by Jonathan Spyer
An FSA fighter engaged in a shootout in Aleppo, Syria (November 2012).
Syria today
is divided de facto into three identifiable entities. These three
entities are: first, the Asad regime itself, which has survived all
attempts to divide it from within. The second area is the zone
controlled by the rebels. In this area there is no central authority.
Rather, the territory is divided up into areas controlled by a variety
of militias. The third area consists of majority-Kurdish northeast
Syria. This area is under the control of the PYD (Democratic Union
Party), the Syrian franchise of the PKK. This article will look into how
this situation emerged, and examine its implications for the future of
Syria.
As the Syrian civil war moves
toward its fourth anniversary, there are no signs of imminent victory or
defeat for either of the sides. The military situation has reached a
stalemate. The result is that Syria today is divided de facto into
three identifiable entities, each of which is capable of defending its
existence against threats from either of the others.
These three entities are:
first, the Asad regime itself, which has survived all attempts to divide
it from within. The second area is the zone controlled by the rebels.
In this area there is no central authority. Rather, the territory is
divided up into areas controlled by a variety of militias. The third
area consists of majority-Kurdish northeast Syria. This area is under
the control of the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian franchise of
the PKK.
This article will look in more
detail at how this situation of de facto fragmentation in Syria came
about. It will also observe the current state of affairs within each of
the entities. Finally, it will examine the possibilities for an early
conclusion of the Syrian conflict and the reunification of the country,
or, conversely, for continued war and the solidifying and consolidation
of these separate areas into de facto “quasi-states.”
HOW DID THE FRAGMENTATION OF SYRIA COME ABOUT?
The emergence of a de facto
divided Syria is the result first and foremost of the Asad regime’s
response to its strategic predicament in the course of 2012. By the end
of 2011, the uprising against the regime had transformed from a largely
civilian movement into an armed insurgency, largely because of the
regime’s very brutal and ruthless response to civilian demonstrations
against it. This response did not produce the decline of opposition,
but rather the formation of armed groups intended initially to defend
protests.[1] These armed groups then began to conduct their own independent actions against the regime’s armed forces.[2]
The Asad regime initially
tried to hold all parts of the country against the insurgency. Yet it
was unable to muster the required number of reliable troops to mount a
classic campaign of counterinsurgency. This soon became evident in the
rebel heartlands of northern Syria, close to the border with Turkey.
Beginning in late 2011, the
opposition and Free Syrian Army began to occupy ground, taking control
of a number of towns and villages in the Idlib province. In January
2012, Zabadani was taken. Douma, near Damascus, fell in the same
month. The rebels also took control of the greater part of Homs city,
for a few months. In January 2012, some additional Damascus suburbs
fell under partial opposition control.[3]
Asad hit back. The regime
first attempted to launch a concerted effort to recapture these areas,
in the late winter of 2011/2012. In February 2012, a counterattack was
mounted. It began by retaking Douma, then moved on to Homs, and then
began the pacification of Idlib–in time for the beginning of the
“ceasefire” brokered by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, which
was due to take effect in April 2012.[4]
The regime’s counterinsurgency
tactics were characteristically bloody and brutal. Human Rights Watch,
in a document based on field research carried out in the Idlib province
described how 95 civilians died and hundreds were wounded in the period
between March 22 and April 6, 2012, as Syrian armor and infantry swept
methodically through the towns of Sarmin, Saraqib, Taftanaz, Hazana, and
Killi.[5]
Similar actions took place
throughout the country in areas affected by the uprising, including in
Homs, Hama, Idlib, Deir al-Zor, Rastan, Dar’a, and Douma near Damascus.
The pacifications involved the use of helicopters, artillery, and armor
against civilians as well as large scale roundups, disappearances, and
many deaths.
