Obama's Promises about Iranian Sanctions go by the Boards

by Rick Moran


When the interim deal with Iran was struck late last year, President Obama said that the agreement would give Iran about $7 billion while maintaining a ban on exports of oil.


Both of those promises have proven to be about as solid as the president's "If you like your insurance, you can keep your insurance" promise.


Washington Times:

Iranian oil exports soared in January, hitting new highs just months after the United States consented to billions of dollars in economic sanctions relief under the interim nuclear deal.
Exports of Iranian crude oil jumped to 1.32 million barrels, up from December's high of 1.06 million barrels, according to data from the International Energy Agency.
The spike in exports-mainly to Japan, China, and India-has helped Iran's once-ailing economy stabilize and decrease inflation. Iranian oil exports have steadily risen since negotiations with the West restored confidence in Tehran's economy. The increase runs counter to a promise by the Obama administration that "Iran's oil exports will remain steady at their current level of around 1 million barrels per day."
The significant rise in oil exports has led some experts to accuse the Obama administration of misleading the public about the amount of sanctions relief provided under the interim nuclear deal.
While the White House said Iran would receive no more than $7 billion in relief, these experts say that the rise in oil exports and other economic spikes will give Iran "well more than $20 billion."
"These numbers ... cast doubt on the accuracy of the administration's estimates for sanctions relief," former Ambassador Mark Wallace, CEO of the advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran, said in a statement. "The $6 or $7 billion estimate does not take into account the tens of billions of dollars Iran will reap from increased oil sales."
"It is becoming more and more evident that the Geneva deal provided Iran with disproportionate sanctions relief, in exchange for far less significant concessions regarding its nuclear program," Wallace said.
Iran currently has some 30 million barrels of crude oil stored on tankers, "including 6 million barrels in vessels off China's coast," Iran's state-run media reported. It produced 30,000 more barrels in January, bringing its total to around 2.78 million, according to the report.
As international markets continue to open their arms for Tehran, South Korea is reportedly set to become Iran's next oil customer.

What happened? The president was hoodwinked by the Iranians and is too embarrassed to admit it. It's clear that Iran is interpreting the agreement in such a way as to give them maximum advantage. Either the agreement wasn't carefully drawn up - a distinct possibility - or, more likely I think, the Iranians are testing the Obama administration by seeing how far they can push the boundaries of the agreement without a response.

The reason we don't know is because the administration refuses to make the agreement public. Given the way that Washington and the rest of the west is responding to Iranian statements about their being able to continue to build new centrifuges and up their oil exports, while dragging their heels in negotiations for a permanent nuclear deal, there is not likely to be any protests.



Rick Moran

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/02/obamas_promises_about_iranian_sanctions_go_by_the_boards.html

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Do 'Syria,' 'Iraq' and 'Lebanon' Still Exist?

by Jonathan Spyer


For almost a century, the Middle East has been defined by the nation-states that emerged following the Allied victory in World War I and the end of the colonial era. Since then, strategic analyses of the region have concentrated on the relations between these states, and diplomatic efforts have generally attempted to maintain their stability and the integrity of their borders. As a result, the current map of the Middle East has remained largely unchanged over more than nine decades.

But this is no longer the case. The old maps no longer reflect the reality on the ground, and the region is now defined not by rivalry between nation-states, but by sectarian divisions that are spilling across the old borders and rendering them irrelevant. Today, there is a single sectarian war underway across the Middle East, one that threatens to engulf the entire region.

This war has a number of fronts, some more intense and active than others, but it is everywhere defined by sectarian conflict, especially the divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims. It is most intense in the area encompassing the current states of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; but has also spread further afield—to Bahrain, northern Yemen, and to some degree Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia.

The core power on the Shia side is the Islamic Republic of Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terror and founding patron of Hezbollah, which until 9/11 held had killed more Americans than any terror group in the world. The Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Maliki government and assorted Shia militias in Iraq, the Houthi rebels in northern Yemen, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are all allies or proxies of the Islamic Republic, which is capable of rendering substantial assistance to its friends through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a powerful military and economic force that possesses substantial expertise and experience in building proxy organizations and engaging in political and paramilitary warfare.

On the Sunni side, the dominant power is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which after 9/11 has been wary of Tehran, but also has struggled against the Islamists of Al Qaeda. Its allies include various groups among the Syrian rebels, the March 14 movement in Lebanon, the military regime in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and sometimes Turkey. The Saudis, however, are at something of a disadvantage. They possess no parallel to the IRGC, and have problematic relations with the extreme Sunni jihadists of al-Qaeda, who have played a prominent role in the fighting on all three major fronts.

How did this situation come about? Is there evidence of a clear linkage between the various forces on the respective sides? Why is this conflict so extreme in certain countries—like Syria and Iraq—where it appears to be leading to the breakup of these states? How dangerous are these changes for the West?

Focusing on the areas of most intense conflict—Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon—can help us answer these questions.

This war is a result of the confluence of a number of circumstances. First, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are all home to a host of different sectarian and ethnic communities. The stark divisions that exist in these societies have never been resolved. In Syria and Iraq, they were suppressed for decades by brutal dictatorial regimes. The Assad regime in Syria and Saddam Hussein's in Iraq were family dictatorships based on minority sectarian communities—the Alawis in Syria and the Arab Sunnis in Iraq—while claiming to rule in the name of pan-Arab nationalism. In service of this ideology, the Syrian and Iraqi regimes ruthlessly put down ethnic and sectarian separatism in all its forms; in particular, Shia Islamism in Iraq, Sunni Islamism in Syria, and the Kurdish national movement in both countries. All were treated without mercy.

