Turkish-Syrian Relations Go Downhill

by Damla Aras

As Syria sinks deeper and deeper into the throes of civil war, the decade-long honeymoon between Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) and Bashar al-Assad's regime has all but ended. Fearing the possible spread of the revolt to Turkish territory, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu cold-shouldered their hitherto feted ally, openly siding with the rebels. They sheltered thousands of refugees fleeing government repression, including scores of military defectors, conferred with opposition leaders, and even threatened military intervention should the regime continue its brutal crackdown.[1] In August, Erdoğan warned that "we reached the end of our patience";[2] three months later, he lauded the "massacred" rebels as "martyrs," prophesying that "the Syrian nation will reap the results of its glorious resistance."[3] As President Assad ignores these admonitions, has Turkey reached the limits of "soft power" and will it revert to the instruments of hard power to find stability on its southern border?

From Coercion to Normalization

Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Öcalan sits guarded aboard an aircraft en route to Turkey following his arrest by Turkish special forces in Nairobi, Kenya, February 15, 1999. Turkey and Syria have had a lengthy and fraught relationship due, in part, to Damascus's tacit support for the terrorist and separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). A turning point came in 1998 when Syria, under compulsion, cut its ties with the group and forced Öcalan to leave the country.

Historically, Turkey's strategy toward Syria was based on instruments of hard power, an approach that was, in part, shaped by Syria's sponsorship of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the early 1980s. In a bid to end Damascus's support for the armed separatist organization with which Ankara had battled for decades, the government executed coercive strategies against Syria on four separate occasions during the 1980s and 1990s.

In 1987, Prime Minister Turgut Özal decided to use Turkey's control of the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers as a bargaining chip against Syria. In return for securing its share of regional water resources, Damascus would be forced to stop backing the PKK. But this ploy failed, and Syria carried on supporting the group. In 1992, another coercion attempt failed when Ankara did not follow up its threats of retaliation for Syria's harboring of the PKK. The pressure eventually resulted in a short-lived accord in which Damascus agreed to clear the Helwe training camp of PKK militants. Yet, Turkish decision-makers failed to take further actions when, in 1993, Syria permitted the PKK to open a center where 1,000 militants were trained.[4] In 1996, a third attempt was also unsuccessful as Turkey had to halt its saber-rattling against Syria due to the unexpected eruption of a crisis with Greece over the Aegean island of Kardak.[5]

The turning point in relations came with Ankara's final attempt in October 1998, which was backed by Washington and facilitated by Tehran and Cairo. This time the Turkish leaders made clear that they would use force against Damascus in the event of non-compliance. During the inauguration of the National Assembly, President Süleyman Demirel underlined Ankara's right to retaliate against Syria due to its support for terrorist activities; Chief of Staff Gen. Hüseyin Kıvrıkoglu stated there was an "undeclared war between Turkey and Syria," and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz subsequently announced that "the military was waiting for the order."[6] Ankara also initiated a diplomatic offensive and military campaign to back up its threats and make them more credible, inviting television crews to the Syrian border to film the mobilization of Turkish armed forces for war (which was actually a preparation for the ongoing NATO "Dynamic 98" maneuvers in Iskenderun).[7] Furthermore, Ankara announced that it was going to hold an independent maneuver at the Syrian border on November 7-9 with the aim of intimidating Damascus. It also declared that Reliant Mermaid II exercises would be held with the participation of Israel, the United States, and Jordan in October 1998.[8] (The exercise was later postponed as a gesture to Syria when PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was forced to leave the country.) Finally, as part of its diplomatic offensive to put pressure on Damascus, Ankara benefitted from Washington's strong backing. It also benefitted from the psychological impact on Damascus of close Turkish-Israeli relations and the shuttle diplomacy of Syria's friends Egypt and Iran between Ankara and Damascus.[9] As a result, unlike previous efforts, the Turks' strategy succeeded this time. Ankara and Damascus signed the Adana accord, which declared the PKK a terrorist organization and stated that its camps in the Bekaa Valley would be closed, and Öcalan would never again be permitted to enter Syria. It also established a mechanism to monitor Syria's compliance with the agreement.[10]

Perhaps the most important consequence of the 1998 crisis, along with the defeat of the PKK, was the normalization of Turkish-Syrian ties. With the cessation of Syrian support for the PKK and Öcalan's extradition to Turkey from Kenya, the two countries could develop a more conciliatory relationship. Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer's participation in Syrian president Hafez al-Assad's funeral on June 10, 2000, contributed notably to a warming of relation between Damascus and Ankara.[11] Following Hafez's death in June 2000, Ankara welcomed Bashar's presidency, especially his interest in developing political and economic relations with Turkey. It was expected that as a young ophthalmologist who had worked in the United Kingdom, Bashar would introduce wide ranging political reforms. Initially this seemed to be the case as manifested in the so-called "Damascus Spring," in Bashar's initiatives to revive the economy, and his efforts to end Syria's isolation and improve its relations with the international community.[12]

Consequently, not only did diplomatic relations improve, but the Syrian government went a step further, taking strict precautions and eagerly cracking down on the PKK. Damascus closed the organization's camps within Syria itself, shut down its radio transmission lines, banned its demonstrations, barred PKK sympathizers from running in local and national elections, curbed distribution of PKK publications in Syria, ended anti-Turkey news and editorial lines in the state media, prevented border infiltrations, turned over PKK members with Turkish citizenship to Ankara, and accepted the immigration of 1,500 Kurds with Syrian citizenship from northern Iraq to Syria on condition that they not participate in PKK activities. In addition, Syria held several broad military operations against the PKK, acting both alone and in cooperation with Turkey, imprisoning the militants or surrendering them to Turkey.[13]

As a result of this demonstration of goodwill, Ankara established close ties with Damascus in several fields. In the realm of defense and the military, Gen. Aytaç Yalman, appointed in September 2000 as commander of gendarmerie to coordinate communication and consultation between the two countries, organized nine meetings on security and cooperation between October 1998 and January 2002.[14] Further, the two countries signed a security protocol in September 2001 and a training and cooperation framework agreement in June 2002.[15] In April 2009, they held joint military maneuvers.[16]

Ankara also viewed strengthening economic ties with Damascus as a key element to creating interdependence between the two states, viewing the integration of the Syrian economy into the broader global economy through Turkey as a potentially profitable opportunity. According to some Turkish decision-makers, Syria was, in a sense, Turkey's hinterland, and its economy could become a natural part of the Turkish economy.[17] Both countries could thus benefit from each other's markets and act as bridges for one another to enter world markets. Thus Ankara hoped to benefit from Damascus's close ties with other Arab countries to increase its share in the larger Middle Eastern market; it was willing to open its borders as much as Syria would allow in order to accommodate cross-border trade and to create a free-trade zone, going so far as to eliminate customs restrictions.[18] For this purpose, serious steps were taken when Turkey and Syria signed the free trade agreement in which both sides agreed to reduce customs taxes gradually until they would finally disappear.[19]

It was hoped that this greater integration would encourage Damascus to support a politically and economically stable Turkey and allow Ankara to enter the lucrative Syrian and Middle Eastern markets.[20] These expectations began to produce results when the head of the Trade Chamber of Damascus, Rateb Shallah, declared that Turkish companies could benefit from Syrian free trade agreements with its neighbors by establishing joint investments with Syrian companies and sending their products to other Arab countries with zero customs levied.[21]

The AKP's "Soft Power" Strategy

While the Turkish governments of the 1990s put serious efforts into improving relations with Syria, it was the Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002, that truly capitalized on the new opportunities. The AKP leadership envisioned a prominent role for Turkey within the greater Middle East context. In order to actualize this vision, AKP leaders decided to adopt the instruments of soft power—finance and trade, culture, ethnic and religious kinship, diplomatic activities[22]—while the coercive tools of hard power took a backseat.

The AKP's use of soft power was epitomized by Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's motto of "zero problems with the neighbors." This maintained that owing to its unique geostrategic position as a "central country" in the midst of Afro-Eurasia, Turkey enjoyed strategic depth that would allow it, through close relations with its immediate neighbors, to become a major regional and even a global actor.[23] The AKP's success in building close relations with Syria and other Middle East countries was to rest on its understanding of these economic and political instruments and their full utilization.

