Thursday, July 22, 2010

Who's Against a Two-State Solution?

 

by Efraim Karsh

 

"Two states, living side by side in peace and security." This, in the words of President Barack Obama, is the solution to the century-long conflict between Jews and Palestinian Arabs in the Middle East. Washington is fully and determinedly on board. So are the Europeans. The UN and the "international community" vociferously agree. Successive governments of the state of Israel have shown their support for the idea. So far, there is—just as there has always been—only one holdout.

 

The story begins a long time ago. In April 1920, the newly formed League of Nations appointed Britain as the mandatory power in Palestine. The British were committed, via the Balfour Declaration, to facilitating the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. But they were repeatedly confronted with violent Arab opposition, which they just as repeatedly tried to appease. As early as March 1921, they severed the vast and sparsely populated territory east of the Jordan River ("Transjordan") from the prospective Jewish national home and made Abdullah, the emir of Mecca, its effective ruler. In 1922 and 1930, two British White Papers limited Jewish immigration to Palestine and imposed harsh restrictions on land sales to Jews.

 

But the violence mounted, and in July 1937 it reaped its greatest reward when a British commission of inquiry, headed by Lord Peel, recommended repudiating the terms of the mandate altogether. In its stead, the commission now proposed a two-state solution: the partitioning of Palestine into an Arab state, united with Transjordan, that would occupy some 85 percent of the mandate territory west of the Jordan river, and a Jewish state in the remainder. "Half a loaf is better than no bread," the commission wrote in its report, hoping that "on reflection both parties will come to realize that the drawbacks of partition are outweighed by its advantages."

 

But partition did not happen. While the Zionist leadership gave the plan its halfhearted support, Arab governments and the Palestinian Arab leadership (with the sole exception of Abdullah, who viewed partition as a steppingstone to the vast Arab empire he was striving to create) dismissed it out of hand.

 

The same thing happened in November 1947 when, in the face of the imminent expiration of the British mandate, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine. Rejecting the plan altogether, the Arab nations attempted to gain the whole by destroying the state of Israel at birth. This time, however, Arab violence backfired. In the ensuing war, not only did Israel confirm its sovereign independence and assert control over somewhat wider territories than those assigned to it by the UN, but the Palestinian Arab community was profoundly shattered, with about half of its members fleeing to other parts of Palestine and to neighboring Arab states.

 

But the results hardly won the Arabs over to the merits of the two-state solution. Rather, the Arab states continued to manipulate the Palestinian cause to their own several ends. Neither Egypt nor Jordan permitted Palestinian self-determination in the parts of Palestine they had occupied during the 1948 war. Jordan annexed the West Bank in April 1950, while Egypt kept the Gaza Strip under oppressive military rule. No new Palestinian leadership was allowed to emerge. Only after the conquest of these territories by Israel during the June 1967 Six-Day war, and the passage five months later of UN Security Council Resolution 242, would their political future become a question of the first order.

 

At the time, though, nobody envisaged a return to the two-state solution. To the contrary: Palestinian nationhood was rejected by the entire international community, including the western democracies, the Soviet Union (then the foremost supporter of radical Arabism), and the Arab world itself (as late as 1974, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad openly referred to Palestine as "a basic part of southern Syria"). Instead, under Resolutions 242's "land for peace" terms, it was assumed that any territories evacuated by Israel would be returned to their pre-1967 Arab occupiers: Gaza to Egypt, and the West Bank to Jordan. The resolution did not even mention the Palestinians by name, affirming instead the necessity "for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"—a clause that applied not just to Arabs but to the hundreds of thousands of Jews expelled from Arab states following the 1948 war.

 

What, then, about the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established in 1964 at the initiative of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser? Through a sustained terror campaign in the late 1960s and early 1970s, most notably including the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at the September 1972 Munich Olympics, the PLO would gradually establish itself as a key international player. In October 1974 it was designated by the Arab League as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people, and in the following month PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat became the first non-state leader ever to address the UN General Assembly. Soon afterward, the UN granted observer status to the PLO despite that organization's open commitment to the destruction of Israel, a UN member state; within a few years, it was allowed to open offices in most west European capitals.

 

The PLO's ascendance, coupled with Jordan's renunciation of its claim to the West Bank, led to a reinterpretation of Resolution 242 as in fact implying a two-state solution: namely, Israel and a Palestinian state governed by the PLO in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Conveniently ignored was one glaring fact: the PLO rejected any such solution. In June 1974, the organization adopted a "phased strategy," according to whose terms it would seize whatever territory Israel was prepared or compelled to cede and use it as a springboard for further territorial gains until achieving, in its phrase, the "complete liberation of Palestine."

 

It is true that, in November 1988, more than two decades after the passage of 242, the PLO made a pretense of accepting the resolution; but this was little more than a ploy to open a dialogue with Washington. Shortly after that move, Salah Khalaf, Arafat's second-in-command (better known by his nom de guerre of Abu Iyad), declared: "The establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of Palestine is but a step toward the whole of Palestine." Two years later, following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (which the PLO endorsed), he reiterated the point at a public rally in Amman, pledging "to liberate Palestine inch by inch from the [Mediterranean] sea to the [Jordan] river."

 

Despite all this, Israel's Labor government, which had backed the "land for peace" formula in the immediate wake of the 1967 war, decided to enter into its own peace negotiations with the PLO. In 1993 it signed the "Oslo Accords" providing for Palestinian self-rule in the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period not to exceed five years, during which time Israel and the Palestinians would negotiate a permanent settlement. Although the Oslo accords were not based explicitly on a two-state solution, they signaled an implicit Israeli readiness to acquiesce in the establishment of a Palestinian state.

