in the Middle East.

 

 

Steven Simpson

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

What's Wrong: Demanding A Stable Compromise Peace or Refusing to Make Peace at All?

by Barry Rubin

It's amazing how rarely any mainstream Israeli view--excluding the far left, which provides good anti-Israel ammunition, and, rarely, the far right, to make them look stupid--gets into many of the American media's most elite organs. I'm not referring here to regular news articles but opinion pieces, columnists, and editorials. Often, it is incredibly easy to give a strong, accurate, and persuasive response to claims being made or ideas being promoted by this media. Yet since no one is allowed to do so, these rather silly and ignorant arguments go largely unanswered.

Here, for example, is the always anti-Israel Nicholas Kristof in the New York Times who writes:

"Israel has a point when it argues that relinquishing the West Bank would raise real security concerns. But we must not lose sight of the most basic fact about the occupation: It's wrong."

Even his opening sentence acknowledging that Israel has real concerns is a rarity. That's progress perhaps. But I'm not sure what the sentence "It's wrong" actually means.  I can think of dozens of things in the Middle East, or in the world, that can said to be "wrong," yet what counts in international affairs is survival and reality, not the highly selective use of one-sided moral judgments.

For example, it's wrong to ask Israel to take dangerous risks and possibly commit suicide. It's wrong to take sides with radical movements and dictatorships against democracies. It's wrong to help establish on the Mediterranean Sea the long-term rule of a repressive revolutionary Islamist, antisemitic, genocidal, terrorist regime that oppresses women and Christians while being a client of Iran. Yet these wrongs for some reason don't seem to bother the current foreign policy establishment.

Moreover, the most basic claims made about Israel are simply inaccurate: There is no "occupation" (not in the way people in the West generally speak of it, which seems to assume the situation of 1967-1993 still prevails) and Israel's policy is quite right on this matter.

Despite a minority position within the country (which disappeared in the last 20 years), that Israel should annex that territory, the main basis of Israeli policy has always been a simple one:

Israel should hold onto an overriding control of this land until a peace can be negotiated that is stable, lasting, includes real Palestinian acceptance of Israel's right to exist, and ends the conflict forever.

If the Palestinian side were willing to do this, peace and a Palestinian state could be achieved within months. If not, no other gimmick will work. This includes the recently touted gimmick that Palestinian prosperity is sufficient  to build peace without Palestinian political moderation.

Having said this, let's consider some details.

First, before 1993 Israel had total control of the West Bank. Since then it has withdrawn from almost all populated areas and a Palestinian Authority has been created which rules the people there, receives massive foreign aid, and has proportionately huge security forces. In a real sense, Israel doesn't "occupy" the West Bank. Indeed, if there were not terrorist attacks there would be even less presence.

Second, and this might sound strange at first but is quite true, whatever Israel is doing in the West Bank is not a non-consensual occupation but embodies arrangements accepted by the PLO and PA. They have signed numerous agreements which regulate the situation. True, after they sign agreements they often say they were unfair and demand more. But this is hardly a good omen for their abiding by any future agreements. The fact is, however, that the "occupation" ended in 1994-1996.

Third, as noted above, the PA can end the Israeli presence whenever it wants to do so simply by making a peace agreement.

In a sense, then, Kristof's stance, and that of the many who echo it, is based on a trick. The PA refuses to make a compromise deal, thus forcing the continuation of the "interim" arrangements, then complains that it is suffering. The solution is then to say that Israel's presences is "wrong" and should be ended even without the PA doing anything.

It is interesting to note that this conception of morality is based on the view, so popular nowadays, that suffering--even if self-induced--trumps every other possible consideration, from common sense, to keeping one's commitments, to existing law, to historic morality. Even terrorism is justified on the basis of the real or alleged suffering of those committing it, and even if the terrorism being committed makes a major contribution to the continuing of the suffering that supposedly created it in the first place.

Yet in the real world if the presence of Israel--settlements, etc.--is "wrong" the PA's refusal to make real peace--stop incitement, agree to a permanent end of the conflict, resettle refugees in Palestine, make a real effort to transform its ideology and public opinion in favor of peace with Israel--is equally wrong.