The AKP sought to utilize its historical and religious ties with the Levant as a soft power tool. According to its worldview, Turkey possessed a special responsibility toward the regions that it believed had thrived under Ottoman rule. In addition, as products of an Islamic political movement, AKP theorists viewed Turkey as a role model for the countries in the area, striving to revive what they perceived as the justice, fairness, and economic prosperity of the Ottoman era. This self-image also helps fulfill the expectations of AKP's constituents, sensitive to developments in the Middle East and viewing themselves as a key part of the Islamic world. This psychology was manifested when Erdoğan asserted during a December 2004 Damascus visit that he could not differentiate between the shining faces of Turks and Syrians and would thus call them his brothers, rather than his friends.[24] Similarly during another speech, he addressed the Arab countries "not only as friends, but, at the same time, brothers."[25] Some have dubbed this approach "neo-Ottomanism."[26]

The AKP's efforts to increase Turkish influence in the Middle East found unexpected support in the Turkish cinema and music industries. At least forty Turkish soap operas have been broadcast in the Arab world in the last decade.[27] Turkish music, movies, and other television series have become instant hits in Arab societies; the finale of the Turkish TV series Noor was watched by approximately twenty-one million Arab viewers in 2009.[28] One explanation of such popularity could be that Turkish films and videos provide an alternative, grassroots view of how predominantly Muslim societies can live, illustrating increased societal freedoms—especially in the case of Turkish women—and higher living standards, thanks to the Turkish liberalized economy.[29]

Following the lead of the previous government, the AKP emphasized the improvement of bilateral trade relations. In October 2009, the Strategic Cooperation Council, composed of ministers of the two countries, met in the Syrian city of Aleppo and the Turkish town of Gaziantep in a bid to improve bilateral relations in all fields.[30] The AKP's vision of expanding its influence through strong trade relations with Syria was wholeheartedly supported by an army of umbrella organizations comprising Turkish investors, businessmen, and company officials. The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, the Turkish Exporters Assembly, the Foreign Economic Relations Board, the International Transporters Association. and the Turkish Contractors Association, as well as smaller, local business associations such as the Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce, Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, and Istanbul Chamber of Commerce had been actively involved in expanding their businesses in Syria.[31] This led to a significant increase in Turkish-Syrian trade volume, from $824.1 million in 2003 to $1.84 billion in 2010.[32] The two countries had hoped to reach $5 billion by 2012. In 2011 alone, Turkish companies invested a total of $223 million in the Syrian metal, food, cement, and open sea fishing industries. In addition, there was a considerable increase in the number of Syrian tourists visiting Turkey, from 154,000 in 2003 to 500,000 in 2010[33] while the termination of visa requirements for visits shorter than ninety days undoubtedly played a role in the success of both tourism and trade.

As a result of these efforts, the AKP government appeared to have enhanced Turkish prestige throughout the Middle East as evidenced by Bashar al-Assad's reported request that Ankara help mediate Syrian-Israeli covert talks[34] while Israeli minister of transportation and deputy prime minister Shaul Mofaz confirmed that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had sent a secret message to Syria through Turkey in June 2007. The Olmert government had reportedly asked Damascus to take some constructive steps toward peace in return for Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights.[35] By the same token, when Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, Erdoğan sent Davutoğlu to Damascus at Olmert and President George Bush's request to ask that Assad use his influence on Hezbollah.[36] For his part, Lebanese prime minister Fuad Siniora turned to Ankara for help to convince Damascus and Tehran to abandon their politically destabilizing strategies toward Lebanon.[37] Although these efforts apparently came to naught, the fact that they were undertaken at all indicates a role for Turkey hitherto not contemplated within the Middle East's various conflicts.

Another strong indication of Ankara's shifting policies was its open disagreement with Washington's approach toward Damascus, which resulted in a visible deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations. This was perhaps most notable after the 2003 invasion of Iraq when Ankara's strategic interests coincided with Damascus's—and Tehran's—on a number of issues.

All three states considered the possible partition of Iraq and the formation of a Kurdish state in its northern part a grave danger, fearing the domino effects of such a development on their own Kurdish populations. Syria, for example, had been concerned about its Kurdish population after the Kurds in Qamishli rose up against Damascus in March 2004 to protest violations of their human and political rights.[38] In the ensuing years, the AKP government challenged Washington's tougher stance and mistrust of Damascus and argued that rather than exclude the Assad regime, U.S. administrations should support limited reforms in Syria.[39] It argued that Washington's concerns about Syria—including its weapons of mass destruction programs, sluggish democratic reforms, support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and anti-coalition forces in Iraq, its meddling in Lebanese politics, and its acting as an Iranian agent in the Arab world—could only be resolved through dialogue.[40]

To this end, Ankara warmed its relations with Damascus in a number of ways. In July 2004, Erdoğan met with Syrian prime minister Naji Otri while refusing to meet Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert who visited Ankara on the same day.[41] In April 2005, President Sezer refused to cancel his trip to Syria while Lebanon was in the midst of its short-lived Cedar Revolution, instead taking the risk of being at loggerheads with the West.[42] Turkey's relations with what had been its most important ally, the United States, were strained yet again when Washington criticized Ankara for harming the international efforts to force Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, so much so that the Bush administration called Ankara's policy "unacceptable."[43] This, however, did not deter Erdoğan from being at Assad's elbow in August 2008 when the latter met French president Nicholas Sarkozy and Qatari Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani in Damascus to discuss the peace process with Israel.[44]

Ties between Turkey and Syria were further consolidated through Erdoğan's personal friendship with Assad, whose 2004 visit to Ankara was the first for a Syrian president in sixty-eight years. This was followed by the Assad family's one week holiday at a Turkish resort in Bodrum where the Erdoğan family met the Assads at the airport and had a lunch with them before traveling to their hotel together.[45] The first ladies, Emine Erdoğan and Asma Assad, campaigned together for an endangered species, the bald ibis, while Emine Erdoğan visited Syria as Asma Assad's guest to talk about Turkey.[46]

The future of Turkish-Syrian relations seemed extremely rosy until the outbreak of the Arab upheavals in early 2011.

Back to Square One?

Despite the many successes of the AKP's "soft power" approach, it was not able to sustain the influence on the Syrian regime it had expected, especially when it mattered most—during a time of unrest.

With the rise of Syrian resistance to the Assad regime, beginning in March 2011, the Turkish-Syrian rapport began to deteriorate. The AKP government initially believed that its influence on and close ties with the Assad regime would exert a moderating impact on its behavior. After several attempts to stop Assad's brutality, including a lengthy meeting between him and Davutoğlu in August 2011, Ankara realized that the Syrian government was unwilling to resolve the problems through reforms and would continue to use force against its citizens. Hence Erdoğan's November 2011 endorsement of the rebels[47] and President Abdullah Gül's proclamation that "our trust [for the Syrian government] has vanished."[48]

While Erdoğan and Assad's friendship has seemingly come to an end, Ankara's relations with Washington are becoming more closely aligned. The Turkish prime minister has been in regular contact with the administration since the start of the Syrian uprising, discussing the unrest personally with President Barack Obama.[49] In late September 2011, the two leaders declared publicly that they were in agreement on pressuring Syria.[50] While Ankara initially dragged its feet on imposing sanctions against Damascus (as Washington and Brussels have), it appears now to be preparing to make similar moves. During a recent interview with the Financial Times, Davutoğlu revealed that Ankara was preparing targeted sanctions against Damascus, which might include a buffer zone on Syrian territory.[51]

Ankara's support for Syrian opposition groups is one of the clearest signs of its break with Damascus. To this end, the Turkish government built several tent camps in Antakya, a city in southeastern Anatolia bordering Syria, to host eight thousand Syrian refugees fleeing their government's violent crackdown. One of the camps hosts defecting military officials. Modest in number (some seventy people although the Syrian opposition claims that hundreds of defectors fled to Turkey),[52] they call themselves the "Free Syrian Army" and have been gearing to toppling the Syrian government. Their camp is protected by Turkish soldiers while their commander Col. Riad Asaad travels with a Turkish official. Part of the Syrian National Council (SNC), an umbrella resistance group formed in Istanbul in early October 2011, these Syrian rebels seem to have found a welcoming haven in Turkey. They have already met with Davutoğlu, and in the coming weeks, their tent camp will host Erdoğan. Turkish officials describe their help as purely humanitarian,[53] and Asaad has confirmed that the SNC possesses no weapons and does not conduct armed training in the camp, contrary to the claims of a recent New York Times article.[54]

