Monday, October 1, 2012

Intervention Won't Save Syria



by Gary C. Gambill


The death toll in Syria has reached a threshold where outside parties are entitled to use force to protect the civilian population. But those who would intervene in ostensible pursuit of this noble objective have an obligation to ensure that, on balance, the patient benefits from the procedure. Whereas former president Bill Clinton can claim with some justification that "the burning of villages and killing of innocents was history" after NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, achieving a positive balance sheet in Syria will be extraordinarily difficult.

The Syrian conflict differs from other notable targets of humanitarian intervention in three critical respects. For starters, the constituency that has borne the brunt of appalling human-rights abuses is not an imperiled ethno-sectarian minority (such as Iraqi Kurds or Kosovo Albanians) or the population at large (as with Somalis in 1992). Instead, it is Syria's Sunni Arab majority that is suffering at the hands of an oppressive minoritarian regime.

Also in sharp contrast to major intervention precedents, this group is already on track to win the war. With a fivefold demographic advantage over President Bashar al-Assad's quasi-Shiite Alawite sect and growing material support from surrounding states, the overwhelmingly Sunni rebels are sure to eventually overpower regime forces. That's why they have zero interest in negotiating with the Syrian president.

Finally, the situation in Syria is unique in that the main victims have a long history of subjugating their victimizers. Syrian Alawites were deeply impoverished, socially marginalized and politically powerless for centuries prior to the rise of the Baath Party in the 1960s. Given the scale of regime atrocities in the interim and the increasingly Sunni Islamist character of the revolt, Alawites and other minorities that benefited disproportionately from Assad's rule (or at least suffered less than their fair share) have well-grounded fears of violent retribution when the walls come crumbling down. The fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated minoritarian regime led to several hundred extrajudicial executions of former officials within a year and a mass exodus of Christians, despite the presence of U.S.-led coalition forces.

A humanitarian intervention must be expected to have a positive net impact on civilian life over the entire arc of the war, which won't end with Assad's downfall. Former regime forces are likely to regroup in areas of northwestern Syria where minorities predominate, and Iran can resupply them by sea. The reduction of these enclaves, as well as free Kurdish areas that have sprung up amid the fighting, could claim more lives than the fight to bring down the regime, and the civilians most in need of protecting will not be Sunni Arabs.

The dilemma, then, is how to prevent atrocities in Syria today without aiding in the commission of others tomorrow. Most intervention plans under discussion amount to direct or indirect military support for insurgents likely to perpetrate atrocities once the tables have turned. It's impossible to create and defend aid corridors or "safe zones" for refugees without providing rebels with rear bases to resupply and refit, particularly if the international community relies on neighboring Turkey to do the heavy lifting.

A no-fly zone designed to deprive all sides of offensive air power avoids the pitfalls of aiding and abetting combatants, but enforcing one without a UN Security Council mandate will still lead a sizable minority of the population to see the United States as a participant in the war. This could prolong Syria's ordeal by bolstering Assad's anti-imperialist credentials and making it easier for Iranian-backed malcontents to mobilize opposition to the successor regime. Taking part in a sectarian turf war decades in the making could also compromise U.S. credibility in contending with other multiconfessional hot spots, such as Lebanon and Iraq. Few advocates of intervention appear to be thinking this far ahead. 

There are no easy solutions to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, least of all the Obama administration's futile pursuit of a multilateral diplomatic initiative to end the war. The best-case scenario of such a settlement (assuming a highly unlikely change of heart by Russia and the acquiescence of Iran) would mean a Lebanon-style interim power-sharing formula, which might cut down on the violence but only at the cost of stunting Syria's political recovery. This is precisely why the rebels will never agree to it.

Absent a workable plan for saving lives or a compelling strategic rationale for intervention, the United States should stay out of the conflict—while using all means short of force to dissuade the participants and their regional backers from committing egregious human-rights abuses. Once the smoke clears, Syria will need a benefactor with clean hands to help it pick up the pieces. 

Gary C. Gambill is an associate fellow at the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum.
Source: http://www.meforum.org/3347/syria-intervention

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Obama Lied After People Died



by Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.


Suddenly, the President's new clothes seem embarrassingly transparent.  The contention relentlessly promoted by Team Obama, to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief's performance with respect to foreign policy and national security was simply unassailable, is being seen for what it is: an utter fraud.

The deal-breaker has been the accumulating evidence that President Obama and his subordinates disinformed the American people - to put it charitably - about a present danger: the outbreak of violence against our diplomatic personnel and facilities and other interests in more than 30 countries around the world.  Specifically, they denied that a carefully planned and executed jihadist attack against our consulate in Benghazi was responsible for the murder of the Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues on September 11, 2012.

The party line assiduously pushed for days thereafter by administration spokesmen including, most risibly UN Ambassador Susan Rice, was that the attack spontaneously ensued from a demonstration outside the U.S. compound prompted by an American video, "Innocence of Muslims," which reviles the founder of Islam. And, so the story went, the demonstrators got carried away and wound up sacking the consulate and a nearby safe house, in the course of which the four victims were killed.

It turns out that Team Obama knew early on that such representations were untrue.  In a blog post headlined "Some administration officials were concerned about initial White House push blaming Benghazi attack on mob, video," ABC News' Jake Tapper recounted on September 27th that, "The Daily Beast's Eli Lake on Wednesday reported that intelligence officials said ‘the early information was enough to show that the attack was planned and the work of al Qaeda affiliates operating in Eastern Libya.' ‘There was very good information on this in the first 24 hours,' one of the officials told Lake.

For one thing, on September 10th, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri, had issued a public call for retribution against the United States for a recent assassination by drone strike of one of his senior commanders.  The consulate in Benghazi was low-hanging fruit - a vulnerable facility in a jihadist-infested city with a high-value target, a U.S. ambassador, who had no security. 