Finally, of course, Kristof deliberately doesn't mention the Gaza Strip. There the idea that Israel's occupation was "wrong," prevailed, Israel withdrew, and found itself with a revolutionary Islamist neighbor seeking to wipe it off the map. Something parallel could well happen if the "wrongness" of Israel's role on the West Bank were to set the tone of the situation.

Incidentally, if and when Kristof and such people decide that the Hamas coup in Gaza and the construction of a terrorist state there is "wrong" and they advocate the overthrow of Hamas, they might have a bit more credibility.

There is no doubt that the way Kristof presents the situation is widely accepted in the West, but that, too, is quite wrong. Indeed, this picture is so misleading and using it as the basis for policy is so dangerous that Israel only can--and will--ignore such foolish advice.

If I might put it bluntly: Just because you are stupid (having bad judgment) and ignorant (unaware of the facts and history) why should I have to die and see my country destroyed? That is very very wrong.

Note: One might consider a situation in which the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War Two extended over a long period of time because the political movements and ideas that had led those two countries into aggression continued to prevail. If the dominant political forces in those countries refused to accept a peace on terms acceptable to the victors and openly spoke of conquering Europe and Asia, respectively, would the continued controls still be "wrong" merely because of the length of time involved or inconveniences to the Germans and Japanese?

Remember, too, that the Allies would be stronger than the Germans or Japanese who would thus be eligible for consideration as repressed underdogs. And then if a neo-Nazi or aggressive nationalist movement seized control in a large part of Germany or Japan, openly proclaiming that it was going to wipe out neighboring countries, would it be wrong to overthrow those regimes or, if that was not possible, to put embargos on them?

No analogy is perfect including this one. But given the support the Palestinians would enjoy from elsewhere for continuing their war on Israel and other factors, the West Bank case is actually stronger than even the Germany-Japan parallel in justifying Israel's refusal to unilaterally concede all the cards it holds.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

A little rain on the Palestinian parade

 

by Nathan Brown

 

Since June 2007 -- and the split of the Palestinian Authority in two halves, one running Gaza and one running the West Bank - U.S. policy has banked heavily on an attempt to back the West Bank half, headed by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. When the Obama administration took office in January 2009, it doubled down on the U.S. bet on Abbas and Fayyad. Fayyad has responded with an ambitious program that is designed to provide the institutional basis for a Palestinian state. His unassuming style, honest and capable administration, and sometimes soothing words have led to a host of international paeans to "Fayyadism." Salam Fayyad is held to be quietly building a Palestinian state rather than waiting for international actors to deliver one.

 

There is no doubt that Fayyad as an individual has some real virtues: a measure of personal integrity, an ability to convey an attitude that politics is about public service rather than personal aggrandizement, and a shift from revolutionary rhetoric to practical action. But is Fayyadism building a Palestinian state?

No.

And in a recent trip to the West Bank, I could not find a Palestinian who thinks he is. I report more fully on my findings in a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that was released today. 

 

There are those who admire and participate in Fayyad's efforts to be sure. And there is much to admire in Fayyad. But even those participating in his project would be the first to admit -- along with Fayyad himself -- that the effort cannot be sustained unless it is supported by a diplomatic process that also points to Palestinian statehood. And nobody believes there is such a viable process right now. The only question that most serious observers debate is whether hope for a two state solution is dead, dying, or merely in hibernation.

But there are three other problems with pinning our hopes on Fayyadism as the basis of a two-state solution.

First, it is simply not true that his cabinet is building institutions on the West Bank. Instead, it is improving the functioning of some existing institutions in some areas -- and failing in others. I have been trying to follow the institutional development of the Palestinian Authority since it was founded; on my trip to the West Bank to update my research, I found that for every one step forward taken under difficult circumstances, politics in the West Bank has taken two steps taken back. I paid particular attention to two sectors I have focused on over the years: law and education. The legal system is operating more smoothly in some areas (courts are more efficient and are handling non-political cases better), but it is also politicized, bypassed by the security services, and hamstrung by internal rivalries. The education system is merely holding together (which is credit to Fayyad's cabinet), but it is hardly improving.