Yet it became apparent at that
time that the regime did not have sufficient wherewithal to place all
areas in revolt under permanent occupation. A pattern therefore emerged
in which rebel fighters would leave an area before the regime military
arrived. The regime’s retribution would be taken out on the civilian
population. Then, when the armed forces moved on as their limited
numbers obliged them to do, the uprising reemerged.[6]
The failure of the
counteroffensive of February and March 2012, and the predictable still
birth of Annan’s ceasefire, left the regime in a dilemma. Resources and
lives of soldiers were being wasted on seeking to hold the entirety of
the country. In the Sunni rural northwest, the regime ruled against the
direct opposition of the population. In the course of July and August
2012, therefore, regime forces regrouped, effectively ceding large parts
of northern and eastern Syria to their opponents, and establishing new
defensive lines further south.
In July 2012, the regime also
withdrew from the Kurdish northeast, with the PYD (Democratic Union
Party) moving rapidly to replace it.[7]
The PYD is aligned with neither the rebels nor the regime. The regime
was therefore able to keep control of the cities of Hasakah and most of
Qamishli inside this new Kurdish enclave, as well as of a border
crossing to Turkey just outside Qamishli. Further west, the regime
effectively ceded the rural parts of the Raqqa, Idlib, and Aleppo
provinces to the rebellion. The regime strategy, as explained by its
spokesmen, was not of course to concede the effective partition of the
country. Rather, regime apologists noted that Asad maintained control
of the main urban areas and main transport arteries to the cities,
ceding more remote areas.[8]
It is true that with the
exception of Raqqa city, no major provincial city has fallen in its
entirety to the rebels. However, regime garrisons were isolated and
beleaguered, often supplied by air, and mainly engaged in defending
themselves–with minimal influence on life outside of their boundaries.
Effectively, various elements of the rebellion became the political
masters of eastern and northwest Syria in the course of 2012. Beyond
the areas of regime control, rudimentary rebel attempts at building
administrative structures emerged. This de facto partition was
accentuated by the tactics adopted by the regime in the second half of
2012. Asad adopted a policy of aerial bombings and later, use of
ballistic missiles indiscriminately against the areas that had fallen
out of his control.
Since the summer of 2012, the
fighting in Syria has essentially been about each side seeking to clear
its own area of remaining enclaves of enemy forces and to secure lines
of control most advantageous to it. Thus, three distinct entities have
come into being on Syrian soil. Two of these entities–that of the
regime and that of the Sunni rebels–are at war with each other. The
third, the Kurdish enclave, is seeking to the best of its ability to
stay out of the fight. Next, the situation within each of these
enclaves will be considered.
First is the regime area. The
area under the control of Bashar Asad is nominally ruled by the same
individuals and the same system that ruled the entirety of the country
prior to March 2011. However, contrary to the image the regime wishes
to convey, a certain fragmentation is also under way within the
regime-controlled zone.
As of the writing of this
article, Asad controls the western coastal area stretching across the
Latakia, Hama, and Homs provinces; the city of Damascus and most of its
environs; and the road links between the two. This gives him ownership
of about 40 percent of the land mass of Syria.[9]
However, the regime also controls all of the provincial capitals of the
country with the exception of Raqqa city, which is under jihadi
control, and Aleppo city, which is disputed between the sides.
Yet it would be wrong also to
imagine that Asad-controlled Syria in 2013 was indistinguishable from
the pre-2011 regime. Asad is not in charge of a united, centralized
system. Rather, the regime-controlled area has become a center for a
variety of Iran-linked forces, which together are conducting the war
against the rebels.
It is deeply questionable as
to whether Bashar Asad is the individual solely responsible for
directing operations. Rather, given his beleaguered status and the
seniority of some of the Iranian personnel known to have spent time
directing operations on Syrian soil, it is likely that the Iranians are
today playing a significant role in running the regime’s war effort.
The regime war effort is no
longer the sole preserve of the Syrian Arab Army, assisted by its
paramilitary Shabiha allies. As described above, by early 2012, it was
plain that these forces would not be sufficient to defeat the revolt.
