Thursday, June 9, 2011

The Tragic Fight for Gilad Shalit


by Frimet Roth

There are myriad reasonable paths available for securing the freedom of Gilad Shalit, kidnapped and held by Hamas five years ago. So why has Israel persistently pursued the suicidal release of hardened murderers in order to bring him home?

Senior PA officials revealed last week that an agreement between Hamas and Israel on a mass Palestinian prisoner release is imminent. We have PM Netanyahu’s serial bungled handling of Shalit’s captivity to thank for this sorry state of affairs.

Many opportunities presented themselves for pressuring Hamas to free Shalit without the disastrous return of convicted mass murderers to Hamas. Netanyahu caved-in on each occasion.

One confounding example is his recent payment of tax revenues to the PA. In response to the PA’s unity deal with Hamas, Netanyahu initially withheld those funds, totaling $100 million, from the PA for two weeks.

The Shalit family urged Netanyahu to remain firm and freeze that money until Shalit’s return. Yet their call won no support from the Israeli media; their desperate lone voice went unheeded. Under pressure from the West, and from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Netanyahu capitulated and transferred the funds to the PA.

The Shalit’s push for a prolonged revenue freeze aimed to hurt the perpetrators of Shalit’s kidnapping: Hamas and its new accomplice, the Palestinian Authority. Clearly, if the PA has genuinely reunited with Hamas terrorists, it now shares responsibility for all of Hamas’ actions, including, of course, the Shalit kidnapping.

As Noam Shalit said: “Today, after the reconciliation deal… the PA is actually responsible for the kidnapped Israeli soldier held by his captors, who are also part of the new government set to be formed.”

After the release of the funds, Shalit noted: “Unfortunately we received no explanation of why the tax funds were transferred to the PA given these facts.”

Of course not. There was no rational explanation.

In return for the transfer of funds, Israel received – in the words of Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz – “reassurances and clarifications that the money would not find its way to terrorists’ hands…”

Whom was he kidding? Those commitments come from the same Fatah and PLO people who promised that they would never join forces with the terror organization, Hamas.

Despite this, and throwing all caution to the wind, Israel has gone ahead and transferred the funds to the PA while failing to implement any mechanism for tracking the transferred funds.

After the confounding release of those tax revenues, Noam and Aviva Shalit turned to the US for help. They called on Congress to halt its financial assistance to the PA in the wake of its union with Hamas, until his son’s release. Since Fatah and Hamas have agreed to form a unity government, the letter argued, the PA can no longer disclaim responsibility for Gilad’s fate, and the threat of losing Washington’s annual $400 million donation might encourage it to take action. They even pleaded directly with Senate Majority leader Harry Reid and House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner to halt that funding.

The Shalits reminded the two US legislators that under the Rome Statute of the International Court 1998, it is a war crime to hold someone hostage.

Then last week, the Shalits and several supporters successfully blocked a courier service truck at the Gaza border forcing it to return to Jerusalem. The truck was attempting to transfer fresh shekels to Gazan banks which Shalit activists want withheld until Gilad Shalit is granted visitations from the Red Cross.

All of these moves to free their son have been only briefly reported by the Israeli press. The successful blocking of the aid funds earned nothing but a 270- word report in Haaretz.

No columns or editorials referred to these efforts, let alone galvanized the Israeli public. The silence of the Israeli press has been deafening. It contrasts sharply with the encouragement that Israeli journalists and columnists exude whenever the Shalits insist that Israel release all the terrorist murderers that Hamas demands in return for their son’s freedom.

The message to the Shalits could not be clearer: the media will assist you unstintingly as long as you stick to the prisoner release route. But once you try to punish the Palestinians for Shalit’s captivity – you are on your own.

In other words: Let the Israeli public pay the price for Shalit’s return – just leave the poor perpetrators alone.

Turning a blind eye to the activities funded by those revenues is unforgivable. The PA provides a monthly stipend for all Palestinian and Israeli Arab terrorists imprisoned in Israel. Included on the payroll are the terrorists who carried out the bombing of the Sbarro restaurant in central Jerusalem on 9th August 2001, the massacre that cost the life of our daughter Malki, 15, and many other innocents. [ JPost].

The fungibility of PA money means that while the US, the EU and other Western donors are not explicitly promoting terrorism, their gifts enable the PA to divert other funds toward that end. [ Source: " PA to Pay Salaries to All Terrorists in Israeli Prisons"]

Together with the European Union, the US provides the bulk of financial aid that reaches the PA. Only 22% of the $530,000,000 received since the beginning of 2010 came from Arab donors . The total amount of foreign aid received directly by the PA was $1.4 billion in 2009 and $1.8 billion in 2008

I have vowed to my dead daughter that I will never cease pleading and fighting for justice toward her murderer, Ahlam Tamimi.

Often misleadingly described as the woman who transported the bomb that was used in the Jerusalem Sbarro terror attack, Tamimi was actually the main perpetrator of that massacre. She selected the target, a venue packed at that hour with women and children. She transported the 10 kg. of explosives, met up with her accomplice, handed him the bomb, deposited him at the target and instructed him on the precise timing the attack so that she could escape unharmed.

Last week the website of Al-Qassam Brigades, the wing of Hamas to which Tamimi belonged, revealed that the streets of Ramallah – the “moderate” Abbas’ headquarters – are emblazoned with posters of Tamimi’s smiling face.

The site also mentions Tamimi’s conviction and sentence: 16 life sentences along with “a recommendation not to release her in any possible exchange of prisoners.”

The judges foresaw the current predicament we are in but their clause is one we, the victims, have never heard or read from any other source. Presumably it is one that the media and the government would prefer to bury.

If the PA officials are correct, Israel is about to add fuel to the very fire of terrorist danger that IDF commanders warn is about to ignite. Once again, our leaders, entrusted with the job of protecting their constituents, are content to place us in the line of fire in order to remove one very painful political thorn in their sides.

And we, the parents of murdered Jewish children, will weep alone for our second loss.

Frimet Roth is a freelance writer in Jerusalem. Her daughter Malki was murdered at the age of 15 in the Sbarro restaurant bombing (2001).

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

Pro-Syrian Palestinian Group Kills 11 Palestinian Refugees Who Opposed Anti-Israel Golan Activities


by Khaled Yacoub Oweis

Gunmen from a Palestinian faction loyal to Syria shot dead at least 11 Palestinians at a refugee camp near Damascus Monday in a dispute over the group's backing for Damascus, Palestinian sources said Tuesday.

Hundreds of angry refugees had tried to storm the headquarters of the Syrian-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) in Yarmouk camp on the edges of Damascus.

They accused the group of sacrificing Palestinian lives by encouraging protesters to demonstrate at the Golan Heights, where several were shot by Israeli forces.

Syria said 23 people, including a woman and a child, were killed and 350 wounded Sunday when Israeli troops fired on Palestinian protesters who surged against the fortified boundary fence on Syria's Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Israel, with U.S. backing, accused Syria of orchestrating deadly confrontations on a ceasefire line between the two countries as a distraction from Damascus's bloody crackdown on an 11-week-old revolt against President Bashar al-Assad.

"There has been a mood of deep frustration in the camp since Friday that Palestinian blood is cheap and Palestinians were being used by the Syrian regime to deflect attention from its internal crisis," one of the sources at the camp said.

He was referring to sympathy among Palestinian refugees for the plight of Syrian protesters calling for political freedoms in demonstrations during which hundreds of civilians have been killed by security forces, according to human rights groups.

The sources said that the unrest at the camp began when mourners at a funeral for eight Palestinians killed in the Golan turned into a protest against leftist pro-Syrian Palestinian factions during which mourners threw stones at Palestinian figures who had praised Assad.

Hundreds of refugees armed with sticks and stones then headed to the PFLP-GC headquarters and tried to storm it. Several protesters managed to get in and killed one PFLP-GC gunman, they added.

"The confrontation lasted from the afternoon to well after midnight," another source said.

Like several other Palestinian factions in Syria, the PFLP-GC, which is headed by veteran guerrilla leader Ahmad Jibreel, is regarded as a terrorist organization by the United States.

Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/07/us-syria-palestinians-killings-idUSTRE7564MN20110607

Khaled Yacoub Oweis
(Additional reporting by Suleiman al-Khalidi in Amman)

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

RAND Corp: Iran 8 Weeks from the Bomb


by James Lewis

According to a RAND report, the United States and the world have blown the chance to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. Half a year ago, US air strikes and a no-fly zone might have prevented a nuclear bomb in the hands of the martyrdom ideology of Khomeinist Iran. That window has now slammed shut. In about 8 weeks, the RAND report concludes, Iran will have the nuclear material for its first bomb.

RAND Corporation's Gregory S. Jones believes that Iran has produced almost 40 kilograms of uranium enriched near 20% percent. Jones suggests that air strikes can no longer stop Ahmadinejad's rush to nuclear weapons.

It appears that the Obama administration knowingly allowed the optimal window of opportunity against Iranian nuclear weapons to pass. As a result, the world has suddenly become immensely more dangerous.

The slogan "Death to Israel! Death to America!" has been chanted on a daily basis by mass meetings in Iran. It is sheer wishful thinking to believe that after 30 years of daily threats they don't really mean it. The Obama Administration either believes there is no looming nuclear threat, or that it's willing to live with it. But the Saudis and other neighboring countries don't agree.

Thirty years after Jimmy Carter allowed Iran to be conquered by the Ayatollah Khomeini, a proponent of martyrdom war to spread Shiite Islam, Iran has the means to strike countries it has threatened directly, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. Iran's ballistic missile program, with major North Korean help, may be able to reach the United States by 2015. ICBMs only require a flight time of about half an hour.

It is likely that Saudi Arabia and possibly Egypt will import their own nuclear weapons from Pakistan, which is now rushing to build an advanced plant for uranium production. An American nuclear scientist who visited a North Korean centrifuge plant recently reported that the plant he saw was so advanced it could only have been built with Chinese help. North Korea therefore seems to have been working as a Chinese proxy to promote worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Iran is dominated by a martyrdom ideology. Ahmadinejad was likely involved in mass suicide charges in the Iran-Iraq war, in which boys wearing green plastic "Keys to Paradise" were ordered to drive their motorcycles into Saddam Hussein's minefields. Ahmadinejad is thought to be a "Twelver," a devout believer in the Shiite Mahdi (messiah), who will bring Armageddon to infidels and victory to an extremist sect of Shi'ism.

