The Start of a New Defense Era

by Amir Rapaport with a foreward by Dr. Aaron Lerner

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Amir Rapaport's reports are certainly interesting. But please keep in mind that the references seeking to blame Israel for the lack of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are more a reflection of what is apparently his political orientation than a description of what has transpired.  There haven't been talks because Mahmoud Abbas won't talk with Israel unless Israel gives in to his laundry list of demands.]

Judea and Samaria - The Start of a New Defense Era Recognizing Hamas sovereignty in Gaza has raised the level of violence in Judea and Samaria; The IDF senior echelon is frustrated from the situation and point fingers towards the political echelon; and in Syria, Assad’s status continues to deteriorate

The silence that has prevailed around the Gaza Strip has led to a rise in the level of violence throughout the Judea and Samaria region. This is more than just violence: the IDF and the Shabak are already regarding to the new situation there as the start of a new defense era. The near-total calm that characterized the years 2008-2012 is a thing of the past.

In order to understand the new reality, a fact should be noted that has not been significantly discussed, and which it is doubtful that even one percent of the Israeli populace is aware of. During operation Pillar of Defense, Israel made a decision of historical significance - to recognized Hamas as the full sovereign in the Gaza Strip. It isn't as though Israel did not consider Hamas to be responsible for events transpiring in the Gaza Strip, but it made sure to honor the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), at least symbolically.

Thus Egypt involved the Authority in the negotiations held over the ceasefire due to previous rounds of combat, such as operation Cast Lead in 2009. However, that was in the era of President Hosni Mubarak. The current ruler, Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammad Morsi (who continues dealing with his own internal troubles, due to his failed attempt to dictate a new constitution in Egypt), does not count Abu Mazen or the King of Jordan, Abdullah. There is a certain logic in recognizing Hamas as the de facto ruler in the Gaza Strip, from Israel’s perspective. As a ruler, the cost of Hamas’s losses from previous rounds against Israel is higher, and by that rationale (as well as a desire to end Pillar of Defense as soon as possible), Israel gave Hamas far-reaching achievements in the framework of the negotiations. With the immediate end of the fire, it cancelled the "perimeter, a 300 meter area to the west of the border fence encompassing the Gaza Strip, to which entry was prohibited since the end of Cast Lead. Israel also agreed to ease the blockade imposed on Gaza and even expanded the permitted fishing areas off of the coast of the strip.

"The Jews Only Understand Force"

If we examine just the tactical implications of recognizing Hamas, then the success of the effort and of Pillar of Defense is dizzying. Since an hour after the end of the operation (when the last rocket was launched towards Israel) and until this weekend, not a single shot was fired from Gaza into Israel. This is despite the fact that IDF forces killed two Gazans who tried to storm the fence and wounded several other rioters.

In recent weeks, Hamas has taken full command and has even stopped the protests. The IDF’s Operations Branch is comparing the data collected in the past three weeks since the end of the Pillar of Defense to the first few weeks after Cast Lead, when bombs and rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip at a rate of 2-3 events per week. This pace receded, until the start of a new round of escalation.

The officers coordinating the data find it difficult to believe that the quiet in the south since the end of Pillar of Defense is absolute. The problem is that the current achievement could result in a strategic disaster over time. It is quite possible that Hamas and Islamic Jihad will try once more to obtain weapons that can reach Tel Aviv, in order to refill their bunkers.

Worse than the future strengthening of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad is the fact that Fatah suffered a huge blow in the West Bank from HAmas. It would be simplistic to argue that the violence that has risen in recent weeks in the Palestinian territories is because Israel has not negotiatied with the PA in recent years, or because the results of Pillar of Defense harmed the deterrence. However, both of these factors have contributed to the new situation that has been created in the territories.

With regards to the political matter, the halting of negotiations has definitely generated considerable frustration in the Palestinian street. Expectations for UN recognition of a Palestinian state in September 2011 were dashed, and there is an authentic protest over the economic situation and living expenses. These have pressured Abu Mazen to take a unilateral step of approaching the UN this year for recognizing Palestine as the 194th state, under observer status. Abu Mazen not only led the political move which was successful for him, he also began using "popular struggle" terminology in his speeches, and spoke at the heart of Ramallah after the UN announcement, with hundreds of Palestinians shouting "a million martyrs rise to Jerusalem" in front of him. He has never looked so much like Arafat, until that demonstration.