 

But once again the PLO had other plans. In its judgment, the Oslo "peace process" offered a path not to a two-state but to a one-state solution. Arafat admitted as much five days before signing the accords in Washington when he told an Israeli journalist that "In the future, Israel and Palestine will be one united state in which Israelis and Palestinians will live together"—that is, Israel would cease to exist. And even as he shook Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's hand on the White House lawn, Arafat was assuring the Palestinians in a pre-recorded Arabic-language message that the agreement was merely an implementation of the PLO's phased strategy.

 

The next ten years offered a recapitulation, over and over again, of the same story. In addressing Israeli or Western audiences, Arafat would laud the "peace" he had signed with "my partner Yitzhak Rabin." To his Palestinian constituents, he depicted the accords as transient arrangements required by the needs of the moment, made constant allusion to the "phased strategy," and repeatedly insisted on the "right of return," a euphemism for Israel's destruction through demographic subversion.

 

And that was the least of it. Further discrediting the idea of "two states living side by side in peace and security," Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) launched a sustained campaign of racial hatred and political incitement. Israelis, and Jews more generally, were portrayed as the source of all evil and responsible for every problem, real or imagined, in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians were indoctrinated in the illegitimacy of the state of Israel and the lack of any Jewish connection to the land, supplemented with tales of Israeli plots to corrupt and ruin them.

 

Nor did it stop there. Embracing violence as the defining characteristic of his rule, Arafat set out to build an extensive terrorist infrastructure in the territories—in flagrant violation of the accords and in total defiance of the overriding official reason for his presence there: namely, to lay the groundwork for Palestinian independence. Israeli concessions had no effect, or worse. In 1997, Jerusalem gave the PA full control over virtually the entire Arab population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as some 40 percent of the land, as a prelude to final-status negotiations. But Israel's civilian casualties only mounted. At the American-convened peace summit in Camp David (July 2000), Ehud Barak offered Arafat a complete end to the Israeli presence, ceding virtually the entire territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the nascent Palestinian state and making breathtaking concessions with respect to Jerusalem. Arafat's response was war, at a level of local violence unmatched in scope and intensity since the attempt to abort the creation of a Jewish state in 1948.

 

Although it had become abundantly evident by then that the PLO had no interest whatsoever in statehood, the international community responded by condemning Israel's defensive measures against the Palestinian intifada and urging it to accelerate the "peace process." It also maintained the massive influx of international aid to the Palestinian Authority, making the Palestinians the largest recipients of foreign aid per-capita in the world—though most of the funds were promptly siphoned off to the personal bank accounts of Arafat and his cronies and/or channeled to terror operations. Even after Arafat's death in late 2004 and the landslide victory of the militant Islamist group Hamas in Palestinian parliamentary elections twelve months later, Western governments insistently maintained the façade of a "peace process," now embracing Mahmoud Abbas and his defeated Fatah as the epitome of moderation.

 

But is there in fact a fundamental distinction between Hamas and Fatah when it comes to a two-state solution? Neither faction formally accepts Israel's right to exist; both are formally committed to its eventual destruction. Moreover, for all the admittedly sharp differences between Arafat and his successor Abbas both in personality and in political style, the two are warp and woof of the same dogmatic PLO fabric.

 

In a televised speech on May 15, 2005, Abbas described the establishment of Israel as an unprecedented historic injustice and vowed his unwavering resolve never to accept it. Two-and-a-half years later, at a U.S.-sponsored peace conference in Annapolis, he rejected Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's proposal of a Palestinian Arab state in 97 percent of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip, and categorically dismissed the request to recognize Israel as a Jewish state alongside the would-be Palestinian state, insisting instead on full implementation of the "right of return."

 

In June 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broke with longstanding Likud precept by publicly accepting a two-state solution and agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state, provided the Palestinian leadership responded in kind and recognized Israel's Jewish nature. The Arab world exploded in rage. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, whose country had been at peace with the Jewish state for 30 years, deplored Netanyahu's statement as "scuppering the possibilities for peace." Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat warned that Netanyahu "will have to wait 1,000 years before he finds one Palestinian who will go along with him."

 

At Fatah's sixth general congress, convened in Bethlehem in August last year, the delegates reaffirmed their longstanding commitment to "armed struggle" as "a strategy, not a tactic . . . . This struggle will not stop until the Zionist entity is eliminated and Palestine is liberated." More recently, even as Abbas has publicly mouthed the Obama formula for "two states living side by side in peace and security," he pointedly insists on preconditions impossible for Israel to accept.

 

The Peel Commission had the principle right. While a two-state solution "offers neither party all it wants, it offers each what it wants most, namely, freedom and security." It is a great historical irony that this "half-a-loaf" solution should have been repeatedly advanced as a response by others—Europeans, Americans, Israelis—to the actions of its most implacable opponents, who have then repeatedly proceeded to repudiate it in word and deed. On the Palestinian side, not a single leader has ever evinced any true liking for the idea or acted in a way signifying an unqualified embrace of it. The same is true, with the partial exceptions of Egypt and Jordan, for the larger Arab world.

 

Nearly two decades and thousands of deaths after the launch of the "peace process," one might hope that Western policy makers would at last begin to take the measure of what the Palestinian leadership tells its own people and wider Arab audiences. For the lesson of history remains: so long as things on the Arab side are permitted, or encouraged, to remain as they are, there will be no two-state solution, and therefore no solution at all.