Insult was added to injury as our Commander-in-Chief - he who has not been able to find time for most of his daily intelligence briefings - reportedly went to bed after being advised that the consulate was under attack.  When he awoke, Mr. Obama made a Rose Garden statement expressing regret at the loss of the four Americans' lives and rejecting "all efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others." (Astonishingly, he neglected to mention anything about the roughly concurrent attack on the U.S. embassy in Cairo.)

Then, on September 18th, President Obama insisted during an appearance on David Letterman's show that the attacks on a number of diplomatic missions "including the one in Libya" were conducted by "extremists and terrorists" who "used...as an excuse" popular anger at the release of the video by a "shadowy character who lives here."  The President could not at that point have been under any illusion about the veracity of that statement concerning the Benghazi bloodletting.  It was, in short, a lie.  Worse yet, it was, as we shall see, a lie that served the interests of America's enemies. 

Incredibly, even after his own press spokesman acknowledged on September 20th that the murderous assault in Libya was not the spontaneous work of a mob, Mr. Obama used his speech before the UN General Assembly on September 25th to perpetuate the meme that those offended by our freedom of expression are responsible for such attacks - not jihadists doctrinally obliged to seek our destruction.  
While the President used much of the speech to profess his opposition to such behavior, he declared that, "The future must not belong to those who slander the Prophet of Islam." That is a call for non-Muslims to abide by shariah blasphemy laws that could have been uttered by any Islamic supremacist, including al Qaeda's Osama bin Laden, the Muslim Brotherhood's chief jurist Yusef al-Qaradawi or Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. 

After all, it has been a top priority of these and our other Islamist foes - notably, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) - to begin establishing their dominion over the rest of us by restricting what we can say, and therefore know and do, about Islam and its totalitarian doctrine known as shariah.  President Obama and his subordinates (notably, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her "Istanbul Process") have been playing directly into such adversaries' efforts to prohibit and criminalize shariah blasphemy with their serial complaints and apologies about the video.  By so doing, the Obama administration is effectively inviting more violence against Americans deemed "offensive" to the Islamists, making the world a more dangerous place for all of us.

Critics of George W. Bush harshly chastised him for allegedly misleading the American people about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction in order to get us into a needless and unjustified war.  They insisted that "Bush lied, people died."  Never mind that it wasn't true.  Mr. Bush acted on the basis of what was known at the time: Saddam had used such weapons previously and had not verifiably eliminated either his remaining stocks or the capacity to make more.

Will those once so vociferous about presidential truth-telling be equally seized with the fact that "Obama lied after people died"? 

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

Source: http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p19105.xml

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Western Courts Bend to Islamic Practices



by David J. Rusin


Judges' consideration of Shari'a when deciding cases may be the most alarming avenue by which Islam influences Western legal systems, but it is not the only one. With increasing regularity, Islamic practices sway the administration of courtrooms, affecting when sessions are held, who must rise, and what attire is permissible. This trend should not be overlooked. Courts that yield to Islamic norms, even in mundane matters, encourage Islamists and cast doubt on the future of equal rights and responsibilities under the law. 

Ramadan. The Islamic month of fasting can require significant shuffling of schedules by devout Muslims, but are secular courts obligated to alter theirs? Some answer in the affirmative.

Muslim convert Mark Edward Wetsch is one recent beneficiary. Charged with robbing 13 Minnesota banks, he objected to a hearing set for July 20, 2012, the first day of Ramadan, and asked that it be pushed back for a month. Though Judge Jeanne Graham initially declined the request, he persisted. Ramadan means "not engaging in conflict and argument," but rather taking part in "work to reconcile differences and seek peace," according to a motion filed on his behalf. "Clearly, a contested hearing in which the government is making allegations against Mr. Wetsch and he is fighting against [them] causes him to engage in conflict and argument." Graham relented and issued the desired continuance.

The U.S. military court that will try five al-Qaeda terrorists accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks bent to similar sensitivities this year. After turning their May 5 arraignment into a circus, the jihadists sought to postpone a hearing scheduled for the week of August 8, near the end of Ramadan. James Connell III, a government-compensated defense attorney, stressed in a filing that "the last 10 days of Ramadan commemorate the night God — Allah — revealed the Holy Quran to the Prophet Mohammed." Hence, "these 10 days are the most holy period of the Muslim calendar and are typically observed by fasting, prayer, and seclusion." Despite having previously ruled out Ramadan-related extensions, the judge, Colonel James Pohl, agreed to a delay. Connell was relieved: "It's very difficult to pay attention to sometimes intricate legal proceedings when you haven't had any sleep and you haven't had any food." (In one bright spot, Pohl rebuffed a petition not to hold hearings on Fridays, the day of communal Islamic prayers.)

Such Ramadan accommodations are not new. Four years ago, a French judge postponed a trial after a lawyer complained that "his client, a Muslim, would have been fasting for two weeks and thus, he said, be in no position to defend himself properly," in the words of the BBC. "He would be physically weakened and too tired to follow the arguments as he should." (Note that Muslims have played professional football during Ramadan fasts, so it is not obvious that ordinary Muslims are incapable of sitting in a courtroom.) A prosecutor denied that Ramadan had anything to do with the change, but others believed it to be the sole viable explanation. Fadela Amara, a Muslim then serving as urban affairs minister, decried the "knife wound" to France's separation of religion and state.

Of course, scheduling controversies are not exclusive to Islam. In 2011, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a lower court had "abused its discretion" by rejecting an Orthodox Jewish plaintiff's motion to suspend a malpractice trial for two days due to Shavuot, during which his faith would preclude him from working or having work done for him. However, the decision stands out because many other U.S. federal and state courts have found no abuse of discretion by judges who did not grant similar Jewish holiday requests. If a continuance of one or two days is not automatic, then certainly the bar should be that much higher for a month-long Ramadan break — especially when its religious necessity is far less concrete than the work proscriptions characterizing strictly observed Jewish holidays.