Asad simply did not have enough reliable troops to deploy against the
rebels. The result has been a general mobilization by Iran of its own
and its allies’ assets on behalf of the regime. This has included the
large scale deployment of Hizballah forces on Syrian soil.[10]
While Iranian assistance to
Asad was evident from the very beginning of the uprising, the extent of
this support sharply increased as the rebellion became more militarized,
and Asad’s forces more beleaguered and overstretched. According to a
senior Israeli source, the commander of the Qods Force of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps, Qasim Sulaymani, has personally visited
Syria on at least one occasion to take part in the guiding of the war.[11]
Following a trip by Hizballah
leader Hasan Nasrallah to Iran in April 2013, Hizballah increased the
extent and visibility of its presence in the regime-controlled areas.
The Lebanese group took part in important battles to consolidate the
regime controlled area in al-Qusayr and the Khalidiya district of Homs
city. Hizballah forces are also present in Damascus, and according to
some reports, Aleppo. Around 10,000 Hizballah fighters are reckoned to
be present on Syrian soil at any given time.[12]
IRGC forces themselves are present in Syria, and Iranian specialists
have been present in an advisory capacity since the early days of the
revolt.[13]
Iran and Hizballah have also
participated in the creation of an organized paramilitary force trained
to fight on behalf of the regime–the so-called National Defense Forces.
This was an attempt to arrange the plethora of mainly Alawi pro-regime
irregulars active in Syria into a more coherent force.[14]
This force first deployed in the beginning of 2013. In addition, Iraqi
Shi’i paramilitary groups, such as Ahl al-Haq and Kta’ib Hizballah, are
active on Syrian soil.[15] Iraq has, of course, also played a vital role as a route for Iranian-supplied weaponry on its way to the Syrian armed forces.
In civil terms, the regime has
managed to maintain basic services in the areas under its control and
to enable citizens to live for the most part in normality. Its powerful
intelligence services remain intact and ever present. Despite various
reports predicting that Asad’s currency reserves must surely be
approaching exhaustion, it appears that a credit line from Iran will
prop up the regime for the foreseeable future. The decline of the value
of the Syrian pound has also led to predictions of economic collapse,
which have not yet materialized.
John Sfakianakis, chief investment strategist at MASIC, a Riyadh-based investment company, recently predicted to Bloomberg News,
for example, that “[t]he currency will continue to depreciate,
inflation will rise, and with sanctions in place, the country’s foreign
reserves will soon be wiped out.”[16] But this has not yet happened. The Iranian contribution appears to be the reason.
To a degree, running a
centralized, repressive wartime economy is not problematic for Asad. The
regime maintained itself and justified its repressive nature for
decades by claiming that it was at war (with Israel). The mechanisms for
distribution and of course for rapid suppression of any dissent are
still present in government controlled areas. The part of Syria
controlled by the regime side is not going to become a prosperous
economy under present conditions, of course. Domestic output has
declined 50 percent since 2011,[17] but neither does it appear close to collapse in the immediate future.
THE REBEL-CONTROLLED AREA
Unlike the area controlled by
the regime, the rebel-controlled part of the country is not united even
nominally under a single governing authority. Rather, there has emerged
a patchwork of fiefdoms controlled by various rebel groups and
commanders. The rebel controlled area stretches from Abu Kamal on the
Iraqi border up to the Turkish border in the northwest. There is an
additional, smaller zone of rebel control in the south in the Dar’a
province, going up to Douma and Zabadani along the border with Israel
and Lebanon. In these areas, authority appears largely to be based on
rebel guns and varying interpretations of Islamic Shari’a law–from very
extreme Salafi doctrines to a Muslim Brotherhood type outlook.
The rebel forces remain deeply
divided, with a number of different formations competing for support
and control in these areas. One estimate considers that there are today
1,200 different rebel groups fighting the Asad regime. These may range
from militias of a few hundred gathered around a particular local
leader and neighborhood to larger formations of thousands of fighters.
