Thursday, November 19, 2026

The Case for Rebuilding the U.S. Navy - James E. Fanell

 

by James E. Fanell

If there ever was a bipartisan issue to protect America, it must be to restore American maritime power.

 

Three news events occurred in the past month that should remind Americans of the importance of sea power for America’s national security. The first item was the report at the end of September that “Middle East crude oil exports are back at prewar levels.” The second event occurred on October 26, 2026, the 20th anniversary of a Chinese Navy Song-class submarine (SS-321) surfacing within five nautical miles of the Vital Area (VA) of the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) while the carrier was conducting flight operations east of Okinawa. The third news event was the November 3 revelation by the Taiwan National Security Council that over 100 PLA Navy warships, including two of three aircraft carriers, were at sea throughout the First and Second Island Chains in October and November.

These reports highlighted the President’s call to rebuild the U.S. Navy via the proposed Golden Fleet, which includes Trump-class battleships. This call to restore American naval power should be front and center for the new Congress. These three events should be a reminder that regardless of political party, rebuilding American sea power requires bipartisan support.

First, the pre-midterm news that the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf is at or above pre-war levels should have garnered a lot more attention than it received, especially as gas prices are dropping dramatically just two weeks after the midterms, as President Trump had predicted. All of this good news would not have been made possible except for the U.S. Navy’s blockade against Iran. Yes, the joint force helped destroy Iran’s nuclear and conventional forces, but the U.S. Navy made the blockade a reality. It has been the U.S. Navy, not boots on the ground, that has isolated the Iranian regime from sustaining its economy via maritime exports and imports.

But the blockade has come with a heavy price. As Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle indicated, the Navy will need years for the U.S. Fleet to recover from these unusually long 300-day deployments to the Gulf. As one fellow officer with 40 years of experience told me, “The fleet, especially our carrier strike groups, has been ridden hard and put away wet.” As such, Caudle and other Navy leaders are now planning for a surge in maintenance work that will place even greater pressure on shipyards that are already at overcapacity and overworked.

This reality leads to tough decisions between conducting maintenance and repairs for the existing fleet versus building the Golden Fleet with new warships and submarines. This dichotomy has plagued the Navy and has gradually seen the fleet dwindle in overall size over the past 40 years. For instance, when I was commissioned in 1986, the U.S. Navy had nearly 600 warships and submarines; today that number is under 300.

Second, the twentieth anniversary of the Song-Kitty Hawk Incident marked the beginning of a shift in the naval balance of power in the Western Pacific. While the event received the requisite level of attention at the time, looking back on this event, 20 years later, it seems clear the People’s Republic of China (PRC) used this event as a launching point for the transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy into the largest, if not the most dominant, maritime power in the Western Pacific.

The Song-Kitty Hawk Incident was a watershed event for the PLA Navy in two ways. First, it legitimized the PRC’s naval modernization program, the largest by any nation since WWII. Second, the incident saw the PLA Navy “break out” beyond the First Island Chain, as Beijing expanded its reach around the world.

This incident was an important inflection point in history, the results of which the U.S. Pacific Command and Fleet are now dealing with as the PRC and PLA Navy daily threaten the existing regional peace and security the Western Pacific has enjoyed since the end of WWII.

As it relates to size, in 2006, according to the Congressional Research Service, the PLA Navy consisted of 222 combatant warships (excluding auxiliary and support ships), while the U.S. Navy consisted of 281 (including auxiliary and support ships, while excluding patrol craft, of which the USN had very few). That gave the U.S. Navy a 59-ship advantage over the PLA Navy. By 2026, the situation had flipped with the PLA Navy having approximately 370 combatants, while the U.S. Navy remained under 300.

Conservatively, that is a 120-ship swing in just 20 years and has placed the PLA Navy as the largest navy on the planet. Principal among that swing has been the building of big-deck warships, aircraft carriers, and amphibious assault ships. Today, the PLA Navy has three aircraft carrier strike groups that were built in just over a decade, with a fourth carrier expected to be launched in 2027.

Likewise, the PLA Navy has built four expeditionary strike groups led by four new amphibious assault carriers, all built in the last decade, demonstrating that the CCP leadership fully intends to deploy the PLA Navy globally, just like the U.S. Navy has been doing since the end of WWII. In addition to the big-deck carriers, the PLA Navy has built hundreds of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes—all equipped with long-range ballistic, cruise, or hypersonic anti-ship missile systems that outrange the U.S. Navy.

But nowhere does the impact of the Song-Kitty Hawk Incident become more obvious than in the “far seas” operations of the PLA Navy. While the PLA Navy first sent a training ship, AXT-81 Zheng He, to Hawaii in 1989, the PLA Navy had never deployed more than one or two ships beyond the First Island Chain, and then only on a rare occasion. However, following the Song-Kitty Hawk Incident, the PLA Navy began to “break out” beyond the First Island Chain.

Beginning with the deployment of a five-ship surface action group (SAG) beyond the First Island Chain for the first time in 2007, the PLA Navy expanded its operations into the Philippine Sea between 2007 and 2009, which is now a routine occurrence as PLA Navy warships and submarines operate in these waters nearly daily.

In December 2008, the PLA Navy began its inaugural deployment of its Naval Escort Task Forces (NETF) to the Gulf of Aden. During 18 years of uninterrupted deployments, PLA Navy task force combatants have been sent to a wide variety of ports from Kiel to Cape Town and the west coast of Africa to the east coast of Australia.

During those years, the PRC built a naval base in Djibouti that was opened in 2017, supporting successive task forces through the 49th NETF, which is on station as of this writing. A tremendous level of effort in just 18 years, which originated in the aftermath of the Song-Kitty Hawk Incident.