 

 

Efraim Karsh, editor of the Middle East Quarterly and author most recently of Palestine Betrayed (Yale), is professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King's College, University of London.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Middle East 101: Understanding Regional Political Logic


by Barry Rubin

A reader asks why Egypt insists on tying restrictions on the Iran's nuclear program with putting restrictions on Israel's program, including demanding Israel join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that the doors to Israel's Dimona reactor be opened to international inspectors, and that Israel must declare that it has nuclear weapons.

The reader adds that he knows Israel won't do this so what's the point of Egypt making a demand which makes it more likely Iran will get nuclear weapons and thus endanger Egypt and its interests? On one level, then, Egyptian policy doesn't make sense.

For those who don't know, by joining the NPT Treaty countries (like Iran) have received certain benefits. In exchange, they have to submit to inspections and basically promise not to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has broken these commitments. Israel never made them in the first place so Israel's actions are quite in accord with international law.

At any rate, I responded by explaining that it was easy to understand the Egyptian government position: The regime wants everything without making any concessions itself. That isn't just a goal; that's its negotiating position. In addition, by putting the emphasis on Israel's arsenal—which doesn't threaten the current regime—Cairo looks good in Arab and Muslim terms. Will it actually work? Hey, that isn't important! It works in other ways: strengthening the regime's credentials at home and in the region. And that's what's important!

He responded: These despots don't seem cunning to me at all.

But that's flat wrong. They are very cunning and if you understand why and how then you can understand the Middle East. Conversely, those who don't get it understand nothing.

Here is the order of priorities and methods that make up what might be called the Middle East version of pragmatism. It goes like this:

The most important priority is regime survival, which means the current rulers staying in power. The people's well-being and country's interest is secondary at best. To stay in power, a dictatorship needs to generate foreign enemies, reduce freedom, and monopolize economic power. This is in many ways the opposite of the Western democratic framework that a government which provides freedom and material benefits is the one most likely to stay in power.

To ensure regime survival, the dictatorship must protect its Muslim and Arab credentials. Using these two pillars in various combinations, the rulers mobilize the people to support them. A key way to do this is anti-Western and anti-Israel demagoguery: the government portrays itself as a champion of Islam and Arabism against the West.

What the West thinks or says in response is pretty unimportant to a populace which already views those countries as enemies or the regime can ensure this through propaganda. Suppose the United States distances itself from Israel or Israel makes concessions, for example. How will the Arab populaces know this? They will be told that nothing has happened, it is all a trick, or it is far from enough. Rather than prove that they are good guys, these developments are interpreted as merely proving they are weak and frightened.

In these dictatorships, the main purpose of the army is to support the regime and not to threaten it with a coup. This is more important than the military being able to win wars. The main purpose of the educational system and media is to glorify the regime, not to improve the society and help correct its mistakes. The main purpose of the economy is to provide the regime with assets with which to reward friends and punish enemies, not to create general prosperity or raise living standards.

This approach is not democratic and neither provides rapid progress or better lives for the people. But if you start with the original premise—keeping the regime in power comes first—everything makes sense.

Now that you've absorbed this lesson, let's move to a more advanced stage. Here's a paraphrase of a letter from another reader which parallels the first one:

"Given that Israel is not the only country in the Middle East that feels threatened by Iran's nuclear ambitions, and that Israel is likely to be the only country that has the political will to do anything about the situation, doesn't this give Israel a considerable strategic advantage?

"It strikes me that a number of demands could be made upon Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in exchange for Israeli action against Iran, starting with:

"--An end to media, trade and academic boycotts against Israel

--"An end to indoctrination and propaganda

--Concrete steps to share the burden of the Palestinian refugee issue"

Now this is a very good question. But the answer is: No. Why? Because there is very little or no give and take. If the Arab regimes get something from Israel, they will not give anything in return (I'll qualify that point in a second). If they don't get anything from Israel, they will not give in order to get an advantage. They will let events go as they may.

The precise same point, by the way, applies to U.S.-Arab state relations. Of course, the United States saved Kuwait in 1991 and Kuwait likes having U.S. military forces around. But there has been no effort to promote pro-American feeling or to help out much on such issues as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the efforts to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

Why is this? Are the regimes stupid? No, they are following their interests as they perceive these things to be. Similarly, they are not irrational. True, in the end they may pay a high cost for their policy, but up until now they have survived pretty well. The exception is Saddam Hussein in Iraq who just kept going too far.

Of course, too, they can expect in this case that Israel or the United States will attack Iran for their own reasons, or at least the U.S. policy will contain Tehran without their having to do anything. They certainly have seen the West often desperately trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict without them having to do much to help. If the West fails, the regimes can get gifts by complaining how much they are suffering; if the West succeeds, they don't have to do anything any way. The more you think about it, the more sense their stance makes.

And they have another reason for acting this way: the West lets them get away with it. When they have to choose whether to be more afraid of the United States or their internal rivals, neighbors, and people conditioned to accept radical ideologies, it is easy for them to pick the second option. It is often more risky to be moderate, to work with the West, then to defy it. Thus, being intransigent and defiant, using radical rhetoric, maintaining hardline positions, is the rational alternative. They are acting logically.

If you tell them that they would be better off if they went to a more Western-style system, they would reply that this is not their culture. But there are also additional factors: their masses might not like it; their rivals at home and abroad would take advantage of it to portray them as traitors. The Arab elites very carefully watched what happened in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The West cheered a revolution toward freedom; the Arab regimes shivered at the thought of anarchy and their own downfall.