A number of shifting rebel
militia alliances emerged in the course of the insurgency. Until
recently, the largest of these was the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front,
dominated by formations associated with a Muslim Brotherhood-type Sunni
Islamist ideology. Constituent brigades included the Tawhid Brigade of
Aleppo, Suqqour al-Sham, the Farouq Brigades in their various
manifestations, and the Islam Brigade, which operates in the Damascus
area.[18]
This force probably numbered
around 40-50,000 fighters (though accurate numbers are very hard to
reach, for obvious reasons). Its 20 constituent units were loyal to
either one of these Western-supported organizations: the Supreme
Military Council (SMC) or the General Staff of the Military and
Revolutionary Forces. The latter is a body headed by former Syrian Army
Major General Salim Idris. It is responsible for the distribution of
Western and Gulf assistance to the rebels, and on this basis, secured
the loyalty of most of the SILF rebel units. The intention, clearly,
was to establish a unified rebel military structure subordinate to the
external political leadership of the revolution, which Idris supports.
A number of smaller factions,
including Afhad al-Rasul, Asifat al-Shamal, and others, also aligned
with the SMC, though not the SILF.[19]
Again, all these groups pledge allegiance to one or another form of
Sunni Islamism, with the “Ikhwani”-type outlook strongest among them.[20]
It is, however, doubtful whether those units that pledged allegiance to
the SMC in order to receive support subsequently agreed to take orders
from Idris and the SMC. Rather, individual commanders retain a great
deal of autonomy; and it is they who held power on the ground within
their own fiefdoms, not Major-General Idris.
However, the attempt to
solidify the alliance between the SILF and the SMC appears to have
comprehensively failed. Instead, key Islamist forces, including former
SILF members, announced on November 22, 2013, the formation of a new
alliance, the Islamic Front.[21]
This grouping brought together some of the most powerful rebel units
from across the country, most importantly Jaysh al-Islam, Suqour
al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, and Liwa al-Tawhid. It appears to have been
established because of regime gains in a number of areas of the country
and the fear that rebel disunity could deliver a decisive defeat. Saudi
tutelage appears to be behind the new initiative, along with declining
American support for the rebels. The new grouping has now declared its
opposition to the SMC, and its actions appear to be leading to a
withdrawal or decline of U.S. support for the latter, which may now
become increasingly irrelevant.
Another important rebel
alliance is the Syrian Islamic Front, a more hardline Salafi gathering,
which has around 20,000 fighters. Its main constituent group is the
Ahrar al-Sham militia, whose leader also heads the SIF. This grouping
is openly Salafi, calling for an Islamic state in Syria. At the same
time, it is not linked with al-Qa’ida, and its focus is on Syria, rather
than global jihad. Ahrar al-Sham has now joined the newly formed
Islamic Front, making the future of the SIF uncertain.
A third very significant
factor on the rebel landscape are the openly al-Qa’ida-linked groups
Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
These are the main forces
available to the insurgency. As noted above, they do not always
cooperate successfully and on a number of occasions have clashed,
resulting in wounded and dead on both sides. Elements of these forces
exercise physical control over the great majority of the territory
controlled by the Syrian rebels.
In Raqqa city, the only
provincial capital so far to have fallen into rebel hands, the
al-Qa’ida-linked fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
organization have consolidated their control after clashing with more
moderate fighters associated with the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front
and the Supreme Military Council.[22]
The fighters of the Afhad al-Rasoul organization have been driven out
of the city by ISIS. There have been protests in Raqqa against the very
repressive rule that the organization has imposed on the city, in line
with its stringent interpretation of Islamic law. However, as of now,
ISIS control of the city appears secure.
Still, it should not be
concluded that the al-Qa’ida groups are sweeping all before them. There
are powerful and capable brigades aligned with a Muslim Brotherhood-type
Islamist outlook. These include, for example, the Tawhid Brigade of
Aleppo and the Farouq Brigades, the latter having originated in Homs but
which now has franchises from Dar’a in the south all the way to the
Turkish border–where its members control a number of border crossings.