The fact is that the institutions Fayyad's cabinet is operating were built in previous periods. There was actually far more building of institutions under Yasser Arafat than there has been under Fayyad. It is true that many institutions were built in spite of Arafat and that Fayyad's behavior suggests a greater respect for rules and institutions. But that is consolation only for those who mistake personalities for politics. For all his admirable qualities, what Fayyad has managed to do is to maintain many of the institutions built earlier and make a few of them more efficient. 

The second problem is that these efforts take place in an authoritarian context that robs it of domestic legitimacy. Palestinian democracy has died, and Fayyad could not operate the way he does (and would probably not be prime minister at all) if it were still alive. The president's term has expired, the parliament's term is also expired, no new elections are in sight, elected local officials have been selectively dismissed, and local elections have been cancelled. Opposition supporters have been ousted from the civil service and municipal government and their organizations have been shuttered. Activists are detained without charges; court orders have been ignored; and the broader citizenry is increasingly administered according to laws that are drafted by bureaucrats out of public view. This is not the "rule of law" if the phrase is to have any meaning.

Fayyad's measures look like stop gap damage control rather than "state building" when they are contrasted with what came before. The greatest strides in reviewing, modifying, modernizing, and unifying Palestine's legal framework were taken when there was a viable parliament (between 1996 and 2006). The process was messy, contentious, and uncertain. But it also resulted in laws that were far more solidly based, liberal in spirit, and regarded as legitimate. Since Hamas' January 2006 electoral triumph, and the Israeli arrest of several Hamas deputies later that year (paralyzing the parliament), that legislative process has come to an end.  Now the cabinet makes law by having bureaucrats draft law out of public view in an ad hoc procedure -- one that is constitutionally a bit dubious if politically inevitable.

The third problem with relying on Fayyadism is that political paralysis and authoritarianism is infecting other Palestinian institutions, even those outside of the governmental structure. Structures that were launched or knit together over the past two decades (professional associations, NGOs, political parties) are hardly being built or improved; they are decaying. Some are being actively squeezed and even suppressed, such as Islamist NGOs in the West Bank or non-Islamist ones in Gaza. A recent report of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights found "stark violations" of the law by both halves of the PA and observed more dryly that "it is possible to conclude that despite the presence of a modern legal framework governing the registration and operation of associations, the current political and security considerations prevail over the system of rights and public freedoms." 

But it is not only civil society that is feeling the pinch. Palestine's political parties are also in a state of crisis. Hamas is certainly in the healthiest state, but only in Gaza (in the West Bank the organization is still in hibernation, with only a few leading members active in public view). And even in Gaza, where its dominance is so well established, the movement is still sorting out the effects of being melded with a governing political structure it had long held in disdain. The smaller factions (such as the PFLP and the People's Party) remain small, and the newer initiatives (most notably the Palestinian National Initiative) are not gaining much traction.

But Fatah is undoubtedly in the greatest disarray. The much-celebrated (and long delayed) party congress held last summer did little to revive the organization or calm its bitter internal rivalries. It is not clear if Fatah really remains a political party in any meaningful sense; instead it consists of an aging old guard monopolizing top positions, a middle generation that stands in the wings (and is no more unified than the old guard), and a host of local branches whose links to the center are tenuous. The recent debacle of local elections -- in which Fatah leaders forced Fayyad's cabinet to cancel them just as candidate registration was closing because of the movement's inability to assemble electoral lists -- shows the extent of the disarray. Fatah could have waltzed to an overwhelming victory with Hamas boycotting and a host of smaller parties and independents either cooperating with Fatah or putting forward meager challenges. One of the most knowledgeable observers of Palestinian elections told me: "Now we know that Fatah is incapable running against itself, let alone against Hamas."

Fayyad is not building a state, he's holding down the fort until the next crisis. And when that crisis comes, Fayyad's cabinet has no democratic legitimacy or even an organized constituency to fall back on. What he does have -- contrary to those who laud him for not relying on outsiders -- is an irreplaceable reservoir of international respectability. The message of "Fayyadism" is clear, and it is personal: if Salam Fayyad is prime minister, wealthy international donors will keep the PA solvent, pay salaries to its employees, fund its infrastructural development, and even put gentle pressure on Israel to ease up its tight restrictions on movement and access. 