Lebanon, by contrast, is a far weaker state, which was ruled by a power-sharing arrangement between ethnic and religious groups that collapsed into civil war in 1975. The issues underlying that war were never resolved; instead, between 1990 and 2005 the Syrian army presence in Lebanon ended all discussion of basic issues of national identity.

Over the last decade, the once ironclad structures of dictatorship and suppression that kept ethnic and sectarian tensions from erupting have weakened or disappeared. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq destroyed the Saddam Hussein regime. A sectarian Shia government, based on the Shia Arab majority and conditionally accepted by the Kurds, took its place. In Syria, a brutal civil war has severely curtailed the power of the Assad regime, which now rules only about 40 percent of the country's territory. The Sunni Arab majority and the Kurdish minority have carved out autonomous sectarian enclaves in the 60 percent that remains.

Western hopes that a non-sectarian identity would take hold in the areas formerly ruled by Saddam and the Assads have proved persistent but illusory. Remarks about Iraq made by then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in 2004 sum up these hopes and the tendency to self-delusion that often accompanies them. "What has been impressive to me so far," Rice said, is that Iraqis—whether Kurds or Shia or Sunni or the many other ethnic groups in Iraq—have demonstrated that they really want to live as one in a unified Iraq…. I think particularly the Kurds have shown a propensity to want to bridge differences that were historic differences in many ways that were fueled by Saddam Hussein and his regime… What I have found interesting and I think important is the degree to which the leaders of the Shia and Kurdish and Sunni communities have continually expressed their desires to live in a unified Iraq.

This faith is shared by the Obama Administration, and as a result, it has continued to support the Shia-dominated government in Iraq, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. It sees Maliki's opposition to Sunni insurgents in western Anbar province as an elected government's opposition to extremist rebels. This fails to take into account the sectarian nature of the Maliki government itself and the discriminatory policies he has pursued against the Sunnis of western Iraq.

The reemergence of sectarian conflict so evident in Iraq has also emerged in Syria and is, in turn, spilling over into neighboring Lebanon. Lebanon was first drawn into the conflict as a result of the significant and highly effective intervention in Syria in support of the Assad regime by Iran's Lebanon-based terrorist army, Hezbollah. This quickly led to retaliation against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon by elements among Syria's Sunni rebels. Supporters of the Sunni rebels have succeeded in attacking Hezbollah's Dahiyeh compound in south Beirut five times. The bombing on January 2 was carried out by a young Lebanese member of an organization called ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) named Qutaiba Muhammad al-Satem; ISIS are Islamic extremists who have been operating as a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria.

A map of Syria showing zones of control by the regime and various militias. (Image Source: WikiMedia Commons)

While Hezbollah's decision to intervene on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria and the subsequent Sunni reaction is partially the result of the divided nature of Lebanon and Syria and their unresolved questions of national identity, larger regional conflicts, also of a sectarian nature, are a driving force behind the violence.

Hezbollah's participation in the Syrian civil war came not as a result of automatic sentiments of solidarity, but because Hezbollah forms part of a regional alliance headed by Iran, to which the Assad regime also belongs. When Assad found himself in trouble, Hezbollah was mobilized to assist him. On the opposing side, the Syrian rebels have benefited from the support and patronage of Iran's rival, Saudi Arabia, and other states along the Arabian peninsula, including the United Arab Emirates.

This rivalry is long standing and not primarily rooted in theological differences. It is about power. Iran is controlled by a revolutionary regime whose goal is to become the hegemonic force in the Middle East. Although the Iranians certainly regard the Saudis as an enemy and as unfit custodians of Islam's most holy sites, the Tehran's main goal is to assert control over Arabian Gulf energy supplies, replacing the U.S. as guarantor of resources upon which world is dependent. Tehran understands that the real source of power in the region is the Gulf itself, with its enormous reserves of oil and natural gas that are essential to the global economy. To achieve its goals, Iran must tempt or coerce the Gulf monarchies away from U.S. protection and toward an alliance with Tehran, and ironically, American weakness in the face of Tehran's nuclear pursuit makes that all the more possible.

Riyadh has emerged as the principle opponent to Iran's regional ambitions, mainly because the former guarantor of the current regional order, the United States, has chosen to leave the field. Until 2011, the Middle East appeared to be locked into a kind of cold war, in which the Iranians, along with their allies and proxies, sought to overturn the U.S.-dominated regional order, which was based on U.S. alliances with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. Events over the last five years, however, have created the impression that the U.S. no longer wishes to play this role: America failed to back its longtime Egyptian ally, Hosni Mubarak, when he faced domestic unrest in early 2011. It failed to support the rebel forces fighting the Iran-backed Assad regime. And it failed to back Bahrain against an Iran-supported uprising in the same year. Now, the U.S. appears to be seeking a general rapprochement with Iran.

As a result of all this, Saudi Arabia has begun to take a far more active role in the region. Riyadh and its Gulf allies have certainly helped to finance and stabilize Egypt after the military removed Muhammad Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood government from power. It began to take a leading role in supporting the Syrian rebels. It has well-documented relations with the anti-Syrian March 14 movement in Lebanon. In December 2013, the Saudis pledged $3 billion to the official Lebanese army. They also support anti-Maliki elements in Iraq. In addition, they are seeking to create an alliance among the other Gulf states in order to oppose Iranian ambitions, with some success.

This increasingly violent rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, intensified by American withdrawal from the region, has helped turn a conflict that was once cold into an increasingly hot cross-border sectarian war.

There is considerable evidence of links between Iran and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and their respective allies in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, on the other.