A contest between rival
factions is under way. There have already been occasions on which this
contest has turned bloody. The Farouq Brigades are suspected of
involvement in the killing of Abu Mohamad al-Absi in September 2012.
The brigades clashed with Absi, a Syrian jihadi leader, over control of
the Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Syria and Turkey.[23] The al-Qaida linked Jabhat al-Nusra is also engaged in a long-running feud with the Farouq Brigades.
Yet the ideological
differences between these groups should be placed in perspective. The
Syrian rebellion emerged from the poorer, rural Sunni Arab areas of
Syria. Today, the areas over which the various rebel factions rule are
all of this type. The main non-Salafi fighting groups are nevertheless
uniformly Islamist. In Aleppo and Azaz, the forms of governance
supported by non-Salafi groups such as the Tawhid Brigade are
Islamic–including Shari’a courts and a Shari’a council. [24]
In Aleppo, rival Shari’a councils supported by the jihadists and the
MB-oriented groups have been established. Thus, there is no significant
presence of non-Islamist politics on the ground in the rebel controlled
part of Syria.
Standards of governance also
differ widely depending on which group is in control. Jihadi
organizations have sought to portray their rivals as corrupt. Certainly
there have been instances of theft by rebels, of smuggling for profit,
and of use of control of the provision of food and essential goods to
make profit. The alternative, however–namely the very harsh and
repressive rule of the Salafists–is also quite alien to Syrian
traditions. This has led to some manifestations of popular rejection of
these organizations, despite their military prowess.[25]
The chaos and confusion in the
rebel-controlled areas is further exacerbated by the regime policy of
indiscriminate aerial bombardment of rebel-held areas. The regime has
intervened with the deliberate intention of disrupting rebel attempts to
maintain vital services in rebel-controlled areas. Asad’s complete air
superiority has been used, for example, for the bombing of hospitals in
the Aleppo city area, such as Dar al-Shifa.[26]
The regime also pursued a strategy of bombing bakeries, thus preventing
the orderly provision of food to the population. Ten bakeries were
bombed, for example, in the Aleppo area in August 2012.[27]
As a result both of divisions
among the rebels and deliberate regime policies of attacks on civilians
and infrastructure, the rebel-controlled areas of Syria are currently
the most chaotic and least governed space in the country. The rebels
lack the all-seeing eye of the Syrian security services, which serve to
ensure order and obedience on the regime side. Indeed, it is a
by-product of the plethora of disunited rebel groups controlling
territory on the rebel side that no movement toward establishing
centralized policing or other public services has been possible.
Rather, each rebel militia makes whatever provisions it can for the area
under its control, often in cooperation with but sometimes in
competition with the neighboring forces.
The bottom line is that the
rebel-controlled areas of Syria are today dominated by warlords, who
pledge allegiance to one or another variant of Sunni Islamist ideology.
THE KURDISH ENCLAVE
The third important area of
control in Syria is that maintained by the Kurds in the northeast of the
country. The Kurdish enclave consists of a swathe stretching from the
border of Iraq across to the town of Ras al-Ayn on the Turkish border
and a little beyond it. In addition to this major enclave, there are
two areas of Kurdish control further west along the border with
Turkey–one in the area surrounding the town of Ayn al-Arab (known as
Kobani to the Kurds) and one further west around the city of Afrin.
The Kurdish enclave was able
to come into existence because of the Asad regime’s decision to abandon
large swathes of northern Syria in the summer of 2012. Shortly
following the departure of regime forces from the majority Kurdish
northeast, forces loyal to the PYD (Democratic Union Party) established
control in the abandoned areas. The PYD is the Syrian Kurdish franchise
of the PKK organization.[28]
The PKK assisted greatly or
controlled the process of the establishment of Kurdish authority in
northeast Syria. Many PKK fighters and activists are themselves of
Syrian origin. This derives from the fact that the Asad regime
encouraged Kurds of separatist sentiment to volunteer with the PKK
against Turkey (while severely repressing any Kurdish attempt at
organizing and demanding their rights within Syria).