Fayyad may be a good person, but finding a good person is not a policy. If he is making mild administrative and fiscal improvements in some areas, this cannot obscure the deeper problem that most Palestinian political institutions are actually in deep trouble and the most important ones are in a state of advanced decay. 

 

Nathan Brown is a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, a fellow at the Woodrow Willson International Center for Scholars,

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

They are scared of Hezbollah

 

by Hanin Ghaddar  

 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 was passed to ensure that Lebanon enjoys full sovereignty and control over all its territories. However, the incidents that occurred in South Lebanon earlier in the week have proved that certain parties are set on undermining the resolution's aims.
 
One day before UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon issued his 13th report on UNSCR 1701, residents in 22 villages in the South took to the streets, blocked roads and attacked UNIFIL troops with stones to protest the increased presence of the UN peacekeepers in the South.

The countries contributing to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon are concerned that their freedom of movement has been compromised. According to Michael Williams, the UN's special coordinator for Lebanon, "UNIFIL's exercise in the area was carried out as part of its normal operations and with full respect of its mandate."

UNSCR 1701 calls on Hezbollah to disarm and authorizes UNIFIL to "take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council…"

But as the Lebanese army failed to issue a statement on the incident to clarify the situation, Hezbollah declared its dissatisfaction with UNIFIL. In an interview with As-Safir newspaper on Friday, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem said that "UNIFIL must pay attention to what it does and realize that any excess only serves to cause worry and harm trust between the force and residents," adding that if the government cannot protect border village residents, then they will have to find a way to protect themselves.

His comments came after the head of Hezbollah's Executive Council, Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, said during a commemoration ceremony on Thursday evening that the Resistance and its history cannot be erased by anyone's resolution.

What happened this week is a clear sign that Hezbollah is in total control of the area south of the Litani. The party can boost its weaponry, smuggle arms, carry out maneuvers and interpret 1701 as it wishes, while UNIFIL is attacked and the Lebanese army looks on impotent.

So what would have satisfied Hezbollah? Should UNIFIL send a letter to Hezbollah, instead of the Lebanese army, to inform it of their activities? Hezbollah feels it must be aware of, and approve, any UNIFIL movement, and that it is master of the South and to hell with the UN and UNSCR 1701.

That said, Hezbollah does not want UNIFIL to leave Lebanon; this would expose Lebanon and the South to danger. It does, however want to send a message to the international community that it is in control. And it has worked. UNIFIL halted its maneuvers on Thursday.

Another thing: UNIFIL would be in charge in the occupied Ghajar village in the event of an Israeli withdrawal, and the attack against the UN troops has raised concerns in light of the Israeli cabinet's recent approval of withdrawing from the northern part of the village. There are fears that these attacks are linked to a possible withdrawal from Ghajar. The Resistance's cause would be harmed if it appeared that diplomacy had achieved better results than armed confrontation. Indeed, Hezbollah needs to justify its arms and highlight the need for its presence as a more significant force than UNIFIL.

But that is not it. In the past few weeks, Hezbollah has launched a number of drives indicating that all is not well with the party walls. 

Two weeks ago, Loyalty to the Resistance bloc MP Nawwaf Moussawi launched a campaign against Lebanese media outlets and other organizations that he said had been funded by the US to undermine Hezbollah's image to the tune of $500 million, adding that other Arabs who are US allies have paid twice as much to the same cause. 

Then Hezbollah MP Kamel al-Rifai promised that the party would soon "confront American defamation campaigns" and prepare a list of individuals, parties and clubs collaborating with the US.

Then there was news of the arrest of an employee from the Alfa mobile telecom company for allegedly spying for Israel, allowing Hezbollah to imply that Israel controls the Lebanese telecom network and is, according to Hezbollah MP Mohammad Raad, capable of "sowing strife." It also means that any future indictments based on cell phone data analysis can be easily dismissed as an Israeli conspiracy.

So UNIFIL and 1701 are not the only targets. All international resolutions, as well as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, are under attack, now and in the future. Some would also link these attacks to the recent Security Council sanctions against Iran. The main peacekeeping troops targeted during these attacks were the French and the Spanish. According to sources in the French Embassy, these attacks were organized by Hezbollah to send a message to European countries in reaction to the sanctions.