No nuclear war has occurred in the last sixty years since Stalin's (stolen) atom bomb explosion. Rational nations do not commit suicide. The Iranian Twelver regime is the first openly suicide-promoting regime since the Japanese Imperial cult of World War II. Ahmadinejad is a religious fanatic who claims to have direct conversations with Allah and the Twelfth Imam, a claim that has led to internal struggles between Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard factions. Khamenei recently arrested Ahmadinejad supporters accusing them of practicing witchcraft against the dominance of the religious elite.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor when Khomeini overthrew the Shah, has recently said that Obama's demand for Israel to pull back to its 1949 ceasefire lines was not strong enough. Brzezinski apparently wants greater concessions from Israel.

Newt Gingrich has called Obama's demand "an invitation for Israel to commit suicide." Michele Bachmann has called it "a betrayal" of Israel.

It is now beyond serious doubt that Obama and Carter have empowered the most radical and dangerous forces in the Islamic world.

1. In 1979 Jimmy Carter brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power by undermining the Shah, who was a modernizer and relatively enlightened on issues like women's education. The result is 30 years of a reactionary Islamist regime, the Iran-Iraq war, and now, nuclear weapons.

2. A few months ago Obama publicly pushed Hosni Mubarak out of power in Egypt. The result has been a rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and an apparent breakdown of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. The Saudis are outraged and frightened by the "Arab Spring," which is bringing down regimes all over the Arab world. Pakistan is ready to supply the Saudis and Egypt with nuclear weapons, probably backed by China.

The world has had 30 years to prepare for this moment. Only the United States has the military power to knock down Iran's nuclear industry and impose a no-fly zone that will keep Iranian missiles and aircraft from being launched. Israel is motivated to do it, but cannot sustain a long air campaign. The only option Israel seems to have is to launch its own weapons of mass destruction first.

Dr. Jones' eight-week estimate for the first Iranian Bomb may be off by weeks or months. Nobody can doubt that we will be facing a nuclear Iran some time soon. George W. Bush was mercilessly mocked for launching a preemptive war against Saddam Hussein because Bush did not want to take the risk that Saddam might have WMD's. It now appears that Obama has failed to preempt Iran's nuclear breakout. We will therefore have an opportunity soon to find out what happens when the United States does not try prevent rogue regimes from getting nukes.

Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/06/rand_corp_iran_8_weeks_from_the_bomb.html

James Lewis

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Syria Changes the Subject


by Khaled Abu Toameh

Syrian dictator Bashar Assad is now trying to direct the heat toward Israel.

Like most of the Arab dictators, Assad wants Israel to be held responsible for instability and violence.

Facing growing protests in his country, Assad has decided to send Palestinians living in Syria to march on the border with Israel, even if that means that some of them could get killed or wounded by land mines or gunfire from Israeli troops.

Assad, of course, has never cared about the Palestinians. He is not sending them to the border with Israel because he supports their "right of return to Palestine."

Nor is the tyrant in Damascus sending young men, women and children to confront and provoke Israeli soldiers because he wants to help Palestinians or alleviate their suffering.

He is dispatching them to the border because he wants to divert attention from his serious problems at home. Assad wants the international community and media to focus their attention on the Israel-Syria border and not on the daily massacres that his regime has been perpetrating against Syrians in the past few weeks.

The Assad regime has banned Arab and Western media representatives from covering the massacres that his soldiers are committing. Journalists from different parts of the world have been denied entry to Syria out of fear that they would report on the brutal crackdown on innocent civilians and anti-government demonstrators.

While Syria TV has refrained from carrying live coverage of the daily anti-Assad demonstrations in the country, the station this week reported extensively and live from the clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians who were trying to infiltrate the border into the Golan Heights.

State-controlled Syria TV has been reporting about the events inside Syria as if they are "isolated and sporadic cases of violence instigated by armed gangs and thugs who receive support from external forces." Assad's TV station is continuing to pretend as if everything is fine and calm in Syria and that the only problem is with a tiny minority of armed gangsters and thugs who are shooting and torturing civilians and members of the Syrian security forces.

When Syrians began demonstrating against his regime a few weeks ago, Assad also tried to blame Israel, the US and some Arab countries and TV stations. Clearly, many Syrians have not bought that claim and are continuing to demand regime change in defiance of Assad's tanks and ruthless measures.

Now Assad is hoping to use the Palestinians in his country as cannon-fodder to save his regime. That is why he has allowed Palestinians and some Syrians to march on the border with Israel.

For the past four decades, Assad's army stopped everyone from coming close to Israeli soldiers and the Israel-Syria border was the calmest and most peaceful front. The events along the Israel-Syria border in recent weeks are a sign that Assad has decided to change the rules of the game to salvage his regime.

Source: http://www.hudson-ny.org/2177/syria-changes-subject

Khaled Abu Toameh

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What They Don't Want You To Know About The Turkish Flotilla


by Adam Daifallah

Brace yourselves: the Gaza flotilla is back for a repeat performance this summer. Political activists, led by Turkey's Islamist IHH, are in the midst of preparing "Freedom Flotilla 2," a convoy of ships intent on breaking through Israel's naval blockade of Gaza. The flotilla will be led by the same ship as last year – the Mavi Marmara – and will reportedly be joined by others, including one backed by a taxpayer-funded Canadian coalition.

There are five easy, safe and legal crossing-points in Israel through which to reach Gaza: the northern Erez crossing, the eastern Karni crossing (specifically designed for cargo), the southern Sufa crossing, the Kerem Shalom crossing and Rafah. If the flotilla's real intention were to deliver aid to Palestinians, it could be done wth no problem by passing through any of these points.

Items truly for humanitarian aid get through to citizens already. It is only those deemed as "dual-use" -- things like steel pipes, fertilizer and cement -- that are blocked. Some of the items on last year's flotilla included ballistic vests, gas masks, night-vision goggles and clubs. You can expect more of the same this time.

The timing is also questionable. The Middle East today looks a lot different than it did a year ago. Gaza is now as lavish as any place in the Middle East. There are appalling refugee camps in Gaza, but since for several years, it has been under the full control of its own government, Hamas, presumably these humanitarian crises should be laid wholly at the door of the Arabs. Why, therefore, are they not being held accountable? Further, these camos [camps] are perpetuated and presided over by the UN, why is the UN not being held accountable?

Egypt, which had re-opened its borders for a few days, making the transport of supplies to Palestinians easier, has now closed them again: Why is Egypt not being held accountable?

We may be headed for the same messy ending as last year – a violent one – which is exactly what these professional provocateurs want, and which would end up embarrassing Israel in the international media.

The organizers do not even hide that fact. IHH president Bulent Yildirim is openly taunting Israel in the media, encouraging the IDF to attack the flotilla. "Even if we sacrifice martyrs, we will be on the side of justice," he reported said in a recent interview. Yildirim claims 10,000 people have signed up to be get on board the ships.

The IHH, which was behind last year's flotilla, was founded in 1992 and was designated by Israel in July 2008 as a terrorist organization. There has been pressure from the Dutch to place the IHH on the EU's list of terrorist organizations and also in the U.S. The group has documented links to jihadist groups in Europe and Africa and has even been linked to al Qaeda.

The new flotilla plans come at a critical time in Turkey, with the Islamist government of Prime Minister Erdogan preparing to face the electorate in a June 12 vote. Erdogan's tacit support of the IHH and the flotilla is a sombre reminder of how far the Turks have drifted toward radicalism.

Even a Canadian group calling itself "Canadian Boat to Gaza" is organizing a ship to form part of the convoy. Canada's government has been on the right side of most foreign affairs issues of late, and they are again this time. Indeed, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird is urging those wishing deliver aid to do so through established channels, calling the unauthorized efforts "provocative and, ultimately, unhelpful to the people of Gaza." But that doesn't mean there aren't plenty of Canadians on the other side of the issue.

According to a report, one group helping to organize the ship, Montreal-based Alternatives International, which describes itself as "social and political movements struggling against social injustices, neoliberalism, imperialism and war," has received $5-million in Canadian taxpayer funding in recent years.(A dual Israeli-Canadian citizen has filed a lawsuit against the boat and Alternatives International, charging that they are raising funds for and providing material support to Hamas, a banned terrorist organization in Canada.)

Provocation is the sole point of this exercise. Any Israeli retaliation to block the effort will be portrayed by the media as "excessive" – the strong beating down the weak, which fits neatly into these activists neo-Marxist dialect. Last year, Israeli navel commandos who boarded the Mavi Marmara were attacked by activists. The result was nine dead Turks and five wounded Israeli soldiers. The rabble-rousers hope for the same outcome this time.

Much of the blame must be laid at the feet of Prime Minister Erdogan. The changes in the Arab Middle East have been disconcerting for the Turks, who are now flailing around trying to find a way to stay relevant.

By doing nothing to stop IHH and the flotilla, Erdogan is encouraging them, further shoring up his support with Islamists before the election. Tacitly supporting the IHH is not the only thing he has done in this regard: sex tapes featuring members of the MHP, the largest opposition party, have recently been leaked, leading to a mass resignation of senior officials -- and allowing Erdogan to paint the opposition as immoral.

Many suspect Erdogan's AKP political party is behind the move, as there have been no sex tapes of members of the AKP, and no offical effort to investigate the source of these tapes.

In another troubling development, a senior Turkish general, Bilgin Balanli, was arrested and sent to prison for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government as part of the so-called "Sledgehammer" case. A Turkish report noted that 29 of the current 300 active-duty Turkish generals are currently under arrest for coup-plotting, as are more than 160 active and retired soldiers. These arrests serve only to give the AKP a veneer of strength heading into the vote.

The toxic combination of crass electioneering on the part of Erdogan, the desire of Islamists to provoke Israel and the apparent willingness of useful idiots in the West make to go along for the ride makes the second coming of the flotilla just as dangerous – if not more – than the first.

Source: http://www.hudson-ny.org/2180/turkish-flotilla

Adam Daifallah

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Pakistani Journalist Killed for Exposing Al-Qaeda's Links to Pakistan's Armed Forces


by Anna Mahjar-Barducci

Pakistani investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad knew that speaking the truth can be dangerous. On May 31, Pakistani police found the dead body of Shahzad in a canal in the Mandi Bahauddin district, about 150 kilometers southeast of Islamabad, and about 10 kilometers from where his car was found. His mutilated body bore the marks of torture. He left a wife and three children.

Shahzad, 40, had been writing for nearly 10 years for Asia Times, an online newspaper based in Hong Kong, and owned by Thai tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul. Shahzad specialized in covering security and terrorism topics, especially about Al-Qaeda's activities in the Indian subcontinent.

Shahzad was the author of a book, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, published just before his assassination. The alarm for his disappearance had been launched after he failed to show up on a television talk show in Islamabad. Immediately, the International Federation of Journalists made an appeal to the government of Pakistan to activate its security forces "to find a senior journalist who disappeared in Islamabad on May 29."