Rising for judges. Standing when a judge enters and leaves the courtroom is a centuries-old tradition conveying respect for authority and maintaining order. Those who fail to rise may be cited for contempt, but some Muslims are challenging this point of protocol.

The most important U.S. case has centered on Amina Farah Ali, a citizen and Minnesota resident who, along with a second woman, faced federal charges of funding a Somali terrorist organization; both were convicted last autumn. After Ali did not stand at a pretrial hearing, Judge Michael Davis warned that all must do so. Unlike other Muslims present, she refused again and again for the first two days of the trial, prompting Davis to issue 20 contempt citations carrying jail time. The defendant said that because Islam's prophet had told his followers that they did not need to honor him in that way, it would be wrong of her to stand for anyone but Allah. 

An appeals court threw out 19 of the citations in June, determining that an ultimatum to rise "substantially burdens the free exercise of religion" for her. It instructed Davis to consider her rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which declares that religious exercise can be curbed only if the government has a compelling reason. On September 18, Davis reinstated contempt charges but then quickly "purged" them, dropping the penalties. While there are precedents for religious exemptions from the standing requirement, involving Quakers in particular, Ali's case opens the door for a very different group: American Islamists eager to thumb their noses at the secular legal system. Expect more such incidents in the U.S.

Comparable conflicts have erupted elsewhere. Several radicals later found guilty of shouting hatred at British troops during a 2009 homecoming parade would not rise at their trial, because "in Muslim countries it is a grave and cardinal sin to show respect in this way to anyone other than God himself." Although the UK is not a Muslim country — at least not yet — the judge caved, acceding to a compromise whereby they could enter the courtroom after she did. Accused terrorists are not big fans of the standing requirement either, as seen in 2007 at the outset of proceedings against nine men from Sydney, Australia, charged with plotting attacks. According to one account, the judge "was not concerned by the refusal but suggested it might not be a wise course of action when the trial started," for jurors could take a harsher view. The jihadists got their comeuppance regardless: all eventually pleaded guilty or were convicted.

The issue has extended to lawyers as well. Mohammed Enait, a fundamentalist attorney in the Netherlands, initiated a long dispute over his resolve to stay seated on the grounds that all are equal before Allah. Mixed messages ensued. A court in 2008 approved an exception for Enait, but it was reversed. Meanwhile, the bar association reprimanded him, but an appeals tribunal voided it, referencing his "sincere and authentic religious convictions."

Clothing. Common sense dictates that face veils (niqabs) should not be welcome in a court of law, where security is critical, participants must be identified, and some judges and lawyers use facial expressions to analyze the veracity of statements. Yet none of this has slowed the push for concessions.

The good news is that most witnesses wanting to wear niqabs are turned down, as demonstrated by examples from Australia, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, the temporarily uncovered women often are allowed to testify with backs to the audience or from behind screens — an accommodation in and of itself. Also of relevance, judges have been known to expel women in niqabs from public seating areas, with recent ejections in France, where face-concealing attire is now broadly restricted, and Sweden, where safety concerns were voiced at a hearing related to a plot to kill cartoonist Lars Vilks.

The bad news is that there have been leaks in the dam, with the potential for more. Three years ago, a woman became the first in Denmark to give evidence from underneath a niqab, after briefly revealing her face to a female judge for identification purposes. A 2012 decision by Italy's Higher Judicial Council clears the way for veils to be worn as long as they "constitute a legitimate exercise of the right to profess one's own religion" and meet the subjective criterion of not "causing disturbance to the regular and correct court proceedings." Indeed, judges in most jurisdictions are not bound by rigid guidelines. For instance, following Judge Paul Paruk's dismissal of a plaintiff's case in 2006 because she would not testify with her face showing, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed only that lower courts are to "exercise reasonable control over the appearance of parties and witnesses." A judge more in thrall to multiculturalism could have acquiesced to the niqab — just like the Danish one did.

A Canadian case that began in 2007 is among the most pivotal. At its center is a sexual assault complainant, N.S., who wished to testify against two male relatives at a preliminary inquiry while wearing her niqab. The accused men objected, insisting that they would need to see her face to evaluate her claims, and Judge Norris Weisman noted that N.S. was not veiled in her driver's license photo. Weisman determined that she must remove the niqab, but this order was quashed by the Ontario Superior Court and the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The latter extensively acknowledged the religious rights of niqab wearers in the courtroom, though it did admit that in some circumstances a defendant's right to a fair trial could require a witness to bare her face. It sent the issue back for reconsideration and urged "constructive compromises," including such possible arrangements as a female judge and an all-female courtroom staff. The Supreme Court of Canada heard testimony last December, as N.S. was still seeking an order entitling her to take the stand covered. Its eventual ruling may shake up the niqab debate in that country and beyond.

Even the jury box can be a place of controversy. In March, a UK judge took the "extraordinary" step of prohibiting a niqab-clad woman from serving. Muslim leaders condemned it as bias, but one could argue that she actually benefited from a new shade of courtroom accommodation that rescued her from the unpleasantness of jury duty: forget about dropping the veil and just go home. Will more Muslims be inspired to arrive in niqabs, hoping to escape their own obligations?

Although most wrangling has focused on face veils, mainstream Islamic attire occasionally stirs the pot. Allowing judges to wear headscarves (hijabs), which could preempt the desired image of religious neutrality on the bench, is an issue in Europe. A state-appointed body recently recommended that Norwegian judges be permitted to don them, while the topic formerly roiled the Danish government. Lawyers also have been involved in such disputes. In 2009, an appeals panel of the Dutch bar association ruled that the same Mohammed Enait introduced above could wear a "Muslim hat." As for others with business at the courthouse, the U.S. state of Georgia has led the way in officially relaxing restrictions on headgear to accept apparel worn for religious reasons, following the 2008 arrest of a woman who refused to remove her hijab at a security checkpoint; the shift has aided Muslim men as well. Finally, no discussion would be complete without mentioning Cheryl Bormann, a Pentagon-paid civilian attorney who has covered her hair when representing one of the accused 9/11 planners. She requested that the court order modest dress for all women participating in the Gitmo legal process — "out of respect" — so pious terrorists are not compelled to look away "for fear of committing a sin under their faith."