On the Iranian side, Tehran no longer makes any serious attempt to deny the enormous assistance they have given the Assad regime in Syria. Indeed, the Iranians have effectively mobilized all their available regional assets in order to preserve it. The commander of the Revolutionary Guards' elite Qods Force, Qassem Suleimani, went to Syria himself in order to coordinate these efforts. Perhaps most notably, in mid-2012 the Iranians began training a new light infantry force for Assad. Called the National Defense Force, it was necessary because Assad was unable to use much of his own army, which consisted of Sunni conscripts whose loyalty was unreliable. Iran has even sent its own IRGC fighters to fight in Syria; a fact revealed by footage taken by an Iranian cameraman who was later killed by the rebels, the testimony of Syrian defectors, and the capture of a number of IRGC men in August 2012.

In April 2013, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was summoned to Iran and instructed to deploy his own fighters in Syria. Up to 10,000 of them are now on the ground in Syria at any given time, and they played a crucial role in retaking the strategic town of Qusayr in August 2013. Hezbollah fighters are also taking a prominent role in the battle for the Qalamun area near the Lebanese border, as well as the fighting around Damascus.

Iranian financial donations have also been vital in keeping the regime alive. In January 2013, Iran announced a "credit facility" agreement with Syria that extended a $1 billion line of credit to Assad. Later the same year, an additional credit line of $3.6 billion was announced.

Iraq has also played a vital role in supporting Assad, mainly by allowing Iran to use Iraqi territory and airspace to transfer weapons to Syrian forces. At first glance, this appears to be a strange policy. Relations between Iraq and Syria prior to the civil war were not good, with Maliki openly accusing Assad of supporting Sunni insurgents. But this has now changed. Indeed, Maliki has openly supported Assad since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. This reflects his increasing closeness to Iran, which helped ensure Maliki's emergence as prime minister after the 2010 elections and pressured Assad to support him as well. Relations between Iraq, Iran, and Syria have only improved since.

In addition to government support, Iraqi Shia militias are now fighting in Syria on behalf of Assad. The Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades, Ktaeb Hezbollah, and the Ahl al-Haq group all have forces in Syria. They are playing an important role, given that one of Assad's major weaknesses is his lack of reliably loyal soldiers. The eruption of violence in Iraq's western Anbar province has further cemented this alliance, since the insurgency is a direct result of advances made by Sunni jihadis in Syria.

As a result of all this, the Iranian-led side of the regional conflict has emerged as a tightly organized alliance, capable of acting in a coordinated way, pooling its resources for a common goal, and fighting effectively from western Iraq all the way to the Mediterranean.

The Sunni side of the conflict is more chaotic and disjointed. Saudi Arabia is its main financier, but it lacks an equivalent to the Qods force and the IRGC, who are world leaders in subversion and irregular warfare.

Only the most extreme jihadi elements appear capable of clear coordination across borders. For example, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as its name suggests, is active in both countries and controls a contiguous area stretching from the western Anbar province in Iraq to the eastern Raqqa province in Syria. ISIS regards itself as a franchise of al-Qaeda, although it does not take orders directly from the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. Another al-Qaeda group, Jabhat al-Nusra, is active in Syria. In Lebanon, a third branch of al-Qaeda, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, has played a role in the attacks on Hezbollah. In addition, both the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are active in Lebanon.

But there are also less extreme groups opposing the Syrian-Iranian axis. Saudi Arabia has backed the March 14 movement, which is the main Sunni opposition party in Lebanon, as well as providing financial support to the Lebanese army. In Syria, the Saudis have fostered the Islamic Front, an alliance of eight Islamist groups unconnected to al-Qaeda. It includes some of the strongest rebel brigades, such as Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid. It is now emerging as the key bloc among the rebels. The Saudis also dominate the Syrian opposition in exile, with Ahmed Jarba, who has close links to Riyadh, recently reelected chairman of the Syrian National Coalition.

There are no indications that the Saudis are backing Sunni insurgents in Iraq, but the larger Sunni community is certainly looking to Riyadh for help. Relations between Saudi Arabia and the current Iraqi government are very bad. The border between the two countries is closed except during the Hajj pilgrimage, there is no Saudi embassy in Baghdad, and commercial relations are kept at a minimum. Some of the Sunni tribes in western Anbar have close links to the Saudis. While they are hostile to al-Qaeda, they are also opposed to the Maliki government, which they regard as a sectarian Shia regime.

There is a third element to this regional conflict that is something of a wild card: The Kurds. A non-Arab people who have long sought an independent state, the Kurds have succeeded in creating a flourishing autonomous zone in northern Iraq that enjoys most of the elements of de facto sovereignty. Since July 2012, another Kurdish autonomous zone has been established in northeast Syria. These two areas occupy a contiguous land mass, but are not politically united. The Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq is controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani, while the autonomous zone in northeast Syria is controlled by the PYD (Democratic Union Party), which is the Syrian branch of the Turkish-based leftist PKK movement.

These movements are rivals, and each sees itself as the appropriate leader of the Kurds. But while there is tension between them, each appears to be securely in control of its respective areas. The Kurds do not enjoy the support of any state in the region, and both the Iranians and the Saudis regard Kurdish national aspirations with suspicion. Nonetheless, the Kurds have managed to accumulate sufficient organizational and military strength to ensure the survival of their self-governing enclaves.

All these factors indicate that two rival alliances are clashing for hegemony over the region. There are myriad practical links between the various combatants, and their activities have long since spilled across the borders of the various states involved in the fighting; as indicated by the presence of Iranian fighters, ISIS, and Hezbollah in Syria; Syrian rebels in Lebanon; and many other examples. Iran is the leader of one side, Saudi Arabia is the main backer of the other, while the Kurds are concerned with maintaining their areas of control and are trying to stay out of the conflict.

The most significant result of this is that the continued existence of Syria and Iraq as unified states is now in question. Practically speaking, Syria has already split into three areas, each controlled by one of the three elements listed above. Iraq has also effectively split into Kurdish and Arab zones, with Sunni and Shia groups fighting over the latter.