So, is this system pragmatic? Well yes and no. It is NOT pragmatic in terms of keeping people happy through freedom and high living standards. It is pragmatic in judging that demagoguery and control are alternative means of, if not happiness, passivity or outright support for the regime. It is NOT pragmatic in terms of maximizing material profit because that isn't the regimes' goal. It is pragmatic in terms of its own goal: stability and regime maintenance.

Homework: Apply this model to Palestinian politics. In this framework, why isn't the Palestinian Authority as eager for a complete peace settlement and an independent state through compromise as one would expect using a Western model of politics?


 

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Better for the Patient to Suffer than to Be Treated by Israelis?

 

by  Evelyn Gordon

 

Anyone who thinks the primary concern of human rights organizations is the welfare of the people they are trying to help should consider this report on Israel's medical mission to Congo.

Last week, four Israeli burn specialists arrived in Congo to treat survivors of the fuel truck explosion that killed 235 people on July 2 — a mission organized and funded by Israel's Foreign Ministry. They were not the first foreign doctors on the scene, but they were the first burn specialists, and the first to come with specialized equipment for treating burns. As such, they were enthusiastically welcomed by the Congolese; President Joseph Kabila even phoned to thank them personally.

One might have expected them to be equally welcomed by the doctors already on the scene, a team from Medicins Sans Frontieres. After all, the MSF doctors had traveled all the way to the remote town of Sange to help the victims; surely they would be glad to see specialists with specialized equipment, who could help their patients in ways they themselves could not.

So when Haaretz's reporter heard from the Israeli team that the MSF doctors — whose organization has repeatedly accused Israel of "war crimes" against the Palestinians — "treated them coolly and suspiciously at first," with a Belgian doctor even telling them "there are obvious political sensitivities" about working together, he naturally sought confirmation from the source. The Israelis could easily have been misinterpreting a naturally restrained European style as a cold shoulder or overreacting to a remark not intended to offend.

But when he tried to ask the MSF doctors, they informed him that they were forbidden to speak with him without permission from their head office. And when he then tried to contact the head office, it never responded to his request.

In other words, neither the MSF doctors on the scene nor the MSF head-office staff could bring themselves to say something as banal as "Yes, we're glad to see our Congolese patients getting proper specialist care regardless of who the caregivers are."

A social activist from that region of Congo, Jean-Michel Bolima, had no such problems. "Israel is always first to offer aid, and this is admirable," he declared.

But MSF, it seems, would rather see its patients continue to suffer than deal with the cognitive dissonance of discovering that, far from fitting neatly into its designated pigeonhole as the world's pariah, Israel, by the very standards MSF claims to uphold, can often be downright "admirable."

 

Evelyn Gordon

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

 

Israel is a Normal Country. But Normal Countries Are Becoming an Endangered Species


by Barry Rubin

The latest gimmick in the never-ending discussion over Israel is whether it is a "normal country." My answer is "yes" with one exception: it is the one country in the world on which people who know absolutely nothing feel free to put forward the most absurd, biased, or outdated views. Yet that is an external, not an internal distinction.

To be frank, the question of whether Israel is a "normal country" is a trick question. As I said, the answer is "yes" but the problem is that the definition of what a normal country is has changed.

For example, it is now held to be evil and racist—rather than merely stupid—if a country doesn't allow unlimited immigration, even illegal immigration—of anyone who wants to live there. It is now claimed to be illegitimate if a country has any religious component, or if it is identified with a single coherent people. A country that defends itself or perhaps even has enemies is labeled abnormal, too.

What is remarkable about the demonization of Israel today is that it combines two different and profoundly contradictory strands that look amazingly strange in the conditions of this era.

The first is that of the old pseudo-leftist radicalism of the 1960s-1970s era in which Israel was portrayed in semi-Marxist language as imperialist, aggressive, evil, and to be wiped out even in genocidal fashion.

The second is that of the 1990s' peace process era in which the Palestinians are portrayed as moderate, yearning only for peace and a state of their own and Israel falsely portrays the situation as one of great threats to itself.

Issue number one is that those two "narratives" haven't been introduced to each other. How do those in the second group—including Jewish opponents of Israel—reconcile themselves with the first group, who are after all the people they are supporting.

Issue number two is that this is the era of Hamas, Hizballah, Ahmadinejad, September 11, the bombing of the London underground and bus, and therefore the nature of the threat and extremism is most apparent.

Perhaps, then, the people in the second group should pay some attention to their allies and the goals they are pursuing, the situation in the Middle East, and other such things. You don't need to listen to what Israel is saying so much as to listen to what those who hate and want to destroy it are saying.

[Note by the way that Israel is among the world's most successful countries for integrating people from very diverse socio-economic background, racial appearance, differences in level of religious observance, and national origin. Of course, these people had an identity in common and were integrated into a new society and culture--it is now argued with too much harshness in the state's early years--quite well. The model of normality some are attempting to impose now, however, is to take in people without limit and deliberately not integrate them but to leave them as separate communities with a minimum in common. This will ultimately lead to their being mutually hostile communities.]

Of course, none of this is applied to non-Western nations, countries quite content to have a single people (or at least a single dominating group), common culture, main religion, and strict control over who becomes a citizen. They may use against foreigners and for their own benefit the tools of words like "racism," "Islamophobia," and "multi-culturalism" but they are not stupid. They intend to survive.

These countries and ideologies are, in fact, more racist and xenophobic--but never criticize themselves or are criticized as such--than the countries always criticized as allegedly racist and xenophobic.

As I have previously remarked here, this factor of changing definition explains both why many love Israel in the West and why many hate it. The phrase "canary in the coal mine"--something that warns about imminent contemporary threats and dangers, is often used to express this point about Israel. But there are other canaries in the coal mine—Lebanon, Georgia—whose falling over is being ignored. Israel, because it can and will defend itself, is the eagle in the coal mine.

