by Yoav Limor
Former fighter pilot Maj. Gen. Tal Kalman, who heads the IDF's Iran Directorate, says that dealing with the challenges the Islamic republic poses for Israel is a delicate and complex mission, but one the IDF is more than capable of handling.
 |
| "The Iranian people pay a very heavy price for the regime’s interest in nuclear capability," says Maj. Gen. Tal Kalman | Photo: Eric Sultan |
The past year was very good security-wise. The low number of attacks and victims gave Israelis a relatively high feeling of security, and the intensive focus on coronavirus (and elections) pushed aside other issues that in normal times would have made headlines.
But the security challenges are here to stay. The new government, when it is formed, will not be able to avoid them, and top of the list is Iran. Behind the scenes, preparations are already underway for these marathon discussions, which take place mainly within the IDF, and specifically in the new unit formed last year to deal with Iran and strategic issues – the Strategy and Third-Circle Directorate.
The man heading this unit, Tal Kalman, is one of the most-cautious generals in the General Staff, and his statements here, in his first and exclusive interview, portray exactly the threats and possible responses – including military – but also hold a warning: to avoid dealing with these problems could pose a strategic threat for Israel.
Kalman says 2020 was a good year for the battle against Iran. "I don't want to call it a turning point year, but it was a year of major changes." It began with the killing of Qassem Suleimani, and continued with "a sequence of events that I mostly can't elaborate on, which made the balance positive, even very positive."
Q: And yet, Iran is far from surrendering.
"Iran is not a specific operational challenge, but a challenge one level above the military. It is a challenge for our national security doctrine. We had a tendency to be cynical in recent years, due to the idea that Iran is being pushed into the discussion for other things, but I really think this is about dealing with a country with the potential to become a regional power, headed by an extreme regime with a real goal of destroying Israel.
Dealing with Iran, he says, is based on four components. The first is the extreme regime, "that as long as it rules Iran, Israel will have a major challenge." The second is the nuclear issue. The third is the military strengthening "which is close to that of a regional power." And the fourth is the Iranian attempt to grow its regional influence "that in the long run uses areas with lack of governance and establishes capabilities there."
The challenge that all these pose for Israel is unprecedented. "The standard components of deterrence, defeat and defense are irrelevant for a country of 80 million people that are hundreds of miles away. This is a long-term strategic competition that calls on us to deploy a different kind of thinking than the one used for tackling a country on our border."
Q: Explain.
"For a country on our border, I build up the force, prepare for war, sometimes act to thwart threats, and I keep a very large intelligence hold , with the aim of bringing about defeat in war. With Iran, it's not about defeat. It's a competition. And therefore the components that need to be dealt with are not only military. They're also military, but also diplomatic, economic, conscientious, and more. That's how big the challenge is."
Q: Can Iran be defeated?
"When you're in a strategic competition with a state, you're not concerned about defeat. What you try to achieve is supremacy at any given point in time, supremacy that will give significant deterrence that will give you security and deter the other side from acting against you."
Q: And yet, Jerusalem and Washington had hoped for defeat - that the regime would collapse under the sanctions.
"A strategic competition is not about thinking about tomorrow morning, but long term. It requires synchronizing all the national efforts, some of which are not managed by the IDF, but rather other bodies. Israel has room for improvement in this area."
This is precisely the process that Kalman has been advancing this past year. Together with the Mossad, the Foreign Ministry, the Atomic Energy Commission and other bodies, an orderly process is taking place, which will eventually submit to the state leadership a doctrine of how to deal with Iranian challenge in the long term, and will subsequently bring about the synchronization of all the national efforts "which were not always synchronized in the past."
Q: What have you already learned?
"We understood that we need to deal with all the components of the problem. You can't just look at the nuclear, or just at the military, or just at the regional. You need to deal with everything. These past years we were very focused on the nuclear, which is of course on top because there's a difference in dealing with a nuclear Iran to a non-nuclear one."