The shift in the AKP government's approach toward Damascus stems from a number of reasons, one being Turkey's desire to see the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) come to power, or at least share power with Assad's Alawite regime. According to an Agence France-Presse report, during foreign minister Davutoğlu's lengthy talk with Assad in November, the former suggested Ankara would support Assad if the SMB, an outgrowth of the country's majority Sunni community, was given four major ministries. He also asked Assad to approve the SMB's return to Syria, after decades of exile. Reportedly, Assad rejected the idea on the grounds that the Brotherhood, as an Islamist party, was incompatible with Syria's secular character. Although the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied the story, a Turkish official did state that the ministry had warned the Syrian government to share power and make reforms.[55]

While Davutoğlu's proposal to Assad has yet to be substantiated, the AKP government's approval—if not support—of the SMB is undeniable. In April 2011, the Brotherhood held a conference in Istanbul where it denounced the Assad regime. In June, members signed a declaration in Turkey, along with other opposition groups, which called for "freedom of belief, expression, and practice of religion under a civil state."[56] Indeed, SMB leader Muhammad Riad al-Shaqfa declared that Syrians would accept military intervention by Turkey, rather than the West, for protection from Assad's security forces.[57]

In addition to sharing a similar philosophy, a government ruled by a Sunni Islamist movement in Syria could help the AKP government consolidate its influence and power in the Middle East and North Africa in the coming years. In that sense, it was a positive development for the Turkish government when four Muslim Brotherhood members and six independent Islamists were selected among the nineteen members of the General Secretariat whose names were published by the Syrian revolutionary committee.[58] Ankara's growing influence in the region was demonstrated during Erdoğan's September visits to Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Despite criticism of his intervention by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders, the AKP has emerged as a role model and mentor for political Islamist movements as exemplified by Tunisia's Annahda party's official adoption of AKP's line of thinking.[59]

A Sunni resurgence in Syria could also stymie Tehran's ideological and political expansion in the Middle East, dubbed the "Shiite Crescent" by Jordan's King Abdullah II in 2003.[60] Iran, Syria, and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah represent the most visible members of that group, but unrest in Bahrain and Tehran's growing influence on the Shiite-dominated government of Iraq have made Sunni leaders in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar anxious.[61] Thus, in the event of the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Syria, Turkey as its patron could gain leverage against its long-time rival Iran.

The signs of strained Turkish-Iranian relations were already manifest in September 2011 when Ankara agreed to install new NATO radar systems to detect missiles launched from Iran,[62] a step roundly criticized by Tehran. In the same vein, the recent declaration by SMB leader Shaqfa of his willingness to adopt the Turkish governance system, rather than the Iranian model, is another demonstration of the ongoing competition between the two states over regional leadership.[63]

The AKP government also learned from its slow start in the Libya case. Like Syria, Libya has been a lucrative market for Turkey. Turkish companies secured $15 billion worth of construction contracts from Tripoli. The volume of trade between the two countries was $9.8 billion in 2010, and Turkish companies initiated 160 investment projects.[64] Like his relationship with Assad, Erdoğan also had a close friendship with Libya's ousted dictator Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi: The Turkish prime minister was invited as an honorary participant in the 2010 Arab summit in Sert thanks to Qaddafi and received the Qaddafi International Prize for Human Rights for his "distinguished service to humanity" in November 2010.[65] Consequently, when NATO's involvement in the Libyan crisis began in March 2011, the AKP government dragged its feet. It was not until May that Erdoğan called on Qaddafi to step down.[66] In all likelihood, realizing that the dictator's days were numbered, Ankara finally decided to back the NATO air campaign: It sent six vessels to support the naval blockade against Qaddafi's forces, sent a ship to evacuate Turkish civilians from Misrata, and began supporting the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC). Further, following British prime minister David Cameron and French president Nicholas Sarkozy who backed the NTC from the beginning of the uprising, Erdoğan visited Libya to win the heart of the new government to which Ankara provided $300 million in cash, loans, and other aid.[67]

Unlike the Libyan debacle, this time the Turkish government appears to be anticipating the toppling of the Assad regime. Consequently, Ankara has started to prepare for the next phase of relations with a new Syrian leadership to protect the future of its investments in Syria as well as to establish a strong relationship with a possible Syrian government upon which it can expand its influence. Having said that, when the uprisings in Syria started, Erdoğan at first continued to support Assad, calling him "a good friend who was loved by his people."[68] There were even some rumors, strongly denied by Turkish officials,[69] that the first defector from the Syrian army, Hussein Harmoush, was expelled from Turkey and surrendered to the Syrian officials. However, unlike the Libyan case, this time, Ankara shifted its position quickly.

Perhaps the most significant reason for this policy shift is Ankara's concern over news that the Assad regime has rekindled its relationship with the Kurds granting some citizenship[70] and giving them more cultural rights—opening Kurdish schools, organizing meetings, and allowing them access to the country from Iraq—in return for their support for Damascus. There are claims that the Syrian government has once again been in contact with the PKK in an effort to find new allies inside Syria and possibly as retaliation against Ankara. There have also been rumors that Syrian support was behind the PKK's recent attacks that cost twenty-four Turkish soldiers' lives.[71] Although no precise evidence against Syria was produced, Davutoğlu explicitly warned Damascus, "Recalling the past, [Syria] should not even think of playing the PKK card. Everybody will see where such an act would lead,"[72] clearly referring to the 1998 crisis when the two countries came to the brink of war.

Conclusion

The tools of "soft power" have clear limits, especially when dealing with a nondemocratic state. Dependency created through trade, diplomacy, religious kinship, historical ties, or cultural similarities mean little when the destiny of a state depends on the whims of a dictator who feels threatened. Given the ruthless realpolitik of the Middle East, it is naive to believe that the tools of soft power can foster a meaningful change in such a setting. The problem with Turkey's "zero problem with neighbors" mantra was that it was tested against an authoritarian regime. Equally important, its aim was to better the relations with the regime rather than aiming at the population. None of the integral elements of an open, democratic society upon which the notion of "soft power" rests exist in this context. Consequently, Ankara could expect that its "zero problem" strategy would not influence the decision-making of other authoritarian regimes such as Iran.

From a pragmatic point of view, Ankara has to make sure that the Assad regime is toppled and a new government in Syria is established. Simply in terms of Turkish domestic politics, a protracted Syrian civil war means increasing instability with a mass influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey and the possible revival of the PKK threat from across the Syrian border. Even if Damascus does not intend to use the PKK against Turkey, the PKK may attempt to take advantage of the unstable environment and a potential power vacuum in Syria to resume attacks on Turkey. PKK attacks launched from northern Iraq in the 1990s resulted in more than twenty Turkish cross-border operations,[73] and such efforts from Syria could easily trigger a similar reaction.

Ankara has openly sided with the SNC to reap the future material and ideological benefits of support for the movement. If its calculus works, Ankara may be one step closer to its neo-Ottoman aspirations, helping to spearhead predominantly Sunni, political Islamic movements in the Middle East and North Africa. This could, in turn, cause a negative reaction among those who consider Turkey a rival for the leadership of the Middle East such as the Saudi rulers.

Against this backdrop, it may well be that Ankara's decade-long, improving relations with Tehran have come to an end. Turkey's support of the Syrian rebels explicitly threatens Iran's expanding power in the region and its ideological sphere of influence. Turkey may thus increase its cooperation with the West against Iran while Tehran might also start using the PKK as leverage against Ankara.

After a 10-year honeymoon, Turkish-Syrian relations are back to square one. So long as the Assad regime continues to hunker down and massacre its citizenry, it seems that Ankara's stability, peaceful relations, and strong economic ties with Damascus will only be possible through the use of hard power instruments.