World War One was called the war to make the world safe for democracy. Today's war against Israel is one to make the world unsafe for democracy and the nation-state. To the extent that those in Western democratic states join it, they may ultimately end up being neither Western nor democratic over time.

One should not exaggerate the problem in the West but it is a considerable one, the greatest internal challenge most have faced since 1945. The medicine prescribed for modern countries by large elements of their elites is not a vitamin but a suicide pill. As the dosage increases and the patient starts to exhibit unpleasant symptoms, he may realize what is happening and punch the incompetent or ill-intentioned doctor in the nose.

In my introduction to our new book, Israel: An Introduction, to be published in February by Yale University Press (inquiries welcome for using it as a text in high school, college, and adult education courses), my main theme is that when one gets beyond the political turmoil—which looks a lot more abstract when one actually lives in Israel—the country is quite normal and very much of a success story. That doesn't mean it has no unique features of its own, but that's true for every country on closer examination.

One of those features is the Israeli love of self-criticism (the true national sport) and reflection. But that factor which many (especially in the Arabic-speaking world) see as a weakness is in fact a strength. For these qualities make it possible to correct mistakes and fix problems to a greater extent.

Of course, there are still many problems and shortcomings which I could list at length—see, I told you!—but that's true for all countries even if they are swept under the rug. Indeed, sweeping real problems and practical solutions under the rug is the hallmark of a score of other countries in the region.

I wasn't joking in this article's first paragraph saying that the main "abnormality" is the nonsense said and written about Israel. David Ben-Gurion expressed the fundamental pragmatism that would shape the country when he said, to put it into contemporary language, that what's most important was not what the other nations said but what the Israelis did. Still true today.

Perhaps there should be a Normal Country Movement for those who don't want to be reduced to mere geographical dimensions, housing within themselves a Balkan cacophony of countries and nations certain to quarrel. That's a recipe for conflict, not of living happily ever after. When people ask me if I worry about Israel's survival, my answer is: No, I'm worried about the survival of everyone else.


 

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

When Fall Arrives, Israel's New Challenge Begins

 

by C. Hart

 

The meeting in early July between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama was a short reprieve in the hostile exchanges that have taken place between the two governments since both men took office. It was considered in the best interests of Netanyahu and Obama to show the world that they were partners in Israel's quest for peace with security and in seeing a two-state solution come to pass. A peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians, leading to a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states, seemed to be the goal alluded to by both men during their last public exchange. Each would like to reach this personal peace achievement during his tenure as head of state.

 

The press conference that took place after the Oval Office meeting, on a hot, sunny day in 2010, when many politicians and diplomats were on summer vacation with their families, was not considered the prime time to raise issues of disagreement. Middle East diplomatic engagement is expected to gain new momentum in September. This may be the time when America and the international community could decide, once again, that it is politically beneficial to exert greater pressure on Israel. The current warm temperature in U.S.-Israel relations is set to cool down as the dog days of summer end and the autumn season begins. 

 

The Settlement Freeze, Arab League, and U.N. Meetings

 

The Palestinians seem apprehensive about coming to the peace table for direct talks with Israel. While some of their leaders are expressing interest, others are looking to put off the first direct meeting until the settlement freeze becomes a major diplomatic issue in September. Netanyahu thought he could avoid a political falling-out by getting the Palestinians to the peace table immediately, hoping that current U.S. pressure on Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas would be effective.

 

However, the Palestinians are expected to continue to try to stall direct talks, waiting until September to put greater pressure on the Israeli government. This could cause another feud between Israel and the Obama administration, or else shake up Netanyahu's coalition government. Either way, stalling the talks is a win-win situation for the Palestinians.

 

In the meantime, the Palestinians have indicated that they are waiting for approval from the Arab League before agreeing on direct talks. The Arab League originally approved four months of proximity talks, set to end in September, at which point they would reevaluate whether there had been enough discussion between Israel and the Palestinians on the core issues in order to move to direct talks.

 

The Arab League may look to Obama for reassurances that direct talks will include a major focus on the Arab Peace Initiative, introduced in 2002 by Saudi Arabia. Israel has a serious problem with that Initiative, which government leaders say would not allow the Jewish State to have defensible borders. Among other contentious issues, the plan calls for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 Green Line and an endorsement of East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state. It's expected that Abbas will look for the Initiative to be reintroduced and endorsed at the U.N. Security Council in September.

 

Meanwhile, Obama may decide to wait and kick off the direct talks on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York, also scheduled for September. There are hints in the media that Obama could offer his own vision for direct talks, based on the Clinton Parameters. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton introduced his plan in December 2000. The Clinton Parameters call for Israel to withdraw from 94%-96% of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria); a land-swap compensation of 1%-3%; an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, for a temporary period of time, under the authority of an international force; Palestinian sovereignty over its own airspace; shared Israeli-Palestinian control over Jerusalem neighborhoods, as well as the holy sites; and some absorption by Israel of Palestinian "refugees."

 

The Netanyahu government has already indicated that it will not allow any international force on its eastern border running along the Jordan Valley. Israel insists on a demilitarized Palestinian state in which Israel would have control over all airspace. World Jewry has voiced it concerns over shared control of Jerusalem, especially in regard to the holy sites. Most Israelis insist that Palestinian "refugees" must be absorbed into a future Palestinian state, and not within Israeli territory.