Suspicion about his murder, especially among Pakistani journalists, fell upon the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). "Any journalist here who doesn't believe that it's our intelligence agencies?" author and journalist Muhammad Hanif asked on Twitter. The first to accuse the ISI was Ali Dayan Hasan, Human Rights Watch's [HRW] South Asia researcher. The day Shahzad's body was discovered, Hasan said: "We were informed through reliable interlocutors that he was detained by the ISI." The HRW researcher then reported that in the past, Shahzad had already received threats from members of the ISI, who considered his articles tarnishing Pakistan's international image. "The other day he visited our office and informed us that ISI had threatened him," Hasan said. "He told us that if anything happened to him, we should inform the media about the situation and threats."

On October 2010, Shahzad published in Asia Times an article, "Pakistan frees Taliban Commander," stating that Pakistani authorities had freed one of the most powerful figures in the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Baradar, in order to "play a pivotal role in backchannel talks through the Pakistani army with Washington." As a consequence, Shahzad had been summoned to the Islamabad headquarters of the ISI and told to reveal his sources or retract the story. When he refused, a not-so-veiled threat emerged: the ISI had "arrested a terrorist who carried a hit list and that the ISI would let him know whether or not his name was on it."

On May 27, just few days before his death, Shahzad wrote an article that cost him his life. In the article, about an Al-Qaeda military strike on Pakistan, the courageous Pakistani journalist exposed the existing links between Al-Qaeda and members of the Pakistani navy. The article dealt with the attack carried out by Al-Qaeda, on May 22, against the Mehran naval station in Karachi, after navy authorities had refused to free naval officials arrested "on suspicion of Al-Qaeda links." The attack caused at least 10 casualties and material damages of over $100 million USD.

"The May 2 killing in Pakistan of Osama bin Laden spurred Al-Qaeda groups into developing a consensus for the attack in Karachi, in part as revenge for the death of their leader, and also to deal a blow to Pakistan's surveillance capacity against the Indian navy. The deeper underlying motive, though, was a reaction to massive internal crackdowns on Al-Qaeda affiliates within the navy. Several weeks ago, naval intelligence traced an Al-Qaeda cell operating inside several navy bases in Karachi, the country's largest city and key port," Shahzad wrote. On the eve of his participation to a talk show where he was due to take part, in a discussion about his latest article, Shahzad went missing only to be found dead a few days later. Pakistani writer, Mahjabeen Islam, wrote that Shahzad paid with his life for "the drastic revelation that we [Pakistanis] do not just have Taliban sympathizers in the armed forces, our navy appears to be laced with al Qaeda itself."

The ISI, accused by the U.S. and by the Pakistani population of having hidden Osama Bin Laden, must have considered Shahzad's articles too dangerous. Shahzad was exposing the links between Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani armed force at a delicate moment for the Pakistani intelligence. The ISI is under scrutiny now in Chicago where a terror trial is putting the spotlight on Pakistan intelligence's involvement in the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008.

The ISI directorate issued what was defined a "rare public statement "denying involvement in the killing of the Pakistani journalist. However, after Shahzad's brutal assassination, Pakistani journalists are now scared of speaking the truth. "I am seriously considering the entire process of reporting, and to what extent I can put my own team at risk," said Zaffar Abbas, Pakistani daily Dawn's Islamabad resident editor. "It is becoming increasingly dangerous for people to openly report whether militants or security agencies are involved."

Political assassinations are unfortunately now a common feature of Pakistan. This year, the governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, and the minister for minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, were both shot dead because they were trying to introduce some amendments to the blasphemy law.

Journalist Shada Islam wrote recently in the daily Dawn that after these assassinations by extremist militants, she was hoping that "Pakistan was finally going to turn over a new leaf. But there have been too many false dawns, too many hopes shattered by incompetent leaders — and too many mistruths peddled by an army and security apparatus with an uncanny power to survive repeated shame and scandal."

Pakistani intellectuals such as Mahjabeen Islam are trying to wake up Pakistanis: "We need a resounding chorus of protest that does not just condemn this barbarity but outs the extremists from every walk of life. Many have been martyred for the motherland, dying fearlessly in the way of the truth: Governor Salmaan Taseer, Minister Shahbaz Bhatti and journalist Wali Khan Babar are just a few names that come to mind, and almost invariably the murderers have not been brought to justice.

"Saleem Shahzad's criticism got him killed," Mahjabeen courageously wrote, "yet could his murderers kill millions of Pakistanis that protest extremism? The stakes just keep getting higher. There must be protest and action from every street-corner in Pakistan against extremism. For the next victim is not a young and healthy Saleem Shahzad, it is another young though frail and almost comatose Pakistan."

The West would do well to try to amplify the voices of these courageous reformers. The majority of the population is afraid to speak up; if even the intellectuals feel abandoned and therefore stop denouncing terrorism, many other Shahzads will continue to die.

Source: http://www.hudson-ny.org/2173/pakistani-journalist-killed

Anna Mahjar-Barducci

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

The Future of the Middle East


by Seth Mandel

In recent weeks, the emerging Middle East has given pause to the early optimists of the Arab Spring. Egypt reopened its border with Gaza, Amr Moussa seems poised to win the presidency there, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has been ruthlessly cracking down on anti-regime protests, Yemen has descended into something close to civil war, and a Hamas-Fatah unity government is set to call for a vote at the UN General Assembly on unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state.

To get a sense of where these and other issues in the region are headed, I spoke with Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor and publisher of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. He is the author of more than a dozen books on the Middle East.

Seth Mandel: What are the major events to watch for, and what are their most likely consequences?

Barry Rubin: First, on June 12, Turkey will have an election. That election will probably be won by the government, whether or not it gets a two-thirds majority. The current rulers are going to take this as a signal to take a much tougher line toward Israel and the United States. It is possible that the extent of the increase of Turkey’s enmity toward Israel after that election will astonish the world.

If the governing AK party gets a two-thirds’ majority, that means it will have control of rewriting the Turkish constitution. They will try to create a presidential regime, Erdogan will run for president, and we will see Turkey moving into an increasingly visible alliance with Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah. That’s not alarmism, that’s a serious analysis.

Number two. The Palestinian effort at the UN to gain unilateral recognition for a Palestinian state will fail; the U.S. will veto. But it’s going to be a mess, and it’s a mess created by the incompetence of the Obama administration, which could have prevented this.

Number three—the big one: Egyptian parliamentary elections in September. As of now, the moderate democrats have not organized any serious party. The only serious parties organized are Islamist parties—not only the Muslim Brotherhood but others—and left-wing parties or radical nationalist ones.

I do not know whether there will be an Islamist majority, but there will be a radical anti-American majority in parliament. I have no doubt of that. It literally can’t be any other way. So this is going to have to be covered in the media.

It will be interesting to try to predict what the headlines will look like in the New York Times the day after the election. How will they spin this? What will they say? What can they say about this? This is very, very serious. At that point it should be clear that the Obama policy has been a catastrophe. He helped bring down the Egyptian regime and the result is a radical anti-American regime that’s ready to go into conflict with Israel.

SM: What is the significance of the opening of Egypt’s border with Gaza?

BR: The opening of the Gaza border is one step in that direction [of conflict with Israel]. So what does it mean that they’re opening the border, even if not now but when a new elected president and parliament take office? It means that weapons, terrorists, and money will flow freely into Gaza.

And what does that mean? It means that Hamas will become bolder. And at some point, let’s say in the next year, it will attack Israel with rockets and mortars. And Israel will have to respond militarily.

But at that point we are all going to have to ask the question, What will Egypt do? What will the Egyptian government do? If Amr Moussa is president with a radical parliament or even an Islamist parliament they could send troops. It could become an Egypt-Israel war.

But there are other possibilities. Perhaps they will simply let thousands of Egyptian volunteers go into Gaza to fight. Perhaps it will allow, or not be able to stop, or not try too hard to stop, attacks across the Egypt-Israel border. Again, this is not some alarmist fantasy but realistic scenarios that must be prepared for.

If Amr Moussa is elected president, he is not an Islamist and not a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. But is he going to resist pressure from parliament and the masses for a tough stance? Won’t he try to take advantage of this to promote his own interests and anti-Israel beliefs? This is especially true as Egypt’s terrible economic situation does not permit him to offer the masses a better life or even food at current prices.

Now one can say: Don’t worry, they won’t do anything because the Egyptian military wants to keep getting American aid money. Now that is an argument. But is that enough? Can we base our entire Middle East strategy on that hope?

We have seen cases where countries and governments have been willing to throw away American aid for political goals. Remember that the Iranian revolution threw away all the American aid and military sales. So merely to maintain that everything will be OK because of that money issue is not a satisfactory argument. In addition to that, keep in mind that Egypt is going to face a major economic problem for which there is no solution, and no amount of U.S. aid is going to resolve that problem. The price of food is going to continue to go up.

They are not going to be able to build new housing. They are not going to be able to handle the problem of unemployment. They’re not going to be able to create jobs. This is the reality. So what happens when, as is fully predictable, Egypt’s government is unable to deliver on its promises and the country will go into crisis? What’s going to happen?

SM: What’s your impression of the West’s reaction to these changes taking place in the region?

BR: The things that I’m talking about are totally predicable things. And yes, they are being ignored in the media. Now the new line is that the Muslim Brotherhood are good guys and moderates, the problem is these radical jihadist Salafi groups. Muslim Brotherhood is good; jihadists are bad. But the Muslim Brotherhood is a jihadist group and is in an alliance with these groups. It’s ridiculous to make this distinction.

So basically we are going into a series of totally predictable crises in which there is no serious analysis of the problems, much less the solutions, by the U.S. government, media, experts, and the public debate generally.

And even those three crises leave aside other issues. It’s now June but the U.S. government has still not done anything on Syria at all. Sanctions on Iran are leaking, and we know the three main reasons why they are leaking—it’s China, Russia, and Turkey. And the U.S. government is doing nothing about that. In fact, it’s consciously permitting leaks to continue.

So we are facing a serious crisis of what I might call the return to the 1970s with Islamists in place of Arab nationalists. And again all of this is totally predictable.

SM: How should we be approaching these issues?

BR: What is needed is a strategy that recognizes that the principle regional problem is the challenge of revolutionary Islamism, and what is needed is for the United States to take the lead in developing an alignment that brings together the U.S., the Europeans, the relatively moderate Arab regimes, and Israel, a strategy that supports the oppositions in Turkey, Iran and Lebanon, that recognizes the enemies are Iran and Syria and Hamas and Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood and Iraqi insurgents, and then deal with that in the manner that the Soviet Union and its allies were dealt with in the Cold War. It’s very simple, and of course you have to get into the details but they are not going to do it.

SM: How should Israel respond?