In many ways, Lebanon ceased to function as a unified state some time ago; since Hezbollah essentially functions as a de facto mini-state of its own. The Lebanese Sunnis lack a military tradition and have proved helpless in the face of Iran's support for Hezbollah. But now, the emergence of the Syrian rebels and the growing popularity of Islamism among the Sunni underclass may be altering this balance. This appears to be borne out by the recent surge in Sunni violence against Hezbollah, which is the result of an attempt by Syrian jihadis and other rebels—in concert with their local allies—to bring the war to Lebanon.

Taken together, this indicates that a massive paradigm shift is underway in much of the Middle East. The eclipse of Arab nationalist dictatorships in Iraq and Syria, the historical failure to develop a unified national identity in these states, their mixed ethnic and sectarian makeup, and the U.S.'s withdrawal from its dominant position in the region—with the resulting emergence of a Saudi-Iranian rivalry—have all combined to produce an extraordinary result: A region-wide sectarian war is now taking place in the areas still officially referred to as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

For the West, as in the region itself, this has very serious implications. Dealing with it effectively will required an equally massive paradigm shift in strategic thinking on the Middle East, one that is capable of dispensing with previous illusions and admitting that sovereign borders once regarded as sacrosanct are swiftly becoming meaningless.

There are new borders taking shape, defined by sectarian divisions that the West ignores at its peril. Despite fantasies of withdrawing from the region, the security of global energy supplies and the maintenance of regional stability are still essential to Western interests. The West has as large a stake in the outcome of this sectarian conflict as the regional players involved. If it cannot adapt to the new Middle East that is swiftly taking shape, it will find itself on the losing side.


Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Source: http://www.meforum.org/3751/syria-iraq-lebanon-nation-states

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Hamas Objects to UN Human Rights Books in Schools

by The Associated Press and Israel Hayom Staff

Terrorist group claims UNRWA educational program ignores Palestinian cultural mores and focuses too heavily on "peaceful" means of conflict resolution • UNRWA has "no plans to change its education programs in Gaza," says agency spokesman.

Palestinian children at a U.N. school in the Shati refugee camp in Gaza City [Archive] | Photo credit: AP

Gaza's Hamas authorities have blocked a U.N. refugee agency from introducing textbooks promoting human rights into local schools, saying the books ignore Palestinian cultural mores and focus too heavily on "peaceful" means of conflict resolution.

Motesem al-Minawi, spokesman for the Hamas-run Education Ministry, said Thursday that the government believes the curriculum does not match the "ideology and philosophy" of the local population.

He said the textbooks, used in grades 7 through 9, did not sufficiently address Palestinian suffering and did not acknowledge the right to battle Israel. 

"There is a tremendous focus on the peaceful resistance as the only tool to achieve freedom and independence," he said.

Hamas, which has killed hundreds of Israelis in suicide bombings and other attacks, says that "armed resistance" is a key component of its struggle against Israel.

The group also objected to the books' inclusion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948 that recognizes "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family." 

Hamas believes that certain parts of the declaration violate Islamic law, including the right of people of different faiths to marry and the right to change one's religion.

Al-Minawi said government officials had met with United Nations Relief and Works Agency officials and offered to form a joint committee to revise the book. Adnan Abu Hassna, a local UNRWA spokesman, confirmed that the curriculum had been suspended while the sides work out their differences.

The spat is just the latest in a line of disagreements between Hamas and UNRWA.

UNRWA assists Palestinian refugees and their descendants throughout the region. In Gaza, the agency runs some 245 schools serving more than 232,000 students, dozens of medical clinics and distributes food to many of the territory's 1.7 million residents.

But Hamas has frequently squabbled with UNRWA in a rivalry for the hearts and minds of Gaza's people. Hamas has pressed the U.N. not to organize mixed folk dancing for boys and girls and to keep Holocaust education out of its curriculum. It has also used harsh rhetoric against previous senior U.N. officials. Last year, UNRWA canceled its annual Gaza marathon after Hamas banned women from participating.

UNRWA has taught human rights education in schools across the region for more than a decade. The agency bases its studies on the local curriculum of the host government, but often enhances its courses if it believes there are shortcomings. In Gaza, since Hamas seized power in 2007, it has added certain elements, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Chris Gunness, a spokesman for the agency, said UNRWA has "no plans to change its education programs in Gaza," though he said the agency would have further discussions with Hamas. He said the curriculum had been developed with educators, parents groups, teachers and others.

"We have done our utmost in developing these materials to be sensitive to local values while also being true to the universal values that underpin the work of the United Nations," he said.

Salim Abdel Khaleq, a 48-year-old father of eight, including three young children in UNRWA schools, urged the agency to find a middle ground. He said he supported introducing his children to new ideas, as long as they fit into local cultural norms.

"UNRWA should work on the subject with the government and avoid this headache every year," he said. "We respect UNRWA, but they must respect our history as well."

The Associated Press and Israel Hayom Staff

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=15501

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Is CAIR a RICO Case?

by Mathew Hurwitz

The Council on American Islamic Relations, CAIR, claims to be an anti-defamation organization.  In fact, as we shall see, it is anything but. 


CAIR was founded in 1994 by Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmed, who had ties with the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), which was established by the terrorist organization Hamas.  Therefore, it is an outgrowth of the IAP.  It opened its first office in Washington, D.C. with a donation from the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the largest Islamic charity in the U.S.  CAIR should be, but is not, registered as a foreign agent.  Only 1% of its total revenue comes from membership dues; the balance of its sponsorship is from such foreign sources as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  One of CAIR's unspoken objectives is the Islamification of America.