[1] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Aug. 13, 2011.
[2] AKP website (Ankara), Aug. 6, 2011; BBC News, Aug. 6, 2011.
[3] Haber50 (Istanbul), Nov. 1, 2011.
[4] Nihat Ali Özcan, PKK Tarihi, Ideolojisi ve Yöntem (Ankara: ASAM, 1999), pp. 246-52.
[5] Author interviews with Gündüz Aktan, former deputy undersecretary, Jan. 4, 2006; Atilla Ateş, former commander of land forces, Feb. 24, 2006; Mehmet Ali Bayar, former advisor to President Süleyman Demirel, Feb. 22, 2006; Süleyman Demirel, former president, Dec. 31, 2005; Cenk Duatepe, former ambassador to Syria, May 18, 2007; Korkmaz Haktanır, former Foreign Ministry undersecretary, Feb. 21, 2006; Rıza Küçükoğlu, former commander in second of the 7^th army corps in Diyarbakır, Jan. 4, 2006; Faruk Loğoğlu, former deputy undersecretary, May 25, 2007; Onur Öymen, former permanent representative to NATO in Brussels, Mar. 26, 2007; İsmet Sezgin, former interior and later defense minister, Feb. 20, 2006; Necati Utkan, former spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 20, 2006; Yaşar Yakış, former ambassador to Egypt, Dec. 1, 2006; Mesut Yılmaz, former prime minister, Feb. 22, 2006.
[6] The New York Times, Oct. 4, 1998; Hürriyet (Istanbul), Oct. 3, 1998.
[7] Hürriyet, Oct. 1, Oct. 3, 1998.
[8] Radikal, Oct. 4, 1998.
[9] Author interviews with Mark Parris, U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Oct. 6, 2006; Marc Grossman, U.S. undersecretary of state, Oct. 20, 2006; Harun Kazaz, The Turkish Daily News (Ankara), Oct. 4, 1998.
[10] Hürriyet, Oct. 21, 1998.
[11] The Turkish Daily News, June 13, 18, 2000.
[12] Sonoko Sunayama, "Bashar al-Asad's Syria: Will the Son Shine?" Mediterranean Politics, Summer 2001, p. 127; Eyal Zisser, "Bashar al-Assad: In or Out of the New World Order?" The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2005, pp. 117-8, 122; Eyal Zisser, "Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?" Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003, pp. 16, 19, 20-1; Eyal Zisser, "What Does the Future Hold for Syria?" MERIA, June 2006, p. 98.
[13] Milliyet (Istanbul), July 4, 2003, Dec. 28, 2004, May 17, 2005, Aug. 17, 2005; The Turkish Daily News, Apr. 5, 2007.
[14] Confidential source.
[15] NTV (Istanbul), June 9, 2002.
[16] The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 28, 2010; Time, May 26, 2011.
[17] Author interview with a high ranking Turkish Foreign Ministry official, June 13, 2006.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Milliyet, Dec. 22, 2004.
[20] See Damla Aras and Mustafa Aydin, "Political Conditionality of Economic Relations between Paternalist States: Turkey's Interaction with Iran, Iraq and Syria," Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter/Spring, 2005, pp. 21-43.
[21] NTV, June 20, 2001.
[22] Joseph Nye, Jr., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, no. 2, 2004, p. 256; idem, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, Autumn 1990, pp. 154, 156, 167.
[23] Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001; Kemal Kirisci and Nilgun Kaptanoglu, "The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle Eastern Studies, Sept. 2011, p. 711.
[24] Aksiyon (Istanbul), Dec. 27, 2004.
[25] The Turkish Daily News, June 9, 2006.
[26] See, for example, Hürriyet, Aug. 28, 2011; Omer Taspinar, "Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism And Kemalism," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2008.
[27] Bobby Gosh, "Erdogan's Moment," Time Magazine, Nov. 28, 2011.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Nurcin Yildiz, "Mehmet Muhenned Olunca," Usak Stratejik Gündem (Ankara), Apr. 14, 2010.
[30] Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara, Oct. 13, 2009.
[31] Kirisci and Kaptanoglu, "The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy."
[32] "Turkey-Syria Economic and Trade Relations," Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara, accessed Dec. 23, 2011.
[33] Today's Zaman (Istanbul), Oct. 3, 2011.
[34] Ha'aretz, Jan. 16, 2007.
[35] Milliyet (Istanbul), June 10, 2007.
[36] Ibid., July 6, 12, 2006; The Turkish Daily News, July 5, 2006; Bugün (Istanbul), July 4, 2006.
[37] The Turkish Daily News, Jan. 4, 2007.
[38] Milliyet, June 10, 2005, Feb. 1, 2007; Eyal Zisser, "Bashar under Pressure: Potential Implications of the Qamishli Riots," Tel Aviv Notes, Mar. 22, 2004, p. 2; Zisser, "Bashar al-Assad: In or Out of the New World Order?" p. 119; al-Ahram (Cairo), Apr. 8-14, 2004.
[39] Milliyet, June 11, 2005.
[40] Ibid., June 9, 2005; The New York Times, Jan. 24, 2007.
[41] Hürriyet, July 13, 2004; Yeni Şafak (Istanbul), July 14, 2004; Ha'aretz, July 16, 2004.
[42] Hürriyet, Apr. 9, 2005.
[43] Milliyet, May 12, 2005, June 9, 2005, Jan. 27, 2006.
[44] Sami Moubayed, "Turkish-Syrian Relations: The Erdogan Legacy," SETA Policy Brief, Oct. 2008, p. 7.
[45] Today's Zaman, Aug. 7, 2008; Gosh, "Erdogan's Moment"; Vatan (Istanbul), Aug. 5, 2008.
[46] The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 1, 2010; Hürriyet, May 13, 2005.
[47] The New York Times, Nov. 22, 2011.
[48] Milliyet, Aug. 29, 2011.
[49] AKP official website, Aug. 11, 2011; Hürriyet, June 22, 2011.
[50] Reuters, Sept. 20, 2011.
[51] Financial Times (London), Nov. 1, 2011; Today's Zaman, Nov. 6, 2011; The Telegraph (London), Nov. 29, 2011.
[52] Reuters, June 11, 2011.
[53] The New York Times, Dec. 8, 2011; al-Ahram Weekly, Nov. 17-23, 2011.
[54] Ty McCormick, "Turkey Mulls Buffer Zone on Syrian Border," Foreign Policy, June 17, 2011; Today's Zaman, Oct. 2, 2011; Anadolu News Agency (Ankara), Oct. 18, 2011; The New York Times, Oct. 27, 2011; Milliyet, Nov. 7, 2011.
[55] Agence France-Presse, Sept. 29, 2011.
[56] Piotr Zalewski, "Islamic Evolution," Foreign Policy, Aug. 11, 2011.
[57] Reuters, Nov. 17, 2011.
[58] Barry Rubin, "Obama Administration Does It Again! Empowers Largely Islamist Leadership for Syrian Revolution," GLORIA Center, Herzliya, Oct. 22, 2011.
[59] Gosh, "Erdogan's Moment."
[60] Edward Luttwak, "Revenge of the Sunnis," Foreign Policy, Dec. 7, 2011.
[61] Jacquelyn K. Davis and Charles M. Perry, "Rethinking the War on Terror: Developing a Strategy to Counter Extremist Ideologies," The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, D.C., Mar. 2007.
[62] Gosh, "Erdogan's Moment."
[63] Bloomberg News Service (New York), Nov. 28, 2011.
[64] "Arab Awakening Boosts Turkey's Confidence," IISS Strategic Comments, The International Institute For Strategic Studies, London, Oct. 2011, pp. 1-3; "Turkey's Position on the Libyan Revolution," The Doha Institute, Mar. 21, 2011.
[65] Today's Zaman, Dec. 1, 2010.
[66] Al-Ahram, May 19-25, 2011.
[67] Al-Arabiya News Channel (Dubai), Sept. 16, 2011; "Arab Awakening Boosts Turkey's Confidence," IISS Strategic Comments, pp. 1-3.
[68] Al-Ahram, May 19-25, 2011.
[69] Today's Zaman, Sept. 16, 2011.
[70] Los Angeles Times, Apr. 8, 2011.
[71] NTV, Oct. 19, 2011.
[72] Today's Zaman, Oct. 30, 2011; Wladamir van Wilgenburg, "Turkey Is Afraid Syria Will Target Its Kurdish Achilles' Heels," Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.) Nov. 11, 2011.
[73] Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: Hurst 2003), pp. 312–42.