BR: There are options in dealing with these threats. Israel can deal with this to a large extent successfully or as successfully as possible. The first thing, which is already happening, is the need to rebuild what in Israel is called the Southern Front, which is the defense along the border with Egypt. And that is going to cost a lot of money and people are going to have to do more reserve days, but it can be done.

Israel is going to have to deal with the flotilla, which arrives in mid-June. And Israel is going to have to deal with any attempts of people to cross its border. And what Israel does or doesn’t offer the PA in negotiation is pretty much one of the least important issues for Israel now. I mean it is not a central issue. It’s not an important issue.

The ideas held by Western governments, experts, and pundits are very much out of date. We’re not talking about what borders Israel has. We’re not talking about the future of Jerusalem. We’re talking about strategic issues. We have to deal with 2011; we’re not in the 1990s or 1980s anymore.

But by returning to the 1970s I mean going back to a time when Arab governments were radical or intimidated by the radicals; when Arab governments seriously contemplated and did go to war with Israel. When Arab governments did not respect the United States as the world’s sole superpower and movements genuinely believed they would lead a revolution throughout the region to transform their societies in a radical and undemocratic manner.

And today, Iran and Turkey have joined in that destabilizing set of beliefs and policies.

SM: Is the administration of Barack Obama putting too much pressure on Israel?

BR: There is no real U.S. pressure on Israel. The Israel-Palestinian issue isn’t the core problem in the region. It’s a sideshow. It’s not important.

At any rate people focused on the wrong sentence in Obama’s speech. They focused on the sentence about the pre-1967 borders. The important sentence was the sequential plan, which was that, Israel turns over the entire West Bank to the Palestinian Authority in exchange for some unspecified security guarantees and you have a de facto Palestinian state.

What’s important is NOT this sentence:

“The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states.”

But these two sentences:

“The full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces should be coordinated with the assumption of Palestinian security responsibility in a sovereign, non-militarized state. The duration of this transition period must be agreed, and the effectiveness of security arrangements must be demonstrated.”

Obama says, again it is important to repeat it: Israel should withdraw to the 1967 border, Palestine should become a non-militarized state. And then the two sides will negotiate about refugees, Jerusalem, and final borders. So Obama was calling for the 1967 borders, with Israel giving up all of its bargaining leverage, and then—in reality we should say maybe—the independent Palestinian state would agree to some border swaps. In effect that means that Israel will return to its 1967 borders without “mutually agreed swaps.”

In effect, what Obama told the PA is: No, don’t go through the UN. We’ll give you what you want in exchange for very small things. Of course, according to Obama’s plan the PA will have to agree to security guarantees and demilitarization, both of which they can disregard as an independent state.

And what’s Israel going to do when it’s back on its 1967 borders and the state of Palestine builds an army and lets cross-border terrorist attacks take place? Launch an invasion of a neighboring country? Oh, the world will love that! Depend on Obama to force the state of Palestine to keep its commitments?

He won’t even force the PA to keep its commitment not to partner with a group that rejects the entire peace process framework (Hamas) or to force Egypt to maintain its commitments under the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, guaranteed by the United States.

Obama has no credibility and no country—not just Israel, but nobody—can rely on him.

At the same time, though, there is no pressure on Israel at all from the U.S. government. Obama is telling the truth when he says that in fact the security relationship is quite good. So his talk about the peace process is just words. But his conduct of U.S. strategy is dangerously real.

SM: What should the administration do with regard to Syria?

BR: The U.S. should call for the downfall of the Syrian and Iranian government. Even a purely verbal policy is superior to what we have now. It would encourage the oppositions in those countries. These people are publicly saying, “Nobody is supporting us. Nobody is helping us.”

And it’s true. The first step is a purely declaratory policy. Whatever possibility there is of an Islamist takeover in Egypt and Libya, there is less such prospect of Syria. For one thing lets remember something here, the Sunni Muslim Arab population of Tunisia is 100 percent. The Sunni Muslim Arab population of Egypt is 90 percent. The Sunni population of Syria is 60 percent. And from all my research I believe there are proportionately more moderate democrats among Sunni Arab Muslims in Syria than in Egypt. Is the Muslim Brotherhood a threat in Syria? Yes, definitely. Is it less of a threat than in virtually every other country except for Lebanon? Also yes.

SM: Does the Syrian opposition have what it takes to overthrow Assad?

BR: Probably not. But maybe. And they should be supported and the people of Iran should be supported (and those in Lebanon and Turkey also should be supported). And at present none of them are being supported by the United States.

Why have a policy of being nice to your enemies and nasty to your friends. But again, when we talk about this, it is not just a matter of Israel. It is a matter of wide variety of political forces.

SM: What is the future of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty?

BR: For Egypt, the end of the peace treaty in practice is a certainty. Here’s the problem: if Egypt no longer adheres to the treaty but do not publicly say that, then it becomes a judgment call for the United States. In other words, the Obama administration will have to decide whether or not it believes that the treaty is being kept.

So we can get a situation where for all practical purposes the treaty has been torn up, and the United States refuses to acknowledge it.

We are facing a situation where on June 6 the PA is going to announce a new cabinet, and they will try to do it in a way that they can say, “Oh, no, Hamas is not part of the government.” The U.S. government then will have to interpret whether or not it deems Hamas to be part of the government. And therefore whether or not that triggers something having to do with U.S. aid to the PA.

The Obama administration can say no, Hamas is not part of the government, we should continue to give aid. Then Congress is going to have to decide whether or not it views the PA to be in violation of the congressional law on aid and relations with the PA. Will there be a massive battle between Congress and the administration? Again, this is something that is terribly predictable, and people are not dealing with it.

The Obama administration can say that, Hamas or no Hamas, supporting the PA is a vital U.S. interest. It can, indeed already is, saying the same thing about Hezbollah’s participation in Lebanon’s government. Soon it will have to decide on the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s government, though Obama has preemptively said that it is OK with him. So the U.S. government will have no problem with the participation in governments of three different groups calling for genocide against the Jews and jihad against America.

What truly amazes me is that all of these things are visible. And yet people in positions of power—political, media, and intellectual—are just pretending it’s not happening.

Source: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/06/08/the-future-of-the-middle-east/

Seth Mandel is a writer specializing in Middle Eastern politics and a Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Horowitz Freedom Center.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Shari'a and Violence in American Mosques


by Mordechai Kedar and David Yerushalmi

How great is the danger of extremist violence in the name of Islam in the United States? Recent congressional hearings into this question by Rep. Peter King (Republican of New York), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, have generated a firestorm of controversy among his colleagues, the press, and the general public. Though similar hearings have taken place at least fourteen times since 2001,[1] King was labeled a latter-day Joe McCarthy and the hearings called an assault on civil liberties and a contemporary witch-hunt. Yet the larger dilemmas outlined by both the congressman and some of his witnesses remain: To what extent are American Muslims, native-born as well as naturalized, being radicalized by Islamists? And what steps can those who are sworn to the protection of American citizenry take that will uncover and disrupt the plots of those willing to take up arms against others for the sake of jihad?

Root Causes and Enabling Mechanisms

A comprehensive study of the relationship between Shari'a adherence and incitement to violence in American mosques found that mosques that segregated men from women during prayer service were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than those where men and women were not segregated.

While scholarly inquiry into the root causes and factors supportive of terrorism has accelerated since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, there are few empirical studies that attempt to measure the relationship between specific variables and support for terrorism. To date, almost all of the professional and academic work in this field has been anecdotal surveys or case studies tracing backward through the personal profiles of terrorists and the socioeconomic and political environments from which they came.[2]

One study by Quintan Wiktorowicz, assistant professor of international studies at Rhodes College and now on the staff of the National Security Council,[3] noted that modern jihadists legitimize their violent activities by relying on the same textual works as their nonviolent Salafist counterparts. However, the approach taken to these texts by the violent jihadist may be distinguished from that of the nonviolent Salafist insofar as the jihadist uses the principles advanced by both classical and modern Islamic scholars and ideologues and adapts them to modern situations in a way that provides a broader sanction for the permissible use of violence.[4]

Further, in 2007, Paul Gill concluded that terrorist organizations seek societal support by creating a "culture of martyrdom" and that one theme common to suicide bombers was the support they received from a community that esteemed the concept of martyrdom. Thus, a complex dynamic is at work between a terrorist organization, society, and individuals with the interplay between these three dimensions enabling radicalization and terrorist attacks.[5]

Another item that may help to understand the growth of modern jihadism appears in Marc Sageman's 2004 study, which found that 97 percent of jihadists studied had become increasingly devoted to forms of Salafist Islam highly adherent to Shari'a (Islamic law) while on their path to radicalization, despite many coming from less rigorous devotional levels during their youths. This increase in devotion to Salafist Islam was measured by outwardly observable behaviors such as wearing traditional Arabic, Pakistani, or Afghan clothing or growing a beard.[6]

When viewed together, a picture emerges that may give researchers, as well as law enforcement officials, a way to monitor or potentially to predict where violent jihad may take root. Potential recruits who are swept up in this movement may find their inspiration and encouragement in a place with ready access to classic and modern literature that is positive toward jihad and violence, where highly Shari'a-adherent behavior is practiced, and where a society exists that in some form promotes a culture of martyrdom or at least engages in activities that are supportive of violent jihad. The mosque can be such a place.

That the mosque is a societal apparatus that might serve as a support mechanism for violent jihad may seem self-evident, but for it to be a useful means for measuring radicalization requires empirical evidence. A 2007 study by the New York city police department noted that, in the context of the mosque, high levels of Shari'a adherence, termed "Salafi ideology" by the authors of the report, may relate to support for violent jihad. Specifically, it found that highly Shari'a-adherent mosques have played a prominent role in radicalization.[7] Another study found a relationship between frequency of mosque attendance and a predilection for supporting suicide attacks but discovered no empirical evidence linking support for suicide bombings to some measure of religious devotion (defined and measured by frequency of prayer).[8]

However, the study suffers from a major methodological flaw, namely, reliance on self- reporting of prayer frequency. Muslims would be under social and psychological pressure to report greater prayer frequency because their status as good or pious believers is linked to whether they fulfill the religious obligation to pray five times a day.[9] This piety is not dependent on regular mosque attendance as Muslims are permitted to pray outside of a mosque environment whenever necessary.[10] Hence, the pressure to over-report exists for self-reporting of prayer frequency but is not present in self-reporting of frequency of mosque attendance, which is a measure of both coalitional or group commitment and religious devotion.