Additional concerns. Prayer-related concessions are a source of growing discomfort. A court building in Düsseldorf, Germany, ditched crosses but installed footbaths for ritual washing; the need is said to have arisen because Muslims were cleansing their feet in toilets. The anti-military protesters who managed to remain seated at their UK trial "were given an extra 20 minutes on top of their lunch break to go to pray at a mosque," according to a Daily Mail article, and "a separate 'quiet' room [was] set aside for their regular prayer intervals." Early this year, the Associated Press noted in passing that a federal judge presiding over a sex trafficking case in Tennessee was "allowing the defendants to take scheduled Muslim prayer breaks during the proceedings." Deferential inaction also assisted the alleged 9/11 conspirators in using prayers to disrupt their arraignment.

Another jihadist testing the limits of accommodation is Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S. Army psychiatrist facing a court-martial for murdering 13 people at Fort Hood. Contrary to Army regulations, Hasan began sporting a beard at pretrial hearings in June, sparking a protracted legal battle. "In the name of almighty Allah, I am a Muslim," Hasan explained to the judge, Colonel Gregory Gross, on August 30. "I believe that my religion requires me to wear a beard." However, prosecutors suspect that he simply intends to make it harder for witnesses to identify him. Gross ruled on September 6 that Hasan will be forcibly shaved if he does not shave himself — a decision that has been appealed, thus further delaying his trial and, with it, justice for his victims.

Last but not least, recall the infamous, decade-old British case in which a judge banned Jews and Hindus, as well as anyone married to them, from sitting on the jury that ultimately convicted Muslim cleric Abdullah el-Faisal for promoting the murder of those religions' followers. Though the bizarre move was more of an insult to Jews and Hindus, portraying them as completely emotional beings, than a sop to Islam, nobody should assume it to be the only time that a court will employ creative means to segregate Islamists from the groups they despise.

Demands for courtroom accommodations of all types show no signs of diminishing. Given their success in advancing the Islamist cause, why would they?

Unlike believers of various faiths who aspire to fulfill purely personal religious needs, Islamists view concessions as stepping stones to supremacy. Practitioners of cultural jihad understand how obtaining special privileges that appear minor on an individual basis can yield fundamental transformations in the aggregate, eating away at the bedrock principle of equality under the law and establishing that adherents of Islam are more equal than others. This phenomenon is particularly damaging when it takes place inside the courtroom, the venue in which that law is administered most visibly.

Judges must be mindful of this Islamist campaign of inches. Deference to Islam in any aspect of the legal system calls into question its impartiality as a whole, thereby sapping public confidence in the institution and making it an even more attractive target. Excessive accommodations also communicate a troubling message beyond run-of-the-mill weakness. Professor Barry Rubin's remarks on the Amina Farah Ali case put it best: "If Muslims are told that the state accepts the argument that Islamic law is recognized as superior to state law … they are being taught to be political Islamists."

Surely we have enough political Islamists dreaming of our defeat and dhimmitude as it is.


September 30, 2012, Update: Middle East Forum president Daniel Pipes points out another interesting example of accommodation not included above. In 2004, a federal judge in New York allowed a Muslim, Rafil Dhafir, to avoid a strip search before entering the court for his trial. Dhafir had argued, in the words of the Syracuse Post-Standard, that "Muslims must never appear naked in front of anyone except their spouses." Read about the details here at the update for October 19, 2004.

David J. Rusin is a research fellow at Islamist Watch, a project of the Middle East Forum.

Source: http://www.islamist-watch.org/11189/western-courts-bend-to-islamic-practices

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Concerns Over Syria's Possible Disintegration into Ethnic Entities



by N. Mozes

Introduction 

"Everything in Syria these days is fragmented or divided. The regime is divided and crumbling, the land is divided, [and] the opposition is splintered and fragmented. Nothing is united... Aleppo is practically a separate [region], the Kurdish north is nearly independent, Damascus is isolated, the road to Al-Latakia is unsafe, and Homs is rebelling against the regime..."[1] This is how 'Abd Al-Bari 'Atwan, editor of the London daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi, described Syria, 60 years after its independence and 18 months into a violent struggle between the regime and its opponents. This situation has aroused concern in Arab and Muslim countries, and in the world at large, for Syria's unity and geographical integrity. 

The idea that Greater Syria is disintegrating into separate ethnic and sectarian entities is not new; at the 1920 San Remo conference, after World War I, France, who held the mandate over Syria and Lebanon, decided to split the territory into six national entities on a sectarian basis. Except for Lebanon, these entities remained separate until they were united under the French Mandate in 1936.

Throughout the years Syria has seen sectarian and ethnic tension, primarily from the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Kurds. The MB objected to the secular character of the Ba'th regime, led by the 'Alawite Hafez Al-Assad, and to the marginalization of the Sunni majority in favor of an alliance of sectarian minorities. This resistance peaked in the city of Hama in the early 1980s, and was mercilessly suppressed by the Assad regime. The Kurds also tried several times to rise up against the Ba'th regime, demanding self-rule or at the very least recognition of their national identity and rights; the regime responded in a similar manner. 