The Lebanese government has not reacted in a way to suggest this kind of behavior will not be repeated. Hezbollah proved its strength, and UNIFIL has yielded.

It's not that no one cares. It's just that everyone appears scared of Hezbollah.

 

Hanin Ghaddar is managing editor of NOW Lebanon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Containing Iran Requires Getting Smart, Tough, and Serious

by Barry Rubin

 

It should be too obvious to have to say so but unfortunately some people don't get it: dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran is an extraordinarily important task in which the lives of millions of people will be at risk. Such a policy cannot be based on wishful thinking, on faith in the "rationality" of Iran, or on faith in the competence of the current U.S. government. This is not an issue of ""left-wing" or "right-wing" interpretation but of policy analysis.

 

What concerns me is that the mainstream debate regarding containment is being conducted in a flippant and sloppy manner, based on some questionable assumptions. Attempts to critique those concepts are blithely dismissed rather than seen as pointing out serious issues and necessary adjustments. At present, this seems an abstract debate. In future, though, the failure to consider and plan could be the source of a major tragedy.

In my view, the most likely outcome is not a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, or an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel. While these are, of course, real possibilities, too much focus has been devoted to them. I want to suggest two other scenarios that are more likely: a U.S.-Iran war based on American mistakes and Iranian miscalculations, or huge strategic gains for Iran and revolutionary Islamism in the Middle East.

Another key point is the common error of assuming that there is only one "rational" response by Middle Eastern regimes or states and that this has to be a mirror image of how American experts or policymakers would respond. What is required of an expert is to understand the particular rational response--based on perceptions, history, power structure, ideology, and other factors--that takes place in the context of a specific country's leadership making decisions.

 

Rational responses are not necessarily moderate ones. For example, based on his "rational" response that Iran was weak, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Iran and set off a long, bloody war. Based on his "rational" response that America would not intervene, Saddam invaded Kuwait setting off a world crisis and another war. Neither of these moves was "irrational," they were merely based on false perceptions and mistaken assumptions that were quite understandable given Saddam's world view and information.

Might Iran, then, some day make a "rational" decision that produces aggression--even if indirect--sets off wars and massive instability in other countries? Of course, the answer is "Yes." The Western assumption that if Iran is rational there must inevitably be moderation and stability is one of the silliest of those made by Western policymakers that has in the past created crises, wars, and massive suffering.

 

When Iran gets nuclear weapons a containment strategy will be the best U.S. strategy. But how should that containment policy be carried out? That is a far more delicate and complex question than is generally realized.

If the extraordinarily large challenge this problem will pose is underestimated and the idea of containment is too narrowly defined, the resulting failure will bring disaster in the region and the biggest crisis of our era.

James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh in, "After Iran Gets the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, March-April 2010, propose what U.S. policy should be after Tehran obtains nuclear weapons. But there are significant problems in its predictions and recommendations.

 

By making the possibility of containing Iran seem easier than it is and narrower than it need be the article may stir complacency and rationalize the current lack of serious diplomatic effort to stop Iran from succeeding. In addition, the article's assumptions are repeatedly "best-case" ones that understate the problems involved. It is like the planning of a military campaign by advocates who keep insisting that everything will work out properly. We have repeatedly seen in recent history the dangers of such a procedure.

 

In particular, the article makes four questionable assumptions.

 

First comes the premise that U.S. willpower and credibility with both enemies and friends is sufficient to succeed at containment. The authors note that U.S. policy needs "to reassure its friends and allies in the Middle East that it remains firmly committed to preserving the balance of power in the region."

Yet to do so, there must be a clear understanding as to why these countries don't believe this claim. As the authors point out, "Iran is determined to get nuclear weapons but the West, despite endless talk, is not determined to stop it from doing so" and Tehran's success is a major failure for U.S. credibility. Given this U.S. defeat, "Friends and foes would openly question the U.S. government's power and resolve to shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing themselves from Washington; foes would challenge U.S. policies more aggressively."