Thus, there is a need for the study and corroboration of a relationship between high levels of Shari'a adherence as a form of religious devotion and coalitional commitment, Islamic literature that shows violence in a positive light, and institutional support for violent jihad. By way of filling this lacuna, the authors of this article undertook a survey specifically designed to determine empirically whether a correlation exists between observable measures of religious devotion linked to Shari'a adherence in American mosques and the presence of violence-positive materials at those mosques. The survey also sought to ascertain whether a correlation exists between the presence of violence-positive materials at a mosque and the promotion of jihadism by the mosque's leadership through recommending the study of these materials or other manifest behaviors.

Identifying Shari'a-Adherent Behaviors

Shari'a is the Islamic system of law based primarily on two sources held by Muslims to be respectively direct revelation from God and divinely inspired: the Qur'an and the Sunna (sayings, actions, and traditions of Muhammad). There are other jurisprudential sources for Shari'a derived from the legal rulings of Islamic scholars. These scholars, in turn, may be adherents of differing schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Notwithstanding those differences, the divergence at the level of actual law is, given the fullness of the corpus juris, confined to relatively few marginal issues. Thus, there is general unity and agreement across the Sunni-Shiite divide and across the various Sunni madh'habs (jurisprudential schools) on core normative behaviors.[11]

Surveyors were asked to observe and record selected behaviors deemed to be Shari'a-adherent. These behaviors were selected precisely because they constitute observable and measurable practices of an orthodox form of Islam as opposed to internalized, non-observable articles of faith. Such visible modes of conduct are considered by traditionalists to have been either exhibited or commanded by Muhammad as recorded in the Sunna and later discussed and preserved in canonical Shari'a literature. The selected behaviors are among the most broadly accepted by legal practitioners of Islam and are not those practiced only by a rigid subgroup within Islam—Salafists, for example.

Among the behaviors observed at the mosques and scored as Shari'a-adherent were: (a) women wearing the hijab (head covering) or niqab (full-length shift covering the entire female form except for the eyes); (b) gender segregation during mosque prayers; and (c) enforcement of straight prayer lines. Behaviors that were not scored as Shari'a-adherent included: (a) women wearing just a modern hijab, a scarf-like covering that does not cover all of the hair, or no covering; (b) men and women praying together in the same room; and (c) no enforcement by the imam, lay leader, or worshipers of straight prayer lines.

The normative importance of a woman's hair covering is evidenced by two central texts, discussed at length below, Reliance of the Traveller and Fiqh as-Sunna (Law of the Sunna), both of which express agreement on the obligation of a woman to wear the hijab:

There is no such dispute over what constitutes a woman's aurah [private parts/nakedness]. It is stated that her entire body is aurah and must be covered, except her hands and face … God does not accept the prayer of an adult woman unless she is wearing a head covering (khimar, hijab).[12]

The nakedness of a woman (even if a young girl) consists of the whole body except the face and hands. The nakedness of a woman is that which invalidates the prayer if exposed. … It is recommended for a woman to wear a covering over her head (khimar), a full length shift, and a heavy slip under it that does not cling to the body.[13]

In a similar fashion, Shari'a requires that the genders be separated during prayers. While both Reliance of the Traveller and Fiqh as-Sunna express a preference that women should pray at home rather than the mosque,[14] they agree that if women do pray in the mosque, they should pray in lines separate from the men.[15] Additionally, authoritative Shari'a literature agrees that the men's prayer lines should be straight, that men should be close together within those lines, and that the imam should enforce prayer line alignment.[16]

Sanctioned Violence

The mosques surveyed contained a variety of texts, ranging from contemporary printed pamphlets and handouts to classic texts of the Islamic canon. From the perspective of promoting violent jihad, the literature types were ranked in the survey from severe to moderate to nonexistent. The texts selected were all written to serve as normative and instructive tracts and are not scriptural. This is important because a believer is free to understand scripture literally, figuratively, or merely poetically when it does not have a normative or legal gloss provided by Islamic jurisprudence.

The moderate-rated literature was authored by respected Shari'a religious and/or legal authorities; while expressing positive attitudes toward violence, it was predominantly concerned with the more mundane aspects of religious worship and ritual. The severe material, by contrast, largely consists of relatively recent texts written by ideologues, rather than Shari'a scholars, such as Abul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. These, as well as materials published and disseminated by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, are primarily, if not exclusively, aimed at using Islam to advance a violent political agenda.

Mawdudi (1903-79), for one, believed that it was legitimate to wage violent jihad against "infidel colonizers" in order to gain independence and spread Islam. His Jihad in Islam, found in many of the mosques surveyed, instructed followers to employ force in pursuit of a Shari'a-based order:

These [Muslim] men who propagate religion are not mere preachers or missionaries, but the functionaries of God [so that they may be witnesses for the people], and it is their duty to wipe out oppression, mischief, strife, immorality, high handedness, and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms.[17]

Similarly, Qutb's Milestones serves as the political and ideological backbone of the current global jihad movement. Qutb, for example, sanctions violence against those who stand in the way of Islam's expansion:

If someone does this [prevents others from accepting Islam], then it is the duty of Islam to fight him until either he is killed or until he declares his submission.[18]

These materials differ from other severe- and moderate-rated materials because they are not Islamic legal texts per se but rather are polemical works seeking to advance a politicized Islam through violence, if necessary. Nor are these authors recognized Shari'a scholars.

The same cannot be said for some classical works that are also supportive of violence in the name of Islam. Works by several respected jurists and scholars from the four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence, dating from the eighth to fourteenth centuries, are all in agreement that violent jihad against non-Muslims is a religious obligation.[19] Such behavior is normative, legally-sanctioned violence not confined to modern writers with a political axe to grind. Nor does its presence in classical Muslim works make it a relic of some medieval past. While Umdat as-Salik (Reliance of the Traveler) may have been compiled in the fourteenth century, al-Azhar University, perhaps the preeminent center of Sunni learning in the world, stated in its 1991 certification of the English translation that the book "conforms to the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni community."[20] While addressing a host of theological matters and detailed instructions as to how Muslims should order their daily routine to demonstrate piety and commitment to Islam, this certified, authoritative text spends eleven pages expounding on the applicability of jihad as violence directed against non-Muslims, stating for example:

The caliph … makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians … provided he has first invited them to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax.[21]

The caliph fights all other peoples until they become Muslim … because they are not a people with a book, nor honored as such, and are not permitted to settle with paying the poll tax.[22]

The Fiqh as-Sunna and Tafsir Ibn Kathir are examples of works that were rated "moderate" for purposes of this survey. The former, which focuses primarily on the internal Muslim community, the family, and the individual believer and not on violent jihad, was especially moderate in its endorsement of violence. Relatively speaking, the Fiqh as-Sunna expresses a more restrained view of violent jihad, in that it does not explicitly call for a holy war against the West even though it understands the Western influence on Islamic governments as a force that is destructive to Islam itself.[23]

Nonetheless, such texts do express positive views toward the use of violence against "the other," as expressed in the following:

Ibn Abbas reported that the Prophet, upon whom be peace, said, "The ties of Islam and the principles of the religion are three, and whoever leaves one of them becomes an unbeliever, and his blood becomes lawful: testifying that there is no god except God, the obligatory prayers, and the fast of Ramadan." … Another narration states, "If anyone leaves one of [the three principles], by God he becomes an unbeliever, and no voluntary deeds or recompense will be accepted from him, and his blood and wealth become lawful." This is a clear indication that such a person is to be killed.[24]

Similarly in Tafsir Ibn Kathir:

Perform jihad against the disbelievers with the sword, and be harsh with the hypocrites with words, and this is the jihad performed against them.[25]

The survey's findings, explored in depth below, were that 51 percent of mosques had texts that either advocated the use of violence in the pursuit of a Shari'a-based political order or advocated violent jihad as a duty that should be of paramount importance to a Muslim; 30 percent had only texts that were moderately supportive of violence like the Tafsir Ibn Kathir and Fiqh as-Sunna; 19 percent had no violent texts at all.

Survey Findings

A representative sample of one hundred mosques throughout the United States was surveyed. Table 1 presents the distribution of mosques by state. One quarter of the mosques had 10 or fewer worshipers; 50 percent had up to 28 worshipers; 75 percent had up to 70; the largest mosque had an estimated 1,700 worshipers.

Table 1: Number of Mosques Surveyed by State


n= Percent
Arizona 2 2
California 26 26
District of Columbia 1 1
Florida 12 12
Georgia 1 1
Michigan 8 8
New Jersey 5 5
New York 3 3
North Carolina 12 12
Pennsylvania 1 1
South Carolina 2 2
Tennessee 2 2
Texas 9 9
Utah 3 3
Virginia 13 13
Total 100 100

The study found a statistically significant association between the severity of violence-positive texts on mosque premises and Shari'a-adherent behaviors. As indicated in Table 2, mosques that segregated men from women during prayer service were more likely to contain violence-positive materials than those mosques where men and women were not segregated. Mosques that did not segregate genders were also less likely to possess violence-positive materials (26 percent) but nonetheless did carry both moderate (27 percent) and severe materials (47 percent).

Table 2: Shari'a-adherent Mosques and Violence-positive Materials


No material (n=19) Moderate [i] (n=30) Severe (n=51) [ii] Total Chi-square
(all df=2)
Prayer service [iii]
Segregation in prayer


6.48, p=.04
No 16 (26%) 17 (27%) 29 (47%) 62
Yes 2 (5%) 13 (35%) 22 (60%) 37
Alignment of prayer lines


16.86, p<.001
No 16 (36%) 10 (22%) 19 (42%) 45
Yes 2 (4%) 20 (37%) 32 (59%) 54
Description of imam or lay leader [iv]
Imam or lay leader has Sunna beard



No [v] 13 (26%) 14 (28%) 23 (46%) 50 6.62, p=.04
Yes [vi] 3 (7%) 15 (33%) 28 (61%) 46
Imam wore head covering



No 9 (20%) 16 (35%) 21 (46%) 46 1.98, p=.37
Yes 7 (14%) 13 (26%) 30 (60%) 50
Imam wore traditional (non-Western garb)


4.97, p=.08
No 11 (25%) 14 (32%) 19 (43%) 44
Yes 5 (10%) 15 (29%) 32 (62%) 52
Imam wore watch on right wrist [vii]


2.61, p=.27
No 15 (18%) 23 (28%) 45 (54%) 83
Yes 1 (8%) 6 (50%) 5 (42%) 12
[i] Has only Tafsir Ibn Kathir commentary on the Qur'an and/or Fiqh as-Sunna (n=20).
[ii] Has Riyadh as-Salaheen (n=7) or more extreme fiqh material.
[iii] In 1 mosque there was no prayer and surveyor could not determine the usual practice.
[iv] 4 mosques did not have a leader.
[v] 3 with no beard included in this category.
[vi] 3 had traditional beards with henna; and all were in the severe group. They were combined with this group for ease of reporting.
[vii] In 1 case it was not determined.