CAIR funnels money to various nefarious causes.  It justifies its criminal money-laundering by comparing its actions to those of AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.  They liken AIPAC's open support of Israel to CAIR's secret backing of Israel's enemies.  CAIR is a Muslim-American outfit whose key officials were convicted of passing money to Hamas and Hezb'allah, two terrorist organizations dedicated to jihad (holy war) against Israel.


Immediately following 9/11, CAIR placed on its website a plea for donations to its New York and Washington, D.C. emergency relief fund.  It accepted money that it diverted to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the very Islamic charity which has subsequently been shut down by the FBI for its ties to Hamas.  The FBI has declared CAIR a front organization for Hamas.  In 2002, federal prosecutors brought charges against the organization for funding Hamas.


CAIR influences government policy, individuals, and private businesses by aggressive lawsuits, threats of civil rights litigation, boycotts, demonstrations, and propaganda promulgated by the politically correct liberal news media.  It was the fear of lawsuits by CAIR that prevented our military from expelling Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, even though they knew of his un-American leanings.  Owing to CAIR's threats of anti-discrimination lawsuits, an overly sensitive military failed to weed out a traitorous Islamic jihadist in its midst, and Hasan killed 12 soldiers and wounded 29.


CAIR sued John Doe passengers who alerted an airline crew that a group of six Muslims were acting suspiciously.  Clearly their behavior was intended to intimidate the passengers and crew, and the captain put them off the flight.  The Six Imams, who are Muslim and whose backgrounds range from Arab to Albanian, allege that U.S. Airways, the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC),  various agents and employees of U.S. Airways, MAC, and the FBI intentionally discriminated against them solely on the basis of their race, religion, and national origin.  U.S. Airways is being sued on grounds that it discriminated against the imams because of their practice of their Muslim faith.  MAC, an FBI agent, and state officials are being sued because they violated the constitutional rights of the imams.


This suit fits in with CAIR's anti-profiling campaign, which has had a chilling effect on airlines and the Federal Transport Safety Administration.  Travelers are less secure because of politically correct anti-profiling policies.


The FBI has cut off all contacts with CAIR.  These relationships were instituted by the Obama administration in the name of improved Islamic relations.  Obama directed the FBI to mount an outreach program with CAIR in cases of alleged civil rights violations.


This short-lived alliance broke down over mounting concerns with CAIR's roots in Hamas and its refusal to renounce the terrorist organization.  The FBI has named CAIR an unindicted co-conspirator in one of the largest finance cases in U.S. history, alleging that CAIR acted as a front in a conspiracy with the Muslim Brotherhood, a parent of al-Qaeda and Hamas, to infiltrate U.S. institutions.  The ultimate intent was to impose Saudi-style Islamic law in America.


In a pending case, CAIR stands accused of plotting to influence members of Congress by infiltrating their staffs with Muslim interns.  In this connection, a senator and five congressmen urged the IRS to investigate CAIR.  The FBI maintains that CAIR does not qualify as a nonprofit organization like the NAACP and AIPAC.


However, the fact of the matter is that CAIR is a front for Hamas and the radical Muslim Brotherhood; therefore, it should not be tax-exempt.


CAIR claims that U.S. policy is dictated by Zionist extremists.  It mounts a relentless propaganda campaign to influence the American government to disclaim Israel's status as a special ally.  The organization is an advocate for the destruction of Israel and the occupation of its territories by the Palestinians.


A year before CAIR's founding, Niwad Awad and Omar Ahmad conspired with Hamas leaders in a 1993 meeting in Philadelphia to disguise funding for Hamas as charitable donations.  Since the money for such transactions originates with its Arab patrons, CAIR's ongoing diversion of donations to Hamas is clearly a case of money-laundering.  To date, the organization has been able to get away with this, and it continues to fund terrorist and jihadist causes.


There are documented violations by CAIR of America's Iranian Assets Control Regulations imposed by executive orders of prior presidents including Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, and Bush 43.  The regulations prohibit essentially all commercial dealings and cash transfers with Iran by U.S. citizens, corporations, and organizations.  Violations of this act are punishable by steep fines, civil penalties, and imprisonment.


Cofounder Omar Ahmad said: "Islam isn't in America to be equal to other faiths, but to become dominant."  He went on to say: "The Koran should be the highest authority in America, and Islam the only accepted religion on earth."  


In the late 1980s, Ihsan Bagby, professor of Islamic studies at the University of Kentucky and a CAIR board member, stated that "Muslims can never be full citizens of the US because there's no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country."


Clearly, CAIR is a foreign-sponsored subversive organization comparable to the American Communist Party when it was Soviet-controlled. 


Therefore, CAIR should be handled under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enacted by Congress in 1970.


Originally intended to deal with the Mafia, RICO's scope was expanded in the 1980s to provide civil remedies with treble damages to any person injured in their business or property by reason of a RICO violation.  By the late 1980s, RICO was one of the most commonly-asserted claims in federal court.


Due to over-litigation, the Supreme Court limited the use of RICO in civil cases.  Today RICO is applied to criminal prosecution of individuals, businesses, political protest groups, and terrorist organizations.  It is used in cases involving conspiracy, coercion, subversive activity, tax evasion, and money-laundering.


CAIR's activities from its founding in 1994 to the present day clearly qualify this organization to be prosecuted and convicted under the RICO act.



Mathew Hurwitz is a retired engineer, BSME, MIT, a consultant, and independent inventor with several dozen patents and peer-reviewed technical papers to his credit.  He welcomes feedback at hurwitzmathew@gmail.com.

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/02/is_cair_a_rico_case.html

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Problems in the Global Jihad Family

by Yoram Schweitzer

Over the past two and a half years, the bloodletting between Syrian President Bashar Assad and opposition forces in his country has become a familiar routine. 