Damla Aras is a postdoctoral research associate at the war studies department, King's College London.

Source: http://www.meforum.org/3206/turkish-syrian-relations

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Survey: Even Liberal Jews Not Crazy About Obama's Israel Policy

by Seth Mandel

The Public Religion Research Institute, recently in the news for its survey on Catholic attitudes toward the Obama administration’s decision to include religious institutions in its contraception mandate, today released the findings of its polling on American Jewish values: “Chosen for What? Jewish Values in 2012,” a report based on its recent survey of 1,004 self-identified American Jews. Here is one of the key findings highlighted by the report:

When asked which qualities are most important to their Jewish identity, nearly half (46 percent) of American Jews cite a commitment to social equality, twice as many as cite support for Israel (20 percent) or religious observance (17 percent). Fewer than 1-in-10 say that a sense of cultural heritage and tradition (6 percent) or a general set of values (3 percent) are most important to their Jewish identity.

This is a strong theme of secular liberalism running through the report, authored by PPRI’s Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox, who recently contributed an essay on President Obama for an anthology of presidents and religious influence. The organization’s surveys often focus on testing the Obama administration’s most visible narratives on policy issues. (The previous three surveys were on whether religious liberty is under attack, Americans’ opinion on economic inequality, and whether Catholics support the contraception mandate.)

“Chosen for What?” tests many of these themes among the Jewish population, with similar findings. Tikkun olam, for example, is held to be either somewhat important or very important to 72 percent of respondents. On religion, however, a full 41 percent say it is not too important or not at all important. About 18 percent of respondents said they do not believe in God.

Partisan splits account for some of the other issues polled. On health care, for example, Jewish Republicans say they would overwhelmingly support a Supreme Court decision overturning Obamacare, while Jewish Democrats favor keeping the law by about the same margin. A majority of Jewish independents would favor overturning the administration’s health care reform law.

While the poll paints a picture of a markedly liberal American Jewish community, that fact should give Obama supporters pause on certain issues. Though only 4 percent say Israel is the most important issue for them in the upcoming presidential election, Obama gets mixed reviews for his Middle East policies: “Twenty percent report that they agree with the president’s policies and that they like the way he is executing these policies. Fifteen percent say that they agree with the president’s policies but don’t like the way he is executing these policies. About 3-in-10 (28 percent) say they disagree with the president’s policies.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gets high marks, which may help explain why even many of those who agree with Obama’s Mideast policies don’t like the way he carries them out, which usually involved picking a fight with or expressing his contempt for Netanyahu. A majority (59 percent) also support the U.S. taking military action against Iran’s nuclear program if sanctions fail.

This polling institute is led by outspoken allies of, and current or former advisers to, President Obama (as Alana pointed out last month, David Saperstein is its chairman), that polled what turned out to be a mostly liberal population with very liberal answers (high support for abortion in all cases and a majority who think Israel’s “ultra-Orthodox” are too powerful and a “major problem”), and still the president can’t find broad support for his treatment of Israel.

This is a subset of the population ready to defend the president’s policies. They are, however, still waiting for a defensible Israel policy.

Seth Mandel

Source: http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/04/03/survey-liberal-jews-obama-israel-policy/

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UN peacekeepers to Syria but is Assad serious about the pullback?

by Rick Moran

It's not clear whether the UN is going to send bona fide, Robin's egg blue helmeted peacekeepers or unarmed peace "monitors" to Syria to watch over compliance by the Syrian government with the terms of the cease fire to which President Assad has agreed.

Whatever they are, they are going to have their hands full.

VOA:

An advance U.N. team is due to arrive in Syria within 48 hours to discuss the deployment of peacekeepers in a bid to halt violence from the government's year-long crackdown on dissent.

A spokesman for U.N.-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan made the announcement Tuesday, saying the group would work out the details of deploying international monitors to Damascus.

The announcement comes a day after Annan said Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had agreed to begin pulling out his forces from opposition protest hubs and complete the pullout by April 10.

U.N. diplomats say President Assad also agreed to several "immediate" steps including a cessation of troop movements toward population centers and the start of a withdrawal of soldiers and heavy weapons already in such areas.

The cease-fire proposal is part of a peace plan drafted by Annan last month and later endorsed by a U.N. Security Council statement. The U.N. says more than 9,000 people have been killed in Syria since the uprising began a year ago.

In spite of the plan, government attacks have continued with scattered violence reported on Tuesday.

There are still a thousand things that can go wrong before we can be sure Assad is serious about talking to the opposition. I give this thing 48 hours before the entire rickety edifice collapses and its back to square one. Will Assad allow the "peacekeepers" to be armed? Otherwise, they're sitting ducks. Will he allow them to go into cities like Homs and Hama that are still hotbeds of rebel activity?

Somehow, I don't see the Syrian dictator allowing this sort of thing, which means the fighting will go on.

Rick Moran

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/04/un_peacekeepers_to_syria_but_is_assad_serious_about_the_pullback.html

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Barack Obama and the End of the Progressive Era

by Steve McCann

The people of a nation that has experienced unprecedented peace and prosperity for an extended period of time are often lulled to sleep, believing there will never be an end to their good fortune. Many powerful countries throughout history have floundered and decayed as they gradually descended into chaos, not realizing the ultimate fate that awaited them. However, the United States has been granted an opportunity to escape this fate through what appears to be a long-term disaster potentially turning out to be its long-term salvation. That event is the election of Barack Obama as president.

Over the past fifty years, regardless of who was in the White House or in charge of Congress, no one has been able to halt the incessant spread of left-wing radicalism in the nation's institutions, as well as the exponential growth of a federal government with its tentacles increasingly intertwined in the day-to-day lives of all Americans. As long as the people remained largely disengaged, the potential damage to society as a whole and to the financial health of the country was unknown to the vast majority of the population.

Over the past three years, this indifference has begun to change as the reality of the nation's future and the motives and tactics of those on the left have come into focus. But that reality has come to the fore solely as the result of the aggressive implementation of left-wing policies by the current administration combined with a two-year Democrat supermajority in Congress which allowed the progressives to pursue their vision of America unopposed and unencumbered.

During this two-year period, ObamaCare was passed using unprecedented legislative trickery and political bribery. An extraordinary number of "czars" were appointed to enact policy in the dark of night and avoid oversight by Congress. A litany of grants and loans were given to political cronies ostensibly to develop green energy companies -- many of whom have now declared bankruptcy.

Additionally, the regulatory agencies, such as the EPA, have issued a tidal wave of regulations geared to strangle the free market and centralize economic control in Washington. Three failed stimulus packages were passed, none of which came remotely close to creating the jobs promised. Since 2008, over $5 trillion in national debt has been accumulated with no end in sight, and financial insolvency a real possibility in the not too distant future.

The unplanned circumstance of a Democrat supermajority in Congress and a leftist president came about decades before the strategy of gradualism, begun in the 1930s, would have more easily achieved the same objectives. The primary aspect of this strategy was straight out of the socialist/progressive handbook. That is to create a demand for subsistence and dependence on a powerful central government under the mantra that a country so wealthy and prosperous owes its citizenry an ever-expanding social safety net, all the while subtly altering the historic relationship between the people and the government, as a greater percentage of the population would become dependent on the largess of those in control of government.

Additionally, beginning in the late 1960s, the left began to aggressively infiltrate the media, the entertainment complex, the education establishment, and government bureaucracies. The ultimate prize was the control of a major political party while indoctrinating the populace with anti-American and pro-socialist dogma. By the mid-1980s, they succeeded in dominating these sectors of the American ruling establishment, and as of 2008, they achieved control of the Democratic Party.

However, they have had less than thirty years, and only one generation to program with their failed and self-serving philosophy. That is why over 40% of the electorate still identifies as conservative while only 21% self-identify as liberal (moderates make up 35%). In fact, since 1992, conservative identification has increased from 35 % to 40%, while the liberal identification has increased only from 18% to 21%. Assuming that half of those who consider themselves moderates lean conservative, then conservative leaning moderates and conservatives combined would account for 58%-59% of the population, confirming that the United States is a right-of-center country.