The Iranian regime is interested in nuclear capability, he says, first of all to secure its stability. But for Israel, this is an existential issue, and it will be a different Middle East, entering a nuclear arms race where other countries can join Iran and attempt to achieve nuclear capabilities."
Q: Who?
"I presume many of the countries around us will attempt to achieve nuclear capability. Certainly those with the economic capability."
Q: Saudi Arabia? The Emirates? Egypt? Turkey?
"All these countries are candidates, yes. They are worried about Iran as much as we are."
As opposed to public belief, Kalman thinks the Israeli strategy in the past 30 years actually worked, and the proof is that Iran still has no nuclear capability. The way to continue to delay this aspiration in the future is to make it understand that the price it pays is heavy. "The Iranian people pay a very heavy price for the regime's interest in nuclear capability. But I believe this is not an Israeli problem, but one for the whole international community."
Therefore, he believes, during negotiations, Israel needs to focus only on the nuclear issue, and not additional issues. "When speaking of nuclear capability, you should only talk about that and not about other regional issues and military reinforcement. It's not right to push all those issues into the deal."
Q: Why?
"Because the nuclear issue is the number one threat, and we have to achieve the maximum on that one. With all the rest we'll know how to deal. It's not that we're not asking the international community to deal with those as well, but there's a clear priority. First of all: nuclear capability."
Kalman is also very concerned about the conventional military strengthening of Iran, which is "a discussion we're missing out on." It's not about tanks and artillery, mostly long-range missiles and rockets, many of them precise, cruise missiles, drones, advanced aerial defense weapon systems that could challenge the Israeli air force and more. "Iran doesn't only produce for itself. It supplies its subordinates with precise capabilities, with cruise missiles, with aerial defense systems to deal with Israeli air force capabilities. What's made in Iran doesn't stay in Iran. It's immediately found in Syria, Lebanon, and maybe later on in Gaza."
'The military option is always there'
Kalman believes that Israel can influence what the deal with Iran will look like. The way to do that is through dialogue with the new US administration, which is already underway. Earlier this month there was a comprehensive discussion between the sides, led by the National Security Council, in which Kalman and his people took part. "The first stage is to be aligned with them on the intelligence picture. The Iranian nuclear program in 2021 is not the same program that existed when the deal was signed in 2015."
Q: And they agree with us?
"I think that in very high percentages they see the situation as we do."
Q: And can you understand the fear in Israel, based on the fact that these are the same people who were involved with making the deal last time?
"It's true that in some of the cases these are the same people, but it's not the same administration. So far, this administration is keeping its promises. It has come to listen, not rush to a new deal. So, I think there's a space of a few months to try and influence the administration's policy. Even the Americans are clearly saying they will not allow Iran to achieve nuclear capability. Now, the question is how to act in this situation."
Q: What should Israel be demanding?
"I can't go into detail, but basically we're saying 'yes' to a deal that will be longer and stronger."
Q: What do you say to those who think Iran is closer to the bomb than it was under the deal?
"As we see it, the actions Iran has taken are reversible, and were made to signal the international community to 'hold us back and come back to the deal.' It's not that Iran has run away and headed towards a bomb. Furthermore, if the deal still existed, the Iranian issues wouldn't be on the agenda. Under Biden's national security doctrines, the Middle East is in fourth or fifth place. The US is looking at other regions and doesn't want to invest as much in ours. Leaving the deal actually left the Iranian issues on the agenda very clearly."
Kalman believes that the chances that Iran has secret components in its nuclear program are very low. "We have great intelligence and cooperation, but since it's already happened to us once - our strategy needs to be that it can happen to us again. I can assure you that the utmost efforts and means are invested in surveillance and to be prepared so we are not surprised, but since I can't foresee the future, and presuming this is indeed an existential threat for Israel that we can't tolerate, we need also relevant military tools."
Q: Let's discuss the military option.
