by Yoav Limor
The implications of the United States' potential recommitment to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran are a top priority for Israeli officials, who believe the Iranians are the ones who should be nervous – not world powers.
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| Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during the International Conference on the Legal-International Claims of the Holy Defense, in Tehran. Feb. 23, 2021 | Photo: AFP/Atta Kenare |
Israel's top defense officials and their political and diplomatic counterparts are growing increasingly anxious over the apparent direct and indirect negotiations between the United States and Iran over the former's potential recommitment to the 2015 nuclear deal with the latter.
Israeli decision-makers see this possibility as nothing less than a nightmare. Most officials believe it would be better to do away with the deal than keep it in place, but they also believe that under the current circumstances, there is an opportunity to rectify many of the original deal's faults.
The latest Diplomatic-Security Cabinet meeting sought to formulate Israel's policy on the matter, and it seemingly had two upsides and one downside.
The first positive was that for the first time in a long time, all political, diplomatic and intelligence officials were at the same meeting and presented decision-makers with all the available information and intelligence on which decisions should be based.
The second positive was that there was a consensus among all those involved that this issue is the most pressing defense challenge Israel is currently facing.
There is no argument over the fact that a nuclear Iran would be an existential threat to Israel and, therefore, no effort should be spared to prevent the ayatollahs not only from obtaining nuclear weapons but also from being able to make any sort of mad dash from a bomb.
This consensus, however, failed to yield a conclusion as to which strategy Israel should adopt at this time. Such consensus is the vital basis for any plan of action on the ground that, in turn, is essential for Israel to achieve its goal of having as much impact as possible on any future deal between world powers and the Islamic republic.
Jerusalem understands that Washington is adamant to re-enter the deal from which former US President Donald Trump withdrew in 2018. However, the Americans have made it clear over the past few weeks that they have no intention of being shortchanged – something Israel has to delve into to understand exactly what the US means and how that could be translated on the ground.
Dotting I's and crossing T's
The first step, a senior defense source said this week, is agreeing on where Iran's nuclear program actually stands. Since the 2018 exposure of Tehran's secret nuclear archives, the world has learned that the ayatollahs consistently violated written agreements mandating full disclosure – something they continue to do, as per recent findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Moreover, Iran's aggression in the Persian Gulf and across the Middle East at large, proves that Tehran's word isn't worth that much, to put it mildly.
Once an agreement is reached in where things currently stand – assuming such an agreement can be reached – Israel and the US will begin discussing what Jerusalem would like the agreement to reflect.
The cabinet plans to present the White House with a long list of the demands meant to make a bad deal plausible and perhaps even acceptable.
Topping that list is the deal's so-called "sunset clause" – meaning when it expires. The original deal states that any limitation imposed on Iran's missile development elapse in 2023. The limitations imposed on nuclear research and development expire in 2026, and by 2031, Iran would face no limitations on uranium enrichment.
In layman's terms, this means that a decade from now, there will be nothing stopping Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
Officials with the Biden administration have argued that the original deal could be extended at any given time – even a day before it elapsing. That may not be true and in any case, Israel would like to see those deadlines extended now.
Jerusalem would also like to see Washington impose a host of other limitations on Tehran – beyond its nuclear activity – including tighter oversight and the curbing of its regional aggression, which has dramatically increased since the deal was inked six years ago.
Israel is trying to convince the Americans not to rush into anything. The only ones who should be nervous right now are the Iranians. The sanctions have crippled its economy, which is why it is pushing for a new deal. The other parties, including and mainly the US, have less to worry about, which is why it is the Iranians who must relent.
It is not certain that this logic will convince Washington. Israel is currently troubled by a different logic, according to which in exchange for a return to the original agreement, Iran will agree to reduce its regional activities in terms of arming its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.
This is a dangerous prospect because it includes the worst of all worlds: Iran will remain too close to producing nuclear weapons all while it continues to sponsor its proxies with the large sums of money that will flow to it freely once the sanctions are lifted.
Assuming that a perfect agreement that includes Israel's full "wish-list" will not be reached, Jerusalem will be required to prioritize its demands.
At the top of the list will be Iran's nuclear aspirations – every aspect of them – and that is what Jerusalem has to push for vis-à-vis the US and other world powers, namely Germany, Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Russia and China.
Israel will have quite a few regional partners in this effort, as they, too, see Iran as a major threat.
Israel can handle the other aspects in which Iran is a thorn in its side. It requires planning and resources, but as one can learn from the situation in the northern sector as long as Israel's operational leeway is preserved – and it must be preserved under any and all circumstances – Iran would find it increasingly difficult to make Syria a base of operations.
This will also inherently undermine the Islamic republic's proxies throughout the Middle East, as they will find it hard to push forward with their chief backer hobbled.
Yoav Limor
Source: https://www.israelhayom.com/2021/02/28/the-nuclear-nightmare/
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