The basic character and beliefs of the majority of the American people have not been significantly altered. While the timing may have been in place to have Barack Obama elected president while pretending to be moderate, the timing to turn the United States into a bastion of socialism was not. The infiltration of the various institutions by the left and the creation of a preponderant dependent class have not been underway long enough to change the character of the majority of the population.

In essence, Barack Obama's presidency coupled with the left-wing dominance of the Democratic Party with a congressional supermajority occurred too early in the history of the nation for the left to achieve their objectives.

Yet the overreaching by the Obama administration has continued even after the resounding defeat in 2010, when the Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives, as Barack Obama is now governing by use of executive orders and recess appointments in contravention of the Constitution. Obama's and the Democrats' indifference to the rule of law and the future of the country has not only awakened the people, but also placed the fate of the American left in jeopardy.

Thus, panic has begun to set, as it is now dawning on the American left that there is a very real possibility that Barack Obama will be defeated in November; the Republicans may well control both houses of Congress by a significant margin; and the odds that the Supreme Court could declare their landmark accomplishment, ObamaCare, unconstitutional have risen dramatically. If Obama loses and the Republicans control Congress, then the last chance for the progressives to achieve their socialist utopian dream will be gone forever. They are now retreating to the only political strategy they know: fear and intimidation.

The digital storm troopers of the left, Media Matters and MoveOn.org among others, have been dispatched to shut down the alternative media by any means possible. They harbor a particular animus against talk radio, as chronicled by Jeffrey Lord in the American Spectator. The effort to incite societal upheaval through racial intimidation has been and will be further escalated. Class warfare and its attendant demonstrations, rallies, and riots will be pushed to a level never experienced in the United States. There will be no moral or ethical limits to the lies, vitriol, and demagoguery the nation will be put through over the next seven months.

The hallmark of the conservative and Republican opposition over the past fifty years has been passivity with an over-emphasis on civility. The left is counting on the same in this election cycle, as they intend to overwhelm and intimidate not only their Republican opponents, but the Tea Party movement and the populace as a whole.

While those in the conservative movement and the Republican Party cannot stoop to the level of the Democrats, Barack Obama, and the left, they must stand up and go toe-to-toe with their adversaries and understand that the vast majority of the American people are not sympathetic to the end-product of progressive policies. However, if the Republican Party campaigns as it has over the past five decades, Barack Obama could win an unnecessarily close election despite all the factors arrayed against him.

Therefore, every political accusation has to be answered with a forceful rebuttal; every lie told must be called a lie, and not some polite euphemism; everyone who tells a falsehood or fabricates an anecdote out of whole cloth must be called a liar. There must be a constant drumbeat of focused talking points used by all candidates for public office and their supporters reminding the electorate of the failures of Barack Obama and the Democratic Party as well as the long-term impact of these fiascos. Charges of racism, homophobia, misogyny, et al. should be dismissed with Ronald Reagan's famous line -- "There they go again" -- and then ignored, as this tactic is now threadbare from overuse.

Whoever wins the Republican presidential nomination and those running for the House of Representatives, the Senate, and governorships must be determined to win their elections at any cost and without reservation or so-called "civility."

The citizens of the United States have been granted an unprecedented window on a future as envisioned by the American left. That prospect must be rejected by soundly defeating Barack Obama and the Democratic Party in November thus ending the progressive era in America.

Steve McCann

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/04/barack_obama_and_the_end_of_the_progressive_era.html

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

After Assad, Naïveté is our Worst Enemy

by Farid Ghadry

What makes a human being naive? Which part of his/her brain is so dysfunctional it defies rational thinking and turns lies into hope, deceptions into wishful thinking?

I am referring here to Secretary Kofi Annan making a statement today to the fact that Assad will pull his armies and heavy equipment by April 10.

These are the exact words the CBS/AP story began with:

(CBS/AP) UNITED NATIONS – International envoy Kofi Annan said Syria informed him its military will complete withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from populated areas by April 10, according to United Nations diplomats briefed on the plan.

U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice said Annan told a closed Security Council briefing Monday that he received this timetable from Syria’s foreign minister on Sunday and indicated that he would have preferred an earlier deadline.

The key words are “Syria informed him”. With more than a handful of Assad lies already under his belt in the last 2 short weeks Annan has worked this case, the ex-Secretary General still accepts the words Assad utter for their face value.

Moreover, Annan seems to be more worried about an earlier date to stop the violence (We appreciate this effort) than if the Assad promises can stand the test of time.

I am fully aware that Annan is a man of peace and we should all applaud that aspect of his professional life, but peace cannot come at the expense of other forms of institutionalized tyrannies. Especially when misinformation and deception are an integral part of the Assad foreign policy and used as often as possible.

Is Annan looking for justification for his efforts? Maybe. But he is not calculating the effects this will have on his reputation should Assad deny him the luxury of looking like a statesman instead of a naive envoy, which is a certainty if Syria‘s freedom fighters keep the pressure up.

Further, was April 10 a date proposed by Annan or Assad? It makes one hell of a difference if Annan proposed it and even a worse difference if Assad suggested it.

The Assad regime is a trap sprang by the Soviets, who call themselves Russians now, to embarrass, defeat, and terrorize the west with. Yet, over and over again, the west falls for this trap without learning anything worth learning.

Is there a pill one can take to deliquesce naïveté in the brain?

Farid Ghadry

Source: http://ghadry.com/2012/04/02/after-assad-naivete-is-our-worst-enemy/

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Obama Welcomes Brotherhood Run for Egyptian Presidency

by Ryan Mauro

The Muslim Brotherhood swore up and down that it wouldn’t seek the Egyptian presidency as proof of its desire for a pluralistic society. At the last minute, the Brotherhood nominated Khairat el-Shater. According to the New York Times, State Department officials actually look at this as a good thing that could stop the more puritanical Salafists from winning.

“State Department officials said they were untroubled and even optimistic about the Brotherhood’s reversal of its pledge not to seek the presidency,” the Times reports.

Shater has had extensive contact with U.S. officials and has convinced them that he’s not to be feared. Apparently, these U.S. officials have forgotten about (or never were informed of) the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and history.

The Brotherhood’s leaders preach a strategy of “gradualism” towards “mastership of the world.” Hamas has officially added “a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood-Palestine” to its name. The Vice Chairman of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party says Hamas is a “resistance group” and that Cairo should host one of its offices. The Brotherhood’s leaders are not shy about their goal of destroying Israel and its internal documents refer to its “work in America as a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within.”

In November, a Brotherhood spokesman stated without equivocation, “The Sharia, the Muslim legal framework, must be the foundation for everything.” On November 24, senior Brotherhood leaders publicly preached violent jihad, and the International Union of Muslim Scholars, a Brotherhood entity, declared that it is time to “revive the duty of jihad in all its forms.” One top leader, Mohamad Katatni, predicts that the revolution in Egypt would lead to the elimination of the state of Israel.

The State Department’s welcoming of Shater’s candidacy is partly due to fear of the Salafist candidate, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail. He is outwardly hostile to the West. The Salafists shocked the West when they won nearly one-fourth of the vote in Egypt’s elections. The latest poll shows that Ismail leaped forward from as low as fifth place to second place at 22%, about 10% behind the secularist presidential frontrunner, Amr Moussa.

Ismail is happy about Shater’s candidacy. He believes that it will take votes away from Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a Muslim Brotherhood leader whose membership was suspended when he ran for president against the leadership’s wishes. He’s currently polling at 8%. The election is held in May, and if no single candidate gets more than 50% of the vote, a run-off is held between the top two candidates the next month. If it comes down to Moussa and Ismail, the Islamists will rally behind Ismail and give him a landslide victory.

Three long-standing Brotherhood officials resigned in protest of Shater’s campaign. One of them, Kamal el-Helbawi, suspects that a deal has been struck between the ruling military council and the Brotherhood. He points out that the council declared Shater innocent of all charges brought against him. Shater serves as an important liaison between the military council and the Brotherhood.

Dr. Daniel Pipes and Cynthia Farahat believe that the military council has a power-sharing arrangement with the Islamists that will allow the generals to justify their rule. There were widespread allegations of fraud in the elections and reports that the military council even funded and supplied the Islamists.