The current uprising against the Assad regime began in March 2011, as part of the wave of popular protest that swept over many countries in the Arab world. Opposition activists stressed that the uprising was a socio-political protest expressing the will of all of Syrian society, regardless of religion, sect or ethnicity. However, as the struggle escalated and became armed, with both sides sticking to their uncompromising stances and treating the conflict as a life-or-death struggle; as efforts to resolve the crisis by political means failed time and time again, while the role of Islamists and of foreign elements with their own agenda grew, and as the regime became increasingly unstable – there was increasing talk of an inter-sectarian struggle, and increasing concern that Syria could split along sectarian and ethnic lines into several smaller states. Lending poignancy to this concern is the memory of the civil war in Lebanon and the fall of the Ba'th regime in Iraq, which left these countries scarred and under constant threat of sectarian strife. It is perhaps true that most of the statements on these issues, both from the regime and its allies and from the opposition and its allies, are aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the other side, whether inside or outside Syria, and at warning of the ramifications of the other side controlling the country. 

Nevertheless, in light of the yawning chasm of hatred, the unending cycle of violence, and the breakdown of confidence among the various groups in the country, these statements could indicate the beginning of a real rift in the country. This report will discuss a number of scenarios for a possible division of Syria.

928a.JPGBalkanization of Syria[2]

Arab World Concerned For Integrity Of Syria

As mentioned, concern for Syria's geographical integrity has grown with the escalation of the violence there. In August 2011, some five months after the outbreak of the unrest, and as reports of massacres by the regime proliferated, calls began to be heard to preserve Syria's unity, similar to the calls that were heard in the past regarding Iraq, when there was talk of its partition into three separate entities: Kurdish, Shi'ite and Sunni. Qatar, for example, urged the Syrian regime to stop the bloodshed, cease the use of force, and heed the people's legitimate demands for reform in order to "preserve Syria's security, stability and national unity."[3] On August 7, 2011, Saudi King 'Abdallah bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz likewise called on the Syrian leadership to enact swift and comprehensive reforms, lest Syria "be dragged into the depths of anarchy and loss..."[4] The secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 'Abd Al-Latif bin Rashed Al-Zayani, later clarified that this statement by the Saudi king "underscored Saudi Arabia's concern for the security, stability and unity of Syria."[5]

Naturally, it is Syria's neighbors are most concerned about the possibility of an uncontrolled collapse of the central regime there and the country's disintegration into several entities. To judge by the number of statements, it is Jordan who feels the greatest concern. Its king, 'Abdallah II, was the first Arab leader to publicly hold Assad responsible for dividing the country along sectarian lines. In an interview with the CBS, he said: "...If he [Assad] can't rule Greater Syria then maybe an Alawite enclave is plan B... That would be, I think for us, the worst case scenario because that means the breakup of Greater Syria... If Syria then implodes on itself, that would create problems that would take us decades to come back from."[6] About one month later, the king uttered another warning: "The sectarian violence in Syria does not threaten Syria alone. The conflict may spread to neighboring countries that have a similar sectarian makeup. Signs indicate that this danger is getting closer and closer..."[7]
'Abd Al-Bari 'Atwan, editor of the London daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi, stressed the importance of King 'Abdallah's remarks: "...Jordan's King 'Abdallah II is a seismograph, or a precise lens showing us the plans being concocted for this region. He was the first to warn against the 'Shi'ite Crescent' and the need to establish a 'Sunni Crescent' to confront it. This prophecy from six years ago is coming true on the ground... We must take these warnings very seriously, because he does not make groundless remarks... This warning is the first substantial indication of the seriousness of the possibility that Syria might be divided on a sectarian and ethnic basis..." 'Atwan warned that "...No country is immune to [this danger], including Jordan, Turkey, the Gulf states, and especially Saudi Arabia. If Syria sees the establishment of an 'Alawite state, a Sunni state, a Kurdish state, and a Druze state, then we should all expect [to see] the establishment of a Hijaz state, a Najd state, an 'Asir state, and an Al-Ahsa state [in Saudi Arabia], and maybe even a Copt country in Egypt. And let us not forget Lebanon..."[8]
Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon are indeed afraid of a power vacuum and a state of anarchy in Syria, which could turn this country into a base for terrorism against them. Turkey's and Iraq's greatest fear is that an independent Kurdish entity might emerge in Syria, which could incite the large Kurdish minorities within their own territories. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki said there was no predicting what the future might hold. "Perhaps a Kurdish state will be born in southern Turkey, Northern Iraq, or Northern Syria, and perhaps Syria will be split into two states. All of these scenarios are possible."[9] According to reports, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who has likewise expressed concern for Syria's unity,[10] has met with representatives of Syrian Kurdish movements in order to prevent northeast Syria from becoming a base for terrorism against his country.

In the course of August 2012, the fear seemed to spread to other parties. On August 15, Saudi Arabia convened an emergency Islamic Solidarity Summit in Mecca to discuss the situation in Syria, which stressed the need to preserve this country's unity, sovereignty, independence and geographical integrity.[11] At the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, which took place in Tehran, Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi called on all members of the Non-Aligned Movement to support the Syrian people's demand for freedom and to promote a non-violent transition to democracy there, so as to prevent a civil war or the division of the country.[12] At a conference hosted by the Arab League on September 11, 2012 in a bid to unite the Syrian opposition, Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad 'Amr said that Syria's unity and integrity were a red line not to be negotiated over, and that his country was committed to preventing Syria from falling into the abyss of partition or of a sectarian or ethnic conflict.[13]

Countries outside the Arab and Muslim world, chiefly Russia, also expressed concern over the possible collapse of central government in Syria, and especially over the ramifications this could have for the minorities there. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that if the Syrian regime fell, several countries in the region would work to establish a Sunni regime there, which could adversely affect the Christians and other minorities in Syria, as well as the stability of Lebanon and Iraq, which likewise have a heterogeneous population.[14] Lavrov's deputy, Mikhail Bogdanov, warned against the "Somalization" of Syria, namely a takeover by radical Islamist groups that would try to impose shari'a law. He suggested trying the Lebanese model in Syria, namely an agreed-upon sharing of power among the various sects.[15]