 

Turkey's Heightened Profile and the Goldstone Report

 

Turkey is set to take over the rotating presidency of the U.N. Security Council in September. With Turkey at the helm, Israel can expect resolutions to come forth condemning Israel, once again, for the flotilla crisis of May-June 2010. Turkey continues to demand that Israel apologize for the killing of nine Turkish nationalists on board the Mavi Marmara, one of the ships in the flotilla. Israel refuses to apologize, insisting that the nationalists were terrorists that attacked Israeli naval commandos when they tried to stop the ship from breaking the blockade of Gaza. Turkey is also demanding financial compensation for the families of the terrorists, which Israel has so far refused to grant. Israel has said that Turkey should apologize for sending a terrorist ship to the Middle East. Meanwhile, Turkey is insisting on an international commission of inquiry to look into the Gaza flotilla crisis and could use its influence at the U.N. to fulfill its demands. Turkey has also threatened to cut off all diplomatic ties with Israel.

 

It's expected that the Goldstone Report will be reintroduced at the U.N. in September during Turkey's role as head of the Security Council. Israel considers the report biased and full of falsehoods, pointing to inaccuracies that favor Hamas and condemn Israel. The report has been used by Israel-haters to try to delegitimize the Jewish State, especially its need to defend itself against terrorist regimes.

 

Ramadan

 

Ramadan begins on August 11 and ends on September 9. Ramadan has traditionally been a time when Israel has offered confidence-building measures to the Palestinians -- another term for Israeli concessions. Israel has indicated that it might expand Palestinian control over major cities in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). It also may be a time when Netanyahu releases Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, which has happened during previous Ramadan holidays. Meanwhile, Hamas has refused to release Israel's P.O.W. Gilad Shalit, who has been held in a basement jail in Gaza for four years, without any visitations allowed from his family or the International Red Cross. If Israel concedes to release Palestinian prisoners during Ramadan, there could be a public outcry by many Israelis who have stood in solidarity with the Shalit family.

 

The Hamas Ceasefire with Israel

 

Few analysts realize that Hamas has declared a self-imposed ceasefire with Israel that supposedly expires in September. Most Palestinians do not want a renewal of the violence that gripped Gaza and Israel before and during the Gaza War of 2008-2009. However, it's possible that Hamas could renew its missile war against Israel once the ceasefire ends. This would depend on Iranian goals. Iran has announced it will be sending a delegation to the Gaza Strip to meet with Hamas leaders. That may be the time that Iran gives Hamas the signal to prepare for a renewed conflict with Israel.

 

While Iran succeeded in its attempt to cause Israel diplomatic damage through the flotilla crisis, the Iranian government has still not been able to break Israel's naval blockade of Gaza. Iran wants to open the Gaza port and expand the capabilities of Hamas in an effort to send advanced weapons directly to the terrorist government. The Iranian plan is to smuggle the weapons in on ships, under the guise of humanitarian aid. So far, the international community has supported Israel's right to protect its security interests by enforcing the naval blockade.

 

Further Iranian Goals

 

Iran plans to launch the Rasad 1 satellite into space at the end of August with great fanfare, focusing on the government's latest achievement in space technology. Additionally, Iran plans to open up the Bushehr nuclear power plant in September, after 37 years of preparations, despite attempts by the U.S. and the international community to stop Iran's efforts. While the latest U.N. sanctions against Iran are having some effect on the Iranian economy, Iran continues to try to enrich more uranium towards the goal of achieving nuclear capability.

 

Meanwhile, Arab states are becoming more and more anxious about Iran's determination to reach nuclear capability, and they are looking to the U.S. to provide stronger leadership to stop the Persian State. The United Arab Emirates recently indicated that it could not live with a nuclear Iran, emphasizing the serious threat that Iran poses to the UAE and other Gulf states.

 

Israel's Defense Forces have recently acknowledged Israel's failed deterrence in Lebanon, following reports of an unprecedented buildup of Hezb'allah forces in southern Lebanon in defiance of U.N. Security Resolution 1701, which was supposed to be implemented after the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Threats from Hezb'allah are increasing at such a rate that Israel is preparing the nation and the international community for the possibility of a renewed conflict in Lebanon in the near future. This will depend on when Iran wants to pursue war with Israel through Hezb'allah, its proxy terrorist army.

 

Looking to the Future

 

Summer vacations will be over by September, and Israelis will be gearing up for the next set of challenges to the Jewish state -- politically, diplomatically, and militarily -- from both allies and adversaries alike. Whether the Israeli-American relationship remains warm or cools off in the autumn breezes remains to be seen. Much of what occurs on the international front will determine just how cold the winter season will get, as well as how much the conflict will heat up in the Middle East region.

 

 

C. Hart

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

The Middle East Leader Who Should Be Ignored


by Barry Rubin

The BBC has just broadcast a
program entitled, “Syria's Bashar al-Assad: A leader who cannot be ignored.” This precisely echoes Syria’s main propaganda theme: it is the center of the Middle East, the leader of the resistance (to Israel and the West), the key to peace and the anvil of war.

This is rubbish. In fact, the title inspired me to think: Bashar “the giraffe” Assad is a leader who can—and up to a point, of course should—be ignored. He is the tail on Iran’s dog, an ally who won’t cross Tehran on any major issue. Bashar is intransigent on negotiations with Israel. He takes concessions from the West and gives nothing in return. He is being allowed to get away with recapturing Lebanon; sponsoring Hamas and Hizballah; and killing Americans in Iraq through insurgent terrorists he sponsors there.

U.S. attempts to engage Syria have failed. Syria is too weak to go to war with Israel. It has not even succeeded—despite numerous efforts—to revenge itself for Israel’s bombing of its plutonium reactor (build in partnership with Iran to help Tehran’s nuclear program) or the killing of two important people (one a Hizballah leader; the other a Syrian general who worked on the nuclear program and was liaison to Hizballah) in some of the most secure territory in the country.