However, the violent clashes we have seen these past few months within the opposition, among the Islamist elements, are rather new. Al-Qaida's statement that it has nothing to do with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (abbreviated as ISIS) organization, and that it is not responsible for the group's actions in Syria, points to problems within the global jihad family.

The present conflict between al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began when Baghdadi, on his own accord, announced last April the merging between his Iraq-based group and the Syria-based Nusra Front rebel group, without coordinating the move first with Zawahiri or Nusra Front leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani.

The Nusra Front leader rejected Baghdadi's unification decree while simultaneously declaring his allegiance to Zawahiri as his supreme commander. The move was seen as a slap in the face, because it was Baghdadi who sent Joulani to Syria to establish the ISIS branch there. Zawahiri, in efforts to establish his own superior status in the global jihad movement, attempted to intercede and maintain a semblance of unity. He took Joulani's side and declared that each organization should act in its own home country -- Baghdadi in Iraq and Joulani in Syria. He even sent an emissary on his behalf to Syria to mediate between the two.

In response, Baghdadi took several tangible steps to implement his decree and operate in both countries, and since mid-2013 his group has been increasingly conspicuous in Syria. Additionally, ISIS ramped up its activities in Iraq, primarily in Anbar Province. ISIS also became the most active and dominant organization on the Syria front and its forces have captured several towns in the north and north-east of the country, which has led to violent skirmishes with other rebel elements on the ground. These clashes come in the form of military battles and mutual assassinations between ISIS and the Syrian Islamic Front (a Salafist umbrella organization of Islamist rebel groups fighting Assad), as well as the Free Syrian Army. Violent clashes have also recently taken place between ISIS and the Nusra Front.

The brunt of the criticism against ISIS has been over its brutal treatment of the local population and its attempts to forcefully institute strict Shariah Law. These actions have included severe punishment for those who deviated, in their view, from the edicts of Islam. 

Due to the swelling number of violent acts perpetrated by ISIS operatives against the locals and other opposition forces in Syria, Joulani in January strongly condemned Baghdadi and his men. In response, Baghdadi was forced to issue an apologetic statement, in which he also claimed that anyone opposing his path was also opposing the ways of the Prophet Muhammad and aiding the enemies of Islam, primarily the Shiites. Despite Zawahiri's declaration of Baghdadi's excommunication, it does not appear Baghdadi intends to abandon his path or bow to Zawahiri's dictates.

Suffice it to say, the main beneficiary of this jihadist infighting is the Syrian president, who is exploiting the splintered opposition to make headway on the battlefield. In addition, the intensifying confrontation between the jihadist elements in the opposition could serve the West as well, including Israel, which are closely watching the growing stream of jihadist fighters spilling into Syria and grabbing a foothold there. The rift created by these global jihadist leaders, who have revealed themselves as power hungry fanatics who fight among themselves for personal prestige and recognition, could be utilized by intelligence services to enlist disillusioned jihadists as agents, to help thwart the terrorist attacks expected to migrate from Syria to other parts of the globe.

Yoram Schweitzer is the director of the Terrorism and Low-Intensity Warfare Research Project at the Institute for National Security Studies.

Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=7393

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PA and Hamas Ring Alarm Bells over Israeli Plans to 'Impose Sovereignty' on Temple Mount

by Khaled Abu Toameh

Knesset is set this week to discuss a proposal to place the Temple Mount under Israeli sovereignty; Hamas official criticizes Fatah minister for saying Jews could visit Western Wall under future Palestinian state.

 

A JEWISH man waves a flag with the Temple Mount in the background. 

Photo: REUTERS

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas warned Sunday of Israeli “plans” to impose Israeli sovereignty on the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

PA Minister for Religious Affairs Mahmoud al-Habbash said that there would be no sovereignty over the Aqsa Mosque and Islamic and Christian holy sites other than Palestinian sovereignty. “This is the full right of the Arab, including Muslims and Christians,” he said.

Al-Habbash claimed that Israel has plans to “divide” the Aqsa Mosque. “These efforts won’t succeed,” he added.

He was referring to routine visits by Jews to the Temple Mount and calls by some Israelis to impose Israeli sovereignty over the compound.

The PA minister said that only Muslims were entitled to pray at the holy site.

The Knesset is set to hold a plenary discussion on Tuesday to discuss a proposal by MK Moshe Feiglin (Likud) to place the Temple Mount under Israeli supervision.

Another top PA official was quoted as warning Israel against the consequences of “desecrating the holy sites in Jerusalem.” Israel, he charged, is “playing with fire.”


In the Gaza Strip, Hamas representative Yunis al-Astal accused Israel of plotting to “destroy” the Aqsa mosque in order to build the Third Temple.

The Hamas official criticized the PA minister al-Habbash for saying that Jews would be permitted to visit the Western Wall after an Israeli withdrawal from east Jerusalem.


Khaled Abu Toameh

Source: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/PA-and-Hamas-ring-alarm-bells-over-Israeli-plans-to-impose-sovereignty-on-Temple-Mount-341598

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Dissolve the Congressional Turkey Caucus

by Michael Rubin


Any congressman who remains in the “Caucus on U.S. Turkey Relations and Turkish Americans,” is either asleep at the switch or does not mind using their position as a shield for a government that:

• Supports Hamas
• Helps Iran evade sanctions
• Turns a blind eye to jihadis transiting its territory
• Finances and perhaps supplies al-Qaeda affiliates inside Syria
• Peddles cheap anti-American and anti-Semitic conspiracies
• Systematically eviscerates the free press and seeks China-style censorship over the Internet
• Undercuts NATO security by threatening to compromise software to the Chinese

The cherry on top now is a recording (start at 0:30) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that emerged on Friday that appears to show Erdoğan interceding with the mayor of Istanbul on behalf of the business interests of Yasin al-Qadi. Al-Qadi, of course, is designated by the U.S. government as an al-Qaeda financier. After reports suggested that both Cuneyt Zapsu, a top advisor to Erdoğan, and Zapsu’s mother had made donations to al-Qadi, Erdoğan shrugged off the matter saying he believed in al-Qadi as he believed in himself. Now, it seems that Erdoğan’s partnership with this apparent al-Qaeda-financier went much deeper.