As was the case with gender segregation, those mosques that displayed strict alignment of men's prayer lines were more likely than their less observant counterparts to contain materials from both the moderate and severe categories. Thus, 59 percent of such mosques contained severe texts as opposed to 42 percent of mosques that did not enforce strict prayer line alignment. Conversely, only 4 percent of mosques with strict prayer line alignment possessed no violence-positive texts while 36 percent of their less observant counterparts exhibited no such literature.

Whether the mosque's imam or lay leader wore a traditional beard was also predictive of whether the mosque would contain violence-positive materials on premises. Of the mosques led by traditionally bearded imams, 61 percent contained literature in the severe category, 33 percent contained only moderate-rated materials, and 7 percent did not contain any. Forty-six percent of the mosques in which the imam did not wear a traditional beard contained severe materials, 28 percent had moderate-rated texts, and 26 percent contained none on site. Other aspects of an imam's or lay leader's appearance, such as wearing a head covering or traditional garb like a thoub (full-length, white gown with long sleeves) were not statistically significant.

Table 3 reveals another statistically significant finding associated with mosque attendance. Mosques that contained written materials in the severe category were the best attended, followed by those with only moderate-rated materials, trailed in turn by those lacking such texts. Mosques with severe materials had a mean attendance of 118 worshipers while mosques containing only moderate materials had a mean attendance of 60 worshipers; mosques that contained no violence-positive literature had a mean attendance of 15 worshipers.

Table 3: Violence-positive Materials, Mosque Attendance, and Shari'a-based Worshiper Characteristics


No material
(n=19)
Moderate [i]
(n=30)
Severe [ii]
(n=51)
Total F test (unless otherwise noted)
Number of worshipers [iii] Median 4
Mean 15
Median 25
Mean 60
Median 45
Mean 118
Median 28
Mean 81
Kruskal-Wallis, p<.002
Percentage of men with beards (SD) [iv] 14% (26.3) (n=17) 36% (25.4) (n=30) 48% (32.4) (n=51) 39% (31.7) (n=98) F=8.61, df=2, 95P<.001
Percentage of men with hats 16% (25.8) (n=17) 34% (26.2) (n=29) 47% (32.6) (n=51) 38% (31.3) (n=97) F=6.54, df=2, 94 p=.002
Percentage of men with Western garb 73% (39.9) (n=16) 35% (30.7) (n=30) 34% (33.1) (n=51) 41% (36.2) (n=97) F=8.79, df=2, 94 p<..001
Percentage of women with modern hijab (vs. traditional hijab/niqab) [v] 57% (45.0) (n=7) 38% (37.5) (n=21) 42% (27.3) (n=37) 33% (32.9) (n=65) F=0.92, df=2, 62, p=.40
Percentage of girls with hijab 29% (48.8) (n=7) 14% (32.2) (n=21) 36% (40.4) (n=37) 28% (43.8) (n=65) F=1.87, df=2,62 p=.16
Percentage of boys with head covering [vi] 14% (37.8) (n=7) 24% (37.6) (n=20) 32% (40) (n=36) 27% (38.8) (n=63) F=0.72, df=2, 60, p=.49
[i] Has only Tafsir Ibn Kathir commentary on the Qur'an and/or Fiqh as-Sunna (n=20).
[ii] Has Riyadh as-Salaheen (n=7) or more extreme fiqh material.
[iii] In 2 mosques only the imam was present.
[iv] Data in parentheses that follow percentage figures denote the standard deviation.
[v] Women were present in 65 mosques.
[vi] Boys were present in 63 mosques.

The adoption or rejection of Western dress by male worshipers was yet another telling indicator of the presence of violence-positive materials. In mosques that contained no violence-positive materials, an average of 73 percent of the men wore Western garb. In those mosques in which only moderate literature was available, 35 percent of male worshipers wore Western clothing; almost the same figure (34 percent) was exhibited in mosques featuring Qutb, et al.

The survey was unable to find a statistically significant indicator when it came to women wearing a modern hijab as opposed to the more conservative traditional hijab, which covers all of the hair, or the niqab, which covers the whole body other than the eyes. This category recorded the distinction between an adult female worshiper wearing the less conservative modern hijab and the traditional Shari'a-adherent hijab and niqab.

Perhaps more troubling than the correlation between jihadist literature and Shari'a-adherent behaviors within a mosque was the role played by imams in recommending that worshipers study material that promote violence. The more manifestly Shari'a-adherent a mosque, the more likely its imam was to recommend the study of violence-positive texts. Thus, as seen in Table 4, 96 percent of the imams in mosques that observed strict prayer line alignment recommended such reading material. Similarly, 93 percent of the imams who sported a traditional, full beard endorsed the study of such writings.

But while the presence of certain Shari'a-adherent behaviors correlated almost one-to-one with the promotion of the violence-positive texts, the absence of these attributes should not be construed as a sign of true moderation. In mosques that did not practice strict prayer line alignment, a striking 72 percent of imams nonetheless recommended violence-positive materials. Similarly, 78 percent of imams who did not wear a traditional beard were proponents of these texts.

Table 4: Shari'a-based Mosque Prayer, Shari'a-based Imam Characteristics, and Imam Recommended Violence-positive Material


Did not recommend [i]
(n=15, 15%)
Recommended
(n=82, 85%)
Total
(n=97) [ii]
Chi-square (all df=1) p=
Prayer service
Segregation in prayer


No 12 (20%) 48 (80%) 60 3.77, p=.05
Yes 2 (6%) 34 (94%) 36
Alignment of prayer lines


No 12 (28%) 31 (72%) 43 11.10, p=.001
Yes 2 (4%) 51 (96%) 53
Description of imam or lay leader
Beard of imam or lay leader



No 11 (22%) 39 (78%) 50 4.61, p=.03
Yes 3 (7%) 43 (93%) 46
Imam wore head covering


No 9 (20%) 37 (80%) 46 1.76, p=.18
Yes 5 (10%) 45 (90%) 50
Imam wore traditional garb


No 10 (23%) 34 (77%) 44 4.32, p=.04
Yes 4 (8%) 48 (92%) 52
Imam wore watch on right wrist [iii]


No 14 (17%) 69 (83%) 83 2.37, p=.12
Yes 0 (0%) 12 (100%) 12
[i] Ten imams did not recommend that a worshiper study any violence-positive materials and 4 imams instructed against the study of violence-positive materials. All 14 observations were included in the "do not recommend" category.
[ii] In 4 mosques, neither an imam nor a lay leader was present. However, in 1 of these 4 cases the imam had made clear recommendations on the mosque's webpage.
[iii] In 1 case it was not determined.

Moreover, mosques where the imam recommended violence-positive materials for study were marked by a higher presence of worshipers—both men and women—who took on a Shari'a-adherent appearance and a lower percentage of worshipers of a more assimilative or Western appearance (see Table 5). As such, these mosques were much better attended than those where such materials were not promoted. Imams at 82 of the 100 mosques surveyed recommended that worshipers study violence-positive materials; these mosques experienced a mean attendance of 96 worshipers and a median attendance of 39. At the same time, at the 15 mosques surveyed where the imam did not recommend the study of such texts, the mean attendance was approximately 17 worshipers with a median attendance figure of 4.

Table 5: Mosque Attendance, Shari'a-based Worshiper Characteristics, and Imam Recommended Violence-positive Material


Did not recommend [i]
(n=15, 15%)
Recommended
(n=82, 85%)
F test for significance
Number of worshipers Median=4
Total=250
Median=39
Total=7864
Mann-Whitney U p<.001
Percentage of men with beards (SD) [ii] 13% (27.6) (n=13) 44% (30.3) (n=82) F=11.99, df=1, 93, p=.001
Percentage of men with hats 15% (27.2) (n=13) 42% (30.4) (n=81) F=9.07, df=1, 92, p=.003
Percentage of men with Western garb 87% (19.1) (n=12) 34% (32.6) (n=82) F=30.17, df=1, 91, p<.0001
Percentage of women with modern hijab (vs.traditional hijab/niqab) [iii] 70% (44.7) (n=5) 41% (30.9) (n=59) F=3.85, df=1, 62, p<.054
Percentage of girls with hijab 20% (44.7%) (n=5) 29% (41.6) (n=60) F=.21, df=1, 63, p=.65
Percentage of boys with head coverings 0% (n=5) 30% (39.6) (n=58) F=2.77, df=1, 91, p<.10
[i] Ten imams did not recommend the study of any materials and 4 imams instructed against the study of violence-positive materials. All 14 observations were included in the "do not recommend" category.
[ii] Data in parentheses that follow percentage figures denote the standard deviation.
[iii] Women were present in 65 mosques. Data collected on percent women with niqab (rare), hijab, and modern hijab.

The survey found a strong correlation between the presence of severe violence-promoting literature and mosques featuring written, audio, and video materials that actually promoted such acts. By promotion of jihad, the study included literature encouraging worshipers to engage in terrorist activity, to provide financial support to jihadists, and to promote the establishment of a caliphate in the United States. These materials also explicitly praised acts of terror against the West; praised symbols or role models of violent jihad; promoted the use of force, terror, war, and violence to implement the Shari'a; emphasized the inferiority of non-Muslim life; promoted hatred and intolerance toward non-Muslims or notional Muslims; and endorsed inflammatory materials with anti-U.S. views. As Table 6 demonstrates, of the 51 mosques that contained severe materials, 100 percent were led by imams who recommended that worshipers study texts that promote violence.

Table 6: Violence-positive Materials and Promotion of Violent Jihad


No material
(n=19)
Moderate [i]
(n=30)
Severe [ii]
(n=51)
Total
(n=100)
Chi-square
(all df=2)
Imam recommended studying texts promoting violence



70.7, p<..001
No 14 (82%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 15
Yes 3 (18%) [iii] 28 (97%) 51 (100%) 82
Promoted violent jihad



87.6, p<.001
No 18 (95%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 19
Yes 1 (5%) 29 (97%) 51 (100%) 81
Promoted joining terrorist organization



.49, p=.78
No 18 (95%) 28 (93%) 46 (90%) 92
Yes 1 (5%) 2 (7%) 5 (10%) 8
Promoted financial support of terror



81.9, p<.001
No 18 (95%) 1 (3%) 1 (2%) 20
Yes 1 (5%) 29 (97%) 50 (98%) 80
Collected money openly at mosque for known terrorist organization



.70, p=.70
No 18 (95%) 29 (97%) 47 (92%) 94
Yes 1 (5%) 1 (3%) 4 (8%) 6
Promotes caliphate in U.S.