So Bashar cannot do much more mischief than he’s doing now and, at any rate, won’t offer anything in return any way.

I can’t think of anyone more worthy of being ignored in the region.

Even Human Rights Watch took time off from its relatively single-minded obsession with bashing Israel to
point out that Bashar has done nothing to improve the human rights' situation in his dictatorship during the ten years he has run the family business. Yet there are still those in the West who rhapsodize about Bashar being a reformer based on absolutely nothing.

Incidentally, here's a good joke told by a close observer of the region. When he heard that al-Jazira was introducing an English-language service a few years ago, he thought, "But they already have an English-language al-Jazira. It's called the BBC!" Another pointed out that an al-Jazira editor was so vitriolically anti-American that when he was fired there he immediately got a job with the BBC's Arabic-language service.

 

 

Barry Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Hizballah Prepares for War Based on Using Civilians as Shields

 

by Barry Rubin

The Israeli army has released for the first time sensitive intelligence data on how Hizballah is digging into southern Lebanon. The deliberate strategy is to store weapons and put defense positions right next to civilian houses. In the event of a war, Israel will have to choose between giving Hizballah a tremendous advantage or killing civilians.

Or as a Lebanese person remarked privately, "Hizballah is painting a big fat target on all the Shi'a down there."

This strategy is the fruit of the world reaction to the 2008-2009 war in the Gaza Strip when Hamas was rewarded for using civilians as human shields. Despite the care Israel took to avoid damaging civilian property or endangering civilian lives, there was a strong anti-Israel response. Given that behavior, others will no doubt follow this approach in future, thus leading to more suffering for civilians and stronger radical totalitarian movements, which will also oppress people where they hold power.

Remember this material when Hizballah sets off the next war and the inevitable media and other complaints against Israel begin: These condemnations will be based on--and will, in turn---reinforce a cynical and vicious deliberate effort by terrorist groups.

By the way, remember how the UN promised Israel in 2006 to keep Hizballah out of southern Lebanon with a reinforced UNIFIL force? What a joke. Hizballah does whatever it wants and no one interferes.

In the Strategic World Cup that's Hizballah 1, World 0. It's also a big zero for international guarantees to Israel. Remember that as well when you next hear that Israel "defies" the "international community" and refuses to put its survival into the hands of others who make big promises and then break them.

By making these points I am not suggesting there will be a war between Israel and Hizballah in the near future, certainly not this year. It is quite possible that Iran wants to hold Hizballah in reserve to use only if Israel attacks Iranian nuclear facilities. At any rate, Hizballah is too busy taking over Lebanon to want a war for the next year or possibly two.

You can read about the intelligence data on southern Lebanon here and here. Iran has also
named a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officer named Hossein Mahadavi to be a liaison and perhaps in part commander of Hizballah.

 

 

Barry Rubin
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

 

How the Media, the UN and the Diplomats Saved Hamas 18 Years Ago

 

 

byDaniel Greenfield

 

For the past two months the media has been consumed with talk of Hamas ruled Gaza and the flotillas meant to break the Israeli blockade. But how one might ask did Gaza come to be overrun with Hamas terrorists. The answer is that the world forced Israel to let them in.

18 years ago in the winter of 1992, there was another Gilad Shalit, and his name was Nissim Toledano, a border police sergeant was kidnapped by terrorists on the way to work. After an extended search, Nissim Toledano was found dead in a roadside ditch. In response to that attack and numerous other atrocities committed by Hamas, including a planned massive car bombing, Israel made the decision to deport 400 Hamas terrorists. Among them the past and present day leaders of Hamas. And you might assume the story ends there. And you would be wrong.

The United Nations issued a unanimous resolution condemning Israel's deportation of "civilians" and demanding that Israel immediately bring them back, or face sanctions. The United States voted for that resolution, along with three others condemning Israel. Thomas R. Pickering, the American delegate warned that the deportations of Hamas terrorists "do not contribute to current efforts for peace." Of course we now know, just how much the Hamas terrorists that the Bush and Clinton Administrations forced Israel to accept "contributed to peace".

Lebanon refused to officially accept the terrorists. The Red Cross brought them tents and blankets and the media swarmed to take photos of them "shivering from the cold" while drinking coffee outside their tents. Newsweek accused Israel of "Deporting the Hope for Peace". The LA Times ran a tearful interview with the wife of Mohammed Taamari, a future member of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, who was terribly lonely without her husband. Much as after the flotilla raid, the Israeli media condemned the clumsy mishandling of the deportations.

Finally after enough browbeating by James Baker and Warren Christopher, Rabin agreed to take the Hamas terrorists back. In a bizarre charade that would serve as a tragic foretelling of events to come, Rabin agreed to return 100 terrorists immediately, and to take the remainder back in a year. 18 years later, the Hamas terrorists that Israel took back control all of Gaza, and have been responsible for an untold number of murders.

The terrorists that Israel was forced to accept included current Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh and Hamas' religious figurehead, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. They included Mahmoud al-Zahar, a co-founder of Hamas, who last year proclaimed; "They have legitimised the killing of their people all over the world by killing our people". They included Mohammed Taha, another co-founder of Hamas. They also included Abdel-Aziz Rantisi, another Hamas co-founder, who was responsible for numerous murders of Israelis, who would proclaim, "By Allah, we will not leave one Jew in Palestine". They included his son Ayman Taha, who commanded the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which carried out numerous attacks on Israel, including the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit.