Yet the article doesn't draw the obvious conclusion from this situation: Iran emerges as the most powerful regional player; America declines into relative irrelevance compared to the past. It would be a strategic shift in which revolutionary forces become more aggressive and those who can do so use appeasement to survive.

 

Simply declaring that it will protect regional states or issuing verbal warnings to Iran will not be sufficient. Does Iran's government believe that President Barack Obama would go to war, even nuclear war, to constrain it? Will Arab rulers bet their lives on this expectation? Is Israel going to trust its security to a U.S. government which could arguably be called the least friendly to Israel in history? "No" seems the likely answer.

 

Israel cannot and will not appease Iran. But the authors state that "the Israeli government's calculations about Iran would depend on its assessment of the United States' willingness and ability to deter Iran." Since the Obama Administration's efforts against Iran have been unimpressive and support for Israel has plummeted, Israel's calculations will not assume confidence in U.S. policy.

 

As for Arab states, the authors dismiss the danger of massive appeasement, saying, "Pursuing that strategy would mean casting aside U.S. help and betting on the mercy of Tehran." But there is no reason that appeasement must be all-or-nothing. Certainly, they'll take U.S. security guarantees but then hedge their bets, limit cooperation, and try hard to please Iran. Combining U.S. guarantees with buying off Tehran is sensible policy.

 

Second is the idea that Iran will act rationally and, at least as the result of pressure, moderately as well.

 

One doesn't have to think Tehran eager to commit suicide to understand how it is prone to risk-taking, not to mention the likelihood of miscalculation by a highly ideological regime which profoundly misunderstands the West. Even if not insane or suicidal, Iran's regime is the farthest thing from a rational-actor state the United States has confronted since Berlin fell in 1945.

 

Moreover, the regime may think it has found ways around the "suicide" problem or simply discount the risk. Its nuclear weapons will be controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most fanatical institution with the closest ties to terrorist groups. Iran's defense minister is an internationally wanted terrorist. Any system based on confidence about Iranian self-restraint is on a shaky foundation.

 

Modern Middle East history is full of examples of less volatile rulers and regimes jumping off cliffs. Egypt provoked the 1967 war; Iraq attacked Iran and Kuwait; the PLO chose launching a losing war rather than making peace and getting a state in 2000.

 

Taking up an Obama Administration talking point, the authors say all will be well if U.S. policy shows "Tehran that acquiring the bomb will not produce the benefits it anticipates but isolate and weaken the regime." Nuclear weapons, they say, "can accomplish only a limited set of objectives." But it seems more likely the regime is right in concluding the bomb will bring many benefits: making it more powerful, respected, and influential abroad.

 

Containment advocates understate many elements in this context. For example, consider their minimizing the possibility of Iran transferring nuclear weapons to others because it fears U.S. wrath. Yet precedents, as seen from Tehran, suggest America is a paper tiger. The United States has been passive in response to Iran's transferring weapons to Iraqi Shia radicals, Hizballah, Hamas, Afghan Islamists, and even cooperating with al-Qaida, despite the fact that Americans have died as a result.

 

To some extent, the authors put faith in Iran's "common sense":

"Iran has observed clear limits when supporting militias and terrorist organizations in the Middle East. Iran has not provided Hezbollah with chemical or biological weapons or Iraqi militias with the means to shoot down U.S. aircraft. Iran's rulers understand that such provocative actions could imperil their rule by inviting retaliation."

That's true up to a point, but what about possible Iranian involvement in Syria's effort to build nuclear facilities? As for advanced anti-aircraft systems, Iran has already provided them to terrorist groups. The U.S. Department of Defense Quadrennial Report for 2010 warns: "Non-state actors such as Hizballah have acquired…man-portable air defense systems from Iran." Equally, Iran provides bombs to Iraqi militias to "shoot down" American convoys.

 

Thus, while Iran may not transfer weapons of mass destruction it is more possible than containment optimists claim. Tehran will certainly escalate the transfer of other arms for wars against the United States and to try to overthrow its allies.