81.9, p<.001
No 18 (95%) 1 (3%) 1 (2%) 20
Yes 1 (5%) 29 (97%) 50 (98%) 80
Praising terror against West



87.6, p<.001
No 18 (95%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 19
Yes 1 (5%) 29 (97%) 51 (100%) 81
Distributed memorabilia featuring jihadists or terrorist organizations



0.99, p=.61
No 18 (95%) 28 (93%) 45 (88%) 91
Yes 1 (5%) 2 (7%) 6 (12%) 9
Mosque invited imams or preachers who are known to have promoted violent jihad



28.9, p<.001
No 18 (95%) 12 (40%) 12 (24%) 42
Yes 1 (5%) 18 (60%) 39 (76%) 58
[i] Has only Tafsir Ibn Kathir commentary on the Qur'an and/or Fiqh as-Sunna (n=20).
[ii] Has Riyadh as-Salaheen (n=7) or more extreme fiqh material.
[iii] Denominator is 17, 2 in this column had no imam or leader.

For example, mosques containing violence-positive materials were substantially more likely to include materials promoting financial support of terror than mosques that did not contain such texts. A disturbing 98 percent of mosques with severe texts included materials promoting financial support of terror. Those with only moderate-rated materials on site were not markedly different, with 97 percent providing such materials. These results stand in stark contrast to the mosques with no violence-positive materials on their premises where only 5 percent provided materials urging financial support of terror.

These results were comparable when using other indicators of jihad promotion. Thus, 98 percent of mosques that contained severe-rated literature included materials promoting establishing an Islamic caliphate in the United States as did 97 percent of mosques containing only moderate-rated materials. By contrast, only one out of the 19 mosques (5 percent) that had no violence-positive literature advocated this. Similarly, mosques with severe or moderate materials invited speakers known to have promoted violent jihad (76 percent and 60 percent respectively) versus one mosque out of 19 (5 percent) which did not contain violence-positive texts.

Finally, three patterns of behavior indicating promotion of violent jihad did not strongly correlate to the presence of violence-positive literature. Despite the presence of severe texts in such mosques, only a small number actually encouraged joining a terrorist organization, openly collected monies for such organizations, or distributed memorabilia featuring jihadists or terrorist organizations. Although very few mosques engaged openly in these activities, a correlation between these activities and the presence and severity of violence-positive literature was shown to exist.

Broader Policy Implications

The conclusions to be drawn from this survey are dismal at best, offering empirical support for previous anecdotal studies on the connection between highly Shari'a-adherent mosques and political violence in the name of Islam. The mosques where there were greater indicators of Shari'a adherence were more likely to contain materials that conveyed a positive attitude toward employing violent jihad against the West and non-Muslims. The fact that spiritual sanctioners who help individuals become progressively more radicalized are connected to highly Shari'a-adherent mosques is another cause for deep concern.[26] In almost every instance, the imams at the mosques where violence-positive materials were available recommended that worshipers study texts that promoted violence.

The survey also demonstrates that there are mosques and mosque-going Muslims who are interested in a non-Shari'a-centric Islam where tolerance of the other, at least as evidenced by the absence of jihad-promoting literature, is the norm. Mosques where violence-positive literature was not present exhibited significantly fewer indicators of orthodox, Shari'a-adherent behaviors and were also significantly less likely to promote violent jihad or invite speakers supportive of violent jihad. These non-Shari'a-centric mosques may provide a foundation from which a reformed Islam and its followers can more completely integrate into liberal, Western citizenship.

The results of this survey do not indicate the percentage of American Muslims that actually attend mosques with any regularity, nor does it reveal what relative percentage of American Muslims demonstrate Shari'a-adherent or non-adherent behaviors. Moreover, although this study shows that imams at Shari'a-adherent mosques recommend studying violence-positive materials and utilize their mosques for support of violent jihad, it does not capture the individual attendees' attitudes toward religiously sanctioned violence. However, it is at least reasonable to conclude that worshipers at such mosques are more sympathetic to the message of the literature present at those mosques and to what is being preached there. A follow-up survey of individual mosque attendees would provide insight regarding the relationship, if any, between Shari'a-adherence on the individual level and the individual's attitude toward violent jihad.

A recent study by Andrew F. March examined whether Islamic doctrine would allow Muslims to cooperate socially with non-Muslims and sincerely affirm liberal citizenship as that term is understood in its Western, democratic sense. He argued that there were grounds for an overlapping consensus but also noted that present-day Salafists cite texts holding that Muslims are either at war with non-Muslims or, at best, are in a state devoid of any obligation to cooperate socially with them.[27] Additionally, March noted that the underpinnings of his theoretical consensus might be negated by empirical evidence showing that a large percentage of Muslims are unaware of [or reject] arguments that advocate for Western notions of liberal citizenship.[28]

Although released before March's study, an April 2007 survey conducted by WorldPublicOpinion.org presented such empirical evidence. The survey found that majorities in Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia—ostensibly moderate Muslim countries—favored a strict application of Shari'a law in every Islamic country and keeping Western values out of Islamic counties.[29] However, that survey reports the attitudes of residents in non-Western countries that enforce Shari'a to varying degrees. It might be expected that Muslims in the West—who are immersed in Western culture, values, and democracy—would express different attitudes than their counterparts in the Middle East, Far East, and North Africa.

Unfortunately, the results of the current survey strongly suggest that Islam—as it is generally practiced in mosques across the United States—continues to manifest a resistance to the kind of tolerant religious and legal framework that would allow its followers to make a sincere affirmation of liberal citizenship. This survey provides empirical support for the view that mosques across America, as institutional and social settings for mosque-going Muslims, are at least resistant to social cooperation with non-Muslims. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of mosques surveyed promoted literature supportive of violent jihad and a significant number invited speakers known to have promoted violent jihad and other behaviors that are inconsistent with a reasonable construct of liberal citizenship.

This survey suggests that, first and foremost, Muslim community leaders must take a more active role in educating their own faith community about the dangers associated with providing a safe haven for violent literature and its promotion—whether that safe haven is the mosque or the social club. These results also suggest that researchers and counterterrorist specialists should pay closer attention to the use and exploitation of classic Islamic legal doctrine and jurisprudence for recruiting and generating a commitment to violence against the perceived enemies of Islam. Finally, these findings should engender at least an interest among researchers to begin to study carefully Muslim attitudes toward citizenship and violence but one that differentiates between those who are Shari'a-adherent and those who are not. And, among Shari'a adherents, this future survey data must be sensitive to the distinction between traditionalism, orthodoxy, and Salafism, along with the more obvious sect distinctions, such as between Sunnis and Shiites.

Shari'a-Adherent Behaviors:[1]

List Description Observation:Yes/No;
or Count
Subject to Secondary Review[2]
Gender segregation during prayer service Shari'a-adherent communal prayer occurs when men and women are segregated during prayer service. The segregation could occur by virtue of men and women praying in different buildings or different rooms. The segregation could also occur when men and women were in the same room, but were separated either with or without the use of a physical divider.
Non-Shari'a-adherent communal prayer occurs when men and women are not segregated during the prayer service and the genders mix.
Yes/No No
Alignment of men's prayer lines Shari'a-adherent alignment of men's prayer lines occurs when either the imam, lay leader, or the worshipers inspect and enforce the straightness of the men's prayer lines.
Non-Shari'a-adherent alignment of men's prayer lines occurs when there is no observable attention paid to strict alignment of the men's prayer lines.
Yes/No No
Imam's or lay leader's beard [3] An imam's or lay leader's beard is a Sunna-style (i.e., full) beard, whether trimmed or not and either with or without henna dye coloring the beard.
A non-Sunna style beard is either limited to a chin-beard or if the imam or lay leader wears no beard at all.
Yes/No No
Imam or lay leader wore head covering Shari'a-adherent behavior is that the imam or lay leader wore a religious head covering.
Non-Shari'a adherent behavior is that the imam or lay leader did not wear a religious head covering
Yes/No No
Imam's or lay leader's clothing Shari'a-adherent garb is any of the following: (a) short thoub; (b) pants rolled up above the ankles; or (c) ankle-length thoub.
Non-Shari'a-adherent garb is Western-style clothing such as modern-style dress or casual pants and shirt.
Yes/No No
Imam or lay leader wore watch on his right wrist[4] Certain Salafists wear the watch on the right wrist.
Wearing the watch on the left wrist or not wearing a watch at all.
Yes/No No
Percentage of men with beards Shari'a-adherent behavior is for an adult male worshiper to have a beard (full or not).
Non-Shari'a-adherent behavior is for an adult male worshiper to have no beard.
Count No
Percentage of men with hats Shari'a-adherent behavior is for an adult male to wear a religious hat.
Non-Shari'a-adherent behavior is for an adult male to not wear a religious hat.
Count No
Adult male worshipers' clothing Shari'a-adherent behavior is to wear either: (a) short thoub; (b) pants rolled up above the ankles; or (c) ankle-length thoub or similar Muslim attire.
Non-Shari'a-adherent behavior is to wear Western-style clothing such as pants not rolled up above the ankles.
Count No
Adult female worshipers' clothing Shari'a-adherent behavior is to wear either the traditional hijab (covering the hair) or the niqab (covering the entire female body except the eyes).
Non-Shari'a-adherent behavior is to wear the modern hijab (a scarf that does not completely cover the hair) or to not wear any hair covering.
Count No
Girls (age 5-12) wear hijab Shari'a-adherent behavior is to wear the traditional hijab.
Non-Shari'a-adherent behavior is to not wear the hijab.
Count No
Boys (age 5-12) wear head covering Shari'a-adherent behavior is to wear a religious head covering.
Non-Shari'a-adherent behavior is to not wear a religious head covering.
Count No
Presence of violence-positive Shari'a legal and religious texts or presence of violence-positive Islamic political literature If the surveyor found the Fiqh as-Sunna or Tafsir Ibn Kathir, but not more extreme materials, then the mosque was categorized as containing moderate-rated material.
If the surveyor found the Riyadh as-Salaheen, works by Qutb or Mawdudi, or similar materials, then the mosque was categorized as containing severe-rated materials.
If the surveyor found no violence-positive materials or if the violence-positive materials constituted less than 10% of all available materials, then the mosque was categorized as containing no materials.
Yes/No No, unless the surveyor found materials promoting Fiqh as-Sunna, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Riyadh as-Salaheen, or works by Qutb or Mawdudi. Other materials were subject to a secondary review.
Imam recommended studying texts promoting violence Following the prayer service, the surveyor asked the following question: "Do you recommend the study of: (a) only the Qur'an and/or Sunna; (b) Tafsir Ibn Kathir; (c) Fiqh as-Sunna; (e) Reliance of the Traveller; or (f) the works of Qutb, such as Milestones, and Maududi, such as The Meaning of the Qur'an?"
If the imam or lay leader recommended studying any of the materials mentioned above except the Qur'an and/or Sunna, then the imam or lay leader was recorded as having recommended the study of texts promoting the rated material.
Yes/No No.
Promoted joining terrorist organization[5] If materials available on mosque premises promoted joining a known terrorist organization, such as "mujahideen" engaged in jihad abroad, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted joining a terrorist organization. Yes/No Yes
Promoted financial support of terror If materials available on mosque premises promoted the financial support of terrorism, jihadists, or terrorist organizations, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted the financial support of terror. Examples include materials that made explicit calls to support mujahideen abroad or families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Yes/No Yes
Openly collected money at the mosque for a known terrorist organization If materials available on mosque premises indicated that speakers came to the mosque to raise money for specific terrorist organizations, then the mosque was recorded as having openly collected money at the mosque for a known terrorist organization. Yes/No Yes
Promoted establishment of the Islamic caliphate in the U.S. If materials available on mosque premises promoted establishing the Islamic Caliphate in the United States, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in the U.S. Yes/No Yes
Praised terror against the West If materials available on mosque premises praised engaging in acts of violence against the West or praised acts of terrorism previously committed against the West, then the mosque was recorded as having praised terror against the West. Yes/No Yes
Mosque invited guest imams or preachers known to have promoted violent jihad If materials available at the mosque indicated that the mosque had invited a guest imam or other guest speaker who is known to have promoted violent jihad, then the mosque was recorded as having invited guest imams or preachers known to have promoted violent jihad. Yes/No Yes
Promoted violent jihad If any of the materials featured on mosque property promoted engaging in terrorist activity; promoted the financial support of terrorism or jihadists; promoted the use of force, terror, war, and violence to implement Shari'a; promoted the idea that oppression and subversion of Islam should be changed by deed first, then by speech, then by faith; praised acts of terrorism against the West; or praised suicide bombers against Israelis, then the mosque was recorded as having promoted violent jihad. Yes/No Yes