"I've been dealing with this for 25 years. I know the plans from the tactical level to the systemic and strategic level where I am today. For the past decades, it was always in gear, during the first years of the deal the level of attention to this dropped somewhat, but over the past year we're back in fourth-fifth gear."
Q: So one should ask if Israel has the ability to militarily thwart Iran's nuclear plan. To attack and completely destroy it, like in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007.
"The answer is yes. When we build these capabilities, we build them to be operational. It's not that there aren't many strategic dilemmas, since the day after Iran can go back to the plan, but the ability exists. Definitely."
A military threat, he believes, should be part of the strategic components. This is the message that Israel is sending in its dialogue with the US and Europe. "We don't want to use it. Maybe when I was young I did, but today I understand it must be the final resort. We need to reach a solution in other ways, diplomatically, and I think there's a chance for that, but this tool is also important. The Iranian regime is looking at this long-term, strategically, and is cautious and calculated. We already said that for them the nuclear bomb is an insurance policy, so if they understand it could endanger them - they'll think again."
While Israel is building capability to attack Iran, he says, the path forward is through cooperation. "Without being pompous, over the past two years we've seen dramatic changes in cooperation with our allies, mainly the US We have a relationship that has reached high intimacy. There were operations in the past year where things happened that never did before, from intelligence cooperation to operational cooperation. It happens because the Americans understand the shared interest in restraining the Iranian challenge in the Middle East."
Q: Many in the defense community believe that instead of fighting the Iranians on our border, we should move the battle to their territory.
"One of the conclusions in the process we're doing now is that we need to strengthen that component in the set of actions we're doing."
Kalman very much believes that the normalization agreements with the Gulf states do exactly that. "I think the Iranian leader, whose strategy is to base Iran on Israel's borders, wakes up these days and is very concerned, because he sees potential for Israel to be based around his own borders. It's a major change."
Q: And military activity?
"Moving part of the activity to areas outside of Israel is part of the issue. There's no doubt it's a right tool, we'll have to figure out how to develop it."
Q: That means that if things explode on our border, Iran won't be able to sit quietly back at home?
"We need to develop such tools. Definitely. When you're competing against an intelligent, strategic actor who plays long term, you need to act to influence his intentions. For that you need to act also in other places and in other ways."
In order to win this competition, he warns, you need to build force. "For the civilians, the security situation is basically good, and Iran is far away, but since this is a challenge to our national defense doctrine, we need to deal with it and we need to build a stable force that will last for many years and will not depend on any kind of agreements."
Q: And what will you say to the Minister of Finance who will come a minute after elections and demand cuts?
"I'll explain the whole picture, and say that in order to invest in other areas that are important like education and health and social services you need security stability, and in order to get that you need budgetary stability for the defense establishment. When you work in sprints, everything is much more expensive. When you plan long term and spread it out over the years, you can do things more intelligently and at lower costs."
Israel facing a 'security paradox'
Kalman, 52, is married and the father of three. In 2018 he was appointed head of the Strategic Division in the IDF Planning Directorate, and last year was appointed head of the new division responsible for Iran and Strategy. He continues to fly and is considered a leading candidate for commander of the Israeli Air Force, a nomination coming up next year.
He believes that despite the Israeli attacks in Syria, where Israel is trying to prevent Iran from establishing itself and the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, Iran has not dropped the dream of a foothold, yet it finds it difficult to do since Suleimani's death. "They're looking for other ways. There's a learning competition between us all the time."
Q: Is there any way to make them give up?
"They're in a different place than what they thought they'd be, and this made them dramatically change their plans. But this isn't a one-two year campaign, and not even four. This is a long-term event."
Q: What needs to happen for them to give up?
"Just like with the nuclear bomb, the solution is not only military. The attacks are only one part of the strategy, but there needs to be a diplomatic component that is missing now. Assad is very dependent on the Iranians economically, and we are thinking about how to bring Syria to the end of its civil war without Iran being there. It's a complicated event that needs to be managed between the powers."