PKK activists appear to have
made their way from Turkey or northern Iraq into the Kurdish-controlled
area of Syria to oversee the establishment of the PYD’s rule in the
area. [29]
The regime forces have not
entirely departed from the Kurdish areas. Asad’s army still controls
the city of Hasakah within this enclave. The city of Qamishli is also
in large part controlled by the regime. For a period, the regime also
maintained a presence in the oil town of Rumaylan.
Outside of these areas,
however, the PYD has created a centralized administration. The Kurdish
security force in the area–the YPG (Peoples’ Protection Units) and the
“Asayish” police and security service are organized across the area of
Kurdish rule, and form the basis of the PYD’s control.
The PYD has also set about a
broader process of “organizing” the area under its rule. This includes
creating institutions for the teaching of the Kurdish language, women’s
and youth organizations, and media centers. All are engaged in
propagating the particular, leftist version of Kurdish nationalism
supported by the PYD and the PKK.
Members of other Kurdish
organizations, most significantly the parties aligned with the KNC
(Kurdish National Council), which identifies with the Kurdish Regional
Government in northern Iraq, have accused the PYD of establishing an
authoritarian system in the areas under its control. The KNC is now
formally aligned with the PYD in the Kurdish Supreme Committee, which is
the nominal ruling authority in the Kurdish controlled areas. However,
the KNC claims that it suffers from heavy-handed tactics by the PYD and
that the YPG is in effect a PYD militia, rather than a joint military
force representing all political elements.[30]
It is clear that the YPG has
received assistance from the PKK and is loyal to its outlook, with
members taking part, for example, in demonstrations calling for the
release of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. PYD members, however,
claim that the movement’s predominance reflects wide public support for
it, and that attempts by rival parties to organize have foundered not
because of PYD interference but because of an absence of visible public
support. The Syrian rebels, too, are deeply suspicious of the PYD and
the whole project of Kurdish autonomy in northeast Syria. Commanders of
rebel militias in northern Syria accuse the PYD and YPG of working with
the regime.[31]
The reality is that the
Kurdish-controlled area is with neither side in the civil war. Rather,
it is trying to walk a precarious line between the two. In essence, the
message the Kurds seek to present to each of the sides is that the
Kurds will work with each of them on the basis of cooperation, but that
no unauthorized entry of armed forces onto Kurdish soil will be
tolerated.
From the regime’s point of
view, such a situation has its advantages. Asad has largely abandoned
northeast Syria, and if his own forces are not there, it is clear that
he would prefer Kurds–with whom he maintains an uneasy relationship,
combining contacts with occasional clashes–to Sunni Arab rebels who are
engaged in an all-out war against him.
From the rebels’ point of
view, this stance looks like separatism at best, and betrayal at worst.
Yet the Kurds regard the rebellion as in any case tainted by its close
association with the government of Turkey, its Islamism, its Arab
nationalism, and its rejection of Kurdish autonomy. The
Kurdish-controlled area remains one of the most peaceful areas of the
country, though clashes between Kurds and jihadi rebels which took place
in late 2013 may be changing this.
WHAT LIES AHEAD?
As of now, the pattern of
conflict in the Syrian civil war largely consists of each side seeking
to consolidate its own lines of control around the area of the country
it controls. Thus, the regime side’s successful offensives this year at
al-Qusayr and the Khalidiya district of Homs were conducted with the
intention of securing the western coastal area and the Syria-Lebanon
border for Asad and his Hizballah allies, and securing control of the
Damascus-Homs highway. These victories, while notable, did not
constitute a major shift toward offensive operations by the regime.
Asad, at the moment, does not have the ability to commence a reconquest
of rebel-controlled northern and eastern Syria.
Some analysts predicted that
following his gains in the west, Asad would attempt to retake the city
of Aleppo in its entirety. Had this been attempted, it would indeed
have represented the beginning of a general counter-offensive by the
regime in the north. There were rumors that the regime and Hizballah
were building up forces in two Shi’i villages–Nubul and Zahra–in
preparation for this assault.