Many congressmen joining the Congressional Turkey Caucus are well-meaning. They may believe Turkey to be a strong ally, a NATO partner, and a force for stability. They are wrong: that was the Turkey of a decade ago, not Turkey today. Given the Pakistani government’s support for terror groups, flirtation with China, and anti-American incitement, few congressmen would affix their names to a Congressional Pakistan Caucus, yet continuing in the Turkey Caucus has the same impact. If congressmen want to support a secular, pro-Western, Muslim majority state that seeks partnership with the United States, they might join the Azerbaijan caucus instead. But to remain in the Turkey Caucus affirms the worst behavior of Erdoğan and his cronies and ultimately undercuts U.S. national security.


Michael Rubin

Source: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2014/02/16/dissolve-the-congressional-turkey-caucus/

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Middle Eastern Studies Association Mocks Academic Freedom

by Michael Rubin


When the American Studies Association and the professional organizations of other ethnic studies associations moved recently to boycott Israeli academic organizations for various political reasons, the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), the professional organization of academics studying and teaching about the Middle East from its ancient empires to the present day, was silent–never mind that such a boycott would go to the heart of a field in which academic discourse and debate about the Middle East is crucial.

But now that various politicians—Maryland State Senator Joan Carter Conway, Speaker of the New York State Assembly Sheldon Silver, and Peter Roskam and Dan Lipinski in the U.S. House of Representatives—have introduced a bill to prevent public money from funding academic participation in organizations participating in the boycott, MESA is crying foul.

Here are letters that MESA President Nathan Brown sent to the politicians mentioned above. In each case, he wrote, “It is clear to us that whatever one’s opinion of the campaign to boycott Israeli academic institutions, the principles of academic freedom protect the right of faculty and students to speak and act for, as well as against, such boycotts.”

What arrogance. Public money dedicated to education isn’t meant to be a slush fund for professors’ pet political causes. The American Studies Association is supposed to be about American studies. If it evolves from its academic purpose to focus more on academic grandstanding than on exchange of knowledge, then professors should not be able to use taxpayer funds for a trip to Los Angeles. Likewise, if the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association isn’t going to focus on Native American and indigenous studies, then why should any professor operating out of the public dole attend its annual shindig in Austin? They can pay out of pocket if it’s that important to them, just as I pay out of pocket with my own money when I make a charitable contribution or should I wish to make a political donation. The same holds true for the Association of Asian American Studies, which will hold its next conference in San Francisco.

If Nathan Brown and MESA’s Committee on Academic Freedom are serious about academic freedom and scholarly discourse, then perhaps they might consider that they should not be in the business of political boycotts to begin with, regardless of target.


Michael Rubin

Source: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2014/02/16/middle-eastern-studies-association-mocks-academic-freedom/

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Losing India

by Vijeta Uniyal

 
Originally published by The Commentator. 

Last week saw India’s envoy to the US air discontent over imminent moves by US Lawmakers to tighten visa regulations on high-tech firms as part of a larger immigration reform. This move would restrict the ability of US based Indian IT firms to source their employees from India.

It is interesting to note that the uncanny and resigned tone of the envoy’s statement has come to define US-India relations in recent years. Once seen as blooming and dynamic, this relationship is now showing signs of deep trouble.

Those working in the US State Department and New Delhi’s South Block on “diplomatic solutions” to these increasingly frequent impasses might not succeed in the long run. For these are mere symptoms of a greater malady.

The reason for this deteriorating relationship is two-fold. The first directly arises from President Obama’s new foreign policy approach. He promised voters in 2008 that as President he would talk to enemies and this is a promise he really has delivered on.

It is a laudable approach to “positively engage” enemies, provided we live in an ideal world where good deeds are reciprocated. But the extended hand of friendship by the US has been seen by adversaries as a sign of weakness; encouraging despots like Assad to play “Russian roulette” with his chemical weapon stockpile, Iran to carry on Uranium enrichment and China to employ strong-arm tactics on Japan.

It has another unintended effect as well. This approach incentivizes bad behavior by enemies and at times penalizes loyal allies. The concessions made to adversaries have come too often at the cost of loyal friends. India has been quick to notice that in the region and has made no secret of her discontent.

The second aspect of this problem might be related to the first one, but has a “values” dimension to it. The current US administration does not seek to be the moral leader of the world. “American Exceptionalism” is not a guiding principle of foreign policy.

The US seeks to reduce its geo-political footprint and assume a more “equitable role” in the world. Another altruistic position, one might think, but it has an impact on India beyond the framework of disengagement politics undertaken by the current administration.

To put it candidly, India’s political leadership did not embrace free market capitalism as a result of an acquired conviction, but it was forced upon them after a balance-of-payments crisis in 1991. The initially painful steps imposed on India paved the way for her growth story. The US at that point played the role of a catalyst nudging India to overcome her initial hesitations and embrace free market capitalism.

India’s economic growth and her foreign policy tilt towards the U.S. have occurred simultaneously and that is by no means a coincidence. India’s initial ascent on the world economic stage was a direct result of her embracing quintessentially American values.

By curbing government control on private enterprise, cutting taxes, and reducing the size of the government bureaucracy through privatization, India unleashed the entrepreneurship of her hard working and ingenious people.