One of the main threats on his table is the rockets and missiles that can hit targets with precision of just a few meters, and therefore pose a strategic threat on the high-profile facilities and strategic assets of Israel. Iran is dealing with this issue intensively in recent years and is spreading capabilities to its subordinates, mainly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.
"There is this tendency, which is wrong, to speak of these precision missiles and Hezbollah in the same sentence," he says. "It's much more widespread and worrying. We're speaking of a technological trend that has become fairly simple and available to all those around us. Israel is a small state and the precision capability on a small country is a threat we define as a grave strategic threat, one below a nuclear bomb. What many don't understand is that it's not just Hezbollah. It's what's being built in Syria, and maybe in the future in the Palestinian arena, and in Iraq and Yemen, and of course in Iran itself. It's a very challenging puzzle."
Q: What you're saying is that if there's a war in the north, your working assumption is that we'll have to deal with precise weapons firing on us from every place in the region.
"Correct. We're not just talking about a battle in the north, but a battle in the Northeast arena."
Therefore, he says, the decision to initiate a preemptive strike in Lebanon against Hezbollah's precision project is complicated, since it could lead to regional war. "We constantly discuss this, and look for ways to deal with the problem in all its dimensions - including the producer, in Iran."
Q: Israel needs to define red lines that it will not cross?
"Defining red lines is very problematic."
Q: Why? You defined red lines when it comes to the nuclear issue.
"Red lines tend to rub out. Israel knows how to respond to complicated challenges, and I believe that with our technology and capability we'll know how to respond to this complicated challenge. But as I said, it's not just Hezbollah but a wider regional problem, which must be part of our strategic discussions with the Americans and others, because nobody in the world is dealing with it. They talk about nuclear bombs, chemical weapons, but nothing about the precision weapons, and this must become part of the discussion."
Q: Let's talk about the upcoming elections in the Palestinian arena.
"This is an event we're watching closely. Israel has decided not to interfere in the elections in the Palestinian Authority, but we are definitely concerned with the Hamas strengthening in Judea and Samaria. The message we passed on to all we speak to, and to the PA itself, is that this is a very dangerous route and it is risky for them."
Q: What is Israel's interest?
"Strengthening of Hamas in Judea and Samaria is a difficult blow to Israel's interest, and to Israeli security. Definitely."
Q: What is Israel's interest in Gaza?
"We're managing an interim strategy in Gaza, where we have yet to define for ourselves what the desired solution is for us long term. As of now Hamas rules the Strip, and our interest is for it to be weakened, restrained, deterred and limited in its capability to strengthen militarily, but simultaneously to keep the humanitarian and economic situation in the Strip reasonable."
Q: That's not a strategic plan. That's crisis management.
"That's the current policy, a policy that has succeeded to prevent quite a few crises over the past year and a half."
Q: But is it good for Israel that Hamas rules Gaza?
"These are discussions we have to have with the state leadership. There can be a long-term situation where Hamas rules Gaza, but that means it will need to change. To recognize Israel. Fatah went through this process many years ago. The probability that Hamas will do this is not very high."
To sum up, he says, Israel is in a "security paradox." On the one hand it is very strong and enjoys strategic supremacy, but on the other hand the threats against it have gotten worse. "We're credited for the security, the daily quiet, but it is our duty to also look long term. There is no doubt that 2020 ended in a very positive strategic balance for Israel."
Q: And how will 2021 end?
"I think that if we succeed in signing a few more normalization agreements we'll have potential for a different Middle East, and as always be very dependent on the dynamics versus Iran. If we succeed in getting the international community on board for a longer and stronger nuclear deal, we'll be in a very positive situation."
Yoav Limor
Source: https://www.israelhayom.com/2021/03/29/israel-has-the-ability-to-completely-destroy-irans-nuclear-program/
Follow Middle East and Terrorism on Twitter
No comments:
Post a Comment