However, the assault never
came. Instead, in a graphic demonstration of the true balance of forces
in the war, following the Khalidiya fighting, the regime turned its
attention to trying to turn back a rebel offensive in the eastern
suburbs of Damascus, which began on July 24, 2013. It was during this
attempt to drive the rebels back in eastern Ghouta that the regime
forces carried out the massacre using chemical weapons on over 1,000
Syrian civilians, on August 21, 2013.[32]
The regime is now engaged in slowly pushing the rebels out of the
Qalamun region, close to the border with Lebanon. Success in this fight
(which is likely) will further consolidate the regime enclave and its
link with its allies in Lebanon, while severely curtailing the rebels’
own links with Sunni elements in Lebanon.
The regime’s determination to
hold onto Damascus reflects its self-image as the legitimate government
of Syria. Should it lose the capital, Asad would be exposed as merely
the leader of an Alawi enclave in the west. The regime, thus, appears
ready to use any means at its disposal to prevent this.
The rebels, meanwhile, have
enjoyed successes of their own in their area of control–most
significantly the capture of the Minnagh Air Base near Aleppo. This
base, one of the largest air bases in northern Syria, had acquired a
symbolic value for the rebels. Thus its capture after a ten-month siege
was considered a major achievement, though the base was of little
strategic value. Still, it was noteworthy in that it removed one of the
last pockets of regime control in northern Syria. It is also worthy of
note that around 200 members of the Minnagh garrison managed to escape
and were offered safe haven in the Kurdish-controlled enclave in Afrin.
There has been fighting
between Kurds and Arab rebels too, in the second half of 2013. Once
again, the form of the fighting has been an attempt to clarify lines of
control. The YPG has clashed with jihadi rebels at Ras al-Ayn, on the
edge of the Kurdish-controlled area. The al-Qaida-linked jihadists of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra engaged
in a series of additional attacks on outlying areas of Kurdish
population and control in July 2013.Their intention ultimately appeared
to be to secure a contiguous corridor under their rule, stretching from
the oil-rich Deir al-Zor area in eastern Syria through the Raqqa
province to the border with Turkey. Demographic and geographical
realities mean that such a corridor would inevitably run through an area
populated by Kurds. The jihadists were keen to ensure that Kurdish
forces would not be present in these isolated enclaves of Kurdish
population. The jihadis were not successful, and a Kurdish
counter-attack in November 2013 forced them back to west of Ras al-Ayn,
leading to Kurdish hopes of uniting the main Kurdish area of control
with the two isolated enclaves further west in Kobani and Afrin.
All these operations consist
in essence of a “mopping up” of areas of control. The single exception
to this pattern has been the advance made by the rebels in the northern
Latakia province in early August 2013. Yet these gains were largely
wiped out by a regime counter-offensive later in the month, leaving the
lines ultimately undisturbed.
Thus the Syrian civil war has
led to the effective fragmentation of Syria into three identifiable
enclaves. Of these, two–the regime area and the Kurdish area–are
tightly ruled by a central authority. The third, the rebel-held zone,
has no central authority but is a kind of conglomerate of various Sunni
Islamist forces ruling over different areas. None of these enclaves are
strong enough to over-run any of the others. None of them are
sufficiently weak as to be in danger of overthrow by any of the others.
What could change this
situation? A determined outside intervention or the withdrawal of
outside support to one of the sides could alter the current balance of
power. It is hard to see what else could, at this stage. At present,
the fighting enclaves in Syria seem destined to continue their fight
until at last one side gains an advantage over the other and is able to
impose its will, or until all sides become resigned to the impossibility
of victory and agree to the partition of the country between them.
*Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a
senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya. His book, The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict, was published in 2010.
NOTES
[1] Adrian Blomfield, “Syrian Opposition Admits Armed Insurgents Are Operating on Fringe of Uprising Against Assad Regime,” Daily Telegraph, August 6, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
[2] Erika Solomon, “Syria Army Rebels Fight from the Shadows,” Reuters, November 23, 2011, http://in.reuters.com.
