by Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos
Respondents to the question: Dror Michman, Danielle Pletla, Gary Samore, Raphael Ofek, Alex Vatanka, Eitan Shamir, Seth Frantzman
Benjamin Netanyahu displays piece of
Iranian drone that infiltrated Israeli airspace, Munich Security
Conference, photo via Wikipedia
BESA Center Online Debate No. 9, April 1, 2018
Q: The recent infiltration of Israeli
airspace by an Iranian drone launched from Syria was considered by
Jerusalem a severe violation of its sovereignty. In response, Israel
conducted a mission to strike the Iranian drone installation in Syria.
During that mission, an Israeli F-16 jet crashed. In the aftermath of
this incident, Israel – while not wishing to escalate – made clear that
it is prepared to act with determination and exact a heavy price
from anyone who attacks it. BESA joins the debate by posing the
question: How might the Israeli-Iranian face-off in Syria evolve?
Respondents: Dror Michman, Danielle Pletla, Gary Samore, Raphael Ofek, Alex Vatanka, Eitan Shamir, Seth Frantzman
Dror Michman, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington DC
Iran has been heavily invested in Syria’s future
and is determined to not only preserve the Assad regime, but also to
capitalize on its gains. Syria represents Iran’s first significant
military success abroad in recent years. The Iranians are intent on
establishing military infrastructure – to include permanent bases,
airfields, and naval bases, manned mainly by proxies (militias) that are
already established in Syria and receive IRGC support, such as
Hezbollah. Tehran seeks to exert significant influence in the region –
not only over Israel, but also over other Iranian rivals – and control a
land corridor that weaves from Tehran to Iraq to northern Syria, ending
in the Mediterranean port city of Latakia.
The Iranians have also concluded that since the
convoys delivering military supplies to Hezbollah are vulnerable to
constant Israeli attacks, they should establish military industry
facilities in Syria and Lebanon, where they can manufacture their own
components to build precision-guided missiles and rockets, greatly
amplifying the strategic threat Israel faces.
Hence the Iranian determination to follow through with this strategy despite their clear understanding of Israel’s red lines.
Israel has shown resolve in blocking Iran where
possible, rather than allowing the situation to fester until it reaches
the scale of other strategic threats facing the country – namely the
over 100,000 rockets and missiles currently in Hezbollah’s arsenal.
Israel, which in most cases would support a policy of stability, finds
itself in a peculiar position: Most of its leverage in Syria comes from
its potential for disruption.
Russia is a major player in this conflict. While
it has positioned itself as an indispensable mediator between the
warring sides, it has not prevented the recent escalation, since a
low-level conflict serves its goals. Moscow has no interest in a
full-scale confrontation between Syria, Iran, and Israel, as such a
conflict would endanger recent achievements in Syria. However, a
simmering conflict between the parties keeps them distracted and in
line, thereby securing Moscow’s growing strategic role in Syria (which
is why Moscow tacitly approves certain provocations). But whether
Russia can really control the conflict moving forward remains to be
seen, and surely serious discussions are underway in Moscow regarding
the Iranian infiltration.
For now, at least, the US appears ready to leave
Russia in the lead in Syria, but its political support of Israel’s
actions serves as a significant factor in Russian response.
While none of the parties involved has an interest
in a full-scale military conflict, the conflict of interests is too
fundamental to have been fully resolved. Iran will continue to challenge
Israel’s red lines, perhaps by using different means and arenas; Israel
will be forced to react, raising the specter of military conflict
between the two.
Danielle Pletka, Senior Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies,
AEI, Washington DC
Assessing the balance of power in the Middle East,
it is hard to escape the conclusion that Iran is winning. On its
low-priority nuisance exercises, whether in Yemen or Qatar, it has
dragged the GCC into both internal and external conflict at little risk
to itself, and with little cost. On its higher priorities, whether
support for the Assad regime in Damascus or Hezbollah in Lebanon, or in
the subjugation of Iraq, these efforts, while more costly, are also
going well. Where does that leave Israel? Facing almost certain
conflict, likely with Iran’s proxy Hezbollah, in Lebanon, and perhaps
also in Syria.
Israelis make clear publicly and privately that
they will not tolerate the build-up and escalation of forces and weapons
capability by Hezbollah. In reality, they have tolerated it for over a
decade, but the tipping point is coming. The US seems neither to grasp
the danger, nor to realize Tehran’s reach and domination in Syria and
Lebanon. A war will not be conclusive, but it will be costly in blood
and treasure. Worse yet for Israel and for the US and its other allies
in the region, it will not solve the threat Iran and its proxies pose,
but merely postpone it for another day.
Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA
Israel and Iran are likely to engage in periodic
clashes over their opposing interests in Syria, but neither side seems
eager to escalate to full-scale conflict at this time. Israel has a free
hand to bomb Iranian installations in Syria and sophisticated weapons
shipments to its allies such as Hezbollah. At the same time, Israeli
bombing raids cannot prevent Iran from achieving its essential
objectives in Syria, including strong political influence in Damascus,
secure lines of transit into Lebanon, and the enduring presence of
Shiite militias in Syria.
One factor that could change this standoff is if
Prime Minister Netanyahu succeeds in persuading President Trump to join
the battle against Iran from the US-supported Kurdish enclave in
northeastern Syria. In that scenario, Iran might retaliate by unleashing
attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon and the Golan, precipitating a
wider conflict.
Raphael Ofek, Senior Analyst, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), Bar-Ilan University
ISIS lost all its ground in Syria in October 2017.
Iran, as a result of its role in the rescue of Bashar Assad’s regime,
is now deeply embedded in Syria. Right now, Iran is trying to rewrite
the rules of Israel’s military involvement in Syria while Israel is
standing as a barrier preventing Iran from establishing a land corridor
via Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The lengthy war of words between Tehran and
Jerusalem escalated recently into a border clash. Israel’s immediate
response to penetration of its airspace by an Iranian drone on February
10 – striking Iranian and Syrian targets in Syria – was a warning that
Israel will not allow Tehran to control any Syrian base from which it
can strike Israel. The Iranian drone penetration thus strengthened fears
that a new war could break out.
It should be noted that the event occurred despite
the widespread demonstrations in Iran in the end of December 2017,
which challenged Tehran’s regime. The people of Iran protested mainly to
express their dissatisfaction with the sluggish economy, accusing the
regime of spending Iran’s resources on undermining the Middle East at
the expense of its own citizens’ welfare.
Russia is also highly implicated in the Syrian
theater, and so far, it seems to be the biggest winner. It has increased
its territorial seizures in Syria and holds now a naval base in Tartus
and an air base in Khmeimim. Notably, despite its cooperation with Iran
during the Syrian civil war, Russia is maintaining good relations with
Israel. For example, Moscow has not publicly denounced Israel for
bombing Hezbollah’s weapons convoys travelling to Lebanon via Syria.
The key to curbing a possible Israeli-Iranian
military face-off in Syria is Moscow. Moscow will probably restrain Iran
so as to avoid becoming involved in a new war in Syria that could
damage Russian interests in the Middle East.
Alex Vatanka, Iranian-American Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC. His book, Personal Rivalries in Tehran and the Making of Iranian Foreign Policy, is due out in early 2019
Listen closely to the debate in Tehran about Syria
and you will detect great unease. There is an underlying fear – inside
both the moderate and the hardline camps of the regime – that Iran won
the war but is in danger of losing out in the post-war period that will
follow. This apprehension has always been there. But it has become
markedly more distinct as the principal foreign powers that intervened
in Syria – Russia, Turkey and the US – set their sights on the long-term
endgame.
With ISIS defeated, the Gulf Arab States
distracted by the Yemeni civil war and intra-Arab Gulf rivalries, and a
US that is still on the fence about Syria, the Iranians might want to
pat themselves on the back (as some do) and declare victory in Syria.
Tehran came in early and heavy in support of the
Assad regime. For it to declare itself among the geopolitical winners of
this nastiest of wars is not unreasonable. For Tehran, losing Syria to
the Gulf Arab-backed opposition was always the biggest nightmare. That
scenario has been avoided.
How, then, do we then explain the enduring
apprehension in Tehran? Put simply, the soon-to-be-settled Syrian war
comes at a time when Iran as a nation is at an ideological crossroads.
In the most recent popular protests in Iran that erupted on 28 December
2017, many of the angry slogans were aimed at Tehran’s costly – and
ideologically driven – foreign policy (for example, “My life for Iran,
not Gaza, not Lebanon”). The Iranian regime’s interventions in the Arab
world have never been as popularly contested inside Iran as they are
today. Given this pushback from below, can the Iranian leadership up the
ante in Syria? This is an unsettled question in Tehran.
In truth, the intervention in Syria was always a
war of choice by Iran. The notion that the rise of ISIS posed an
existential threat to Iranian domestic security was a narrative of
convenience. When the rabidly anti-Shiite and anti-Iran Taliban, which
is not dissimilar to ISIS, took control next door in Afghanistan in 1994
and ruled for seven years, Tehran never intervened militarily. Why was
fighting ISIS in relatively distant Syria so paramount?
In mid-2011, Tehran did a cost-benefit analysis
and determined it had a fighting chance to keep its ally, Assad, in
power. In so doing, it could also protect Hezbollah, its Shiite Lebanese
darling, from the turmoil set in motion by the so-called Arab Spring.