And that is how a failure to drive out those responsible for the kidnapping and murder of one Israeli sergeant in 1992, led to the capture of an Israeli corporal in 2006. It is also the story of why Gaza was turned over to Hamas in the name of "peace." It is the story of how the United Nations, the UK and two US administrations pressured Israel into accepting the leaders of Hamas in the name of peace. It is also the story of how the media conducted a propaganda war on behalf of an Islamist terrorist organization, not just today when it publishes false stories about starvation in Gaza, but 18 years ago, when the only people supposedly starving were adult male Hamas terrorists.

The world insisted that Israel take back the Hamas leadership, and Israel did. The world insisted that Israel had no business being in Gaza, and Israel withdrew from there, which allowed the very same Hamas terrorists that the world insisted Israel take back, take over. Now the world is insisting that Israel has no right to blockade those same Hamas terrorists in Gaza. People who are shocked by this development in 2010 shouldn't be, since 18 years ago Israel wasn't even allowed to throw the same terrorists out of the country.

One of the more cynical left wing talking points is that Israel was responsible for Hamas. Looking back to 1992, when the current Hamas leadership were sitting outside their Red Cross tents in Lebanon and the left was pounding on Israel's door, demanding that they be let back in-- it is all too clear who was and is responsible for Hamas. The people who saved Hamas 18 years ago, are responsible for it today. The media and the diplomats who 18 years ago were claiming that deporting Hamas would somehow "radicalize" the Palestinian Arabs insured that the Hamas leaders would return to radicalize all of Gaza and the West Bank.

After the deportation of the Hamas terrorists, Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin delivered a speech in the Knesset in which he said;

"I have no pity in my heart, nor do I shed tears (for the Hamas terrorists). I see the media whining their hypocritical speeches - and I think instead of Nissim Toledano's orphaned children, the widow of Shmuel Biran, and the bereaved parents of Shmuel Geresh."


Rabbi Shmuel Biran was a schoolteacher in Kfar Darom, an Israeli village in Gaza. He was murdered by Hamas terrorists while crossing a two lane highway. The UN did not condemn the murder of Rabbi Biran. Newsweek did not write any piteous pieces about how much his widow missed him. Instead they called Kfar Darom a settlement, even though it was part of a history going back over 2000 years, and the land it was on had been bought and paid for, fair and square. But the same diplomats and reporters who wailed for the lonely Hamas terrorists in Lebanon, pitied not the family of Rabbi Biran. Instead they demanded his family and all the Jews of Kfar Darom be expelled from their homes.

 Eventually they got their wish. The families of Kfar Darom were dragged out of their homes. Today Kfar Darom is used by Hamas terrorists to launch rockets deeper into Israel, at other towns and villages. And the murderers have inherited the land of their victims. And yet there is no peace. Never any peace.

Now the vultures keep on circling. Once they said there would be peace if only Israel let the Hamas terrorists back in. Then they said, there would be peace if only Israel ethnically cleansed Jewish communities in land claimed by the terrorists. Now if only Israel will lift the blockade and give Hamas access to unlimited weapons-- perhaps then there will be peace. No, there will be no peace. Only more murder. When you bring a snake into your pocket, you will be poisoned. The closer you bring him and the less you restrain him, the worse he will bite you. As with snakes, so it is with terrorists.

After his death, it has become fashionable to selectively quote some of Rabin's speeches. But this speech is rarely quoted. And you don't have to work too hard to understand why.

Our struggle against murderous Islamic terror is also meant to awaken the world which is lying in slumber. We call on all nations and all people to devote their attention to the great danger inherent in Islamic fundamentalism. That is the real and serious danger which threatens the peace of the world in the forthcoming years.


But why quote such a speech? In 1992, America and Europe were not terribly worried about Islamic fundamentalism. It was after 1992, not 1692. And Islamic terrorism was one of those things that would surely go away if Israel would just compromise with the terrorists.

Two weeks after Rabin agreed to take back the Hamas terrorists-- the World Trade Center was bombed by a group led by the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, under Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh" who led al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which like both Al Queda and Hamas, emerged out of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rahman's message to Muslims was very simple; "cut the transportation of their countries, tear it apart, destroy their economy, burn their companies, eliminate their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their planes, kill them on the sea, air, or land." And that was exactly what they went on to do. The World Trade Center bombing in 1993, set the stage for the more successful attacks of 2001. Just as the Hamas atrocities of 1992 set the stage for the bigger and more horrifying attacks to come.

 

Meanwhile in Afghanistan UN aid convoys were being ambushed and massacred. Tourists were being murdered in Egypt. Hamas killed two traffic cops in Tel Aviv. But no one worried. Peace just was just on the horizon. And so Israel was forced to submit to Islamic terrorism. Hamas' path to victory was paved by two US administrations and a press corp always eager to turn terrorists into victims, but never interested in hearing from the victims of the terrorists.Islamic terrorism had won not on its own terms, but with the unified support of the United Nations standing behind it.

That is how Islamic terrorism always wins. That is the template behind its victory. And Rabin's speech of that winter of 1992, which warned the West of what was to come, was ignored. Today Rabin is remembered as the man who compromised with terrorism. It is the only thing he is remembered for anymore .But compromising with terrorism did not bring peace. Not in Somalia, where US troops were brutally murdered next year. Not in Afghanistan, where the Taliban slaughtered aid convoys. Not in Indonesia or New York or Paris or Egypt. And certainly not in Gaza. The Islamic Fundamentalists had won a battle with the backing of the US and the UN. They have won many more since then. Now they are trying to win the war.

 

 

Daniel Greenfield

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.