[3] Mariam Karouny, “Gunfire, Funerals and Fear in Syria’s Protest Centre,” Reuters, January 23, 2012, http://www.reuters.com.
[4] Ruth Sherlock, “Syrian Forces Launch All Out Assault on Douma,” Daily Telegraph, January 26, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
[5] “They Burned my Heart,” Human Rights Watch Report, May 3, 2012, http://www.hrw.org.
[6] See Joseph Holliday, “Syria’s Maturing Insurgency,” Institute for the Study of War, June 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org.
[7] Piotr Zalevski, “By Ceding North-eastern Syria to the Kurds, Assad Puts Turkey in a Bind,” Time, July 27, 2012, http://world.time.com.
[8] Personal interview with pro-regime source, August 2013.
[9] Zach Pontz, “Syrian Opposition Says West Must Enable ‘Syrian People to Defend Themselves,’ Not Just Carry Out Airstrikes,” Algemeiner, August 30, 2013, http://www.algemeiner.com.
[10] See this page for the most detailed and updated information on Hizballah’s activities in Syria: http://jihadology.net/hizballah-cavalcade/.
[11] Interview with former senior Israeli minister, July 2013.
[12] “Source: More than 10,000 Hezbollah Members Fighting in Syria,” Ynetnews, August 25, 2013, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4421844,00.html.
[13] Ian Black, “Iran Confirms It Has Forces in Syria and Will Take Action If Pushed,” Guardian, September 16, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com.
[14] Sam Dagher, “Syria’s Alawite Force Turned Tide for Assad,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2013, http://online.wsj.com.
[15] See Hizballah Cavalcade website.
[16] Dana Baltaji and Donna Abu-Nasr, “Assad’s Syria Chides Bread Lines As Civilians Brace for Hit,” Businessweek, August 29, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Aron Lund, “The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, August 27, 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu.
[19] Ibid.
[20]
The author interviewed commanders and fighters of the Tawhid Brigade in
Aleppo in September 2013. The responses given confirmed that this
brigade and others like it in the SILF are orientated to a Muslim
Brotherhood-style Sunni Islamist politics. Direct links between the
Brotherhood and these groups are of course harder to determine.
[21] “Leading Syrian Rebel Groups Form New Islamic Front,” BBC Online, November 22, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25053525.
[22] Alison Tahmizian Meuse, “In Raqqa, Islamist Rebels Form a New Regime,” Syrian Freedom, August 16, 2013, http://syrianfreedomls.tumblr.com.
[23] Rania Abouzeid, “In Syria, the Rebels Have Begun to Fight Among Themselves,” Time, March 6, 2013, http://world.time.com.
[24] Interview with Yusuf al-Shawi, member of the Azaz Islamic Court and former rebel commander, Azaz, September 2013.
[25] Tareq al-Abed, “Syrian City of Raqqa Suffers Under Rebel Rule,” al-Monitor, July 2, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com.
[26] As witnessed by the author, September 2012.
[27] “Government Attacking Breadlines,” Human Rights Watch, August 30, 2012, http://www.hrw.org.
[28] John Caves, “Syrian Kurds and the Democratic Union Party,” Human Rights Watch, August, 30, 2012, http://www.hrw.org.
[29] As noted by the author in conversations with activists in the Kurdish-controlled area, March 2013.
[30] Eric Bruneau, “KDP and PYD Failed Meddling in Syrian Kurd Politics,” MESOP Newsletter, August 30, 2013, http://www.mesop.de.
[31] Interview with Tawhid Brigade commander Hadji al-Bab, Aleppo, September 2013.
[32] “France: Syrian Regime Behind Chemical Attack,” al-Jazeera, September 3, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com.
Jonathan Spyer
Source: http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/12/fragmented-syria-the-balance-of-forces-as-of-late-2013/
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
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