 

A third assumption is the nature of the threat to be contained, which goes far beyond the need to ensure Iran doesn't fire nuclear weapons at others. Consider the tidal wave effect as millions of Muslims conclude that mighty Iran got it right; that revolutionary, anti-American Islamism works. Islamist movements will increase violence and struggle everywhere, including Europe.

 

Moreover, Iran will practice what can be called nuclear-defended aggression. The authors say a U.S.-backed Israel would keep radical groups "in check." Tehran, "will not risk a nuclear confrontation with Israel to assist" Hamas and Hizballah. But Iran is already helping them at no cost to itself or nuclear confrontation.

 

In contrast, Israel has no leverage to defeat revolutionary Islamist groups outside the West Bank. Indeed, U.S. policy ensures Israel can't overthrow Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The United States won't battle to stop an Iranian-Syrian takeover of Lebanon already in progress through Hizballah and other assets. In this context, too, Palestinian leaders and Arab states will be too fearful of Iran—and their own people thrilled by Iran's defying the West—to move toward peace with Israel. If they do, Iran and its allies will sabotage these efforts, using them to escalate conflict and anti-Americanism.

 

A more accurate picture is presented by Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid, director-general of the al-Arabiya television network, writing in al-Sharq al-Awsat last February: "An Iranian bomb…will not be put to military use; it will be used as a way to change the rules of the game." With nuclear weapons, Iran's nuclear umbrella will protect itself and its clients who seek or take power in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and in the Palestinian lands "from deterrence" by the United States. Iran doesn't need to attack anyone else; it must merely ensure no one else attacks itself as it steps up subversion and terrorism.

 

Another advantage for a nuclear-armed Iran is brinkmanship. As Ahmad al-Jarallah, editor of the Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa, explained last February, Arab states would be "hostage to fears of rash actions by Iran that could cause nuclear catastrophes…." Thus, they would do everything possible to avoid any risk of being obliterated by keeping Iran happy no matter what the United States promised them. It would be cold comfort for them to fear incineration comforted by expectations that Iran would also be flattened.

 

Finally, there's the plan proposed for U.S. policy toward Iran itself. Washington needed "to persuade the Iranian ruling class that the revisionist game it has been playing is simply not worth the candle." But why should we assume the United States can convince these rulers of anything, least of all that Iran's ambitions are mistaken? It's far more likely that the revisionist game yields much fruit, especially since the containment being proposed would cost Iran almost nothing more than it's facing now.

 

The article suggests, "To press Tehran in the right direction, Washington should signal that it seeks to create an order in the Middle East that is peaceful and self-sustaining." But this is exactly why Iran, Syria, and revolutionary Islamist movements see the United States as blocking their ambitions. Thus, its influence must be destroyed if Iran and "Islam" is to gain what they consider to be its "legitimate interests."

The authors conclude U.S. policy can live with an Islamic Republic that abandons its nuclear ambitions and respects neighbors' sovereignty. That's fine in theory. But is there going to be such an Islamic Republic, at least before decades of bloody attempts to overturn the regional order? Containing the USSR took almost a half-century through numerous subversive campaigns and wars. And when the United States began that effort, the Soviet Union was far closer to being a cautious, status quo power than Iran is today.

Successful containment, then, will not just be difficult but extraordinarily so, requiring major changes in current U.S. government thinking and behavior. The first step is to understand the inescapable conflict between U.S. interests and revolutionary Islamist movements, to see the Iran-led alliance as an extremely dangerous adversary which is more determined, ruthless, and probably tactically cleverer than the United States itself.

 

That's why it's so important to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons at all. Otherwise, despite a framework of soothing promises, verbal threats, and military build-ups, Iran's bomb will change the Middle East strategic balance; inspire revolutionary Islamist movements to new levels of violence, foster Arab and Western appeasement, and shift power toward Tehran.

But we are all going to face a nuclear Iran. To deal with this situation, the United States cannot merely take one element—nuclear umbrella and deterrence—from its Cold War experience as containment on the cheap. It must adapt an entire repertoire including a truly tough posture; readiness to contest every country and battle every revolutionary surrogate of Tehran in an appropriate manner, employing a full gamut of overt and covert military, diplomatic, and economic tools.