These statements possibly represent a Russian attempt to take advantage of Western sensitivity to the issue of minority rights, in order to undermine the Syrian uprising by warning of its possible repercussions. However, the idea of applying the Lebanese model to Syria appears to have found supporters in the West as well.[16]

Bashar Al-Assad: There Is A Plot To Divide Syria

Since the beginning of the uprising, the regime has taken advantage of the concern over the possible repercussions of the Syrian crisis, and accused the West and its allies of plotting to divide Syria. In an interview with the Sunday Telegraph, some seven months after the onset of unrest, Assad warned of the consequences of this plot: "Syria is the hub now in this region. It is the fault line, and if you play with the ground you will cause an earthquake... Do you want to see another Afghanistan, or tens of Afghanistans?... If the plan is to divide Syria, that [means] dividing the whole region..."[17] Several months later, in a speech before the Syrian parliament, he claimed that Syria's enemies had attempted to harm it, first through a popular revolution and then with assassinations and terrorist attacks, but had failed; consequently, they had turned to sparking a sectarian war that would divide and fracture society.[18]

Russian Mufti Ahmad Badr Al-Din Hassoun said, "The West wants to partition Syria as it did in Yugoslavia, and just like it destroyed Iraq and Libya."[19]

Are The Kurds Preparing To Establish A Kurdish State In Northeast Syria?

There are indications that the concern for Syria's integrity is not completely groundless, especially in the case of the Kurdish region in northeast Syria. In early July 2012, an agreement was signed between the two major Kurdish bodies in Syria: the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, which is close to the PKK, and the Syrian Kurdish National Council, with the blessing of Massoud Al-Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan. The latter organization was established in October 2011 by 15 Kurdish parties that oppose both Assad and the PKK. According to the agreement, the two sides will stop fighting each other and establish a joint supreme Kurdish body that will banish remnants of the Syrian regime from the area and establish independent rule. Furthermore, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party will confine itself to managing the affairs of the Kurds in Syria (implying that it will cease to support the PKK).[20]

Such a joint body has indeed been established, though reports have it that its makeup heavily favors the Kurdish Democratic Union Party. This body enacts a kind of self-rule in most of the Kurdish areas in Syria, which the Kurds call "Western Kurdistan." This is manifest in the flying of the Kurdistan flag, the teaching the Kurdish language, which was forbidden under Ba'th rule, and the erection of checkpoints manned by armed Kurds.[21]

Preparations by Syrian Kurdish leadership for the post-Assad era also include training thousands of Syrian Kurdish youths in Iraqi Kurdistan, which Kurdish officials claim is for defensive purposes, "in order to fill the security vacuum that will ensue following the collapse of the Syrian regime."[22]

928b.JPG

Syrian Kurds flash sign for victory in the Kurdish town of Jinderes, near Aleppo[23]

 
Kurdish self-rule in northeast Syria was enabled thanks to the diminished presence of Syrian forces throughout Kurdish territory. According to Kurdish spokesmen, these territories were "liberated" after battles with regime forces or after those forces avoided confronting the Kurdish rebels.[24] However, there are reports that the withdrawal of regime forces is actually part of a deal struck between the Syrian regime and the Kurds,[25] most likely in return for the latters' commitment to prevent their region from becoming a base for attacks on the regime by its opponents. The existence of such a deal would explain the regime's decision to withdraw its forces from an area of strategic importance that borders Turkey – a country which supports the Syrian revolution and hosts the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – as well as the Syrian regime's apparent confidence that the Kurds will not take advantage of the situation. The existence of this deal is plausible in light of the regime's cooperation with the PKK and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, which supports the PKK.

Bahoz Erdal, commander of the military wing of the PKK, denied the existence of a deal between Syria and the Kurds, claiming that the reports to this effect are part of Turkish propaganda meant to justify military intervention in Syria. He added that "Kurdish political and civil society organizations [taking over] several cities... was chiefly meant to prevent these areas from becoming a battleground between the regime and the FSA."[26] This statement is characteristic of the Kurdish conduct throughout the Syrian crisis. Despite the bad history between the sides, the Kurds did not ride the wave of protest against the regime, and their areas remained relatively calm compared to other regions in the country. Protests did take place in the Kurdish areas, but they were not widespread, and the Kurds prevented them from becoming militarized, probably due to their fear that the regime would retaliate if it survived the crisis. Furthermore, reports claim that the Kurds are preventing FSA militants from entering their areas,[27] and that violent clashes have occurred between the FSA and PKK following mutual kidnappings.[28] Moreover, many Kurdish organizations refrained from joining the Syrian National Council (NSC) due to its refusal to meet many of their demands and due to their fear of the Islamists in the council.

The Syrian opposition, Turkey and the U.S. fear that the emergence of self-rule in the Kurdish areas in northeast Syria could be the first step towards an independent Kurdish state; they are also concerned about the apparent pro-Assad character of this Kurdish autonomy. This due to reports that control on the ground is in the hands of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, which is close to the PKK and has military capabilities,[29] and that this party acts against the FSA and elements close to Turkey,[30] and enables activity by Syrian security mechanisms in the areas it controls.[31] Statements by Morteza Nematzadeh, former cultural attaché in the Iranian embassy in Damascus, lend further weight to these fears. He said: "Transferring Kurdish areas in Syria to the PKK was an act of self-defense by Assad, and a proper response to Turkey's support of the Syrian rebels, by which [Assad] meant to signal to Turkey that ousting him would cause a long term crisis with the Kurds."[32]

Iran's ties to the PKK and its involvement in this matter are another cause for concern, and various reports indicate that Iran is trying to prevent a Turkish military action in Syria by using the PKK. The Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar reported on understandings between Iran and the PKK, according to which the organization would limit its actions to defending Syria's northern border from Turkish attack.[33] Recent reports also indicate Iranian intelligence activity inside Turkey in cooperation with the PKK.[34]

In an attempt to alleviate these fears, Kurdish elements said: "We are Syrians first. We want self-administration for Syrian Kurds and democracy for all of Syria.[35] In addition, speakers for the Kurdish Democratic Union Party rejected claims of cooperation with the PKK and the Syrian regime, and stressed their willingness to confront regime forces if they attack areas under Kurdish control.[36]

Columnists, Syrian Oppositionists: Assad Will Establish An Alawite Mini-State In The Coastal Region

In contrast to the situation in the Kurdish region, where an independent, or at least autonomous, Kurdish entity indeed seems to be emerging, the situation in the 'Alawite region is less clear, and reports regarding the emergence of an independent 'Alawite state are of uncertain reliability.