The historical debate as to whether the Palestinian Authority founder Yasser Arafat initiated the second intifada in September 2000, or just rode upon it will never be decided. However, it is a simpler case for Abu Mazen: despite the speech in Ramallah, the consensus in the Israeli defense establishment is that his clinging to the political path is authentic. Mahmoud Abbas is not a leader of intifadas. His problem is his population is quite sure that the conflict path remains the right way, and that "the Jews only understand force." We are helping Palestinian streets arrive to this conclusion.

No significant activity was noted this week by Palestinian security forces against Hamas. The Palestinian security force commanders are in a difficult situation, by the way: Hamas’ accomplishments in Gaza severely hurt their pride. Many in the street already compare the Palestinian security forces, which were established with massive US and European assistance and with Israel's full support, to the Southern Lebanese army, which is badly remembered by many Arabs.

The pressure from the street initially influences the field echelons, and resulted in incidents in which the Palestinian security forces were involved, in Hebron, in Tul Karem and in Jenin. This week, there were already signs that the PA is attempting to stop the growing wave of violence and control the height of the flames. However, a series of incidents throughout the Judea and Samaria region prove that it will not be easy to put the genie back in the bottle, if there will be any actual attempt to return things to the way they were.

Instructions for Opening Fire

The Israeli media dealt this week with the question of the soldier instructions for opening fire in the Judea and Samaria region, in light of the new reality and the embarrassing photos of soldiers escaping in Hebron and in Kedum. The fact is that soldiers and Magav police forces carry a fairly thick notebook in their pockets with dozens of instructions for opening fire, according to the various situations. The common denominator for all of the orders is the approval for opening live fire only when facing life-threatening situations. However, there is no chance that any notebook would describe in advance every situation that could develop in a field with such a high level of friction.

Even if it were possible to foresee all of the situations, there is no commander or soldier that can always make the correct decision in a fraction of a second, and while under a sense of danger which is necessarily subjective. The soldiers in the field will continue to be in an impossible predicament – any death of a Palestinian only agitates the situation further, and thus the formal policy remains one of "contained restraint'. However, even photos of soldiers that do not respond to provocations and riots have a disastrous effect.

If it is of any comfort to the junior echelon, there is a growing sense of frustration among the senior echelons of the IDF as well, except that it is directed, (off the record, of course) towards the political echelon. Military sources say that it's not only that the political echelon in Israel has not maintained the process with the Palestinians alive as an alternative to Hamas’ path of conflict, but worse no less is that Israeli ministers have recently spoken against the PA, and the government has announced the construction of 3,000 residential units in the field, to punish Abu Mazen.

As far as the IDF is concerned, the Judea and Samaria sector has returned to being a prominent sector. The IDF has announced the goal of increasing readiness for a significant conflict in the territories, as of the first quarter of 2013. The actual meaning is more training for riot scenarios in the territories and more measures such as non-lethal weapons. At this stage, the IDF is not discussing permanent reinforcement of forces in Judea and Samaria.

On the contrary, forces planned for the sector in 2013 are even somewhat fewer compared to the average force in the area in 2012.

Meanwhile in Syria

In Syria, Bashar al-Assad took another significant step towards his inevitable end: either surrendering to the rebels and even death, or escaping to one of his pre-prepared shelters in Russia, Dubai or in Venezuela. In the past week, the rebels have already achieved a tie-breaker in the ongoing civil war, after 90 organizations united under one roof and attained advanced antiaircraft weaponry (with Qatari and Western funding).

The advanced weapons succeeded not only in hitting several of the Syrian Air Forces’ aircraft and helicopters, but also succeeded in almost completely neutralizing the Syrian air force. This is the background for the astonishing fire of SCUD-B missiles carried out this week by forces loyal to the Assad regime, directed towards rebel centers in the country's north. The fire was initially revealed by US sources. On one hand, it testifies to the weakness of the Syrian regime, which is on the verge of near-total collapse (In the even of a total collapse, there is a scenario in which Assad will launch Scuds towards Israel). Yet on the other, it also points to the weakness of the US administration. 

 
Amir Rapaport; foreward by Dr. Aaron Lerner

Source: http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=1826


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