 

The struggle will be long and hard. On a regional level, victory cannot be taken for granted. Certainly, unless the United States takes containment, struggle, credibility, deterrence, and other such things seriously, a massive defeat for the United States can be taken for granted.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Making the World More Dangerous

 

by Mona Charen

 

It's not easy to divert the Obama administration from its pursuit of "engagement."

 

The timing could hardly have been worse: Just days after President Obama shared a chummy hamburger with Russian president Dmitri Medvedev — the better to dramatize our newly "reset" relations — the FBI announced the arrest of eleven "deep-cover" spies who have been paid and plied by Moscow Center for decades.

The Obama administration seemed more embarrassed about it than the Russians, rushing to reassure the world that this will not affect our new relationship with Russia one bit. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon explained that "we would like to get to the point where there is just so much trust and cooperation between the United States and Russia that nobody would think of turning to intelligence means to find out things that they couldn't find out in other channels."

 

 It's not easy to divert the Obama administration from its pursuit of "engagement." Not even repeated slaps in the face will do the trick.

Consider another diplomatic initiative — that toward Syria. This week it was revealed that Syria had obtained a sophisticated radar system from Iran (in violation of U.N. sanctions — but don't hold your breath for an emergency Security Council session). The radar would make it much more difficult for Israeli jets to fly undetected over Syrian airspace en route to Iran. If shared with Hezbollah, a Syrian-Iranian client based in Lebanon, the radar would vastly improve the accuracy of Hezbollah's missiles and bolster its air defenses.

This is merely the latest signal of contempt by Syria for the Obama administration's sedulous courting. Two months ago, Israel announced that Syria had transferred SCUD missiles (range: 400 miles) to Hezbollah, permitting the terror group to hit Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Dimona, and Ben Gurion International Airport. In 2006, when Hezbollah launched a war against Israel, its missiles had a range of 20 to 60 miles. But, never daunted, the administration interpreted this provocation as proof that even more friendliness was required of us. "Sending an ambassador to Syria who can press the Syrian government in a firm and coordinated fashion . . . is part of our strategy to achieve comprehensive peace in the region," the White House explained.

Since January 2009, a procession of high-level officials, including Under Secretary of State William Burns, Sen. John Kerry, and George Mitchell (three times) has trooped to Damascus for talks with Bashar Assad. The administration also announced the appointment of an ambassador, Robert Ford, for the first time in five years (though Republicans have so far effectively blocked him). The Obama White House also relaxed export licenses, invited the Syrian deputy foreign minister to Washington, and withdrew U.S. objections to Syrian admission to the World Trade Organization. Senator Kerry stressed that his visit and the decision to send an ambassador to Damascus reflect the fact that engagement with Syria is "a priority at the highest levels of our government."

Others drank the Kool-Aid as well. Newsweek magazine praised the engagement initiative as recently as February, saying, "President Bashar al-Assad may finally be ready to play ball. . . . Those small steps (like Ford's appointment, for example) are exactly the thing [sic] Syria is looking to respond to."

Or not. Just a day after Secretary of State Clinton conveyed to Damascus President Obama's hope that the Syrians would draw closer to the U.S. and distance themselves from Iran, Bashar Assad hosted Mahmoud Admadinejad for a lavish state visit. At a grinning joint press conference, the two competed to spew insults at the United States. Ahmadinejad looked forward to a new Middle East "without Zionists and without colonialists." Assad, referring snidely to Clinton, said "I find it strange how they talk about Middle East stability and at the same time talk about dividing [our] two countries." Regarding the suggestion that Syria distance itself from Iran, Assad noted coyly that he must not have understood "maybe because of translation error or limited understanding."

Apparently Assad was too subtle for this crowd. For even after this, and even after the SCUDS, and even despite the radar, the Obama administration truckling continues. According to the June 15 Wall Street Journal, "The State Department has dispatched a high-level diplomatic and trade mission to Syria, according to senior U.S. officials, marking the latest bid by the Obama administration to woo President Bashar al-Assad away from his strategic alliance with Iran."

This is beyond naïve. This is profoundly dangerous. Who can possibly fail to notice that the Obama administration not only imposes no costs on those who cross it, but redoubles its efforts to appease?

Mona Charen is a nationally syndicated columnist.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.