Another reason for the welcoming of the Brotherhood’s presidential campaign by some senior U.S. officials is that it is looked upon as a “moderate Islamist” group that can counter Al-Qaeda and similar jihadists.

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in January that “Al-Qaeda probably will find it difficult to compete for local support with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood” and that “non-violent, pro-democracy demonstrations challenge Al-Qaeda’s violent jihadist ideology and might yield increased political power for secular or moderate Islamist parties.”

When the Brotherhood’s second-in-command said it would “not recognize Israel under circumstances and might put the peace treaty up to a referendum,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland brushed it off as the opinion of just one Brotherhood member. “We have had other assurances from the party with regard to their commitment not only to universal human rights, but to the international obligations that the government of Egypt has undertaken,” she said.

William Taylor, the State Department official overseeing U.S. aid to the countries affected by the Arab Spring, struck a similar tone when he was asked about why his office was giving election training to Brotherhood members. “What we need to do is judge people and parties and movements on what they do, not what they’re called,” he replied.

The second part of Taylor’s answer exposed his ignorance of what the Brotherhood preaches. He said, “as long as parties, entities do not espouse or conduct violence, we’ll work with them.” The U.S. “should not be afraid of [the Brotherhood]. We should deal with them,” he feels. All indications are that the options are not good for the direction of Egypt. Islamic theocracy is the ultimate destination — the only question is whether the country will arrive there by street car or speeding train. And so far, the Obama administration’s role has only been to make this transition more expeditious.

Ryan Mauro

Source: http://frontpagemag.com/2012/04/03/obama-welcomes-brotherhood-run-for-egyptian-presidency/

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Obama Leaks Israel’s Attack Plan?

by P. David Hornik

Last week Mark Perry—a writer with a long anti-Israeli pedigree—published a much-talked-about article in Foreign Policy. It claimed Azerbaijan had granted Israel use of some airbases for an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities—thereby helping Israel solve problems of refueling its planes and making an attack much more feasible.

Azerbaijan is a small, mostly Shiite Muslim country on Iran’s northern border. It has long been concerned about Iran’s treatment of the ethnic Azeri population living there. Azerbaijan is also one of the few Muslim countries having close economic and strategic ties with Israel.

Perry claimed his inside information came from U.S. sources, particularly “four senior diplomats and military intelligence officers.” He quoted one intelligence officer as saying: “We’re watching what Iran does closely. But we’re now watching what Israel is doing in Azerbaijan. And we’re not happy about it.”

In a much-talked-about reaction to Perry’s article, John Bolton claimed the Obama administration had intentionally leaked the story “as part of [its] campaign against an Israeli attack,” weakening Israel’s hand by revealing “very sensitive, very important information.”

Bolton said that, while he didn’t have hard proof of it, “Clearly, this is an administration-orchestrated leak. This is not a rogue CIA guy saying I think I’ll leak this out.”

He added: “It’s just unprecedented to reveal this kind of information about one of your own allies.”

One major Israeli military analyst, Ron Ben-Yishai, reacted similarly to Bolton and went even further, writing that the Obama administration was carrying out a “targeted assassination of potential Israeli operations in Iran” with media leaks that had “caused Israel substantive diplomatic damage, and possibly even military and operational damage.”

Along with the Foreign Policy article, Ben-Yishai emphasized a report by the Congressional Research Service, also published last week, claiming an Israeli attack would only set Iran’s nuclear program back by about six months. “Any Iranian intelligence analyst” reading these two open sources, Ben-Yishai averred, “will find invaluable information there.”

And having served as a reporter in Washington for seven years, Ben-Yishai said he

kn[e]w very well that with a few exceptions, the U.S. administration knows how to prevent leaks to the media if it so wishes…. What we are seeing here is not a trickle of information, but rather, a powerful current, a true flood that leaves no doubt as to the existence of an orchestrated media campaign with clear aims.

The administration, for its part, denied leaking the information on Azerbaijan and said it would “gladly prosecute” those behind it if it knew who they were. An official told Israel’s Ynet that Washington and Jerusalem were cooperating more closely than ever on Iran and making “tremendous efforts.”

That denial may not seem significant in itself, as the administration would hardly confirm that it was responsible for the leak, while declining to comment would be the same as an admission.

More notable, though, is that by early this week some Israeli analysts no less weighty than Ben-Yishai had taken a different tack on the Foreign Policy article.

Ehud Yaari, one of Israel’s most senior commentators on Middle Eastern affairs, scoffed in The Times of Israel that Perry’s report “simply does not make any sense” and was another of his “cloak-and-dagger patchwork stories aimed at undermining the state he intensely detests.”

Yaari asked how Azerbaijan could possibly provide Israel with airbases for striking Iran when

Iranian missiles can quite easily knock out those airbases as well as the huge Azeri BP oil terminal near Baku, which is the lifeline of the country’s economy. Tehran leaders are on record stating that they will retaliate forcefully against any state that will provide bases for an attack against it.

In another article The Times of Israel cited two Israeli security experts who similarly dismissed Perry’s claims. One, Shlomo Brom, said they were “utterly baseless. Azerbaijan is a small country that borders on Iran. It just doesn’t make sense they would help Israel attack them. It would be suicidal.”

To sum up: Perry indeed has an intense animus against Israel—having warned, for instance, against the emergence of “Jewish Hezbollah”—and it is also true that small countries like Azerbaijan generally do not want to infuriate a much more powerful, ruthless neighbor.

But even if the Foreign Policy article is basically Perry’s concoction and the administration is not behind it, it remains the case that the media has been awash with delegitimations of any Israeli action against Iran. In addition to the congressional report, the New York Times reported last month on a classified Pentagon simulation game forecasting that an Israeli attack would spark a regional conflagration and could cost hundreds of U.S. casualties; the Times has also run a series of stories claiming U.S. intelligence and even the Israeli Mossad still are unsure Iran wants to build a bomb at all.

When you combine all this with open statements by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and by Obama himself about the supposed ineffectiveness and bad consequences of an Israeli attack, the impression of an orchestrated campaign remains. That means Israel still may have to choose between putting its fate in the Obama administration’s hands or going into action very much by itself.

P. David Hornik

Source: P. David Hornik

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Terrorism In France

by Julien Balkany

Measured reason and thoughtfulness then look as if they have become the extreme view.

As the serial killing saga of self-styled Islamic extremist and al-Qaeda sympathizer, 23-year old Mohammed Merah, comes to a close in Toulouse, France, it might help to look at the lessons this event unwittingly provides, particularly as political correctness is all too often impedes doing so.

First, let us start by being honest about who the real victims are: not "the nation of France," not "people of all races," not "unity," but Jews. As Yann Moix, in the French magazine, "La Règle du Jeu," stated: "When a Jew is assassinated because he is a man, it is an assassination. When a man is assassinated because he is a Jew, it is an act of anti-Semitism."

This is hardly the first time violence has rocked a French political election – and it is not the first time French people of the Jewish faith have been targeted for death during such a period. During the 1981 campaign season that saw Francois Mitterrand take power from President Valery Giscard D'Estaing, terrorists bombed a Jewish synagogue in Paris, killing four people and injuring 40 others. Jews were the overt targets. The perpetrator did not set out to assassinate "French society" or "national unity"-- just Jews.

In last month's event, people of the Jewish faith – a Rabbi and three young children -- were again targeted in one of the three sets of killings. The targets of the other two killings were French military personnel of North African and Caribbean origin who had put their lives on the line to defend France, and whom the killer possibly deemed worthy of the same fate because of the courageous foreign policy of President Sarkozy in his fight against terrorism.

These incidents can create a public panic that automatically increases the range of acceptable responses. Measured reason and thoughtfulness then look as if they have become the extreme view. The correct reaction is indeed not to accept such acts -- but to respond surgically, with considered, specific measures. This is precisely the strategy for which President Nicolas Sarkozy can be credited for proposing: precise, new, targeted legislative actions.

We are learning, for example, that Merah had spent considerable time in Afghanistan, where he was arrested and subsequently repatriated. Despite being on the French authorities' watch-list since 2008 after making yet another trip to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border last year, and despite squirrelling away in his home enough weapons to supply a small army, he was reportedly considered "harmless" by security services.