Seven years later, can the Islamic Republic of Iran justify to its
people – plagued as they are by deep socioeconomic troubles – its
commitment to an open-ended presence in Syria? One thing is for sure:
the cost of waging war in Syria will be dwarfed by the cost of the
Syrian reconstruction.
No doubt, foreign pet projects have always been
the Iranian regime’s soft spot. But the need to maintain political
stability on the home front supersedes all else, including the fate of
Assad and Syria. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hassan Rouhani, and the rest of
the Iranian leadership know full well that at street level across Iran,
the Syrian venture – as well as Iran’s other Arab pursuits – are
overwhelmingly viewed as nothing but a drain.
The kind of national introspection that Iran is
undergoing at the moment also directly touches that most cherished of
ideological causes of the Islamic Republic: the enmity towards Israel.
At home, Iran’s costly presence in the Levant is sold as necessary to
keep alive the so-called Axis of Resistance against the Jewish State.
While the average Iranian tends not to fathom the
reasons behind Tehran’s opposition to Israel, Iran’s economic troubles
are making more and more Iranians ask if it is worth the price.
Geopolitical maneuverings by on-and-off partners and rivals such as
Russia and Turkey will largely shape Iran’s Syrian calculations in the
short term. What cannot be overlooked, however, is the rising anger
within Iranian society that has begun to defy the policy preferences of
the Islamic Republic like never before. As Iran’s Syria policy evolves,
the role of the Iranian people in shaping Tehran’s calculus should not
be underestimated.
Eitan Shamir, former head of the National Security Doctrine Department in the Israel Ministry of Strategic Affairs
Iran is a revisionist country with an ideology to
expand the Shiite Muslim revolution and Iranian hegemony as a regional
power. An important part of this ideology is the elimination of the
Jewish state. The Iranian Supreme Leader has even announced the year
when this goal will be fulfilled: 2040.
While Iranian ideological motivation represents
the threat, Iranian structural weaknesses, both economic and societal,
represent the opportunities. Another opportunity is the current phase in
the conflict in Syria. Both the Russians and the Iranians were fighting
for the survival of the Assad regime. As they believe they have secured
this objective, both are now seeking to consolidate and capitalize
their gains.
This is where the conflict of interests between
Russia and Iran could arise. The Iranian objective is to create in Syria
another launching pad from which to attack Israel. The Russians would
like to see stability and minimize the chances of conflict in order to
secure their troops and bases.
Israel should try to put a wedge between the Iranian and the Russians and work with the Russians to highlight these differences.
As for a military confrontation, Iran does not
have the means to strategically harm Israel from home. The Iranian plan
is therefore clear: a pincer threat from Syria and Lebanon, giving
Israel two fronts to worry about.
It will take years for Iran to build the necessary
military infrastructure in Syria. Until then Iran wants to avoid a
full-scale escalation. For its part, Israel should keep “mowing the
grass” and stand firmly on its red lines.
If the worst-case scenario comes to pass, Israel
has at its disposal the means to defeat its enemies in the north,
although not without a price. Meanwhile it should continue to weaken
Iran and its proxies using both diplomatic and military means.
In the Middle East there is a geostrategic
reshuffling every decade or so, and hopefully the next one will bring an
end to the current Iranian regime. Until then Israel will have to
prepare for the worst-case scenario.
Seth Frantzman, executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and op-ed editor of The Jerusalem Post
Israel has said that there are serious red lines
in Syria regarding Iranian encroachment towards its northern border. The
most likely evolution of the existing low-intensity conflict is that it
will continue in its current form. Israel has no interest in a massive
conflict with Iran, nor does it have a way to execute such a conflict.
Similarly, Iran wants to use its proxies, including Hezbollah and other
forces in Syria and Iraq, to threaten Israel.
Israel’s problems in targeting Iranian
infrastructure in Syria will increase as the Syrian regime reasserts
control near the Golan border and near Jordan. Russian air defenses and
the presence of Syrian soldiers will complicate Israel’s usual method of
air strikes. The larger concern is that Iraqi Shiite militias will use
Syria as a transit to Lebanon or to the Golan border.
However, Iran’s regime carefully calculates its
threats to Israel. It wants to drag Israel into a larger conflict that
will harm Israel internationally. As long as Israel understands this it
can avoid major conflict. With that said, the international community
has not heeded Israel’s warnings, and Iran’s presence will grow as it
feels empowered by Assad’s victory and Hezbollah’s growing influence in
Lebanon.
For Twitter dissemination: #Besaonlinedebates #Israel #Iran #Syria
@BrookingsInst
@AEI
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@AlexVatanka
@sfrantzman
@Jerusalem_Post
@tzogopoulos
Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos
Source: https://besacenter.org/online-debates/israel-iran-faceoff/
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