While there are too many PLA Navy operations beyond the First Island Chain in the past 20 years to chronicle each and every one, a few are worth highlighting.

For instance, in February 2020, a South Sea Fleet–based SAG conducted a 41-day, 14,000-nautical-mile “far sea joint training fleet” deployment. This operation had unique significance for two reasons. First, for the first time, a Chinese SAG crossed the International Date Line in a “combat-ready state,” and second, the exercise was conducted closer to Hawaii than to Guam. In August 2021, four PLAN vessels operated within the U.S. Alaska exclusive economic zone (EEZ) despite the PRC routinely condemning U.S. Navy operations in the PRC’s EEZ in the SCS.

The PLA Navy also expanded its operations alongside allied foreign navies, including those of Russia and Iran, operating in the Mediterranean, off South Africa, in the Gulf of Oman, and in the East China Sea, as well as frequently navigating around Japan. These events are a stark reminder of how the Song-Kitty Hawk Incident of 2006 ushered in an alternative international order that Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran seek to establish and advance.

Beyond these selected examples of PLA Navy SAG operations, PLA Navy carrier operations have also dramatically expanded, especially since 2022. Most notably, by 2025, the PLA Navy’s first two aircraft carriers (Liaoning and Shandong) conducted flight operations in the western Pacific, with the Liaoning operating more than 500 nautical miles east-southeast of Iwo Jima, well outside the second island chain. Again, another result of the 2006 Song-Kitty Hawk Incident.

As it relates to PLA Navy submarine operations, routine “far seas” patrols beyond the First Island Chain became normalized in the decade following the Song-Kitty Hawk Incident. For instance, in 2015, speaking before the House Seapower and Projections Forces subcommittee on the Navy budget, Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy, deputy chief of naval operations, integration of capabilities and resources, remarked that the PLA Navy submarine force had expanded its missions and patrols. He noted that the PLA Navy submarine force “had three deployments in the Indian Ocean” and that even one Chinese SSBN had conducted a 95-day patrol, which theoretically could have put it in Hawaiian waters, thus able to reach the continental United States with the 7,200 km-range JL-2 ballistic missile.

Third, the news of the PLA Navy surge of 100+ warships, including two of the three aircraft carriers, across the Western Pacific is an unprecedented show of naval forces by the PRC. For instance, never before has the PLA Navy simultaneously deployed three naval task groups from the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Commands.

When combined with the unprecedented circumnavigation of the Philippines by the PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, as well as having its newest carrier, the Fujian, operating in the South China Sea, it seems clear that the primary military training objective for the PLA Navy is what the Chinese call its “Counter Intervention” strategy or what is called “Anti-Access, Area Denial” (A2/AD) in the West.

The purpose of the counterintervention strategy is to create a “no-go zone” for the U.S. and allied navies and other forces through an offensive force disposition. While the PLA Strategic Rocket Force and PLA Air Force provide fires into this “no-go zone,” the presence of PLA naval forces east of Taiwan provides a continuous extended layer of power projection capabilities eastward across the Philippine Sea.

Specifically, these PLA Navy forces are rehearsing establishing air and sea control throughout the area between the First and Second Island Chains. These training objectives are to find, fix, and attack U.S. submarines, surface ships, and aircraft to allow the PLA to either conduct a blockade of Taiwan or, in the ultimate case, an invasion.

The use of PLA naval forces from different theater commands demonstrates that the PLA is also rehearsing command and control capability across theater commands. This effort is clearly an attempt to mimic the U.S. War Department’s “joint force” concept of operations.

This demonstration of a 100+ PLA Navy warship surge into the Philippine Sea also included a likely Type 094/Jin-class ballistic missile submarine that launched an intercontinental ballistic missile from the Yellow Sea into the Chinese mainland. Conducting a submarine-launched ballistic missile test during this Counter Intervention surge by the PLA Navy is a form of “silent intimidation” designed to prevent the U.S. from even considering coming to Taiwan’s defense.

All of these developments demonstrate a continuity of progress by the PLA towards achieving the orders of Xi Jinping and those of other former leaders to the PLA to have the capability to take Taiwan by military force when called upon.

While there are certainly more PLA Navy out-of-area operations over the past 20 years that could be examined, the fact is that before the 2006 Song-Kitty Hawk Incident, the PLA Navy rarely ventured outside the First Island Chain. In the 20 years since that event, the PLA Navy has undeniably broken out beyond the First and Second Island Chains. It has become the most lethal naval force in the Western Pacific and continues in its quest to become the most dominant naval force in the world.

The U.S. government and the U.S. Navy must learn a lesson from these events: Measuring PLA Navy capabilities with a “snap of the chalk line” has been a disastrous approach. Going forward, we must assess the PRC’s maritime power on a trend line, not a snapshot of one moment in time. If we fail to learn this lesson, we may end up seeing PLA Navy ballistic missile submarines patrolling off our shores, along with Chinese carrier and expeditionary strike groups operating in the Western Hemisphere and dominating America’s national security by the end of the next 20 years.

If the Song-Kitty Hawk Incident is going to teach us anything, it is that the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic goals include making the PLA Navy the world’s most powerful naval force. The past 20 years have shown us this reality; the question is, will we respond and restore America’s Navy size and power in order to maintain the advantage we’ve had in naval power for the past 100 years?

Bottom line: these three events should serve as a reminder to the new Congress that they must fund the rebuilding of our Navy. If there ever was a bipartisan issue to protect America, it must be to restore American maritime power. We have no time to lose. 


James E. Fanell

Source: https://amgreatness.com/2026/11/19/the-case-for-rebuilding-the-u-s-navy/

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