Since the start of the uprising, the main elements of the Syrian opposition, chiefly the SNC, have denied claims that the protests have a distinct sectarian or ethnic nature, and have described these claims as propaganda meant to harm the legitimacy of the uprising. They have avoided collectively accusing certain sects of collaborating with the regime, and have characterized the uprising as a popular one encompassing all sectors of Syrian society. However, others in the opposition claimed that, if pressed, Assad would not hesitate to divide Syria in order to ensure his survival, and would establish an Alawite mini-country in the Syrian coastal region, which has a large Alawite population. One of the first to mention this possibility was 'Abd Al-Halim Khaddam, former Syrian vice president and one of the heads of the Syrian opposition abroad. In January 2012, Khaddam claimed that Assad was arming and fortifying the 'Alawite region: "Bashar and his clan have distributed rifles and machine guns in 'Alawite towns and villages, and last month began transferring heavy weapons by land to the coastal region, in order to hide them in the hills and mountains... All the missiles and strategic weapons were also transferred there, as well as some tanks and artillery, because the regime needs them to suppress protestors in the cities. Bashar also planned to send fighter planes to the airfield in Al-Latakia... and is implementing a plan meant to spark a sectarian war... One month ago, Assad told one of his allies in Lebanon of his intention to establish an 'Alawite state, from which he could launch a sectarian civil war."[37] However, Khaddam recently questioned the possibility of establishing an Alawite enclave, "since no [Syrian] citizen would agree to the rending of the national fabric."[38]

928c.JPG

Pro-Assad rally in Latakia[39]

Similar statements were made by a senior source in the FSA to the London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: "The regime's strategy is based on uncompromising combat in Damascus and Aleppo, and if it cannot control them, it will establish a separatist ['Alawite] state on the Syrian coast..." He added that the opposition would relentlessly fight this state.[40]

Khairallah Khairallah, a Lebanese columnist for Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, claimed that the regime was fighting the opposition in Homs due to the city's location and its status as the main obstacle to establishing a sustainable 'Alawite state.[41] The Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai recently reported that the Syrian regime had transferred chemical weapons from a storage facility to Tartus, and estimated that this was done as part of the establishment of an 'Alawite enclave on the Syrian coast.[42]

Various columnists explained that both Assad's allies and his opponents, in the region and internationally, have an interest in Syria being divided. Saleh Al-Qalab, a former Jordanian information minister, said that Russia and Iran have a vested interest in defending an Alawite state if one is established, since it will enable them to maintain their influence in the region.[43] Columnist Mu'ataz Al-Murad wrote that the superpowers have a vested interest in dividing Syrian society, since it will lead to minorities asking for their guardianship, thus granting them a foothold in the country.[44]

Columnists: Small Chance For Establishment Of Sectarian States

On the other hand, there are some who dismiss the possibility that viable sectarian and ethnic states will be established, due to the objections among the minorities themselves and for demographic reasons.

'Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashed, director of Al-Arabiya TV and former editor of Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, spoke of the difficulties that Assad would face if he established an Alawite state: the rebels would pursue him wherever he went, and the Alawites would not agree to defend him and establish a state in a hostile environment and under continuing threats. According to Al-Rashed: "Even if there are internal forces who want to dismantle Syria into mini-states, the region will not tolerate this scenario and countries like Turkey and Iraq will not stand idly by..."[45] George Soulage, a columnist for the Lebanese daily Al-Jumhouriyya and a former advisor to Lebanese defense minister Elias Al-Murr, mentioned several strategic factors that prevent the establishment of a stable Alawite state, such as the lack of infrastructure and defense capabilities. According to Soulage, such a state would not receive international or Arab recognition, and would thus remain isolated. He added that Alawites are no longer the majority even in the coastal region.[46]

Suleiman Taqi Al-Din, a columnist for the Lebanese daily Al-Safir claimed that, even though there is a Kurdish area that is independently administrated, a northern Sunni area that includes provinces outside the control of the regime, and a coastal area with a nearly independent Alawite majority, "this is not a sure path to a division that would cause total separation from the mother country, or to the formulation of plans to establish sectarian mini-states…”  He added that, though sects in various countries can cause anarchy and strife, it is only superpowers that can create states in conflicted regions."[47]

* N. Mozes is a research fellow at MEMRI.