One hopes that questions are being asked about why this case was permitted to progress to the point of disaster. Sarkozy, however, understanding the need for strategically applied surgical reinforcement through new legislative action, announced in the immediate aftermath of the standoff that "any person habitually consulting websites promoting terrorism, hatred, or violence will be lawfully punished" as will anyone who goes overseas "for the purposes of indoctrination in terrorist ideology," as determined by due process consistent with democratic values.

As I have traveled across North America over the past several months, I have met with French nationals of all backgrounds who, like me, have been "adopted" with open arms. In this spirit, we should all act and speak relentlessly to defend and protect our Jewish brothers and sisters who are repeatedly targeted on account of their beliefs.

Julien Balkany is a French National Assembly currently campaigning to represent French citizens living abroad in the United States and Canada, and New York based co-founder and managing partner of private investment firm, Nanes Balkany Partners.

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2988/terrorism-in-france

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Urgently Needed: "Fill the Vacuum" for Israeli Arabs So The Extremists Will Not

by Khaled Abu Toameh

Radicals are are making every effort to drag Israel's Arab citizens toward a confrontation with the Israeli establishment. If If Israel does not build a kindergarten or school in Nazareth, someone else will -- either secular extremists or Muslim fundamentalists.

Some of the leaders of the Israeli Arabs have caused tremendous damage to relations between Jews and Arabs inside Israel.

These leaders are responsible for the fact that a growing number of Jews today view Arab citizens as a "fifth column" and an "enemy from within."

The Arab members of Knesset should be fighting for equality and better services for their constituents, and not spending most of their time defending Fatah and Hamas and issuing fiery statements against Israel.

Participating in a flotilla aid ship to the Gaza Strip does not help improve the living conditions of Israeli Arabs. Nor does participating in Fatah rallies held in Ramallah and other parts of the West Bank.

Some of the Arab Knesset members have obviously forgotten that they were elected by Arab citizens of Israel and not by Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

There is nothing wrong, of course, with expressing solidarity with the Palestinians there. After all, Israeli Arabs see themselves as part of the Palestinian people.

But there is a feeling among Israeli Arabs that at least half of their representatives in the Knesset care more about their Palestinian brethren in the West Bank and Gaza Strip than their constituents.

Israeli Arabs would like to see their representatives fighting to solve the many problems they are facing, such as poverty and unemployment. They would like to see Arab parliamentarians struggling for improved infrastructure and more government funds for Arab municipalities.

Israel, also, can play a role in undermining the radicals among its Arab community. The best way to weaken the radicals is by embracing the Arab citizens rather than alienating them.

Embracing Israeli Arabs would boost their confidence in Israel and drive them away from radicals who are making every effort to drag Israel's Arab citizens toward a confrontation with the Israeli establishment.

If Israel does not build a kindergarten or school in Nazareth, someone else will. And in this case, the someone else could be secular extremists or Muslim fundamentalists. If Israel does not build a community center in Baka Al-Gharbiyya, the Islamic Movement will do so.

Israel needs to start working on repairing the damage that has been caused to relations between Jews and Arabs inside the country. The PLO and Hamas have damaged relations not only between Jews and Palestinians, but also between Arabs and Jews living inside Israel.

In recent years, Israeli governments have taken a number of decisions aimed at rebuilding mutual confidence between Arab and Jewish citizens.

These decisions include allocating additional public funding to Arab municipalities, and investment in infrastructure in Arab villages and towns, as well as incorporating Israeli Arabs in jobs in the public and private sectors.

When the Arab citizens see that their state cares about them and does not relate to them as an enemy, they will keep a distance from the radicals. The radical leaders of the Arab community find fertile soil among disgruntled Israeli Arabs, especially young people who are looking for a better life and paying jobs.

The overwhelming majority of Israeli Arabs remains loyal to the state even though they do not identify with its national anthem. Peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs inside Israel is not a lost cause.

Khaled Abu Toameh

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2987/israeli-arabs-extremists

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Egyptian Liberals Speak Out Against Brotherhood

by IPT News

Speaking out against religious extremism takes courage in today's Egypt, especially when extremists make up an absolute majority in Parliament. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) has translated the comments of two courageous Egyptian intellectuals who took to Arabic television to denounce the dominant Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi parties.

As Egyptian liberals, these two commentators have made it their goal to get the message out about the dangers of the Brotherhood and Egypt's Salafi movement.

Philosopher Murad Wahba told Egypt's CBC TV that the Muslim Brotherhood was the latest in a line of historic movements trying to bring Egypt back to religious extremism. These groups "all took us back to the context of the 13^th century, and we have developed 'antibodies' against the 21^st century. This is the real crisis of our society today," he said in a March 8 broadcast.

For Egyptian thinker Sayyid al-Qimni, the Brotherhood doesn't just reject modern society and the West. To him, there really isn't much distinction between political Islamists like the Brotherhood and Salafis, or even violent jihadists like al-Qaida.

Both the Brotherhood and the Salafis are willing to have "blood on the streets" to protect constitutional guarantees that Islam serves as the state religion and Islamic law as the source of all legislation. Their insistence on protecting state-sponsored discrimination against secular and Christian Egyptians is "ripping Egypt apart," Qimni lamented on Arabian Gulf channel Al-Arabiya TV on Feb. 23.

Both political Islamists and jihadists are willing to do whatever it takes to form an Islamic state ruled by strict religious law, with al-Qaida preferring open violence and the Brotherhood relying on manipulation of the political system, al-Qimni said.

"For one thing, they differ in degree, but not in their nature… some groups say they are conducting political activity, but at the same time declare that they reject democracy," he said. And when the Brotherhood says "that Man cannot make laws unto himself, since Allah alone makes laws – that is exactly what Al-Qaida and other such groups say."

Salafi leaders have confirmed their ideological closeness with the Brotherhood. "At the end of the day, we and the Brotherhood want the same thing. What is that?" Sheikh Ayman Shrieb, the leader of the Salafi al-Nour Party, asked in December. "Well, we want an Islamic state. Every vote we don't get, we hope it goes to the Brotherhood."

The Brotherhood and the Salafis differ in one other key area, al-Qimni said. The Brotherhood is notorious about making political expedient comments at one time and turning on a dime when the moment is right. "Therefore, the difference [between the Brotherhood and al-Qaida] is not in nature, but in timing – one moment they [the Brotherhood] say something, and the next moment they deny it," al-Qimni told viewers.

So while al-Qaida is open about its goal of an Islamic state, the political Islamists seem to have fooled everyone, even government officials, with their deceptive rhetoric.

The examples are abundant. The Brotherhood promised last year not to run a presidential candidate, to respect concerns about the forceful and total transition of the country into an Islamic Republic. But following the group's domination of parliamentary elections, the MB's No. 2 man has thrown his hat into the ring in next month's presidential race.

This flip-flop resembles the group's stance on parliamentary elections and on the independence of its political party from the Brotherhood.

Early last year, officials issued statements that the party would be "completely independent" of the movement, and pledged that the FJP would not contest more than a third of the seats in Egypt's first parliamentary election in more than 30 years. But the FJP is made up almost exclusively of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and has acted as a tool of the Brotherhood to legalize its ideological platform.

The Brotherhood quickly changed its aim on winning seats in parliament. In early April, Mohsen Radi, a former lawmaker and Brotherhood leader, told Egypt's Al Masry Al Youm that the Brotherhood had raised its target "to secure 35 percent to 40 percent of parliamentary seats." Apparently sticking to earlier cautions, Radi reassured the Egyptian daily that "the Brotherhood will not run for more than 49 percent of parliamentary seats."

But less than a month later, the group's stated plans changed again—albeit ever-so-slightly. On April 30, the Brotherhood Shura Council acknowledged its plan for the FJP to contest half of Egypt's parliamentary seats. In a public display of confidence, Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie also stated that if his group was to contest all available seats, it would be able to win upwards of 75 percent.

Egypt is going to need more voices like Wahba and al-Qimni to remind their countrymen about the promise of last year's peaceful revolution that appears to be fading rapidly.

IPT News

Source: http://www.investigativeproject.org/3518/egyptian-liberals-speak-out-against-brotherhood

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.