If one was to summarize India’s success in one word, it would be “incentives”. For the first time in the history of modern India millions of families had a real chance of lifting themselves from poverty, not through government programs, but as a direct result of economic growth and private enterprise.

Economic mobility dented the rigid and inhumane Cast System. Indian women broke new ground and were empowered by their increased participation at all levels of the economy.

However, the last decade saw India falter on this path. Rather than pushing ahead with economic liberalization and focusing on growth, the government is again resorting to the remedy of “social programs”.

The US that India had been dealing from the early 90s was assured of the superiority of its values and willing to inspire others to follow her. But with the present US administration focusing on reducing America’s ‘footprint’ and reluctant to even assert the correctness of its values, let alone defend them, India has lost a vital pillar of support.

That said, India does not seem to have any good option but to push through with her economic reforms and re-embark on her long walk to prosperity. India has a billion reasons to do so.

The coming general elections this summer could be a defining moment for India’s economic future. India has a chance to overcome current political indecisiveness and get back to the path of much needed economic growth by modernizing governance and liberalizing the economy.

However, if India does falter it will have dire consequence for the world’s largest democracy, and the U.S will surely come to see that as a cause for profound regret.


Vijeta Uniyal is an Indian-born analyst based in Germany.

Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/vijeta-uniyal/losing-india/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Israel and UN Assurances

by Ari Lieberman


 

In war, there is no substitute for high ground and strategic depth. Military commanderscovet those conditions and once securing them, rarely give them up without a good fight. Of course, armies can still secure victories without these ideal positions – Israel proved that in 1948 and 1967 – but at higher cost in blood.

On June 6^th 1967 Israel, in response to Jordanian artillery fire and other hostile military deployments, counterattacked and defeated the Jordanian army, liberating Judea & Samaria (West Bank) in the process. In a matter of days, Israel’s strategic situation was instantly transformed for the better.

It is hard to fathom that prior to the conflict, Israel was nine miles wide at its narrowest point. When former President George Bush was informed of this fact he dryly quipped that there were driveways in Texas that were longer than that. Following the war, Israel increased its width to 44 miles. Moreover, Israel secured the Samarian mountain ranges that overlooked the nation’s vulnerable center where more than half the population and industry are situated. On a clear day, one can see the Azrieli Towers and Ben Gurion Airport from those positions.

Israeli forces ceased offensive operations at the Jordan Rift Valley. Those who have not seen the Jordan Rift Valley firsthand cannot begin to fully appreciate its strategic importance. The Jordan Valley is integral to Israel’s defense needs and forms a formidable barrier to infiltration and invasion from Israel’s eastern neighbors. It rises from an area that is 1,200 feet below sea level to a ridge of some 3,000 feet, creating a natural 4,200 foot wall. With Iraq unraveling, Jordan’s fragile monarchy under pressure from the influx of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and ever increasing Iranian imperialistic designs and meddling, the Jordan Valley takes on added significance and securing it becomes more important than ever.

Israel is now being asked or rather pressured into surrendering the Samarian mountain ranges and the Jordan Valley for vague assurances and treaties signed by Holocaust deniers and outright fabricators. To mollify Israeli anxieties, the United States and EU have raised the possibility of introducing foreign forces to patrol strategic locations.

Israel’s experience with foreign forces has been disappointing at best. Foreign troops have in the past proven themselves to be incapable of meeting even the most marginal requirements.

In 1967 UN forces stationed at strategic points in Sinai, vacated their positions after being ordered to do so by Egypt’s president, Gamal Nasser. Their abandonment of their posts led to a series of subsequent escalations that ultimately culminated in the Six-Day War.

In 1978 in response to a Palestinian terrorist atrocity, Israel invaded South Lebanon to clear out PLO terror nests. The UN demanded Israel’s withdrawal and promised to introduce a force that would act as a buffer, restore Lebanese authority in the region and prevent terrorist rearmament and infiltration. Israel complied but the UN force proved useless and on other occasions, actually collaborated with anti-Israel rejectionist groups.

In 2006 the UN force in South Lebanon was significantly enhanced with a more robust mandate, better equipment and more troops. They were there to enforce UNSC Resolution 1701 and ensure that Hezbollah would not once again turn South Lebanon into an ammunition dump and a forward base for military operations. The mandate proved to be another colossal UN failure and Hezbollah currently operates with impunity in regions ostensibly under UN control.

In 2013 UN forces operating as a buffer between Israel and Syria near the vicinity of the Golan Heights, unraveled in the face of ragtag militias with little military training. Professional Filipino soldiers put up no resistance when attacked by armed gangs. They were abducted, stripped of their weapons and their heavy equipment was commandeered. Croatia and Austria proved that they too had no stomach for fighting and following the Filipino debacle, announced that they would withdraw their forces from the region.

The United Nations’ failures are not solely limited to its Mideast operations. In 1995 Dutch troops under UN command, stationed in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica, presided over the worst post-World War II massacre on European soil. They stood by as 7000 people were systematically massacred by forces commanded by the Serb war criminal, Radko Mladic. Their culpability for their inaction was confirmed when a Dutch court found Holland civilly liable for at least three of those deaths.

Since its inception, Israel has fought eight wars with its belligerent, genocidal neighbors and has won on each occasion without the need of foreign troops. The Israel Defense Forces have proved to be a well-oiled, formidable machine capable of withstanding and reacting to multiple threats at once, be they conventional, unconventional or asymmetrical. Notwithstanding her superb military, Israel should not be asked to compromise its ideal strategic situation and surrender land to duplicitous “peace partners” with nefarious aims. This is especially true at a time when Iran attempts to expand its hegemony, instability reigns in Iraq and uncertainty hovers over Jordan.


Ari Lieberman

Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/ari-lieberman/israel-and-un-assurances/

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