[1] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), August 3, 2012.
[2] Image source: socioecohistory.wordpress.com, July 23, 2012.
[3] Qatar New Agency (Qatar), August 3, 2011.
[4] Alarabiya.net, August 8, 2011.
[5] Elaph.com, August 8, 2011.
[6] Reuters.com, August 8, 2012.
[7] Syria-news.com, September 12, 2012.
[8] Bariatwan.com, August 8, 2012.
[9] Al-Mada (Iraq), August 13, 2012.
[10] Syria-news.com, September 12, 2012.
[11] Arabic.people.com.cn, August 16, 2012.
[12] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 31, 2012.
[13] Massai.alahram.org.eg, September 12, 2012.
[14] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), March 22, 2012.
[15] Al-Safir (Lebanon), September 11, 2012.
[16] The Italian Foreign Minister said recently that his country was working to promote dialogue among the various sects in Syria, in order to establish an agenda that respects human rights and freedoms, especially the freedom of religion. All4syria.info, September 18, 2012.
[17] Sunday Telegraph (London), October 29, 2011.
[18] Presidentassad.org, June 3, 2012.
[19] SANA (Syria), September 13, 2012.
[20] Washingtoninstitute.org, July 31, 2012.
[21] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 26, 2012.
[22] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), August 1, 2012.
[23] Image source: gaurdian.co.uk, July 31, 2012.
[24] Aljazeera.net, July 27, 2012.
[25] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 26, 2012.
[26] Al-Safir (Lebanon), August 14, 2012.
[27] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 26, 2012.
[28] Aksalser.com, September 10, 2012.
[29] Alarabiya.net, September 2, 2012.
[30] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), July 28, 2012; Alarabiya.net, September 2, 2012.
[31] It was reported that regime forces operate in Qamishli and Al-Hasakah and arrest oppositionists and individuals wanted for military service. Aksalser.com, September 4, 2012; All4syria.info, September 1, 2012.
[32] Entekhab.ir, August 29, 2012.
[33] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), August 9, 2012.
[34] Today's Zaman (Turkey), August 31, 2012.
[35] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 26, 2012.
[36] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 4, 2012.
[37] Al-Shurouq (Egypt), January 26, 2012.
[38] Levantnews.com, September 10, 2012.
[39] Image source: france24.com, July 20, 2012.
[40] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 6, 2012.
[41] All4Syria.info, August 7, 2012.
[42] Al-Rai (Kuwait), September 9, 2012.
[43] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), July 26, 2012.
[44] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), August 15, 2012.
[45] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), July 28, 2012.
[46] Al-Jumhouriyya (Lebanon), July 24, 2012.
[47] Al-Safir (Lebanon), August 18, 2012.

N. Mozes is a research fellow at MEMRI.

Source: memri@memri.org

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

MSNBC Caught in another Big Video Gaffe



by Dan Gainor


Working for MSNBC has gone to Joe Scarborough’s head, or at least his ears. The Joe of “Morning Joe, broadcast on the “Lean Forward” network, was caught in the latest TV video scandal because he won’t listen.

During his Wednesday broadcast, Scarborough again mocked GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney, this time for how he handled an Ohio appearance with vice presidential running mate Paul Ryan. The show played a clip of Romney taking the mike and saying Ryan is “quite a guy.” The crowd was then shown chanting as the words “Ryan!” popped up on the screen to indicate that’s what they were saying.

Romney then instructed the crowd to chant “Romney/Ryan.” The camera flashed back to the “Morning Joe” set where Scarborough put head in hands and said "Oh, sweet Jesus.” That reaction made the front page of Huffington Post and, as things do when spurred on by HuffPo, it went viral.

Only that isn’t what happened at all – shocking, I know. Rather than have an incident that made Romney look bad, this one made him look good. In the process, it was the latest black mark on the far-left network and another example of how out of touch MSNBC’s token “conservative” host truly is.

Buzzfeed described it by saying “the subtitle in the clip misrepresented what actually took place.” The original New York Times report said the same: “As the crowd began chanting ‘Romney! Romney!’ he cut them off. ‘Wait a second,’ Mr. Romney said, instructing the audience to cheer for ‘Romney-Ryan! Romney-Ryan!’ They did.” Buzzfeed gave credit to The Blaze and Breitbart News for noting the discrepancies. 

Several different Internet sites have called Scarborough on the bogus criticism. Even HuffPo has said the initial report is wrong. “UPDATE: A reporter who attended the event contacted The Huffington Post to say that the crowd was chanting Romney's name, not Ryan's, and that Romney added his running mate's name to the chant, not the other way around,” the story now begins.

When MSNBC loses respect from Huffington Post, that’s the greatest fail imaginable. It’s like Castro’s Cuba being chastised by the old Soviet Union.

Conservative sites from Twitchy.com to Newsbusters were having a field day with Scarborough. The “Morning Joe” host is already viewed by many on the right as a RINO (Republican in Name Only) in the mold of "conservative" newspaper columnists Kathleen Parker and David Brooks, who make their career bashing conservatives. Conservatives again had good reason to mock him.

Twitchy was one of those leading the charge, saying that “MSNBC ran a clip that tried to paint a false narrative.” But Scarborough wouldn’t give up. On Twitter he made a series of statements standing by his original comments. Because, of course, Joe is never wrong.

“The fake controversy over the Ryan chants is a joke. Romney said ‘What a guy!"’ The crowd chanted ‘Ryan!’ and then Mitt jokes ‘Romney/Ryan!’” he wrote, in the face of all evidence.
Scarborough vowed to “have the tape linked this weekend” and told viewers “you watch and be the judge.” As of this writing it was not featured prominently on either the MSNBC site or his own personal site. “We will also play the CSPAN tape on Monday. Going to be fun,” he promised.

This is far from the first time MSNBC has been caught playing games with video. Back in June, Andrea Mitchell ran a piece of Romney speaking about shopping at Wawa which was edited to make him look foolish. In another incident, MSNBC misrepresented a Herman Cain video where he quoted Ben Franklin. Again the goal was to make him look foolish.

MSNBC comes by its bogus video skills like a misbehaving child of a bad parent. Parent NBC, in this case, famously doctored Trayvon Martin 911 call audio to falsely depict George Zimmerman as racist. They later apologized and staffers were fired, but long after the damage had been done.
Perhaps “Morning Joe” needs a bigger jolt of caffeine in the morning before it does its obligatory attack on conservatives, Republicans and anyone else Joe’s lefty paymasters oppose.

Dan Gainor is the Boone Pickens Fellow and the Media Research Center’s Vice President for Business and Culture. He can also be contacted on Facebook and Twitter as dangainor.

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/09/29/msnbc-caught-in-another-big-video-gaffe/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.