[1] According to Islamic jurisprudence, Shari'a adherence can be measured across several normative axes, such as obligatory-prohibited, recommended-discouraged, and simply permissible. In theory, every act of a Shari'a-adherent Muslim falls within one of the normative categories—that is, there is no behavior outside of Shari'a. For purposes of this survey, the authors have chosen, except where indicated by notation, the obligatory-prohibited and the recommended-discouraged or recommended-permissible axes, which we have demarcated Shari'a-adherent/non- Shari'a-adherent, respectively.

[2] If a mosque, on the basis of materials observed by the surveyor, was recorded as having: (a) promoted violent jihad; (b) promoted joining a terrorist organization; (c) promoted financial support of terror; (d) collected money openly at the mosque for a known terrorist organization; (e) promoted establishing the Caliphate in the U.S.; (f) praised terror against the West; (g) distributed memorabilia featuring jihadists or terrorist organizations; or (h) invited imams or preachers who are known to have promoted violent jihad, then the materials that the surveyor relied on to record the presence of this material were subject to a secondary review by a committee of three subject-matter experts. This secondary review was collected and reviewed by the experts evaluating the materials independently of one another. A consensus view of two of the three experts was required to confirm the surveyor's observation. In 63 percent of the cases, the materials were so explicit in their promotion, praise, or support for the above behaviors that the committee's decision was unanimous. In no instance was there not a consensus and agreement with the surveyor's observation.

[3] The different legal schools vary on whether a beard is obligatory or preferable; they also differ on whether the beard for purposes of fiqh is only the chin hairs or also the lateral hairs of the sideburns and cheeks; and they differ on the minimum required length before trimming is permitted. The majority view, taking into account all schools and the Salafist opinions, is that a full beard is Sunna (following the behavior of Muhammad) and if not obligatory, preferable. For purposes of this survey, the full beard, trimmed or not, was considered Shari'a-adherent and a chin beard or no beard, was considered as non-Sunna, and in the survey's lexicon, non-adherent.

[4] While wearing a watch on the right hand is not strictly speaking a Shari'a requirement, during the preparation of the methodology of this survey, the authors identified literature at several mosques attended by Salafists advocating the wearing of a watch on the right hand for two reasons: not to wear jewelry on the left hand to follow the mode of dress of Muhammad, who, based upon certain Sunna, did not wear jewelry on his left hand; and to avoid dressing in the way of non-Muslims. The authors decided to add this observation to determine whether this behavior translated into observance by the more fundamentalist Salafists. They also observed that the 12 imams who wore the watch on the right hand were right handed.

[5] All of the materials characterized from this point to the end of the survey were dated or produced prior to September 11, 2001 but were still available or sold by the mosque in prominent fashion.


Methodology

Sampling: The survey analyzed data collected from a random sample of 100 mosques. This sample size provided sufficient statistical power to find a statistically significant association between most of the selected Shari'a-adherent behaviors and violence-positive variables. Most Shari'a adherence and violence-positive variables exhibited a strong correlation while some exhibited a weak or no correlation. A sample size of 100 mosques also allowed the survey to extrapolate to all mosques in the United States at a 95 percent confidence interval with a margin of error of +/-9.6 percent.

The survey was developed by using state-by-state estimates of the Muslim population extracted from the only extant such survey.[30] This was then used to create a listing of all states whose Muslim population represented at least 1 percent of the estimated total United States Muslim population. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia ("15 randomly selected states") were randomly selected from the final listing to accommodate limits on physical logistics and personnel resources for the actual survey.

For each of the fourteen states and D.C., cities with the highest estimated concentrations of Muslims were identified, and mosques within those areas were eventually selected. The survey combined the data on 1,209 mosques listed in "The Mosque in America: A National Portrait"[31] with the data on the 1,659 mosques obtained online from Harvard's Pluralism Project,[32] with duplicates eliminated. Mosques were excluded from the list if there were indications that they were no longer operating, with a final site list yielding a total of 1,401 potential mosques for the survey.

The dates and prayer times for visiting mosques were also randomly selected. If a mosque was found to be closed, abandoned, or not at the address listed, then the next mosque that appeared on the randomized list for that city was visited. When the dominant language of the subject mosque was determined to be other than English, such as Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi, the surveyor who visited the mosque was fluent in that language. Each mosque was visited twice, once between May 18, 2007, and December 4, 2008 ("Survey Period"), and then again between May 10, 2009, and May 30, 2010 ("Audit Period"). The results of the Audit Period confirmed the findings in the Survey Period in all but nine mosques.

Data Collection: A surveyor visited a subject mosque in order: (a) to observe and record 12 Shari'a-adherent behaviors of the worshipers and the imam (or lay leader); (b) to observe whether the mosque contained the selected materials rated as moderate and severe; (c) to observe whether the mosque contained materials promoting, praising, or supporting violence or violent jihad; and (d) to observe whether the mosque contained materials indicating the mosque had invited guest speakers known to have promoted violent jihad. (See Appendix A for a more detailed presentation of the survey variables and methodology.)

Thus, the survey only examined the presence of Shari'a-adherent behaviors, the presence of violence-positive materials in mosques, whether an imam would promote the study of violence-positive materials, and whether a mosque was used as a forum to promote violent jihad. Since there is no central body to which all mosques belong, it was difficult to ascertain that the sampling universe list was complete. This may have introduced bias into the sampling although the authors find no evidence of any systemic distortions.

Mordechai Kedar is an assistant professor in the departments of Arabic and Middle East studies and a research associate with the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, both at Bar Ilan University, Israel. David Yerushalmi is general counsel for The Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., and director of policy studies at the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Potomac, Md.

[1] "Timeline of the Committee's Work on Violent Islamist Radicalization," Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C., accessed Mar. 24, 2011.
[2] James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages," Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 2006, pp. 159-77.
[3] Morning Edition, National Public Radio, Jan. 24, 2011.
[4] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28 (2005), pp. 75-97.
[5] See Paul Gill, "A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing," International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2 (2007), pp. 142-59.
[6] Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 93.
[7] Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: New York City Police Department, 2007), pp. 2-90.
[8] Jeremy Ginges, Ian Hansen, and Ara Norenzayan, "Religion and Support for Suicide Attacks," Psychology Science, 2 (2009), pp. 224-30.
[9] Saba Mahmood, "Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines of Salat," American Ethnologist, Nov. 2004, pp. 827-53.
[10] Daniel Winchester, "Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of Muslim Moral Habitus," Social Forces, June 2008, pp. 1753-80; Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh as-Sunna (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1991), vol. 2, pp. 67-74.
[11] Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller and Tools for the Worshipper, trans. Sheikh Nuh Ha Mim Keller, p. vii, accessed Nov. 21, 2010; Wael B. Hallaq, Shari'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 72-8, 113-24.
[12] Sabiq, Fiqh as-Sunna, vol. 1, p. 113.
[13] Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, F5.3, F5.6.
[14] Ibid., F12.4; Sabiq, Fiqh as-Sunna, vol. 2, pp. 50, 56.
[15] Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, F12.32; Sabiq, Fiqh as-Sunna, vol. 2, p. 64a.
[16] Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, F8.2; Sabiq, Fiqh as-Sunna, vol. 2, pp. 50, 56.
[17] Abul Ala Mawdudi, Jihad in Islam, Mar. 27, 2006.
[18] Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, in Studies in Islam and the Middle East, 2005, p. 34.
[19] Hallaq, Shari'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations, pp. 324-34; Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 42-137; Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publications, 2005), pp. 1-57; David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 13-92; Majid Khadduri, trans., The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 1-22; Mary Haybeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 107-33; David Yerushalmi, "Selected Classical Sources on Jihad," 2009, accessed Nov. 6, 2010.
[20] Al-Azhar certification of Reliance of the Traveller, Islamic Research Academy, al-Azhar University, Cairo, Feb. 11, 1991.
[21] Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, O9.8.
[22] Ibid., O9.9.
[23] Sabiq, Fiqh as-Sunna, vol. 3, p. 76.
[24] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 77b.
[25] Hafiz Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Houston: Darussalam Publishers, 2000), vol. 4, p. 475.
[26] See, for example, The New York Daily News, Nov. 11, 2009.
[27] Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 266.
[28] Ibid., p. 274.
[29] "Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and Al Qaeda," The Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, WorldPublicOpinion.org, Apr. 24, 2007.
[30] Barry A. Kosmin and Seymour P. Lachman, One Nation under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society (New York: Harmony Books, 1993), pp. 96-7.
[31] Ihsan Bagby, Paul M. Perl, and Bryan T. Froehle, "The Mosque in America: A National Portrait," Council on American Islamic Relations, Washington, D.C., Apr. 26, 2001.
[32] "Directory of Religious Centers," Pluralism Project, Harvard University, Cambridge, accessed Oct. 30, 2010.

Source: http://www.meforum.org/2931/american-mosques

Mordechai Kedar and David Yerushalmi

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.